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citation codes
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Advocates
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Acts
  • Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, Special Marriage Act, 1954,
  • provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution,
  • Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short the Act)
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, Special Marriage Act, 1954,
  • provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution,
  • Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short the Act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Writ Petition was filed in public interest seeking a declaration that Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which prescribes a period of two years’ separation before filing a petition for divorce by mutual consent, is discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Alternatively, the petitioner requested that the two-year period be read down to one year. The petition involved consideration of prior judicial pronouncements, including a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court and a judgment of the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 10-A(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, prescribing a two-year separation period before filing for divorce by mutual consent, is discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the expression “two years” in Section 10-A(1) can be constitutionally read down to “one year.”

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • Section 10-A(1) of the Indian Divorce Act is discriminatory as it mandates a two-year separation period, unlike other personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, and Special Marriage Act, which prescribe only one year.
  • The two-year requirement causes hardship and adverse consequences for those governed by the Indian Divorce Act.
  • Relied on the Kerala High Court Division Bench decision in Saumya Ann Thomas v. Union of India, which read down the two-year period to one year as violative of Articles 14 and 21.
  • Asserted that the Kerala High Court judgment has binding effect nationwide, supported by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India.
  • Noted that the Union of India has not filed any appeal against the Kerala High Court’s order.

Respondent No. 3’s Arguments

  • Acknowledged that divorce is alien to the Christian community but supported the two-year separation period to allow for locus poenitentiae (opportunity for repentance) rather than reducing it to one year.

Respondent No. 4’s Position

  • Represented by amicus curiae, stated that the Protestant Church follows the codified law regarding divorce.

Respondent No. 5’s Position

  • A non-governmental organization working for women’s welfare supported the petitioner’s stance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saumya Ann Thomas v. Union of India (Kerala High Court Division Bench) Reading down the two-year separation period in Section 10-A(1) of the Indian Divorce Act to one year as the two-year period was unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 21. The court accepted this judgment as authoritative and applicable throughout India on the constitutionality of Section 10-A(1).
Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 A Supreme Court ruling clarifying that orders passed on writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of Parliamentary Acts under Article 226(2) have nationwide effect. The court relied on this precedent to hold that the Kerala High Court’s decision applies throughout India, including Karnataka.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the petitioner’s challenge to Section 10-A(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, focusing on the constitutionality of the two-year separation period before filing for divorce by mutual consent. It noted the Kerala High Court’s Division Bench decision which had held the two-year period violative of Articles 14 and 21 and read it down to one year. The court further referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd., which clarified that such constitutional rulings on central legislation have nationwide applicability. Considering these authorities and the absence of any appeal against the Kerala High Court’s decision by the Union of India, the court recognized that the legal position regarding Section 10-A(1) is settled, particularly for the State of Karnataka. Consequently, the court did not find it necessary to issue any specific order on the constitutionality of the provision itself.

Holding and Implications

The Writ Petition is disposed of.

The court accepted the binding effect of the Kerala High Court’s reading down of the two-year separation period to one year under Section 10-A(1) of the Indian Divorce Act as consistent with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This decision clarifies the law applicable in Karnataka and affirms the nationwide applicability of such constitutional rulings on central statutes. No new precedent was established by this court; rather, it confirmed and applied existing authoritative decisions. The direct effect is that the two-year separation period is effectively read down to one year for the purposes of filing a mutual consent divorce petition under the Indian Divorce Act in Karnataka.

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    Mr. Shiv Kumar v. Union Of India, Rep., By Secretary, Ministry Of Law And Justice & Others

    Nagarathna, J.:— This Writ Petition has been filed in public interest to seek a declaration that Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short ‘the Act’) prescribing a period of ‘two years’ as the separation period before filing a petition for divorce by mutual consent is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. An alternative prayer is also sought by requesting the Court to read down the expression ‘two years’ in Section 10-A of the Act as ‘one year’.

    2. We have heard Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Learned Counsel for the respondents.

    3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice a decision of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in SAUMYA ANN THOMAS v. THE UNION OF INDIA, to contend that Section 10 A(1) of the Act has been read down and the expression ‘two years’ is to be read as ‘one year’. She has taken the contention that the expression ‘two years’ was in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution as with regard to other Acts namely, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, Special Marriage Act, 1954, all of which have only ‘one year’ period of separation prior to filing of the petition for divorce by mutual consent. But under the Act in question, the period of two years is causing hardship and adverse consequences on persons to whom the said Act is applicable. She also brought to our notice the fact that the Kerala High Court having held that the period of ‘two years’ in Section 10A(1) being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and must be read down as a period of ‘one year’, is a judgment which is applicable throughout India. In support of this proposition, she placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in KUSUM INGOTS AND ALLOYS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA . 2004 6 SCC 254. It is an admitted fact that the Union of India has not filed any appeal against the order of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court.

    4. Respondent No. 3 who is represented by a Learned Counsel has, however, stated that the concept of divorce is alien to the Christian community but having regard to the codified law applicable throughout India, respondent No. 3 would support two years of separation keeping in mind the locus poenitentiae of the parties, rather than making it one year.

    5. Respondent No. 4 is represented by amicus curiae who has stated that it represents the Protestant Church which follow the codified law in the matter of divorce.

    6. Respondent No. 5 which is anon-governmental organization working for the welfare of women has supported the petitioner.

    7. Having heard Learned Counsel and on perusal of the judgment of the Kerala High Court in SA Umyaann Thomas, as well as the judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots and ALLOYS Ltd., what follows is that Section 10A(1) of the Act has been held to be unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. However, to save it from the vice of unconstitutionality, the expression of ‘two years’ has been read down to ‘one year’ in sub-Section (1) of Section 10A of the Act. The Kerala High Court's pronouncement on the constitutionality of a provision of a Central Act would be applicable throughout India. This is made clear by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots And Alloysl Td., wherein it has been stated that an order passed on a Writ Petition questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act. In that view of the matter, this Writ Petition would not call for any specific orders with regard to holding constitutionality or otherwise of sub-Section(1) of Section 10 A of the Act. Keeping in mind the pronouncement of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court and reading the same in the context of KUSUM INGOTS AND ALLOYS LTD. the position of law with regard to sub-Section (1) of Section 10A of the Act is now been made clear, particularly, insofar as State of Karnataka is concerned.

    8. With the aforesaid observations, the Writ Petition is disposed of.

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    Comments

    Mr. Shiv Kumar v. Union Of India, Rep., By Secretary, Ministry Of Law And Justice & Others
    (Feb 3, 2014)