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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
  • Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 125(1)(b) Maintenance Liability
  • provisions of Section 488 of the Cri. P.C, 1898 and Section 125(1)(c)
  • Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
  • SECTION 127 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 1973
  • Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • SECTION 125 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 125(1)(c) of the Cr. P.C,
  • provisions of Section 125(1)(c)
  • wife.8. Section 125(1)(c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
  • Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 125(1)(b) Maintenance Liability
  • provisions of Section 488 of the Cri. P.C, 1898 and Section 125(1)(c)
  • Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
  • SECTION 127 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 1973
  • Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • SECTION 125 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 125(1)(c) of the Cr. P.C,
  • provisions of Section 125(1)(c)
  • wife.8. Section 125(1)(c)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the husband of respondent 1 and the father of respondent 2. Respondents 1 (wife) and 2 (son) filed a maintenance petition in Cri. Misc. No. 37 of 1992 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Basavana Bagewadi, District Bijapur. That petition was allowed and maintenance was awarded at Rs. 300 per month to respondent 1 and Rs. 200 per month to respondent 2.

Respondents subsequently filed a petition under Section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking enhancement of maintenance. The Family Court, Bijapur, in Cri. Misc. No. 22 of 2005, by order dated 12-6-2006 enhanced maintenance to Rs. 1,000 per month for respondent 1 and Rs. 800 per month for respondent 2. The petitioner challenged the enhancement order by way of the present revision petition.

It is undisputed that when the original petition (Cri. Misc. No. 37 of 1992) was filed the second respondent-son was a minor; by the time the enhancement petition (Cri. Misc. No. 22 of 2005) was filed he had attained majority and was aged 21 years.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Family Court committed error in enhancing maintenance payable to the second respondent (son) who had attained majority by the time of the enhancement application.
  2. Whether a son who has attained majority but continues to be unable to maintain himself (for reasons other than any physical or mental abnormality or injury) is entitled to maintenance from his father under Section 125(1)(c) of the Cr. P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Petitioner)'s Arguments

  • The petitioner restricted the challenge to the enhancement in favour of the second respondent (the son), conceding the enhancement to the wife (respondent 1) need not be disturbed for the purposes of this revision.
  • Reliance was placed on Section 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C. and on authorities (C. Byraiah; K. Sivaram; Noor Saba Khatoon) to contend that a son, after attaining majority, is not entitled to maintenance from his father unless he suffers from a physical or mental abnormality or injury rendering him unable to maintain himself.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents supported the Family Court's order enhancing maintenance to the son, relying on the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan in Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manjulata and the decision of the Supreme Court in Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal.
  • It was argued that the son had been granted maintenance while he was a minor and continued to be unable to maintain himself even after attaining majority; additionally, he was a student (studying in second year of degree course) and would need maintenance at least until completion of his education.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C. Byraiah v. Chi. B. Ansuya & Another, 1999 5 Kar. L.J 181 Holds that maintenance cannot be granted to major children in absence of physical or natural abnormality or injury; daughters in that case were major, educated and employed, so interim maintenance was set aside. The Court treated this decision as supporting the proposition that a major child cannot claim maintenance unless unable to maintain himself/herself due to physical/mental abnormality; it was cited in support of setting aside maintenance to the major son here.
K. Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba, 1990 Cri. L.J 1880 (AP) Observes maintenance under Section 125 is generally for minor children; maintenance after majority is exceptional and limited to cases where the child is unable to maintain self because of physical or mental handicap. The Court relied on this reasoning to reinforce that maintenance beyond majority is permissible only in special circumstances of inability to maintain due to physical or mental abnormality, and thus not applicable to the present major son who had no such condition.
Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim, AIR 1997 SC 3280 Affirms obligation to maintain minor children unable to maintain themselves until they attain majority (and for females until marriage), under personal and statutory law (Section 125). The Court noted the principle but treated it as confirming the obligation applies to minors; it did not alter the conclusion that a major son without abnormality is not entitled to maintenance.
Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manjulata, 2001 1 DMC 605 (Rajasthan); later appeal: Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manjulatha, 2002 5 SCC 422 Held that a child entitled to maintenance even after attaining majority if unable to maintain himself/herself; in the Supreme Court appeal the maintenance for an unmarried girl after majority was sustained by reference to Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Court observed that Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat concerned an unmarried girl and was sustained by the Supreme Court on grounds specific to Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act; therefore, the decision was of no assistance to a major son who is not covered by Section 20(3).
Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal, 1969 3 SCC 802 On interpretation of the word "child" in Section 488 CrPC (1898): the limitation is "unable to maintain itself", not strictly age; the word "child" has different meanings in different contexts. The Court considered Nanak Chand but held that the principle could not be applied to Section 125(1)(c) CrPC, 1973, because that provision restricts entitlement to minor children unless there is physical or mental inability; thus Nanak Chand did not support maintenance to the major son here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the textual provision of Section 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C. and the cited authorities to determine entitlement to maintenance after attaining majority. The key analytical steps, based on the opinion, are:

  1. Statutory interpretation: The Court read Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C. to mean that a person having sufficient means may be required to maintain his child who has attained majority only if that child is "by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself." The Court emphasised the statutory qualification limiting post-majority maintenance to such cases of inability.
  2. Evaluation of precedent: The Court reviewed decisions cited by both sides. It found C. Byraiah and K. Sivaram supportive of the proposition that maintenance cannot be granted to major children absent physical or mental incapacity. Noor Saba Khatoon was recognised as reaffirming obligations to minors and did not alter the interpretation of post-majority entitlement.
  3. Distinguishing contrary authority: The Court examined Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat (Rajasthan High Court) and the Supreme Court's subsequent decision upholding maintenance to an unmarried girl under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The Court held this line of authority was distinguishable because Section 20(3) specifically entitles an unmarried Hindu girl to maintenance after majority — a provision not applicable to a son.
  4. Limitation of Nanak Chand: The Court acknowledged Nanak Chand's broader interpretation of "child" under Section 488 Cr.P.C., 1898, but concluded that the principle could not be transposed onto Section 125(1)(c) of the 1973 Code because the later provision contains an express age-related limitation in practice (entitlement beyond majority is qualified by inability arising from physical/mental abnormality or injury).
  5. Consideration of social/moral factors: The Court accepted the practical reality that many young persons cannot earn till they complete higher education and that fathers have moral/social obligations to facilitate education. However, the Court emphasised the absence of a statutory provision empowering courts to order maintenance of a major son for education in the absence of the statutory qualification. Thus, despite sympathy for the son's educational needs, the Court felt constrained by the statutory framework.
  6. Conclusion from law and facts: On the facts, the second respondent had attained majority (age 21) and there was no finding that he suffered from any physical or mental abnormality or injury rendering him unable to maintain himself. Therefore, under Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C. and consistent with the precedents construed, the second respondent was not entitled as of right to maintenance after attaining majority.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision petition is allowed in part: the impugned order dated 12-6-2006 insofar as it awards/enhances maintenance to the second respondent (son) is set aside; the enhancement in favour of the first respondent (wife) is left undisturbed.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The enhancement of maintenance to the second respondent (from Rs. 200 to Rs. 800 per month) is set aside. The Family Court's enhancement of maintenance to the first respondent-wife (from Rs. 300 to Rs. 1,000 per month) remains in force. There was no order as to costs.
  • Legal principle reaffirmed: The opinion reiterates that, under Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C., a son who has attained majority is not entitled to maintenance from his father unless he is unable to maintain himself because of physical or mental abnormality or injury. The Court distinguished authorities that permit maintenance to a major unmarried girl under separate statutory provision (Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956).
  • No expansion of court powers: The Court explicitly declined to create or expand a judicial remedy to compel a father to maintain a major son for purposes of education where the statutory conditions are not met, stating that such change would require legislative amendment.
  • No novel precedent created: The decision applies and distinguishes established authorities and statutory text; it does not purport to establish a new rule beyond the statutory interpretation set out in the opinion.

    Mallayya v. Smt. Mahadevi And Another

    1. The petitioner herein, who is the husband of the respondent 1 and father of the respondent 2, has challenged the legality and correctness of the order dated 12-6-2006 passed in Cri. Misc. No. 22 of 2005 by the learned Judge, Family Court, Bijapur, enhancing the maintenance payable by the petitioner herein to the respondent 1 from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 1,000/- per month and from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 800/- per month to respondent 2.

    2. The brief facts of the case is as under:

    (a) Respondents 1 and 2 respectively being the wife and son of the petitioner, filed maintenance petition in Cri. Misc. No. 37 of 1992 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Basavana Bagewadi, District Bijapur. The said petition came to be allowed and a sum of Rs. 300/- per month and another sum of Rs. 200/- per month was awarded in favour of respondents 1 and 2 respectively towards their maintenance. Thereafter, the respondents filed a petition under Section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for enhancement of the said maintenance. After considering the legal contentions of the petitioner and respondents on the question of enhancement of maintenance, the Family Court, passed the impugned order, enhancing the maintenance from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 1,000/- per month in favour of respondent 1 and Rs. 200/- to Rs. 800/- per month in favour of respondent 2. The correctness of the said order is challenged in this revision petition.

    3. Heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for both the parties. During the course of argument, Sri Ashok Kalyanashetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that he will restrict the revision petition insofar as the impugned order relates to the enhancement of maintenance from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 800/- per month in favour of the 2nd respondent, who is admittedly a major son. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of C. Byraiah v. Chi. B. Ansuya & Another* . 1999 5 Kar. L.J 181 and the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of K. Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba . 1990 Cri. L.J 1880 AP. and also the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim . AIR 1997 SC 3280 contended that as provided under Section 125(1)(c) of the Cr. P.C, a son, after attaining majority, would not be entitled to claim any maintenance from his father. As against the above contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Smt. Vijaya R. Hanmantgad the learned Counsel for the respondents, while supporting the impugned order, submitted, placing reliance on the decision of High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manjulata . 2001 1 DMC 605 Raj.. and also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal . 1969 3 SCC 802, that since the 2nd respondent son, who was minor and was unable to maintain himself as on the date of order of maintenance passed in Cri. Misc. No. 37 of 1992, continued to be unable to maintain himself even after attaining the age of majority, the Family Court is quite justified in enhancing the amount of maintenance payable to him by the petitioner father. She further contended that in view of the fact that the 2nd respondent-son was granted maintenance when he was minor and he continued to be unable to maintain himself even after attaining the age of majority, he deserves to be further maintained by his father at least till he completes his education as he is still studying in II year of the degree course.

    4. It is not in dispute that when the petition was filed in Cri. Misc. No. 37 of 1992 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Basavana Bagewadi by both the respondents, the second respondent-son was minor, and, as on the date of filing the petition under Section 127 of the Cr. P.C before the Family Court, Bijapur in Cri. Misc. No. 22 of 2005, he had attained the age of majority and inasmuch as he was aged 21 years as on the said date. Referring to the provisions of Section 125(1)(c) of the Cr. P.C and also relying on the decisions referred to supra, Sri Ashok Kalyanashetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner strongly contended that the learned Judge of the Family Court committed serious error in enhancing the maintenance of the second respondent-son, despite the fact that by then he had attained the age of majority.

    5. In first of the said decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, i.e, in the case of C. Byraiah, this Court held:

    “The maintenance cannot be granted to major children in the absence of any physical or natural abnormality or injury. In the said case before this Hon'ble Court, the daughters had attained the age of majority even before filing the petition and they were educated and gainfully employed. Therefore, it was held that so by this Court and the order granting interim maintenance in favour of the said daughters came to be set aside”.

    6. In 2nd of the said decisions i.e, the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of K. Sivaram, it is observed at para 8 of the judgment as under:

    “As per Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is clear that the maintenance can be awarded only to minor children under Section 125 of the Cri. P.C, whether married or not, when they are not also to maintain themselves. Only in special circumstances the maintenance can be awarded even after attaining the majority where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain herself. In the present case, the Court below has found that though the 1st respondent is a physically handicapped woman, respondents 2 and 3 are quite well and intelligent. Therefore, I feel that the Court below ought not to have awarded maintenance to them for a period beyond the age of their attaining majority. Therefore, the maintenance awarded to respondents 2 and 3 is limited until their attaining the age of majority”.

    7. In the case of Noor Saba Khatoon, which is third of the above decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed at para 10 as under:

    “Thus, both under the personal law and the statutory law (Section 125 of the Cri. P.C), the obligation of a Muslim father, having sufficient means, to maintain his minor children, unable to maintain themselves, till they attain majority and in case of females till they get married, is absolute, notwithstanding the fact that the minor children are living with the divorced wife”.

    8. Section 125(1)(c) of the Cr. P.C provides that if any person, having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, such child would be entitled to claim maintenance from his father. Thus, it is clear, from a plain reading of these provisions and also the principles laid down in the above decisions, that if a son has to claim maintenance from his father even after attaining the age of majority, he should be unable to maintain himself by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury suffered by him. In the absence of any such physical or mental abnormality or injury, a son would not be entitled to claim maintenance from his father after attaining the age of majority.

    9. In the case of Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat, which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent-son, it is held as under:

    “III. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 125(1)(b) — Maintenance — Liability to maintain children — ‘Child’ means upto the age of attaining majority. But qualified by words ‘unable to maintain’ himself/herself — Child entitled to avail benefit of maintenance even after attaining majority so long he/she remains unable to maintain himself/herself, (paras 26 and 27)”

    10. It is pertinent to note that before the High Court of Rajasthan, the above said case was of a daughter who had claimed maintenance from her father even after attaining the age of majority on the ground that she was still unmarried but, it was not the case of a son claiming maintenance even after attaining the age of majority without there being any physical or mental abnormality or injury resulting in his inability to maintain himself. Besides this, when the said case was taken before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in appeal (Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manjulatha . 2002 5 SCC 422.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of High Court of Rajasthan granting maintenance in favour of the girl, who had attained the age of majority on the ground that she was still unmarried, did not call for interference as the said girl was entitled to claim maintenance by virtue of the provisions of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which provides that an unmarried girl, despite attaining the age of majority, would be entitled to maintenance.

    11. As could be seen from the provisions of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a Hindu girl would be entitled to the maintenance even after attaining the age of majority if she still remains unmarried. But, this benefit is not extended to a son who has attained the age of majority. Therefore, the above decision of High Court of Rajasthan is of no help to the 2nd respondent-son herein who has claimed maintenance from his father despite he attaining the age of majority even though he does not suffer from any physical or mental abnormality or injury.

    12. Further, in the case of Nanak Chand, which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while interpreting the meaning of ‘child’ as occurred in Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 has observed as under:

    “The word ‘child’ in Section 488 does not mean a minor son or daughter. The real limitation is contained in the expression “unable to maintain itself”, (para 12)

    The word ‘child’ is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code itself. This word has different meaning in different context. Where the word ‘child’ is used in conjunction with parentage, it is not concerned with age. In Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code the word is used with reference to the father. There is no qualification of age; the only qualification is that the child must be unable to maintain itself. There is no justification for saying that this section is confined to children who are under the age of majority”.

    13. On careful reading the provisions of Section 488 of the Cri. P.C, 1898 and Section 125(1)(c) of the Cri. P.C, 1973, it is clear that in the latter provision it is only a minor son who is entitled to claim maintenance from his father till he attains the age of majority. Therefore, the principle laid down in Nanak Chand's case cannot be made applicable to the present case.

    14. Smt. Vijaya Hanmantgad, learned Counsel for the respondent-son vehemently contended that if this respondent, who is still a student studying in 2nd year of degree course, is not maintained by his father, at least till he completes his course, he would be forced to discontinue his studies and, in that event, he would be deprived of his opportunity to get a suitable job for his livelihood and therefore, this Court, exercising its discretionary powers, may direct the petitioner-father to provide the necessary facilities towards his education.

    15. It is true that in these days, the children, whether male or female, would not be in a position to earn anything towards their own maintenance till they complete their education, at least by obtaining a Bachelor Degree or a Certificate in respect of a Diploma Course or any job oriented course. But the fact is that they cannot obtain such degree or certificate, till they attain the age of 20 to 22 years i.e, minimum of 2 to 4 years after they attain the age of majority. It is also true that father of such children has a duty and obligation, both moral and social, to maintain them despite they attaining the age of majority, so as to enable them to complete their education upto a certain stage, so that they would become eligible and competent to earn their livelihood by getting a suitable job or by opting some suitable profession or avocation. If such children are neglected in this regard, they may become disappointed and also frustrated and consequently they may resort to short-cut methods for getting what they need for their maintenance and education. Such a short cut method may be unlawful one or opposed to public policy and morality. Further, the chances of such neglected children becoming anti-social elements in consequence of such disappointment and frustration cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it would be a moral and social obligation of every father to bring up his children, male or female, by giving proper education, culture etc., not only as his children, but also as the future citizens of the nation.

    16. But the fact remains that in the absence of any statutory provision empowering the Courts to direct the father of such children to provide them with the least minimum facilities required for their maintenance and education, at least upto a certain stage, so as to enable themselves to acquire the ability to maintain themselves, no order whatsoever can be passed by the Courts issuing any kind of direction in this regard. Nothing can be done in favour of such children till suitable amendments are brought by the Legislature to the relevant provisions of law. Since it is clear that a major son is not entitled, in law, to claim maintenance from his father unless such son has been suffering from any physical or mental abnormality or any injury resulting in his inability to maintain himself, I have no alternative but to hold that the 2nd respondent-son in this case cannot claim anything, as of his legal right, from his father, towards his maintenance or education. Though the petitioner-father has no legal obligation to maintain his son, nevertheless, he has social and moral obligation to provide him with bare minimum requirements till he completes his graduation and becomes able to maintain himself. Besides this it would be better if the petitioner-father keeps in his mind that if he does not discharge now his moral and social obligation towards his son, he would lose his moral right to enforce his legal right to maintenance against his son in future if, for any reason, he becomes unable to maintain himself. Therefore, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-father shall, in the best interest of both the father and son, suitably advise the petitioner-father and persuade him to provide the 2nd respondent-son with the bare requirements so as to enable the latter to become able to maintain himself by completing his graduation.

    17. In view of my foregoing discussion, I am of the opinion that the learned Judge of the Family Court committed error in enhancing the maintenance in favour of second respondent-son despite he attaining the age of majority and not suffering from any physical or natural abnormality or injury, resulting in his inability to maintain himself. Therefore, the impugned order, insofar it relates to the enhancement of maintenance in favour of second respondent deserves to be set aside. Hence, the following:

    This revision petition is allowed in part. The impugned order dated 12-6-2006 passed in Cri. Misc. No. 22 of 2005 by the learned Judge, Family Court, Bijapur, insofar as it relates to awarding of maintenance in favour of second respondent-son is set aside. The impugned order insofar as it relates to enhancement of maintenance in favour of first respondent-wife is left undisturbed. No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Mallayya v. Smt. Mahadevi And Another
    (Jun 24, 2008)