Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Ram Mohan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent (the plaintiff) instituted three small causes suits — S.C. 15043/2004, 16234/03 and 16233/03 — seeking recovery of money. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant (the petitioner) borrowed Rs. 50,000 on 30.12.2001 as a hand loan and agreed to pay Rs. 1,000 periodically until the principal was repaid. Repayment cheques drawn by the defendant on the Union Bank of India, Shivajinagar branch were dishonoured, which led to the recovery suits and proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The defendant appeared and filed a written statement denying the plaint averments. At trial the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and another witness as PW-2 and exhibited eleven documents (Exs. P-1 to P-11). The defendant and another witness were examined as DW-1 and DW-2, but no documents were exhibited on behalf of the defendant. The trial court framed points for consideration, appreciated oral and documentary evidence, and by judgment dated 24.6.2006 decreed the suit with costs and ordered current interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit until realization.

Petitioner filed revision petitions challenging the trial court's decrees. With the consent of the parties the matters were clubbed, finally heard and disposed of by the common order reflected in this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a loan transaction admittedly made in cash in excess of Rs. 20,000 and therefore in alleged contravention of Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is illegal or unenforceable so as to disentitle the plaintiff to recover the claim.
  2. Whether the fact that the petitioner had earlier instituted Original Suit (OS) 16318/03 seeking return of the cheques (prior in time and not finally decided) disentitled the plaintiff from recovering the monies by instituting the small cause suits.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Sri Rego, Learned Counsel for the petitioner)

  • The trial court failed to appreciate that the cash loan transaction in excess of Rs. 20,000 contravened Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961; such contravention rendered the transaction illegal and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the suit claim.
  • Because the petitioner had earlier instituted OS 16318/03 on the file of the Additional City Civil Judge, Mayo Hall for return of the cheques (which was prior in time and had not attained finality), the plaintiff was disentitled to recover the suit claim in the subsequently filed small cause suits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asst. Director of Inspection Investigation v. Kum. A.B. Shanth, 2002 6 SCC 259 Upheld constitutional validity of Section 269-SS and explained its object: to prevent taxpayers from giving false explanations for unaccounted money and to curb manipulation of records by so-called lenders; Section 269-SS prescribes mode of acceptance/payment/repayment to counteract tax evasion. The court relied on this authority to hold that Section 269-SS prescribes a mode for certain transactions and does not, by itself, declare all cash loans exceeding Rs. 20,000 invalid, illegal or unenforceable. The precedent supported the view that the provision's object is to curb black money rather than to render such transactions automatically void.
Surajmull Nagoramull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd., 1925 (Privy Council) 83 Statement: "No court can enforce as valid, that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid..." — i.e., where statute declares an act invalid the court cannot enforce it. The court acknowledged this observation but held it inapplicable on the facts: because the trial court had considered and rejected the plea that the transaction was void (even though that plea had not been taken in the written statement), the strict principle did not affect the present outcome.
Badri Prasad v. Nagarmal, AIR 1959 SC 559 Authority recognizing circumstances in which a new point as to contravention of a legal provision may be permitted to be raised. The court noted this decision but concluded it had no applicability here because the trial court had examined and rejected the contention of voidness on the merits; thus allowing the petitioner’s reliance on Badri Prasad did not alter the case outcome.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages, applying statutory text and precedent to the facts as found by the trial court:

  1. Interpretation of Section 269-SS: The court set out the text of Section 269-SS (requirement as to mode of acceptance/payment/repayment of certain loans and deposits) and emphasized that the provision was enacted to counteract tax evasion by prescribing a mode (account-payee cheque or bank draft) for certain loans or deposits. The court quoted the explanation of Section 269-SS and expressly noted its limited object, citing the Apex Court's explanation in the Asst. Director case: to prevent false explanations for unaccounted money and curb manipulation by lenders.
  2. Distinction between mode requirement and invalidity: Relying on the Asst. Director authority, the court reasoned that Section 269-SS prescribes a mode but does not, by itself, declare all cash loans in excess of Rs. 20,000 invalid or unenforceable. The court expressly said construing Section 269-SS to render such transactions illegal and unenforceable "cannot be countenanced." This is a textual and purposive reading of the provision consistent with the cited precedent's rationale.
  3. Penal consequences and mitigation under the Act: The court identified that Section 271-D prescribes a penalty (a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit) for contravention of Section 269-SS. However, Section 273B mitigates the rigour of Section 271-D by providing that no penalty shall be imposed if the person proves there was a reasonable cause for the failure to comply. The court quoted the Apex Court's observation (from Asst. Director) that if a transaction was genuine and bonafide and the taxpayer could not, for bonafide reasons, obtain an account-payee cheque, the imposing authority has discretion to refrain from imposing penalty.
  4. Legal consequence for enforceability: Combining the textual reading of Section 269-SS, the penal mechanism in Section 271-D and the mitigating provision in Section 273B, the court concluded that contravention of Section 269-SS attracts penalty but does not automatically render the underlying loan transaction void or unenforceable. Thus, the substantive right of a lender to recover money is not extinguished merely because the loan was taken in cash in excess of Rs. 20,000; remedy for statutory non-compliance is by way of penalty prescribed under the Act, subject to Section 273B.
  5. Application to trial court findings and other authorities: The court noted that the trial court had on appreciation of evidence recorded a factual finding that the plaintiff had in fact extended the loan, the defendant received it and was liable to repay. The trial court also found the cheques given for repayment were dishonoured. The petitioner attempted to rely on the Privy Council and Supreme Court authorities about non-enforceability where statutes forbid validity, but the court observed that those authorities were not apposite because the trial court had considered and rejected the plea of voidness even though that plea was not raised in the written statement.
  6. On the second contention (prior suit for return of cheques): The court observed that the fact that OS 16318/03 for return of cheques was instituted earlier in time and had not attained finality does not, by itself and without more, disentitle the plaintiff to recover his monies by instituting the small cause suits. The court therefore rejected the contention that the prior suit precluded recovery proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision petitions are rejected. The judgments and orders of the trial court (which decreed the suits and awarded costs and interest) were not shown to suffer from any legal infirmity calling for interference.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's decrees in favour of the plaintiff (orders dated 24.6.2006) stand. The petitioner remains liable under those decrees, including payment of the decree amount with interest and costs as ordered by the trial court.
  • Statutory and doctrinal implication: The opinion applies the interpretation that Section 269-SS prescribes a mode for specified transactions and does not, in itself, render cash loans exceeding Rs. 20,000 void or unenforceable; contravention attracts penal consequences under Section 271-D subject to mitigation under Section 273B. The court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond the application of existing authority; it treated the matter as one of applying established principles to the facts found by the trial court.
  • On precedent or broader legal change: The opinion does not claim to set a novel or broader rule altering existing law; it upholds the trial court's factual findings and applies existing case law and statutory scheme to reject the petitioner's challenges.

This summary is prepared strictly on the basis of the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of that opinion.

    Mr. Mohammed Iqbal v. Mr. Mohammed Zahoor

    Ram Mohan Reddy, J.:—

    Since common question of law and that of fact arise for decision making, with the consent of the Learned Counsel for the parties, petitions are clubbed together, finally heard and disposed of by this common order.

    2. Facts in brief are: Respondent instituted SC 15043/2004, 16234/03 and 16233/03 for recovery of money from the petitioner. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant borrowed Rs. 50,000/- on 30.12.2001, as hand loan agreeing to pay Rs. 1000/- until the principle sum was repaid. The defendant's bank cheques drawn on Union Bank of India, Shivajinagar branch, when bounched, impelled the plaintiff to institute the suits as well as proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

    3. Defendant entered appearance and filed writtedn statement denying the plaint averments. The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and another witness as PW-2 and exhibited 11 documents Exs. P-1 to P-11 while the defendant examined himself as DW-1 and another witness as DW-2 but did not exhibit any documents. The trial court, in the premises of the pleadings of the parties, framed points for consideration and on appreciation of the evidence both oral and documentary decreed the suit with costs and current interest at 6% p.a from the date of suit till the date of realization, by judgment and order dated: 24.6.2006

    4. Sri Rego, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the court below though tried the tree suits jointly, separate judgment and orders were made in each suit, Learned Counsel advances the following two contentions-

    (i) that the trial court failed to appreciate that the loan transaction admittedly in excess of Rs. 20,000/- contrary to the procedure and mode of giving and taking loans, under Sec. 269-SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for short the Act, being an illegal transaction disentitled the plaintiff to recover the suit claim;

    (ii) that the petitioner having instituted OS 16318/03 on the file of the Additional City Civil Judge, Mayo Hall, to direct the respondent herein, to return the cheques, subject matter of S.C 15043/04; 16234 & 16233/2003, which was prior in point of time and had not attained a finality, the plaintiff, was disentitled to recover the suit claim.

    5. Sec. 269-SS of the Act under chapter XX B provides for “Requirement as to mode of acceptance, payment or repayment in certain cases to counteract evasion of tax” and reads thus:—

    “269-SS. Mode of taking or accepting certain loans and deposits.- No person shall, after the 30th day of June, 1984, take or accept from any other person (hereafter in this section referred to as the depositor) any loan or deposit otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft if,-

    a) the amount of such loan or deposit or the aggregate amount of such loan and deposit; or

    b) on the date of taking or accepting such loan or deposit, any loan or deposit taken or accepted earlier by such person from the depositor is remaining unpaid (whether repayment has fallen due or not), the amount or the aggregrate amount remaining unpaid; or

    c) the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (a) together with the amount or the aggregrate amount referred to in clause (b), is twenty thousand rupees or more:

    Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan or deposit taken or accepted from, or any loan or deposit taken or accepted by,-

    a) Government;

    b) any banking company, post office savings bank or co-operative bank;

    c) any corporation established by a Central State or Provincial Act;

    d) any Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);

    e) such other institution, association or body or class of institutions, associations or bodies which the Central Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, notify in this behalf in the Official Gazette:

    Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan or deposit where the person from whom the loan or deposit is taken or accepted and the person by whom the loan or deposit is taken or accepted are both having agricultural income and neither of them has any income chargeable to tax under this Act.

    Explanation,- For the purpose of this section,-

    i) “banking company” means a company to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), applies and includs any bank or banking institution referred to in Section 51 of that Act;

    ii) “co-operative bank” shall have the meaning assigned to it in Part V of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);

    iii) “loan or deposit” means loan or deposit of money.”

    6. The Apex Court in the case of the Asst. Director of Inspection Investigation v. Kum. A.B Shanth . 2002 6 SCC 259 while upholding the constitutional validity of Sec. 269 SS observed thus:—

    “The object of introducing S. 269 is to ensure that a tax payer is not allowed to give false explanation for his unaccounted money, or if he has given some false entries in his accounts, he shall not escape by giving false explanation for the same. During search and seizure unaccounted money is unearthed and the tax payer would usually give the explanation that he had borrowed or received deposits from his relatives or friends sand it is easy for the so-called lender also to manipulate his records later to suit the plea of the tax-payer. The main object of S. 269-SS was to curb this menance.

    7. In the light of the observations of the Apex Court, it cannot but be said that Sec. 269-SS only provided for the mode of acceptance payment or repayment in certain cases so as to counteract evasion of tax. Sec. 269-SS does not declare all transactions of loan, by cash in excess of Rs. 20,000/- as invalid, illegal or null and void, while as observed by the Apex Court, the main object of introducing the provision was to curb and unearth black money. To construe Sec. 269-SS as a competent enactment declaring as illegal and unenforceable all transactions of loan, by cash, beyond Rs. 20,000/-, in my opinion, cannot be countenanced.

    8. Yet another reason for this opinion is Sec. 271 -D which reads thus:—

    “271-D. Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269-SS. (1) If a person takes or accepts any loan or deposit in contravention of the provisions of Section 269-SS, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit so taken or accepted.

    2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by the Joint Commissioner.”

    In that if a person takes or accepts any loan or deposit in contravention of Sec. 269-SS is liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit so taken or accepted, as may be imposed by the Joint Commissioner.

    9. Sec. 273B of the Act reads thus:

    “273-B. Penalty not to be imposed in certain cases.— Notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 271, Section 271-A (Section 271-AA), section 271 -B (Section 271-BA), (Section 271-BB, Section 271-C, Section 271-D, Section 271-E, (Section 271-F (Section 271 -G) clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 272-A, sub-section (1) of Section 272-A A) or (Section 272-B or) sub-section (1) of (Section 272-BB or sub-section (1) of Section 272-BBB or) clause (b) of sub-section (1) or clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 273, no penalty shall be imposable on the person or the assessee, as the case may be, for any failure referred to in the said provisions the proves that there was reasonable cause for the said failure.”

    10. This Section provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 271D no penalty shall be imposed on the person or assessee, for failure to comply with Sec. 269 SS, if it is proved, that there was reasonable cause for such failure to obtain a loan otherwise than though account payee cheque or demand draft. The Apex Court in Asst. Director's case supra, having considered the import of Section 273B observed thus:—

    “If there was a genuine and bonafide transaction and if for any reason the tax payer could not get a loan or deposit by account payee cheque or demand draft, for some bonafide reasons, the authority vested with the power to impose penalty has got discretionary power.”

    11. The contravention of Section 269 SS though visited with a stiff penalty on the person taking the loan or deposit, nevertheless, the rigor of Section 271D is whittled down by Section 273B, on proof of bonafides. It cannot therefore be said that the transaction of the nature brought before this court could be declared illegal, void, and unenforceable.

    12. Reliance is sought to be placed on the observation of the Privy Council in Surajmull Nagoramull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd. . 1925 Council 83. which reads thus:

    “No court can enforce as valid, that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment, a thing from which a court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset”.

    This observation was followed by the Apex Court in the case of Badri Prasad v. Nagarmal . AIR 1959 SC 559. while permitting a new point to be raised with regard to contravention of legal provision. In the light of the observations of the Supreme Court supra as to the purpose of enactment under Sec. 269-SS of the Act, coupled with the fact that the Trial Court, considered and rejected the plea that the transaction was void, though such a plea was not taken in the written statement, I am afraid the aforesaid decisions have no applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case.

    13. The Trial Court on a proper appreciation of the evidence both oral and documentary recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff extended the loan which the defendant-petitioner received ans was liable to repay the said sum. In addition the Trial Court concluded that the petitioner's cheques for repayment of the said sum, bounced, resulting the suits for recovery as well as criminal prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act. It may be that the petitioner instituted OS 1631/03 for return of cheques much prior in point of time to the filing of the small cause suits for recovery of money, that by itself and nothing more, cannot be said that the plaintiff is disentitled to recover his monies by instituting the suits. The second contention too must necessarily fail.

    14. In my opinion, the judgments and orders impugned in these revision petitions are not shown to suffer from any legal infirmity occasioning grave injustice to the petitioner, calling for interference.

    Revision petitions are without merit and are accordingly rejected.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mr. Mohammed Iqbal v. Mr. Mohammed Zahoor
    (Jul 12, 2007)