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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed Execution Petition No. 19/1995 before the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and J.M.F.C., Chikkaballapur, seeking arrest and detention of the respondents in civil prison and a direction to the police to enforce a decree for permanent injunction arising out of O.S. No. 67/1988. The respondents filed objections contending that the decree was passed against them ex parte and that the suit filed by the deceased father of the petitioner was not maintainable. The Execution Court framed points including (i) whether the execution petition can be executed as against the respondents-judgment debtors and through the petitioner, and (ii) what order should be passed. The Execution Court answered the first point in the negative and dismissed the execution petition by an order dated 6-8-2003, following a precedent reported at 1992 (2) SCC 504. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present civil revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution petition can be executed as against the respondents (judgment-debtors) and through the petitioner?
  2. What order should be passed on the execution petition (i.e., whether it is maintainable or should be dismissed)?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned order dated 6-8-2003 is opposed to law, facts and evidence and suffers from material irregularity in holding the execution petition to be not maintainable.
  • Reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment in Ramachandra v. Laxmana Rao, ILR 2000 KAR 2341, to contend that the execution petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable and the trial court order is liable to be set aside for fresh consideration.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents supported the reasoning of the Trial Court, which relied on the Supreme Court decision reported at 1992 (2) SCC 504 (Yashpal Singh v. VIII Addl. District Judge), holding that an execution petition under Order 21 Rule 32 can be filed only by a party who was a party to the original suit and that such a party alone can file the execution petition and obtain a decree for injunction.
  • On that basis, the respondents submitted there was no error or illegality in the Trial Court's dismissal of the execution petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1992 (2) SCC 504 The principle that a decree under Order 21 Rule 32 can be executed only against a party who was party to the suit, and that the party who obtained the decree alone can file an execution petition for injunction. The Trial Court relied on this authority to answer the execution point in the negative and dismissed the execution petition; the respondents relied on the Trial Court's use of this precedent in opposition to the revision.
Ramachandra v. Laxmana Rao, ILR 2000 KAR 2341 Held that a decree for permanent injunction protecting a decree-holder's statutory easementary right is enforceable against the transferee judgment-debtor (successor-in-interest) and thus executable against him. The petitioner relied on this Division Bench decision to argue that the execution petition was maintainable; the revising court adopted and relied on this decision in allowing the revision and setting aside the impugned order.
Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Ganesan . 1995 Supp. 3 SCC 69 Held that where an injunction protects heritable and partible rights, the injunction does not extinguish on the death of the plaintiff; the benefit enures to the legal heirs and such a decree can be executed by legal representatives and against successors-in-interest. The revising court relied on this Supreme Court pronouncement to conclude that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the execution petition and to hold that the decree could survive the death of the original decree-holder and be executed accordingly.
Kanchatyalal v. Baburam . 1999 8 SCC 529 Reinforces the principle that decrees of injunction related to heritable/partible rights do not lapse on the death of the decree-holder and can be enforced by successors or against successors-in-interest. The revising court treated this decision as fortifying the law laid down in Muthukaruppa Pillai and relied on it in concluding that the execution petition should be reconsidered in light of these authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The revising court examined the Trial Court's reasoning, observing that the Trial Court had relied on the 1992 (2) SCC 504 authority to dismiss the execution petition without considering subsequent Supreme Court authority. The revising court found that the Trial Court had committed a grave error by not taking into account later decisions, specifically Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Ganesan (1995 Supp. 3 SCC 69) and Kanchatyalal v. Baburam (1999 8 SCC 529), which establish that where an injunction protects heritable and partible rights the injunction does not extinguish on the death of the decree-holder and the remedy enures to the benefit of legal heirs; such decrees can be executed by legal representatives and against successors-in-interest.

The revising court noted that the Division Bench decision in Ramachandra v. Laxmana Rao had adopted those Supreme Court observations and held that a decree for permanent injunction protecting an easementary right is enforceable against transferees/successors-in-interest. Applying these principles to the facts — a suit concerning vacant premises and a decree for permanent injunction obtained by the petitioner's deceased father — the court concluded that the Trial Court's dismissal was unsustainable for failing to apply the later and directly relevant authorities.

On this basis the revising court allowed the civil revision petition, set aside the impugned order dated 6-8-2003, and remitted the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law, directing the Trial Court to afford opportunities to both parties and to decide the matter expeditiously in light of the cited authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 6-8-2003 is set aside.

Implications: The direct effect is that Execution Petition No. 19/1995 (impugned order dated 6-8-2003) has been vacated and the matter is remitted to the Trial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with the Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities cited in the opinion. The Trial Court is directed to afford both parties an opportunity and to dispose of the matter expeditiously. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and following the cited Supreme Court and Division Bench decisions.

    G.M Venkatappa v. Anjanappa And Another

    Patil, J.:—

    The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 6-8-2003 in Execution Petition No. 19/1995 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and J.M.F.C Chikkaballapur presented the instant revision petition.

    2. The petitioner herein had filed Ex. Pn. No. 19/1995 on the file Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and J.M.F.C Chikkaballapur with a prayer to arrest and detain the respondents in civil prison and also for a direction to the Police to enforce the decree for permanent injunction by executing the judgment and decree in O.S No. 67/1988.

    After receipt of summons from the Court below, the respondents have filed their objections to the main petition contending that the petition is not maintainable as the decree was passed placing the respondents exparte and the suit filed by the deceased father of the petitioner who is no more, is not maintainable.

    On the basis of the pleadings of the both the parties and after hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents, the Execution Court has framed necessary points for consideration to the effect:

    i) Whether the execution petition can be executed as against the respondents-Judgment Debtors and through the petitioner as prayed for? and

    ii) What order:

    After going through the judgment and pleadings of the parties and after hearing both the Counsel, the Execution Court has recorded a finding answering point No. 1 in the negative and point No. 2 as per the final order dismissed the execution petition by assigning reasons at paragraph-9 and by following the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1992 (2) SCC 504 stating that a decree under Order 21 Rule 32 can be executed as against the party who was the party to the suit and when the parties to the suit having obtained a decree, that party alone can file an execution petition and obtain a decree for injunction. Assailing the correctness of the impugned order passed by the Trial Court dated 6-8-2003 in Ex. Pn. No. 19/1995 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and J.M.F.C Chikkaballapur, the petitioner presented the instant revision petition.

    3. The principal submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is opposed to law, facts and evidence in the case and the Trial Court has committed illegality and the order impugned suffers from material irregularity in holding that the execution petition is not maintainable. To substantiate his case, he was quick to point out by placing reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case, of Ramachandra v. Laxmana Rao . ILR 2000 KAR 2341. that the execution petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable and therefore, he submitted that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is liable to be set-aside and the matter requires for fresh consideration by the Trial Court.

    4. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents taking me through the reasoning given by the Trial Court at paragraph-9 of the impugned order wherein, the Trial Court placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yashpal Singh v. VIII Addl. District Judge . 1992 2 SCC 504. wherein, the Apex Court has held that the execution petition can be filed as against the party who was a party to the suit and when the party having obtained a decree, that party can alone file an execution petition and obtain a decree for injunction and therefore, there was no error or illegality committed by the trial Court in dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner.

    5. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents, it is manifest that the Trial Court has committed grave error much less irregularity in considering the provisions of Section 50 and Section 146 read with Order 21 Rule 32 of Civil Procedure Code. The grievance made out by the petitioner in the instant case is that the deceased father of the petitioner had filed a suit in O.S No. 67/88 in respect of the vacant premises consisting of front yard of the house bearing House List No. 100 measuring East-West 39’ and North-South 44’, situated in Unegal village, Chikkaballur Taluk. On the death of the first defendant, the first respondent Anjanappa claims to have inherited the said property as a legal representative of deceased first defendant. When the matter came up for consideration before the Trial Court, the Trial Court after discussing the pleadings of both the parties and other relevant material available on the file, accepting the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondents and placing reliance of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Yashpal Singh v. VII Addl. District Judge (supra) as referred to above, dismissed the execution petition without reference to the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court made in the case of Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Ganesan . 1995 Supp. 3 SCC 69. wherein, in this case, the contention of the defendant-appellant before the Supreme Court was that the decree of permanent injunction obtained against him by the deceased plaintiff with respect to his heritable and partible rights, cannot be executed by the legal representatives of the plaintiff on his death. Repelling this contention, the Supreme Court held thus:

    “2…………….It is claimed that the decree being personal, it could not have been executed by the respondent who claimed to be successor-in-interest of the plaintiff in the suit. The submission appears to be devoid of any merit. In the main suit, out of which these execution proceedings have arisen, it was clearly held by the High Court that the rights were heritable and partible. In view of this finding, it is not clear as to how can be appellant raise the argument of decree being personal in nature. Apart from that, the decree passed by the Trial Court, copy of which has been produced by the learned Counsel for the respondent, the authenticity of which is not disputed by the appellant, and which has been extracted earlier, clearly indicates that the injunction granted did not impose any such restriction expressly nor could it be impliedly held that it lapsed with the death of the plaintiff”.

    After careful reading of the well settled principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Ganesan (Supra) referred to above, that if the remedy of injunction granted by the decree is in respect of any heritable and partible right, it does not get extinguished with the death of a party thereto, but in ensures to the benefit of the legal heirs of the decree-holder, as also such a decree could be executed against the successor-in-interest of the deceased judgment-debtor as well. The law so laid down is fortified by another recent decision of the Supreme Court in Kanchatyalal v. Baburam . 1999 8 SCC 529.. Therefore, the Division Bench of this Court while dealing in a similar question in Ramachandra v. Laxmana Rao (Supra) while referring and adopting the observations made by the Supreme Court in the cases of Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Ganesan (Supra) and Kanhatyalal v. Babu Ram (Supra) and several other judgments has held thus:

    “In the case in hand, the decree for permanent injunction being the one granted for protection of decree holder's statutory easementary right of way appurtenant to his dominant heritage and anexed with the servient tenement of judgment-debtors, it is enforceable in law against the transferee judgment-debtor, he being the successor-in-interest of the original judgment-debtor. In other words, the transferee judgment-debtor is bound by the terms and directions of the decree in question and, therefore, the decree is executable against him”

    5. In the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Ganesan (Supra) including the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramachandra v. Laxman Rao (Supra) referred to supra, I am of the considered view that at any stretch of imagination, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court cannot be sustainable and is liable to be set-aside.

    6. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above and taking into consideration the totality of the case in hand, the civil revision petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The impugned order dated 6-8-2003 on the file of the Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) Chikkaballapur is hereby set-aside. The matter stands remitted to the Trial Court for reconsideration afresh for take appropriate decision in accordance with law, after affording opportunities to both the parties and in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court, referred to above and dispose of the matter, as expeditiously as possible on top priority, having regard to the fact that the matter is pending adjudication since several years.

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    Comments

    G.M Venkatappa v. Anjanappa And Another
    (Oct 21, 2006)