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citation codes
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  • Order-IX Rule-13 C.P.C, r/w. Rule-41 of the Workmens' Compensation Rules, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as, Rules for short)
  • Order IX Rule -13 of C.P.C, before the Workmen's Compensation Authority, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1
  • provisions of Workmens' Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short)
  • Workmens' Compensation Act. Though the provisions of Order-IX Rule-13 of C.P.C
  • Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under clause (a) of Section 30(1)
  • Compensation Act under Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules
  • Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  • Section 30(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.7.
  • Rule 41, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order-IX C.P.C,
  • Order IX Rule-13 of C.P.C,
  • Order IX Rule 13
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order-IX Rule-13 C.P.C, r/w. Rule-41 of the Workmens' Compensation Rules, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as, Rules for short)
  • Order IX Rule -13 of C.P.C, before the Workmen's Compensation Authority, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1
  • provisions of Workmens' Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short)
  • Workmens' Compensation Act. Though the provisions of Order-IX Rule-13 of C.P.C
  • Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under clause (a) of Section 30(1)
  • Compensation Act under Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules
  • Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  • Section 30(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.7.
  • Rule 41, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order-IX C.P.C,
  • Order IX Rule-13 of C.P.C,
  • Order IX Rule 13
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns proceedings arising from a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. One Ramanna, son of Respondent No.1, died on 06.07.1997 in the course of employment in the establishment of Respondent No.2. Respondent No.1 filed a claim petition before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Koppal in W.C.A CWC/F. 24/1998, and the Commissioner passed an award dated 31.10.2000 in favour of the claimant for Rs. 2,26,380/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of application until payment.

The petitioner (the Insurance Company) filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C., read with Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924, seeking to set aside the award dated 31.10.2000 primarily on the ground that notice had not been served on the Divisional Manager (the appropriate authority) but only on the Branch Manager, rendering service invalid and resulting in denial of effective representation; the Commissioner rejected this miscellaneous application by order dated 29.10.12003 (Annexure-A). The petitioner then moved the High Court by way of writ petition challenging the Commissioner's rejection of its Order IX Rule 13 application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was correct in rejecting the petitioner's application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. for setting aside the award dated 31.10.2000.
  2. Whether Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C. and Order 43 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. are applicable to proceedings before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner under Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924, and consequently whether an appeal lies against the Commissioner's order disposing of an application under Order IX Rule 13.
  3. Whether the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is maintainable in view of existing Division Bench authority interpreting Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Rule 41 of the Rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Advocate: Sri B.C. Seetharama Rao)

  • The Insurance Company should have been represented by the Divisional Manager (the appropriate authority); service on the Branch Manager was not valid, thereby depriving the petitioner of effective representation and violating principles of natural justice.
  • Rule 41 makes Order IX of the C.P.C. applicable to proceedings before the Commissioner, and therefore the Commissioner should have exercised jurisdiction on merits in respect of the Order IX Rule 13 application instead of rejecting it for want of jurisdiction.
  • Because no appeal is provided under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. against the Commissioner's order on an Order IX Rule 13 application, the petitioner contended that a writ petition to the High Court is maintainable.

Respondent No.2's Arguments (Advocate: Sri P.G. Mogali)

  • Reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision in Praveen Industries v. Banawar Singh (ILR 1990 KAR 605 DB) to submit that the writ petition is not maintainable; the proper remedy is an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act challenging the award dated 31.10.2000.
  • Since the award dated 31.10.2000 was passed on merits by the Commissioner, the Commissioner properly refused to entertain the petitioner's application under Order IX Rule 13; accordingly, the writ petition should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Praveen Industries v. Banawar Singh, ILR 1990 KAR 605 DB Held that the only provision for appeal against orders awarding compensation is Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act; if an application under Order IX Rule 13 to set aside an ex parte award is dismissed, there is no specific provision to appeal against that dismissal and Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. is not made applicable by Rule 41. The Court followed this Division Bench dictum (stare decisis), treated it as binding on the Single Judge, and applied it to hold that the writ petition was not the appropriate remedy; the petitioner must appeal under Section 30(1)(a) against the award and, if necessary, seek condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as permitted by Section 30(3) of the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules which makes the provisions of Order IX C.P.C. applicable to proceedings before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. On that basis, the Commissioner correctly entertained the petitioner's application under Order IX Rule 13. However, the Commissioner rejected the application on merits, observing that the award dated 31.10.2000 had attained finality and could not be withdrawn or set aside; the impugned order was described as cryptic but nonetheless decided on the merits.

The Court then addressed the applicability of Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. and the avenue of appeal. It observed that although Order IX Rule 13 is made applicable by Rule 41, Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. is not made applicable by Rule 41 to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Therefore, an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. against an order disposing of an Order IX Rule 13 application before the Commissioner is not maintainable.

Relying on the Division Bench decision in Praveen Industries v. Banawar Singh, the Court explained that the only statutory appellate remedy against an award of the Commissioner is provided by Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Where an application under Order IX Rule 13 is dismissed after the award has been passed, the appropriate recourse is an appeal against the award under Section 30(1)(a); if delay arises because the Rule 13 application process is concluded, Section 30(3) makes Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to seek condonation of delay.

The Court considered but declined to exercise its extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition, on the ground that the Division Bench authority has consistently held the field for over fifteen years. The Court emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis and judicial comity, stating that a Single Judge is bound to follow decisions of Division Benches and Full Benches of the High Court as well as the Supreme Court; accordingly, the Court followed the Division Bench precedent rather than depart from it.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The Writ Petition is dismissed. The Court held that while an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C. can be filed before the Workmen's Compensation Authority to set aside an ex parte award, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. are not made applicable to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Rule 41; accordingly, there is no appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 against an order disposing of such an application. The only recourse available to the petitioner is to prefer an appeal against the award itself under Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Implications:

  • The immediate, direct effect is that the petitioner's writ is dismissed and the petitioner remains required to challenge the award by filing an appeal under Section 30(1)(a) of the Act.
  • If delay arises because the proceedings on the Order IX Rule 13 application consume time, the petitioner may apply for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act pursuant to Section 30(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (as explained in the Division Bench dictum cited in the opinion).
  • The Court explicitly followed existing Division Bench authority (Praveen Industries) and declined to lay down any new precedent or depart from that settled position; therefore, no fresh legal principle was established by this judgment beyond applying stare decisis to the facts before it.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

    National Insurance Co. Ltd., Rep. By Its Manager, Bangalore v. Smt. Huligemma And Another

    Sri B.C Seetharamarao, Advocate for Petitioner

    Sri Chandrashekar, P. Patil, Advocate for R1
    Sri P.G Mogali, Advocate for R2

    Mohan Shantanagoudar, J.:—

    By the impugned order Annexure-A dated 29.10.12003, the Workmens' Compensation Commissioner, Koppal (“Commissioner” for short) has rejected the Miscellaneous Application filed by the petitioner under Order-IX, Rule-13 C.P.C, for setting aside the award Annexure-B dated 31.10.2000 passed in WC. 24/2001/1992.

    2. The records disclose that one Ramanna, son of the Respondent No. 1 herein died on 06.07.1997 during the course and out of employment in the establishment of respondent No. 2 herein. As such, Respondent No. 1 herein filed claim petition before the Workmens' Compensation Commissioner, Koppal in W.C.A CWC/F. 24/1998, who passed an award in favour of claimant granting compensation of Rs. 2,26,380/- with interest at the rate of 9% p.a from the date of application till the date of payment. The petitioner-Insurance Company thereafter, filed petition Under Order-IX Rule-13 C.P.C, r/w. Rule-41 of the Workmens' Compensation Rules, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Rules’ for short) praying for setting aside the said award dated 31.10.2000 mainly on the ground that the Divisional Manager is not served with notice as he was not made party before the Commissioner and that the notices were served only on Branch Manager of insurance company. As aforesaid, the said petition filed by the petitioner is rejected by the Commissioner.

    3. Sri B.C Seetharama Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously submitted that the Insurance Company should have been represented by the Divisional Manager who is the appropriate authority, but not the Branch Manager and as such, the notice, though served on the Branch Manager is not a valid service of notice; that thus the petitioner could not represent before the Commissioner and put forth its case effectively; consequently the impugned award is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. He further submitted that Rule-41 of the Rules provides for application of Order-IX of C.P.C, to the proceedings before the Workmens' Compensation Commissioner under the provisions of Workmens' Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) and that therefore, the Commissioner should have exercised his jurisdiction on merits; that the Commissioner is not justified in rejecting the said application filed under Order-IX Rule-13 of C.P.C, on the ground of want of jurisdiction. He further submitted that as no appeal is provided against the order passed on the application filed under Order-IX Rule-13 C.P.C, by the Commissioner, this Writ Petition is maintainable.

    4. On the other hand, Sri P.G Mogali, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2, by placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Praveen Industries v. Banawar Singh . ILR 1990 KAR 605 DB., submits that the Writ Petition is not maintainable and the only course open to the petitioner is to approach the appellate Court U/S. 30 of the Act by challenging the award dated 31.10.2000 It is further submitted that since the award dated 31.10.2000 is passed on merits by the Commissioner, he has rightly refused to entertain the application filed by the petitioner. On these grounds he prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition.

    5. The bare reading of Rule-41 of the Rules makes it clear that the provisions of Order-IX C.P.C, shall apply to the proceedings before the Workmens' Compensation Commissioner. In view of the same, the Commissioner has rightly taken up the said application filed by the petitioner for consideration. The Commissioner has however rejected the same on merits and not on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Though the impugned order passed by the Commissioner is cryptic, the same is passed on merits of the application wherein the Commissioner has clearly observed that as the award passed by him on 31.10.2000 has attained finality and it cannot be withdrawn or set aside.

    6. It is true that no appeal can be filed under Order 43 Rule-1 of C.P.C, as against the order passed on the application filed under Order-IX Rule-13 of C.P.C, by the Commissioner in the proceedings arising out of the Workmens' Compensation Act. Though the provisions of Order-IX Rule-13 of C.P.C are applicable to the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act, the provisions of Order 43 Rule-1 of C.P.C, are not made applicable to the proceedings under the Workmens' Compensation Act under Rule-41 of the ‘Rules’. Consequently, the appeal under Order 43 Rule-1 C.P.C, as against the order passed on the application filed under Order-IX Rule-13 C.P.C, is not maintainable. However, the only course open for the parties is to file an appeal under Section 30 of the Act against the order of awarding compensation.

    The Division Bench of this Court, in the decision cited supra while dealing with similar situation observed thus:

    “The only provision regarding appeal against the orders made by the Workmen's Compensation Authority is found in Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under clause (a) of Section 30(1) an appeal lies to this Court from the orders of the Commissioner awarding compensation. Therefore, it is clear that if an order awarding compensation has been made by the Workmen's compensation Authority and thereafter an application was made under Order IX Rule 13 praying or setting aside that order on the ground that the appellant had been placed ex parte without justification and that application is dismissed, the only course open to the party is to prefer an appeal against the order awarding compensation as provided in Section 30(1)(A) of the Act. But no appeal can be filed against an order dismissing the application for setting aside the order as there is no provision for filing such an appeal under Section 30 of the Act and under the Rule 41, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C are not made applicable.

    If, for any reason, as actually happened in this case, by the time the application for setting aside the ex parte against the original order is over, the only course open for the party is to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay, as the said provision is expressly made applicable under Section 30(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.”

    7. It is clear from the aforesaid dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court that under such a situation the only course open to the parties is to prefer an appeal against the order awarding compensation as provided under Section 30(1)(a) of the Act. Though the Division Bench did not specifically consider the question as to whether the writ lies against the order passed by the Commissioner on the application filed under Order IX Rule-13 of C.P.C, it has clearly held that the only course open to the parties to the proceedings before the Commissioner is to prefer an appeal against the order awarding compensation as provided in Section 30(1)(a) of the Act.

    8. Though this Court can exercise its extraordinary/supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in such matters, I decline to entertain the Writ Petition in view of the aforesaid dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court cited supra, which has held the field for more than fifteen years by now. The principle of ‘stare decisis’ has been evolved for maintaining judicial decorum, propriety, discipline and also for not unsettling well settled law by each individual view unless it is overruled by higher Court or a larger Bench. The Single Judge of the High Court is bound to accept as correct, the Judgments of the Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction of Division Benches and of Full Benches of this Court and of the Supreme Court. The principles of ‘stare decisis’ and ‘reference’ are not contrary but complementary to each other. Taking recourse to the doctrine of ‘stare decisis’ would be an imperative necessity, so to avoid uncertainty and confusion, since the basic feature of law is its certainty and in the event of any departure therefrom, the society would be in utter confusion and the resultant effect of which would be legal anarchy and judicial indiscipline - a situation which always ought to be avoided. It is true that the doctrine has no statutory sanction but it is a rule of convenience, expediency, prudency and above all the public policy. It is to be observed in its observance rather than in its breach to serve the people and subserve the ends of justice.

    9. Where the Courts follow their own Judgments, they do so on the ground of judicial comity. The Judgment in Praveen Industries cited supra is followed in number of cases for fifteen long years in this State. Added to it, the petitioner is entitled to raise all the grounds urged in this Writ Petition before the Appellate Court under Section 30 of the Act. Consequently, this Court deems it just and proper to apply the Principles of ‘Stare Decisis’ by following the dictum laid down in the decision cited supra which has held the field for more than fifteen years by now. In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, I hold that though the petitioner is certainly entitled to file an application for setting aside an ex-parte award by filing application under Order IX Rule -13 of C.P.C, before the Workmen's Compensation Authority, the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 are not made applicable to the proceedings under the Workmens Compensation Act under Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules and that the only recourse open to the petitioner in the Writ Petition is to prefer an appeal against the order awarding compensation as provided in Section 30(1)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. In this view of the matter, this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. Hence, the following order is made.

    Writ Petition is dismissed. However, it is open for the petitioner to prefer an appeal against the award dated 31.10.2000 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Koppal in W.C 24/98 (24/2001:1992) before the Appellate Court by filing necessary application for condonation of delay, if it so chooses.

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    Comments

    National Insurance Co. Ltd., Rep. By Its Manager, Bangalore v. Smt. Huligemma And Another
    (Mar 2, 2005)