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  • provisions contained in Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act
  • provisions of Section 10 of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Act
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  • provisions contained in Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act
  • provisions of Section 10 of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (Respondents No. 1 and 2) filed a suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction in respect of certain suit properties, and in the alternative sought possession. The First Plaintiff alleged she was the foster daughter of one Siddegowda (the propositus) and that she purchased the suit properties by a registered sale deed (Ex. P1 dated 17.5.1972) for Rs. 4,000 and has been in possession since. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with possession and enjoyment.

The appellant in the present appeal is the third defendant (referred to as Siddegowda (Junior)). Defendants 2 to 5 are sons of the first defendant. The defendants pleaded that the propositus had adopted the third defendant, and that the properties were ancestral property. They contended that the sale was not for a legal necessity or family benefit and therefore would not bind the adopted son who, by adoption, became a co-parcener.

At trial, the Trial Court found that the third defendant had failed to prove a valid adoption and accordingly upheld the plaintiffs' claim and decreed delivery of possession. The first appellate court confirmed the Trial Court's findings and dismissed the third defendant's appeal. A further appeal to the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 782/01) resulted in the judgment and decree of this Court being set aside and the matter remanded for fresh disposal in accordance with law. On admission of the present matter, the substantial question of law framed was whether the courts below were justified in disbelieving or discarding the adoption plea set up by the appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the courts below were justified in disbelieving or discarding the adoption plea set up by the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Third Defendant's) Arguments

  • The propositus Siddegowda had adopted the third defendant (Siddegowda Junior), and by that adoption the third defendant became a co-parcener.
  • The properties are ancestral; the sale by the propositus was not for a legal necessity or for family benefit and therefore does not bind the adopted son as to his share.
  • Evidence including pronote (Ex. D1), index of land (Ex. D2), and oral testimony (DWs) supported the adoption.
  • Relevant legal provisions and authorities (including Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and case law) permit adoption of persons above 15 years where community custom so permits; where such custom is judicially recognized, pleading of custom in each case is not necessary.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs relied on Ex. P1 (registered sale deed) and possession since purchase to claim exclusive title and possession.
  • The plaintiffs contested the adoption plea and relied on the Trial and Appellate Courts' concurrent findings that adoption was not proved (pointing to alleged deficiencies such as absence of proof of the natural mother's consent, non-pleading/proof of required religious rites/ceremonies and the age of the person purportedly adopted).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haribai v. Baba Anna, AIR 1977 Bom 289 (Division Bench, Bombay High Court) Discusses diversity in rules/texts on permissible age for adoption among various communities and notes that, in Bombay Presidency, adoption of a person (even married) among Sudras was allowed; generally across India a Sudra may be adopted only before marriage but regional differences exist. The Court used the observations to show that shastric texts and judicial decisions recognize variations in customary adoption rules for Sudras and that the appellate court's strict view on age (over 15) without considering community custom was untenable.
Krishnayya Rao v. Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao, AIR 1935 PC 190 Holds that being a major is not an objection to adoption where parties are Sudras; adoption of an older person may be motivated by practical considerations (e.g., estate management). Cited to support the proposition that age alone (majority) does not necessarily invalidate adoption among Sudras and to challenge the appellate court's reliance on age as fatal to adoption.
2002 (1) Supreme 233 (citation in text) Approves the view that Privy Council decisions remain binding unless and until the Supreme Court takes a different view; the binding effect extends to opinions deliberately and advisedly given by the Privy Council. The Court invoked this authority to treat earlier Privy Council rulings (on customary adoption among Sudras) as having continuing binding force and to justify reliance on that body of precedent without requiring fresh proof of custom in every case.
Munnalal v. S.S. Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493 Where a custom has repeatedly been brought to the notice of courts, the courts may hold that custom to be part of the law without requiring proof in each individual case (citing Venkata Mahipati Gangadhara Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur). The Court relied on this principle to conclude that a recognized custom among Sudras permitting adoption above the age of 15 need not be pleaded and proved in each case, thereby undermining the appellate court's requirement for such pleading/proof here.
Venkata Mahipati Gangadhara Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur, 45 Ind App 148 : AIR 1918 PC 81 Earlier Privy Council authority referenced for the proposition that recognized custom may be treated as part of law without repeated proof. Used (via Munnalal) to support the proposition that established custom among Sudras need not be pleaded and proved in each case.
Debiprasad v. Smt. Tribeni Devi, AIR 1970 SC (following Laxman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar, AIR 1961 SC 1378) Under Hindu law, valid adoption requires transfer of the adoptive person from one family to another by a ceremony of giving and taking; a formal ceremony (no particular prescribed form) is essential to secure publicity; natural parents must hand over and adoptive parents receive. The Court applied this principle to the evidence (noting DW6's account of giving, DW5's testimony about presence/consent of the natural mother and the lack of cross-examination), concluding that the essential giving-and-taking requirement of adoption had been satisfied on the evidence presented.
Laxman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar, AIR 1961 SC 1378 Authoritative Supreme Court reasoning on requirements of valid adoption, referenced and followed in Debiprasad. Referenced as part of the Supreme Court line of authority establishing the necessity of a ceremony evidencing transfer (giving and taking) in adoption.
Smt. Neelavva v. Smt. Shivawwa, AIR 1989 Kar 45 Authority cited regarding appropriate moulding of relief where an alienee's title is limited by co-parcenary/partition rights (context: partition and equitable allotment). The Court invoked this authority to justify moulding relief: declaring a half share in favour of the third defendant and directing that the plaintiff as alienee could pursue equitable allotment in final decree proceedings; court ordered a preliminary decree and partition relief in appropriate terms.
Lingayya v. Chengalmmal, 48 Mad 407 (referenced in Kane quotation) Held that even a Sudra cannot be adopted after his marriage (decision follows Dattaka Chandrika tradition referenced in Kane). Appears within historical/shastric discussion; the Court used historical/textual authorities (as cited in Kane) to show regional and textual divergence on permissible age and timing of adoption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the matter in several discrete steps, using facts, documentary evidence and authorities:

  1. The appellate court had disbelieved the adoption plea for three principal reasons: (a) the witness to adoption (DW6) did not refer to the presence and consent of the natural mother at the time of adoption; (b) necessary religious rites and customs required for adoption were not pleaded and proved; and (c) DW3 and DW1's evidence suggested the person adopted was aged more than 15, and Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (HAMA) requires proof of a custom if adoption of a person above 15 is claimed.
  2. The Court examined authoritative textual and judicial materials establishing that the law on adoption among Sudras is not uniform across India and that some recognized authorities and decisions (including Privy Council rulings and subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements) treat certain regional customs as established. The opinion quotes from scholarly and judicial sources (including P.V. Kane and the Bombay Division Bench in Haribai v. Baba Anna) showing divergence and, specifically, that in some areas (notably Bombay Presidency) adoption of older persons (even married) among Sudras was recognized.
  3. The Court relied on the principle (as stated in Munnalal v. S.S. Rajkumar) that where a custom has been repeatedly recognized by courts, courts may treat the custom as part of law without the necessity of proof in each individual case. The Court concluded that, in view of prior authoritative rulings (including Privy Council decisions approved by later decisions), the necessity of pleading and proving the custom in every case does not arise.
  4. The Court examined the evidence produced by the defendants: Ex. D1 (a pronote) refers to loans borrowed for performing the marriage of the adopted son (indicating recognition of the adopted son's status); Ex. D2 (index of land, 1966-67) records the third defendant as the adopted son; oral evidence of DWs 1–9, particularly DW6 (natural father) and DW5, was found to support the adoption story. DW6 described the giving in adoption and DW5 testified to the presence and consent of the natural mother at the time of adoption. The Court observed that the plaintiffs did not cross-examine DW5 to challenge his testimony about the mother's presence/consent.
  5. Applying the Supreme Court's rule (as in Debiprasad and earlier authorities) that the essential element of adoption is the transfer (giving and taking) and that no particular form is prescribed, the Court found that the essential requirement of delivery of the child by natural parents to the adoptive parents was established by the evidence (particularly DW6's account and corroboration by DW5).
  6. On the basis of these findings and authorities, the Court concluded that the appellate court's reliance on the appellant's age (over 15) and on the absence of pleaded/proved custom was not tenable in the circumstances of this case. The Court therefore accepted that the third defendant had been validly adopted.
  7. Because the third defendant was an adopted son and thus a co-parcener by legal fiction, the sale by the propositus (Ex. P1) could not bind the share of the third defendant in the ancestral property. Consequently, the plaintiffs could not be declared exclusive owners of the entire suit property; at most they could have purchased the propositus's share.
  8. To give effect to these conclusions, the Court held that relief should be moulded: a decree for partition could be granted declaring a half share in favour of the third defendant in the suit property, and the first plaintiff (as alienee) could seek equitable allotment in the final decree proceedings. The Court also left open the procedural route to include other joint family properties for partition if necessary by application to the Trial Court.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The judgment and decree of the appellate court was set aside, and the appeal was partly allowed as indicated by the Court. The Court directed that a preliminary decree be drawn and ordered partition relief (including declaration of a half share in favour of the third defendant).

Implications:

  • The Court concluded that the third defendant was validly adopted based on documentary and oral evidence and applicable authorities; as an adopted son he is a co-parcener and has a share in the ancestral property.
  • The sale deed (Ex. P1) executed by the propositus cannot bind the third defendant's share; the plaintiffs cannot be declared exclusive owners of the entire suit property and can only be entitled to the share actually alienable by the propositus.
  • The relief in the suit is to be moulded: a decree for partition declaring a half share in favour of the third defendant is to be passed and the first plaintiff (as purchaser) may seek equitable allotment in the final decree proceedings. The Court also permitted inclusion of any other joint family properties for partition by application to the Trial Court.
  • No broader new precedent beyond application of existing authority was created by this judgment; the Court applied established principles on adoption, community custom and moulding relief to the facts of this case.

    Shri Siddegowda v. Smt. Mallamma And Others

    JUDGMENT

    Sreedhar Rao, J.:—

    The appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed in R.A No. 18/85 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Mysore, arising out of the judgment and decree passed in O.S No. 41/82 on the file of Civil Judge (JR. Dn). Nanjangud. The appellant is the third defendant in the suit. The respondents No. 1 and 2 are the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit properties and for permanent injunction against the defendants not to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and for permanent injunction against the defendants. The plaintiff in alternative seek relief of possession. The plaintiff claims to be the foster daughter of one Siddegowda (Senior) the propositus from whom she has purchased the suit properties under registered sale deed at Ex. P. 1 dated 17.5.1972 for valuable consideration of Rs. 4000/- Since then claims to be in possession and enjoyment. The Second plaintiff is the husband of the First Plaintiff. In view of the interference with her rights, suit came to be filed. Defendants No. 2 to 5 are the sons of the first defendant. The defendants contend that the propositus Siddegowda had adopted the third defendant Siddegowda (Junior) as his son. The properties are ancestral property, the sale of the property is not for legal necessity or for the family benefit Therefore would not bind the third defendant who is the adopted son and had become the co-parcener along with the propositus Siddegowda by legal fiction. Therefore, the claim of exclusive tide in respect of the Properties is stoutly resisted. Besides several other technical defence contentions are taken.

    2. The Trial Court finds that the third defendant has failed to prove the valid adoption in law. Accordingly upholds the claim of the plaintiff and decreed the suit against the defendants to deliver possession. The first appellate court confirmed the finding in the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, dismissed the appeal of the third defendant. Hence, the second appeal.

    3. The judgment and decree of this Court has been set aside by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 782/01 remanded the matter for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

    4. At the time of admission by order dated 23.8.90 the following substantial question of law was formulated by the admission Judge:

    Whether the Courts below were justified in disbelieving or discarding the adoption plea set up by the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case?

    5. There is a concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below that the third defendant has failed to prove the adoption. The appellate Court finds the D.W 6 a witness to the adoption does not refer to the presence and consent of the natural mother at the time of adoption. Secondly finds that the necessary religious rites and customs required for adoption is not pleaded and proved. Thirdly finds that according to the evidence of D.W 3 and D.W 1 at the time of adoption D.W 3 was aged more than 15 years. In view of the provisions contained in Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act holds that the defendants have failed to plead and prove the custom of community to adopt a boy who is aged more than 15 years. For the said reasons the appellate Court disbelieves the theory of adoption set up by the defendants No. 1 to 3.

    6. Admittedly the parties belong to Kuruba community which forms a part of Chaturtavama i.e, shudra. The Division Bench Ruling of the Bombay High Court in Haribai v. Baba Anna . AIR 1977 Bom 289, at Para 31. the following observations are made:

    31. The history of the evolution of the rule in this country is dealt with great scholarship and precision by Dr. Kane in History of Dharmashastra at pp. 679 to 681, as follows:

    “As to the age of the boy to be adopted there is great divergence among the medieval writers which is also reflected in the case law. In this connection certain verses of the Kalikapurana assume great importance. The Vyavaharamukha and the Dattaka-chandrika hold that the passage is of doubtful authenticity (as the verses are not found in several mss.), while the D.M (Dattaka Mimansa) and the Nimyasindhu hold them to be genuine, and the Sam. K, (Samskara-Kaustubha) pp. (169-172) after referring to these views states those verses are opposed to what is stated in the Ait. Br. (Aitarya Brahamana) about Sunhasepa who was adopted by Visvamitra as a son even after Upanayana. The verses are: ‘O King, that son whose samskaras up to (including) the cuda (tonsure) ceremony are performed with the gotra of his (natural) father, does not (i.e, cannot) attain the status the adopted son of another. When the ceremonies of cuda and upanayana are performed under his own gotra (by the adoptive father) the dattaka and the other kinds become (recognised as) sons (in the adoptive family); otherwise they are called dasa (slave). After the fifth year the adopted son and the rest cannot be (recognized as) sons. Having taken one who is five years old one (the adopter) should first perform the putresti. These verses state four propositions (1). If all smaskaras from jatakarma to cuda (i.e, including if) have been performed in the family of birth that boy cannot be adopted in another family; (2) if a boys cuda and other later ceremonies are performed in the adoptive family before any other cermony is performed on the family of adoption he is fully an adopted son; (3) a boy over five years of age cannot be adopted at all; (4) a boy whose cuda has been performed in the family of birth may be adopted up to five years, provided the rite called putresti is first performed in the adoptive family before any other ceremony is performed on the adopted boy. The D.M (Dattaka Mimansa) say that the best time, for adoption is up to three years, then from three years to five is the next best (gauna) and that after five no boy can be adopted. The D.C (Dattaka Chandrika) (p. 36) holds that a boy of the three higher classes can be adopted up to upanayana and that a sudra boy can be adopted till his marriage. The Nimyasindhu seems to be of the same opinion. The Mayukha (vyavakar Mayukha) and Sam. K. (Samskara Kausuha) both hold that even a boy not of the same gotra may be taken in adoption after Upanayanna or after marriage and even when the person to be adopted himself had a son. In Bengal, Banaras and Bihar courts hold that the boys must be adopted before upanayana. The same rule holds good in Madras; but there it is further held that if the boy to be adopted is of the same gotra as the adopter, the adoption may be made after upanayana but before marriage. In Bombay a person may be adopted is of the same gotra as the adopter, the adoption may be made after upanayana but before marriage. In Bombay a person may be adopted at any age, even after marriage and even after he has had children and he may be even older than the adopter. In the whole of India a sudra may be adopted only Before his marriage, but in the Bombay Presidency the adoption of a married man and of one having even a child is allowed also among sudras.”

    7. In Krishnayya Rao v. Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao . AIR 1935 PC 190., at page 193 Cl the following observations are made:

    “He was no doubt a major at the time, but this, the parties being Sudras, was no objection. Having regard to her age and the estate of which she was possessed, she may have thought it desirable to bring into her husband's family someone who could relieve her of the burdens of estate management, rather than an infant whom she might never see in manhood.

    8. Counsel for the appellant relied on the ratio of the Supreme Today, 2002 (1) Supreme 233. In the said decision, at page 235 the following view of the full Bench of the Bombay High Court is approved:

    “so long as the Supreme Court does not take a different view from the view taken by the Privy Council, the decision of the privy Council are still binding upon us, and when we say that the decisions of the Privy Council are binding upon us what is binding is not merely the point actually decided but an opinion expressed by the Privy Council which opinion is expressed after careful consideration of all the arguments and which is deliberately and advisedly given.”

    9. In the light of the ratio, the Counsel for the appellant argued that amongst sudras, there is a custom prevalent in the entire India to adopt a boy over the age of 15 and not before his marriage whereas in the Bombay area, there is a custom recognising adoption of a boy even after the marriage amongst sudra communities. The decision of the Privy Council in this behalf is a binding the ratio. Besides, the decision of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court reported in AIR BOM 1977 289 has elaborately and succinctly discussed the several authoritative shastric texts which supports the proposition that amongst sudras a boy aged about 15 but not before his marriage could be adopted as per custom in the entire part of India except Maharastra, where a boy could be adopted even if he is married.

    10. The provisions of Section 10 of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Act saves the cases of adoption of a person above the age of 15 if a custom to that effect is prevalent in the community. In Munnalal v. S.S Rajkumar . AIR 1962 SC 1493., it is laid down thus:

    “It is well settled that where a custom is repeatedly, brought to the notice of the Courts of a country, the courts may hold that custom introduced into the law without the necessity of proof in each individual case: Venkata Mahipati Gangadhara Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur, 45 Ind App 148 : (AIR 1918 PC 81).”

    11. Therefore in view of the ratio laid down in AIR 1962 SC 1493 the necessity of pleading and proof of custom in every case does not arise when the Privy Council has by law declared that there is a custom amongst the sudras to adopt a boy who is aged above 15 years.

    12. “In the History of Dharmasastra “by P.V Kane at page 481 the following observations are made:

    In the whole of India a Sudra may be adopted only before his marriage; but in the Bombay Presidency the adoption of a married man and if one having even a child is allowed also among Sudras (1288 Lingayya v. Chengalmmal 48 Mad 407 where it was held that even a Sudra cannot be adopted after his marriage (when decision follows the DC)

    13. Therefore, the view taken by the appellate Court that the third defendant was aged above 15 years and could not have been validly adopted in law, in the absence of pleading and proof of custom is an untenable view. The defendants have produced Ex. D1 the pronote executed by propositus Siddegowda, it discloses that the loan under the pronote were borrowed for the purpose of the performing the marriage of the adopted son Siddegowda, obviously the third defendant. The index of land produced at Ex. D2 of the year 1966-1967 discloses that the third defendant is the adopted son. The oral evidence also supports the case of adoption of the third defendant.

    14. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Debiprasad v. Smt. Tribeni Devi . AIR 1970 SC. following the ratio laid down by Supreme Court in Laxman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar . AIR 1961 SC 1378.. The relevant extracts of the said facts and ratio are reproduced hereunder for convenient reference:

    “Under the Hindu Law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption is to secure due publicity. To achieve this object it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parents shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it.”

    15. The evidence of defendant witnesses DWs 1 to 9 fully support the case of adoption. DW 6 the natural father of the third defendant testifies the fact of adoption giving vivid account of the procedures following while giving his son in adoption. DW 5 in his evidence refers to the presence of the first defendant and his wife at the time of adoption and testified to the fact that both of them consented to deliver their son in adoption to the propositus Siddegowda and to his wife. The view of the appellate Court that DW 6 natural father does not speak to the presence and participation of his wife is not a strong and a fatal circumstance to conclude that there was no consent on the part of the natural mother. DW 5 has testified to the fact that natural mother was also present and gave consent. The plaintiff has not cross-examined D.W 5 to discredit his veracity about the consent and presence of the natural mother at the time of adoption. There is nothing in the evidence of D.W 6 to rule out the consent and presence of his wife at the time of adoption. In the ruling of the Supreme Court it is held that the essential part of the adoption ceremony lies in the delivery of possession of the adopted child by the natural parents to the adoptive parents. According to the evidence of D.W 6 the said essential requirement is fulfilled and established in this case.

    16. The fact that the suit property is the ancestral property of propositus Siddegowda is borne out by Ex. D2 index of land and record of rights which shows that Siddegowda inherited the lands from his father Hutchegowda. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the sale is for a legal necessity and family benefit. The third defendant by virtue of adoption becomes co-parcener by legal fiction. Therefore, the sale of entire extent of land by propositus Siddegowda under Ex. P1 in favour of the plaintiff is bad in law and cannot bind to the extent of share of the third defendant, an adopted son.

    17. The suit for declaration that the first plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit property and for relief of possession is untenable. The plaintiff could purchase only the share of propositus Siddegowda under Ex. P1. In view of the ruling of this Court Smt. Neelavva v. Smt. Shivawwa . AIR 1989 Kar 45., the relief can be appropriately moulded and decree for partition could be granted declaring half share in favour of the third defendant in the suit property. The first plaintiff as an alienee can workout the remedy of equitable allotment in the final decree proceedings.

    18. If there are any other properties available for partition, application can be made to the Trial Court to include such of the joint family properties in the fold of the suit for working out equitable allotment. The judgment and decree of the appellate court is set aside. Appeal is party allowed in terms indicated above and preliminary decree to be drawn.

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    Shri Siddegowda v. Smt. Mallamma And Others
    (Jan 20, 2004)