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  • Counsel.4. Section 30 of the Advocate's Act 1961, runs thus:Section 30:Subject to the provisions of this Act,
  • provision independent of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act
  • provisions of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act, 1961.
  • Section 30 of the Advocate's Act, 1961,
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  • Counsel.4. Section 30 of the Advocate's Act 1961, runs thus:Section 30:Subject to the provisions of this Act,
  • provision independent of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act
  • provisions of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act, 1961.
  • Section 30 of the Advocate's Act, 1961,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Tirath S. Thakur, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent-Board appointed the petitioners as Coffee Pool Agents under annually renewed Pool Agency Agreements. The agreements required the petitioners to carry out curing work on pooled coffee and deliver it to buyers under Board directions and provided for payment of remuneration.

Clause 11(a) of the Agreements empowered the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer to conduct "such enquiry as he deems fit" to determine loss caused to the Board by breach of the agreement or instructions and to recover the amounts so determined from the agent's remuneration or other dues.

Following inspections, the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer issued show-cause notices to each petitioner alleging abnormal shortages of various forms of coffee, account irregularities and breaches of agreement terms for the years 1989–1990, 1990–1991 and 1991–1992. The notices proposed recoveries for values of coffee, pool expenses, excise duty, penalty and purchase tax, and called upon the petitioners to show cause.

The petitioners submitted explanations denying the allegations. A personal hearing date was fixed and the petitioners appeared through an Advocate who filed a vakalat. The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer refused to accept the vakalat and set out reasons in an order dated 31 July 1992. The petitioners filed writ petitions seeking certiorari to quash that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners, parties to the Pool Agency Agreements, are entitled to be represented by an Advocate in proceedings initiated by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer under clause 11(a) of those agreements.
  2. Whether the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer qualifies as a "Court, Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence" within the meaning of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, thereby attracting the right of an advocate to appear and in consequence the right of a litigant to engage an advocate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Gupta)

  • The refusal to permit Advocates engaged by the petitioners to appear and argue was illegal and violated provisions of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
  • The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was a quasi-judicial authority empowered to impose substantial penalties, and therefore parties appearing before him should have the right to be represented by Counsel.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar Etc. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1987 SC 1518, in support of their claim.

Respondent-Board's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bhat)

  • The grievance was misconceived because the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was neither a statutory authority nor exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers that would entitle petitioners to counsel.
  • The process under clause 11(a) is contractual in nature; determination of loss and recoveries arises from contract and does not create a right to be represented by an Advocate.
  • Section 30 of the Advocates Act creates a right in favour of an Advocate (to practice before courts, tribunals, or persons legally authorised to take evidence); petitioners themselves are not entitled to directly invoke Section 30 in support of their claim to be represented.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar Etc. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1987 SC 1518 Relied upon by petitioners to support the proposition that representation by counsel should be permitted in the proceedings before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer (invoked in support of rights under the Advocates Act). The court noted that reliance was placed on this Supreme Court decision by petitioners' counsel. The judgment does not elaborate that precedent's content; the court's decision turned on its interpretation of Section 30 and the contractual character of clause 11(a), and it did not accept petitioners' claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which entitles every advocate whose name is on the State Roll to practice (i) in all courts including the Supreme Court, (ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, and (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law entitled to practice.

The judge observed that Section 30 confers a personal right on advocates to practice before bodies described therein and that the litigant's right to be represented by counsel is closely related to — and circumscribed by — the advocate's right to appear. Thus, whether a litigant can engage an advocate depends on whether the adjudicatory officer qualifies under Section 30 as a court, tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence.

The court then addressed whether the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer fits any of the Section 30 categories. It was accepted that the Officer was not a "Court" or a "Tribunal" under Section 30. The pivotal question became whether he was a "person legally authorised to take evidence."

The court concluded that the phrase "person legally authorised to take evidence" does not apply where the authority's powers arise solely from a contract rather than from a statutory provision. No statutory provision was pointed out that authorised the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer to record evidence in the enquiries envisaged by clause 11(a) of the Pool Agreement. Clause 11(a) contemplates "such enquiry as he deems fit" to determine loss but does not envisage recording of evidence in a statutory sense.

Because the proceedings under clause 11(a) lack statutory flavour and are contractual mechanisms designed to ensure fairness by giving the affected party an opportunity to explain its position, they do not partake the character of proceedings before a court, tribunal, or a person legally authorised to record evidence for purposes of Section 30. The court further noted that there was no independent statutory or legal provision outside Section 30 that would guarantee a party before the Officer the right to be represented by counsel.

Consequently, the court determined that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was justified in declining to permit the petitioners' advocates to appear and that the petitioners could not claim a right to representation by counsel under Section 30 in these contractual proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were dismissed. The court concluded that the petitioners were not entitled under Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, to be represented by an Advocate in the clause 11(a) enquiries before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, because those proceedings are contractual in nature and the Officer is not a Court, Tribunal, nor a person legally authorised to take evidence for purposes of Section 30.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer's decision to refuse to accept the petitioners' advocates' vakalat (order dated 31 July 1992) was upheld.
  • The petitioners' writ petitions for certiorari to quash that order failed and were dismissed; the court ordered no costs.

Broader implications: The opinion reasons that clause 11(a) proceedings are contractual and do not carry statutory character that would attract the right to counsel under Section 30. The judgment does not announce or discuss a wider novel precedent beyond the interpretation applied to the facts of this contractual enquiry; no separate new precedent is claimed by the court in this opinion.


End of summary. This synopsis is confined to the contents of the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.

    Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd. & Another v. Chamundi Curing Works & Another

    Tirath S. Thakur, J.:—

    Since a common question of law arises for consideration in these petitions, the same shall stand disposed of by this common order. The question precisely is whether the petitioners who are parties to what are known as Pool Agency Agreements are entitled to be represented by an Advocate in the proceedings initiated by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, in terms of para 11(a) of the said agreements. The controversy arises against the following backdrop:

    The Respondent-Board has appointed each one of the petitioners as Coffee Pool Agents in terms of agreements executed with them which are renewed every year. The agreements inter alia provide that the petitioners shall carry fen curing work of Coffee Pooled by the-Coffee planters and deliver the same to the buyers under the directions of the Board. The terms settled under the agreements envisage payment of remunerations for the work undertaken by the petitioners. Para 11(a) of the Agreements inter alia provides that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer may after making such enquiry as he deems fit determine the amount of loss caused to the Board by reason of breach by the agent of any of the terms of the agreement or of any instructions/circulars issued by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer or other authorised Officer of the Board and upon such determination the amounts determined may be recovered by the Board from out of the remuneration payable to the agents or out of any other amount that may be due to the gents agent by the Board on any other account or by any other means at the discretion of the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer. The Second Respondent Chief Marketing Officer appears to have issued show cause notices to each one of the petitioners, in consequence of an inspection made by the Officers of the Board alleging abnormal shortage of raw Coffee, cleaned Coffee and Coffee under process as also irregularities in the maintenance of accounts and violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement for the years 1989-1990, 1990-1991 and 1991-1992. The Notices proposed to make recoveries of amounts indicated therein from the petitioners towards the value of the coffee, pool expenses, excise duty, penalty and purchase tax etc. The petitioners were called upon to show-cause why the amounts indicated in the Notices be not recovered from them. It is not in dispute that the petitioners submitted their explanations to the show-cause notices in which they denied the allegations made in the same. The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer then appears to have fixed a date for a personal hearing of the petitioners, on which date, and for which purpose the petitioners entered appearance before the Officer through an Advocate engaged by them. The Advocate appears to have filed his vakalat which was not entertained for reasons that were set out by the Officer in an order dated 31st of July 1992. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions for a certiorari quashing the same.

    2. Appearing for the petitioners Mr. Gupta strenuously contended that the refusal of the Respondent Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, to permit the Advocates engaged by the petitioners to appear and argue on their behalf, was illegal and in violation of the provisions of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act, 1961. He urged that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was a quasi judicial authority empowered to impose penalties running into lakhs of rupees and was therefore an authority before whom all those appearing as litigants would have the right to be represented by a Counsel. In as much as the Officer had declined to the petitioners the assistance of a Counsel, he had committed an error apparent on the face of record. Reliance was placed by Mr. Gupta upon a decision of the Supreme Court in H.S Srinivasa Raghavachar Etc. v. State of Karnataka . AIR 1987 SC P- 1518..

    3. Mr. Bhat Counsel appearing for the Board on the other hand contended that the grievance made by the petitioners was wholly misconceived. He urged that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was neither a statutory Authority nor exercising any judicial or quasi judicial powers which could possibly entitle the petitioners to engage a Counsel on their behalf. He submitted that the entire process of determination of the amount of loss and the consequential recoveries if any on the basis thereof, was contractual in nature and did not admit of any party claiming the right to be represented by an Advocate. He contended that Section 30 of the Advocate's Act, 1961, created a right only in favour of an Advocate whose name is entered in the roll to practice before any Court, Tribunal Authority or person prescribed thereunder. It was therefore only an Advocate who could possibly make a grievance against the order made by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer. The petitioners are not, argued Mr. Bhat entitled to rely upon Section 30 of in support of their claim for being represented by a Counsel.

    4. Section 30 of the Advocate's Act 1961, runs thus:—

    “Section 30:—

    Subject to the provisions of this Act, every advocate whose name is entered in the (State roll) shall be entitled as of right to practice throughout the territories to which this Act extends.,-

    (i) in all courts including the Supreme Court;

    (ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and

    (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practice.”

    A plain reading of the above would show that the provision entitles every advocate whose name has been entered in the State Roll to practice before all Courts including the Supreme Court of India. It also guarantees to any such Advocate the right to practice before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence and any other authority or person before whom such Advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practice. It is evident that the provision confers a right upon all such Advocates as have their names entered in the State Roll. It is also true that denial of any such right to an Advocate would entitle him to make a grievance on his own. That would not however necessarily mean that Section 30 would have no reliance for purposes of determining the entitlement of a litigant to engage a Counsel. The right of an Advocate to practice before any Court or Tribunal is closely related to the right of his client to engage him for appearance before any such Court of Tribunal. Stated Conversely the right of a litigant to be represented by a Counsel is circumscribed by the right of the Advocate to appear before such Court, Tribunal, Authority or person. If the Advocate has in terms of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act 1961, the right to practice before any Court, Tribunal, Authority or person, it would-necessarily mean that a litigant before any such Court, Tribunal, Authority or person will have a right to engage and avail of the services of an Advocate. The essence of the matter therefore is whether the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer answers the description of Court, Tribunal or Authority. If the answer be in the affirmative it would mean that an Advocate has a right to appear before him. As a corollary any person engaged in a cause before the Officer would have a corresponding right to engage any such Advocate to represent his cause. In case however the answer be in the negative, it would imply that the litigant also would have no right to engage a Counsel to appear act or argue on his behalf. That is because there is no provision independent of Section 30 of the Advocate's Act nor was any brought to my notice by Mr. Gupta, which could guarantee to a party engaged in a dispute before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer to be represented by a Counsel. Mr. Gupta's effect therefore was to show that since an Advocate has in terms of Section 30 the right to practice before the Officer it must carry with it, the right of the litigant to engage him.

    5. Coming then to Section 30, it was not disputed that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, was not a Court within the meaning of the Act. It was also not disputed that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was not a Tribunal within the meaning of Section 30(II). What as contended by Mr. Gupta was that the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was a person legally authorise to take evidence and therefore obliged to permit an Advocate to appear before him. No reliance was placed by Mr. Gupta upon Clause III of Section 30 nor is it disputed that there is no statutory or other provision, which entitles an Advocate to appear before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officers in the proceedings initiated under Clause 11(a) of the Agreement. The question then is whether the expression “Person legally authorised to take evidence” appearing in Section 3(II) would include a person who is exercising powers flowing not from any statutory provision but from the provisions of a contract. Mr. Bhat, contended and in my opinion rightly so that the expression has no application to cases where the person before whom the right of representation is claimed is not authorised by a statutory provision of law to record evidence. No such provision indeed has been pointed out or can be relied upon on behalf of the petitioners in so far as an enquiry envisaged by 11(a) of the Pool Agreement is concerned. The Pool Agreement does not even envisage the recording of evidence. It only refers to such enquiry as the Officer may deem fit for purposes of determining the amount of loss caused to the Board by reason of a breach of any one of the terms thereof. In the absence of any statutory flavour in the proceedings before the Officer and keeping in view the nature of the provision made by clause 11(a) of the agreement the Officer does not in my opinion answer the description of the expression “person legally authorised to take evidence” used in Section 30 of the Act. That being so, it is difficult to see how a party to the Agreement who has been given an opportunity to explain its position, and a hearing before the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, determines the actual amount recoverable from it can possibly claim, the right to be represented by a Counsel. The entire exercise envisaged by para 11(a) of the Agreement is in my opinion aimed at ensuring fairness in action. The mechanism for an enquiry has been provided with a view to giving the party who is likely to suffer prejudice an opportunity to explain his position. Any such provision cannot therefore be confused with proceedings which are analogous to those referred to in Section 30 of the Act. The Chief Coffee Marketing Officer was therefore justified in holding that the proceedings before him did not partake the character of proceedings before a Court, Tribunal or Authority nor was he a person legally authorised to record evidence so as to entitle an Advocate to appear or a litigant to claim the right of being represent by any such Advocate.

    6. In the result, I see no reason to interfere. This Writ Petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances no orders as to costs.

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    Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd. & Another v. Chamundi Curing Works & Another
    (Jan 29, 1999)