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  • hereunder:5. Section 2(1), Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
  • Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 2(1), Workmen's Compensation Act,
  • SECTION 149 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
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citation codes
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  • hereunder:5. Section 2(1), Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
  • Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 2(1), Workmen's Compensation Act,
  • SECTION 149 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals were filed by the employer (1st appellant) and the Insurance Company (2nd appellant) against an award passed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Two appeals arise: M.F.A No. 1591 of 1993 (claim by the driver of lorry CTX 9525) and M.F.A No. 1592 of 1993 (claim by the cleaner of the same lorry). The claimants alleged that the lorry belonged to the 1st appellant and that they were employed as driver and cleaner respectively. On 6-12-1991 at about 6 a.m., while returning from Madras, the lorry was involved in an accident in which the claimants sustained grievous injuries. They were treated at the Sanjay Gandhi Accident Rehabilitation Centre, Jayanagar, Bangalore, and were subsequently discharged.

Each claimant sought compensation for "total disablement" under the Workmen's Compensation Act: the driver claimed a monthly wage of Rs. 1,500 and the cleaner Rs. 1,000. The owner of the vehicle (1st respondent before the Commissioner) did not contest the claim, failed to file a statement, and remained ex parte at the inquiry. The Insurance Company contested the claim and participated in the inquiry.

The claimants gave oral evidence, produced medical documents and examined the treating doctor. The Commissioner found that (a) the claimants sustained injuries in the accident, (b) they were workers of the 1st appellant, (c) their wages were as claimed, and (d) they had suffered total disablement. The Commissioner assessed monetary compensation accordingly and passed the award now challenged by these appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Commissioner correctly found that the claimants suffered "total disablement" within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  2. Whether the Insurance Company can challenge the quantum of compensation awarded by the Commissioner, particularly by disputing the factual finding of total disablement.
  3. Whether the 1st appellant (owner), having remained ex parte before the Commissioner, may challenge the factual findings of the Commissioner on appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Owner and Insurance Company)

  • The Insurance Company contested the claim before the Commissioner and challenged the award on appeal, including the quantum of compensation.
  • Specifically, the insurer (through counsel) submitted that it was entitled to challenge the Commissioner's finding of "total disablement" because that finding goes to the root of the compensation assessment. The insurer argued that the doctor's evidence showed the claimants could carry on some other work (and possibly even the same work) and that their injuries did not impair their ability to work in a way that would amount to total disablement as defined under Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • The 1st appellant (owner) did not contest before the Commissioner: he failed to file a statement, did not appear, and did not cross-examine witnesses. No explanation for that non-participation was provided in the grounds of appeal before this Court.

Claimants

  • The claimants maintained that they sustained grievous injuries in the accident and that those injuries caused "total disablement," thereby entitling them to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • They adduced oral testimony concerning their employment and wages, produced medical records, and called the treating doctor, whose evidence supported the claim of total disablement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Insurance Company Limited v. Mohd. Saleem Khan, 1992 2 LLJ 377 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Illustration that "total disablement" under Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be assessed with reference to the work the workman was capable of performing at the time of the accident; incapacity to perform that work amounts to total disablement even if the workman can perform some other work. The Court relied on this authority to support its view that a worker who is incapacitated from performing the particular work for which he was employed (e.g., a driver unable to drive heavy vehicles) suffers total disablement under the Act, irrespective of the possibility of other work.
Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, 1976 1 LLJ 235 Support for the proposition that total disablement is to be judged by reference to the work the workman could perform at the time of the accident; partial physical impairment does not preclude a finding of total disablement if the worker cannot do his original work. Cited by the Court (via the Andhra Pradesh decision) to reinforce the principle that inability to perform the pre-accident work qualifies as total disablement under the Act.
Punambhai Khodabhai Parmar v. G. Kenel Constructions, 1985 II LLJ 98 Similar support for assessing total disablement with reference to the work previously performed by the worker; a quantified physical impairment may still amount to total disablement for the purposes of compensation. Relied upon (through the quoted passage) to confirm that even where medical testimony shows a particular percentage of physical impairment, incapacity to perform the original employment can constitute total disablement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Owner's default and effect: The 1st appellant (owner) remained ex parte before the Commissioner, did not file a statement, and did not cross-examine witnesses. The Court treated that non-participation as an effective admission of the facts and findings that were supported by evidence before the Commissioner (such as employment status, wages, injuries, and total disablement). Consequently, the owner could not challenge the Commissioner's factual findings on appeal.
  2. Insurer's limitations: The Court noted established principle (drawn by analogy from motor accident claims) that the Insurance Company cannot ordinarily dispute the quantum of compensation awarded by the Commissioner unless the insurer advances one of the permitted grounds under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellants had not shown that their challenge fell within those permitted grounds; therefore, the insurer's challenge to quantum failed on that basis.
  3. Challenge to "total disablement": The insurer contended that the finding of total disablement could be challenged because it goes to the root of the compensation. The insurer relied on the doctor's evidence to contend that the claimants could carry out some other work and thus were not "totally disabled."
  4. Evaluation of factual finding: The Court characterized the Commissioner's finding of total disablement as a question of fact arising from the evidence and concluded that there was no perversity in the appreciation of evidence to warrant interference. The Court held that the treating doctor's evidence supported the finding of physical disability amounting to total disablement.
  5. Legal construction of "total disablement": The Court explained (adopting reasoning expressed in the cited Andhra Pradesh decision) that "total disablement" under Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be understood with reference to the work the worker was employed to perform at the time of the accident. If the worker is incapacitated from performing that work, he suffers total disablement for the purposes of the Act, even if he could possibly do some other form of work elsewhere. The capacity to do other work does not negate total disablement in relation to the original employment which conferred the worker's status under the employer.
  6. Practical considerations: The Court observed reasons why a skilled worker disabled from his particular skilled work may not realistically be employable as an unskilled worker in the same industry (age, opposition from other workers, practical difficulties), reinforcing the view that loss of capacity to perform the original work can amount to a virtual exit from employment and thus total disablement.
  7. Conduct of appellants and costs: The Court noted that the owner had essentially lent his name to the appeals to enable the insurer to challenge the award, without having participated in the earlier proceedings or offering any explanation. On that basis the Court concluded that the appellants should be mulcted with the respondents' costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both appeals are dismissed with costs.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Commissioner's award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 — including findings that the claimants were employees, their wages as claimed, and that they suffered total disablement — is upheld.
  • The 1st appellant (owner), having remained ex parte before the Commissioner, is precluded from challenging the Commissioner's factual findings on appeal in respect of matters supported by evidence at the inquiry.
  • The Insurance Company's attempt to dispute the quantum of compensation failed because it did not rely upon any permitted ground under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act and because the Commissioner's finding of total disablement was a factual conclusion supported by evidence and consistent with legal principles as to how "total disablement" is to be assessed.
  • The Court ordered that the appellants bear costs; the decision therefore has the direct practical effect of affirming the award and penalizing the appellants for the manner of their prosecution of the appeals.
  • The opinion applies established principles and relies upon prior authority; it does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond reaffirming the proper assessment of "total disablement" vis-a-vis the work the employee was doing at the time of the accident.

    K.P Hanumantha Gowda And Another v. Devaraju And Another

    1. These appeals have been preferred by the Employer as also the Insurance Company with respect to an award passed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The 1st appellant is the alleged employer and the 2nd appellant is the Insurance Company. M.F.A No. 1591 of 1993 arises out of W.C.A/NF-2/92 and M.F.A No. 1592 of 1993 is against the award in W.C.A/NF-/92. The claimant in M.F.A No. 1591 of 1993 is the driver of the lorry CTX 9525 and the claimant in M.F.A No. 1592 of 1993 is its cleaner. It is claimed by them that the lorry belonged to the 1st appellant and the claimants were employed as a driver and cleaner. In an accident that took place at about 6 a.m on 6-12-1991 while the lorry was returning from Madras the claimants sustained certain grievous injuries. They were treated at the Sanjay Gandhi Accident Rehabilitation Centre, Jayanagar, Bangalore. After treatment they were discharged. They claimed to have sustained “total disablement” and claimed compensation accordingly under the Act. The claimant in M.F.A No. 1591 of 1993 claimed his monthly wage to be at Rs. 1,500/-. While the claimant in M.F.A No. 1592 of 1993 claimed Rs. 1,000/- as his wage per month. The compensation was claimed accordingly.

    2. The owner of the vehicle did not contest, nor file any statement. He did not dispute the status of the applicant, the quantum of wages or the disabilities pleaded.

    3. The owner 1st respondent remained ex parte. The 2nd respondent Insurance Company contested and disputed the claim of the claimants. It participated in the enquiry.

    4. The claimants were examined and they deposed in terms of their pleadings. They also stated on oath the monthly wages paid to them. They produced documents to prove the injuries sustained by them and they examined the doctor who treated them to support the contentions that they have suffered total disablement.

    5. The Commissioner found that the claimants sustained the injuries in the accident. It was also found that the claimants were the workers of the 1st appellant. On the basis of the oral evidence it found that the wages of the workers is as claimed by them. It further found relying on the evidence of the claimants as also that of the Doctor who examined them that the claimants had suffered total disablement, and that they cannot carry on their avocation thereafter. The monetary compensation was assessed accordingly and passed the award impugned in these appeals.

    6. The appeals are filed jointly by the owner as also the Insurance Company. The owner had remained ex parte before the Commissioner despite notice. He did not file any statement. He did not cross-examine the claimants or the Doctor. In other words, the owner admitted the gravity of the injury sustained, the status of the claimants, the monthly wages claimed by them, the total disablement pleaded and the total compensation claimed. Nothing is stated in the grounds of appeals before this Court as to why the owner did not appear before the Commissioner and contest the claim. As such, the owner, who is the 1st appellant herein cannot challenge any of the findings entered by the tribunal on the basis of the evidence tendered. Therefore, this court need not consider any of the contentions urged on behalf of the owner in these appeals in so far as it relates to the findings of fact entered by the Commissioner.

    7. This Court has time and again stated that, the Insurance Company cannot dispute the quantum of compensation awarded by the Commissioner for workmen's compensation, invoking the said principle applicable in a motor accidents claim. Further, the grounds of appeals urged before this Court does not show that the challenge against the award is on any of the permitted grounds under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As such, the challenge of the Insurer against the quantum of compensation made by the Commissioner has to fail.

    8. But, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the insurer is entitled to challenge the findings of the Commissioner that the claimants have sustained “total disablement”, as, according to him, the finding goes to the root of the assessment of compensation. According to the learned Counsel, the claimants have not sustained any “total disablement” as defined at Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Doctor's evidence shows that the claimants can carry on some other work and even the same work that they were doing and the injuries have not in any way impaired their ability to do the work.

    9. I am of the view, the finding entered by the tribunal in this behalf is a question of fact and there is substantial question of law arising out of the finding. It cannot be said that the appreciation of the evidence is perverse warranting interference. That apart, the Doctor's evidence clearly shows that the claimants have sustained physical disability resulting in their suffering total disablement. The total disablement should be assessed vis-a-vis the work the worker was carrying. If the worker, is disabled to perform the work he was engaged to perform it amounts to total disablement. It is to be noted that the compensation is claimed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 by the worker as defined under the Act. That worker, due to the injury sustained by him, looses the capacity to do that work, which capacity earned him the status of a worker under the employer. If so, the disablement that he suffers should be understood vis-a-vis the work he carried on or for which he was employed. If by the accident, he becomes totally disabled to carry on that work, as far as he is concerned, it is a total disablement. A driver employed is employed to drive. He is not to work as a sweeper or a manual labourer. If due to the accident, a driver becomes incapable of performing his duties as a driver there is total disablement as far as he is concerned. He will cease to be a driver under his employer and consequently a worker under that employer. The fact that he can do some other work elsewhere is no ground to state that he is not totally disabled. His disablement should be assessed with reference to the work he was employed to perform at the time of accident. His capacity to do some other type of work did not earn him the status of worker under the particular employer. If by the accident, the worker looses his employment under his employer, thereby ceases to be a worker as defined under the Act under that particular employer which employment brought him under the purview of the Act and the relationship of employer - worker is brought to an end, then that amounts to the “total disablement” contemplated under the Act. To repeat his capacity to do some other work either under the same employer or another employer or independently is of no consequence. It has to be remembered that a skilled worker, if by an accident is disabled to do the particular skilled work, may not be in a position to be employed as an unskilled worker in the same industry for a variety of reasons. He may be over aged or there may be opposition from other unskilled worker since the new employee may mar their employment prospects. Hence with the employee being disabled to carry the work for which he was originally employed, it will be a virtual exit from the establishment. It may be contradiction in terms if we are still to hold that there is no “total disablement” for the employee. This is what is expressed in a different manner by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Mohd. Saleem Khan . 1992 2 LLJ 377..

    10. It is stated as hereunder:

    “5. Section 2(1), Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 defines the total disability, which is as under:—

    “total disablement” means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement”.

    By the date of the accident, respondent 1 herein was working as a driver of the truck, a heavy vehicle. It is in evidence that in view of the injuries respondent 1 herein is not fit to drive the heavy vehicle. Thus it is a case of disablement which incapacitated respondent 1 herein from driving the heavy vehicle i.e, the work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. Such disablement comes within the purview of total disablement as defined in Section 2(1), Workmen's Compensation Act, though the doctor held that physical impairment and loss of physical function was to the extent of 50% only. The work which the workman was capable of performing at the time of the accident material to consider whether it is a case of total disablement or not, in view of the injuries sustained in the accident. If the workman is incapacitated to do all the work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident, it is a case of total disablement. It may be that in view of the above injuries, the workman is capable enough to render some other sort of work but still when there is incapacity to do the work which he was capable of performing by the date of the accident, it is a case of total disablement. The Judgments in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata . 1976 1 LLJ 235. and Punambhai Khodabhai Parmar v. G. Kenel Constructions . 1985 II LLJ 98., support the above contention for respondent 1 herein. Hence I find that Lower Tribunal is right in awarding compensation by treating it as a case of total disablement when respondent 1 herein is incapable of performing the duty of driver of a heavy vehicle i.e, the work which he was performing by the time of the accident”.

    11. I am in respectful agreement with what is stated above. The Insurance Company has joined the owner in the appeals merely to enable them to challenge the quantum awarded and the Endings of facts entered by the Commissioner. As noticed earlier, the owner did not either appear or participate before the Commissioner and had not contested the claim; he remained ex parte evincing total disinterest in the proceeding. Neither the owner nor the Insurer have given any valid reason before this Court as to why the owner did not participate before the Commissioner. The owner has simply lent his name to enable the insurer to file the appeals and question the quantum. Therefore, this is a case where the appellants should be mulcted with costs of the respondents.

    12. Both the appeals are therefore dismissed with costs.

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    K.P Hanumantha Gowda And Another v. Devaraju And Another
    (May 31, 1995)