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Structured Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Section 439 read with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner for enlargement on bail in Crime No. 26/91 of Arasikere Rural Police Station. The case was committed to the Sessions Court, Hassan and is pending as S.C. No. 41/1991. The petitioner and another are accused of offences punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 324 IPC.

Relevant dates and procedural steps described in the opinion:

  • The petitioner was arrested on 15-4-1991.
  • He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (J.M.F.C.), Arasikere on 16-4-1991 and remanded to judicial custody on that day; custody was extended from time to time.
  • The charge-sheet was filed before the learned J.M.F.C. on 15-7-1991.
  • The petitioner's bail application before the J.M.F.C. failed; he then applied to the Sessions Judge, Hassan, whose order also refused bail; this led to the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of the 90‑day period in clause (a) of the proviso to Section 165(2) Cr.P.C., the period begins from the date of arrest or from the date on which the accused is remanded by a Magistrate.
  2. Whether a charge-sheet filed after the 90‑day period (as counted by the applicable rule) entitles the accused to release on bail under the relevant provisions.
  3. Whether a public holiday falling on the last day of the 90‑day period may be excluded from counting (i.e., whether Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies to effectively extend the filing date to the next working day).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as set out in the opinion)

  • Main ground: the petitioner should have been released on bail because the charge-sheet was filed after the expiration of 90 days referred to in clause (a) of the proviso to Section 165(2) Cr.P.C.
  • Counsel for the petitioner (Sri Hashmath Pasha) relied on decisions of this Court (Balappa Karnal, Muniswami, Ramu) to contend that the date of arrest must be taken into account for determining commencement of the 90‑day period.
  • Counsel also relied on Balappa Karnal to argue that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to treat a public holiday falling on the last day as extending the period (i.e., the charge-sheet could not be filed on the next day merely because the 90th day was a public holiday).

Respondent-State's Arguments (as set out in the opinion)

  • The respondent-State (represented by the learned Government Pleader, Sri M. Marigowda) contended that the charge-sheet was filed within time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balappa Karnal v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1985 KAR 3098 Interpreted counting of days for the purpose of the 90‑day provision and held that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act will not apply to exclude a public holiday in this context. The court relied on Balappa Karnal for the proposition that a public holiday on the last day of the 90‑day period cannot be excluded when counting the 90 days and that Section 10, General Clauses Act, is not applicable to extend the filing date in such a situation.
Muniswami v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1985 KAR 3180 Used for the method of counting days (same modus operandi as Balappa Karnal). The court observed that Muniswami applied the same method of counting days and treated a day as running from midnight to midnight for the purpose of computing the 90‑day period.
Ramu v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1991 KAR 1861 Relied upon for counting days and related interim principles cited by the petitioner. The court noted Ramu as one of the decisions relied on by the petitioner that employed the same approach to counting the days for the 90‑day calculation.
Ghaganti Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 2130 Supreme Court ruling that the 90‑day/60‑day period in proviso (a) begins from the date of remand by the Magistrate (i.e., detention authorised by the Magistrate), not from the date of police custody/arrest. The court applied this Supreme Court principle to hold that the 90‑day period commences from the date on which the accused is remanded by the Magistrate (the date of remand), and not from the date of arrest.
C. Sathyanarayana's case (citation not provided in the opinion) Illustrated counting of days: a day is to be counted on the basis that it begins after midnight and continues till the next midnight; even a fraction of a day ending at midnight counts as a "day." The court referenced this case to support the method of counting that led to treating the 90th day as a full day (i.e., counting from date of remand so that the 90th day fell on 14-7-1991 in the present facts).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step‑by‑step analysis confined to the facts and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Fact‑finding: it was undisputed that the petitioner was arrested on 15-4-1991 and produced before the J.M.F.C. on 16-4-1991; the charge-sheet was filed on 15-7-1991.
  2. Legal starting point: the court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Ghaganti Satyanarayana which held that the 90‑day period in proviso (a) begins from the date of remand by the Magistrate (i.e., when detention is authorised by the Magistrate), not from the date of police custody or arrest.
  3. Counting the period: relying also on local decisions (Balappa Karnal, Muniswami and C. Sathyanarayana's case) the court explained the accepted method of counting days — treating each calendar day (midnight to midnight) as a "day" for this computation — and concluded that where the accused was produced and remanded on 16-4-1991, the 90th day was 14-7-1991.
  4. Public holiday point: although 14-7-1991 was a public holiday, the court followed Balappa Karnal in holding that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not operate to exclude that public holiday for the purpose of counting the 90 days in this context; consequently a public holiday falling on the 90th day does not permit filing the charge-sheet on the next day as within the 90‑day period.
  5. Application to present facts: since the charge-sheet was filed on 15-7-1991, i.e., after 14-7-1991 (the 90th day), the court concluded that the charge-sheet was filed after the expiration of the 90‑day period as computed from date of remand.
  6. Conclusion on error below: the Sessions Judge had not considered these aspects properly and therefore the Sessions Judge's refusal of bail was found to be incorrect in the light of the above analysis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; the petitioner is entitled to bail.

Direct consequences and conditions imposed by the court:

  • The petitioner is directed to be released on bail on his executing a bond for Rs. 5,000 with one surety for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge, Hassan.
  • Condition of bail: the petitioner shall not leave Hassan Town without the express permission of the Sessions Judge, Hassan.

Broader implications:
The opinion applies existing precedents (notably the Supreme Court decision in Ghaganti Satyanarayana and this Court's own decisions such as Balappa Karnal and Muniswami) to clarify that the 90‑day period in proviso (a) to Section 165(2) Cr.P.C. runs from the date of remand by a Magistrate and that a public holiday falling on the 90th day is not excluded by Section 10 of the General Clauses Act for the purpose of that computation. The judgment does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying and reconciling the cited authorities; its immediate effect is to set aside the Sessions Judge's refusal of bail and to grant bail on the stated terms.


Judge delivering the opinion as stated in the provided text: N.D.V. Bhat, J.

    Shivanna v. State

    N.D.V Bhat, J.:—

    By this Petition, the petitioner has prayed for enlarging him on bail in Crime No. 26/91 of Arasikere Rural Police Station. It is seen that the case is committed to the Sessions Court, Hassan and the same is now pending in S.C No. 41/1991. The petitioner and another are accused of offences punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 324 IPC. The petitioner is arrested in the course of investigation on 15-4-1991. He was produced before the J.M.F.C Arasikere on 16-4-1991. He was remanded to judicial custody on the same day and the custody was extended from time to time. The charge-sheet was filed before the learned J.M.F.C on 15-7-1991. His application before the learned J.M.F.C for releasing him on bail did not fructify. He approached the learned Sessions Judge, Hassan praying for bail. In the meanwhile, the case was also-committed to the Sessions Court by the J.M.F.C, Arasikere. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the application for bail. Hence, the instant Petition under Section 439 read with Section 167(2) Cr. P.C

    2. The only ground made out by the petitioner in his application for bail is that he ought to have been released on bail, since the charge-sheet was filed after the expiration of 90 days referred to in Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 165(2) Cr. P.C

    3. The contention of the respondent-State is that the charge-sheet is filed well within time.

    4. I have heard Sri Hashmath Pasha, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri M. Marigowda, learned Government Pleader.

    5. It is undisputed that the petitioner was arrested on 15-4-1991 in connection with the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC among other offences. Similarly, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was produced before the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Arasikere on 16-4-1991. The charge-sheet was filed before the J.M.F.C on 15-7-1991. Sri Hashmath Pasha, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on three Decisions of this Court viz., Balappa Karnal v. State Of Karnataka* . ILR 1985 KAR 3098.; Muniswami v. State of Karnataka . ILR 1985 KAR 3180. and the Decision in Ramu v. State Of Karnataka* . ILR 1991 KAR 1861., to contend that the date of arrest also will have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the commencement of the period of 90 days referred to in clause (a) to the proviso to Section 165(2) Cr. P.C Sri Hashmath Pasha has placed reliance on Balappa Karnal's case, also to contend that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked in such a situation, to hold that if the last day of the period of 90 days is a public holiday, the charge-sheet can be filed on the next day.

    6. The Supreme Court in Ghaganti Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh . AIR 1986 SC 2130. has among other things held as under:

    “The words used in proviso (a) are ‘no Magistrate was authorised the detention of the accused person in custody’, ‘under this paragraph’, ‘for a total period exceeding i.e, 90 days/60 days’. Detention can be authorised by the Magistrate only from the time the order of remand is passed. The earlier period when the accused is in the custody of a Police Officer in exercise of his powers under Section 57 cannot constitute detention pursuant to an authorisation issued by the Magistrate. It, therefore, stands to reason that the total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run only from the date of order of remand.”

    In the light of the Decision of the Supreme Court it will have to be held that the period of 90 days commences from the date on which the accused is remanded and not from the date of arrest. If the date of arrest and the date of remand are one and the same there should not be any difficulty.

    7. In the instant case as pointed out earlier, the accused was produced before the J.M.F.C, on 16-4-1991. The charge-sheet was filed before the J.M.F.C, on 15-7-1991. 14-7-1991 was a public holiday. However, it is pointed out by this Court in the Decision in Balappa Karnal's case that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act will not apply to such a situation, since there is no time limit within which the Police have to place the final report. In other words, though the accused will be entitled to be released on bail if the charge-sheet is not produced by the Police before the expiry of 90 days, there is no legislative command that the charge-sheet should be filed within 90 days and that therefore, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act will not apply.

    8. If that be so, it will have to be seen as to when 90 days will expire. In C. Sathyanarayana's case the accused persons were arrested on 19-7-1985. However, they were produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate on 20-7-1985. The I.O filed the charge-sheet in that case on 17-10-1985. The Supreme Court took 17th October 1985 as on 90th day commencing from the date on which the accused was remanded. Having regard to the same, it is clear that the day cannot be counted on the basis of 24 hours but on the basis that the day begins after midnight and would continue till next mid-night. It also appears that even a fraction of day ending at midnight will have to be construed as a “day”.

    It is seen that the modus operandi worked out both in Balappa Karnal's case as also in Muniswamy's case for the purpose of counting the days is also the same. In the instant cast, the accused was produced on 16-4-1991. Therefore, 90 days will expire on 14-7-1991. In otherwords, 14-7-1991 will be on 90th day from the date of remand, which in this case, is 16-4-1991. The charge-sheet is filed on 15-7-1991. 14-7-1991 was no doubt a public holiday. However, in the light of the Decision of this Court in Balappa Karnal's case with which I respectfully agree with reference to this aspect, 14-7-1991 though a public holiday cannot be excluded for the purpose of counting 90 days from the date of remand. It is, therefore, clear that the charge-sheet which was filed on 15-4-1991 was filed after the expiration of 90 days from the date of remand. The learned Sessions Judge has not considered the aspects referred to hereinabove, with the result, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge is not correct.

    9. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petitioner is entitled to bail prayed for.

    10. In the result, the Petition is allowed. The petitioner is directed to be released on bail on his executing a bond for Rs. 5000/- with one surety for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge, Hassan and on his undertaking to abide by the following condition:

    (1) He shall not leave Hassan Town without the express permission of the Sessions Judge, Hassan.

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    Comments

    Shivanna v. State
    (Feb 3, 1992)