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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an eviction petition filed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, wherein the petitioner sought to evict the respondent from certain premises. The petitioner attempted to admit two documents in evidence to establish his right to the property: an alleged deed of usufructuary mortgage and a lease deed for eleven months. Both documents were neither registered nor properly stamped, leading the trial Court to refuse their admission in evidence. The petitioner challenged this refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an alleged deed of usufructuary mortgage, which was neither registered nor properly stamped, can be admitted in evidence and treated as a valid mortgage deed.
  2. Whether a lease deed for eleven months, unstamped and unregistered, can be admitted in evidence for any purpose, including collateral purposes.
  3. The applicability of provisions under the Karnataka Stamp Act and Registration Act regarding admissibility of unstamped and unregistered documents in evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the premises were initially mortgaged by deposit of title deeds, which was properly registered, and the subsequent usufructuary mortgage deed did not require registration as an additional security.
  • He relied on the decision in Narayana Rao, M.S v. M.S Shivanna to argue that non-registration of the usufructuary mortgage deed should not bar its admission.
  • Regarding the lease deed, the petitioner argued that although unstamped, it could be admitted for collateral purposes under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act to show the nature of the respondent’s possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayana Rao, M.S v. M.S Shivanna (1988 2 KLJ 330) Non-registration of an agreement (partition) does not bar proof of the agreement to establish date of partition. The Court distinguished this case, holding it was not applicable because the usufructuary mortgage was a distinct transfer requiring compulsory registration.
Murugharajendra Co. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (1974 1 KLJ 177 FB) Subsequent letter acknowledging existing equitable mortgage need not be stamped if it does not create new rights or liabilities. The Court noted this was a different context and did not apply to the present usufructuary mortgage deed.
Malkajappa v. C. Ayamma (1964 1 Mys. L.J 299) Mortgage deeds other than deposit of title deeds must be registered and stamped to be effective; unstamped and unregistered documents do not create mortgage rights. The Court relied on this to hold that the alleged usufructuary mortgage deed could not be treated as a mortgage deed but could be admitted as an ordinary document.
Crompton Engineering Co., (Madras) Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (AIR 1952 Mad. 764 FB) Documents not attested or registered do not operate as transfers by mortgage and do not attract stamp duty liability as mortgage deeds. The Court used this to reinforce that the alleged usufructuary mortgage deed was not a mortgage deed for stamp duty purposes.
Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand (AIR 1946 PC 51) Under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act (similar to Section 34 of Karnataka Stamp Act), unstamped documents are inadmissible for any purpose, including collateral purposes. The Court held that the unstamped lease deed could not be admitted even for collateral purposes, rejecting the petitioner’s reliance on the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the two documents submitted by the petitioner. It distinguished the petitioner’s reliance on Narayana Rao, holding that the usufructuary mortgage was a separate transaction requiring compulsory registration under the law, unlike the deposit of title deeds mortgage which does not require registration. The Court referred to authoritative precedents including Malkajappa and Crompton Engineering to conclude that the alleged usufructuary mortgage deed, being unregistered and unstamped, could not be treated as a mortgage deed but could be admitted as an ordinary document to aid the petitioner’s claim to possession.

Regarding the lease deed, the Court noted that Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act prohibits admission of unstamped documents for any purpose, including collateral purposes. The petitioner’s reliance on the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act was rejected because no similar exception exists under the Stamp Act. The Court relied heavily on the Privy Council decision in Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand to underscore that unstamped documents cannot be admitted even for collateral purposes. Consequently, the trial Court’s refusal to admit the lease deed was upheld.

The Court emphasized the fiscal nature of the Stamp Act, noting that its strict interpretation is necessary to ensure revenue collection, and that no equity-based exceptions apply unless there is ambiguity in the statute.

Holding and Implications

The Court partly allowed the petition by reversing the trial Court’s order only in respect of the document dated 18-6-1988 (the alleged usufructuary mortgage deed), permitting it to be marked in evidence but strictly as an ordinary document and not as a mortgage deed.

The Court upheld the trial Court’s order refusing to admit the lease deed dated 20-6-1988 due to non-compliance with stamp duty requirements under the Karnataka Stamp Act.

The petitioner retains the procedural option under proviso (a) to Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act to pay the required stamp duty and penalty to have the lease deed admitted in evidence.

This decision directly affects the parties’ evidentiary positions but does not establish any new legal precedent beyond the strict application of existing law on registration and stamp duty requirements.

    Hanumanumul Baid v. Ananthapadmanabha

    Shivashankar Bhat, J.:—

    In the course of an eviction petition filed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’), which was filed by the petitioner, against the respondent, he sought to mark two documents in support of his claim that he had right to the property, which he leased to the respondent, one of the documents was an alleged deed of usufructuary mortgage, under which the original owner had supposed to have mortgaged the premises in favour of the petitioner, with possession. The other document is allegedly a lease deed for eleven months under which, respondent is stated to have taken the premises on lease from the petitioner, the mortgagee. Both these documents were neither registered, nor properly stamped; hence the trial Court refused to receive them in evidence.

    2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that, earlier, the premises in question was mortgaged to the petitioner by way of deposit of title deeds, and it had been properly registered; thereafter as an additional security, the same was usufructuarily mortgaged; therefore, the deed did not require registration. For this purpose, the learned Counsel relied on a Decision of this Court in Narayana Rao, M.S v. M.S Shivanna . 1988 2 KLJ 330.. In the said case, there was an unregistered agreement to partition the family property, resulting in the execution of a registered partition deed subsequently. Therefore, this Court held, non-registration of the agreement, would not come in the way of proving the said agreement to prove the date on which the family stood divided in status. I fail to understand as to how the said Decision would help the petitioner's case. In the instant case, there was registered mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds. Thereafter another mortgage of the same property was effected, by way of giving possession to the mortgagee and this second mortgage was an usufructuary mortgage. It is a distinct and different transfer of the interest in favour of the mortgagee, from the earlier mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds. The nature of interest’ created by usufructuary mortgage is quite different from the interest created by the earlier transaction. The rights flowing out of the two transactions are different, though the consideration for the transactions in both cases was the same. The deed of usufructuary mortgage, to be legally effective required to be compulsorily registered. In fact, mortgage by deposit of title deeds is not required to be registered under the law, and this regard other kinds of mortgages are treated differently.

    3. The observations made in Murugharajendra Co. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority . 1974 1 KLJ 177 FB. is again under a different context. Title deeds had already been deposited with the mortgagee towards an earlier loan. A further loan was obtained by the mortgagor on the security of the same title deeds deposited earlier with the creditor. It was held by the Full Bench, that the mere acknowledgment by both the parties that the same title deeds would be held as security for the additional sum does not require to be stamped under the Karnataka Stamp Act, because, under the circumstances of the said case, the subsequent letter was not intended by the mortgagees to be the sole repository of the terms of the equitable mortgage and it was only a letter containing an acknowledgment of an already concluded equitable mortgage; this second letter was not an instrument by which any right or liability was created in respect of an immovable property.

    4. In Malkajappa v. C. Ayamma . 1964 1 Mys. L.J 299. a document purporting to be a mortgage was produced in evidence; but it was not duly stamped. Narayana Pai, J. (as he then was) held that, a document which was not registered is not chargeable to stamp duty as a mortgage; to be a mortgage, (other than deposit of title deeds), registration is compulsory. It was held:

    “If one is to be guided only by the language of the document, it may perhaps be possible to say that some security was intended to be given under the document. But, for the purpose of the Stamp Act, a mortgage deed should be a document under which one person transfers or creates to or in favour of another person a right over in respect of specified property for the purpose of securing money advance, or to be advanced by way of loan, or an existing or future debt, or the performance of an agreement. The essence of the definition is that the document should effect a transfer.”

    In Crompton Engineering Co., (Madras) Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Madras (AIR 1952 Mad. 764 FB) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court taking the same view as stated above of the definition of mortgage deed contained in section 2(17) of the Madras Stamp Act, has pointed out that if the document is neither attested nor registered it cannot operate as a transfer by way of mortgage and that such an event the mere fact that the text of the document reads like a mortgage does not attract liability for payment of stamp duty as a mortgage deed.”

    Consequently, the deed in question was held to be not a mortgage deed and as such did not require to be stamped as such.

    5. This Decision helps the petitioner to some extent. The alleged usufructuary deed produced by him cannot be taken as a deed of mortgage; but just as an ordinary document. To what extent, its recitals could be of use to prove the legal position of the petitioner, in respect of the premises in question is a different matter. The document, execution of which is properly proved, may go in aid of the petitioner's case that he had obtained possession of the premises earlier. Therefore, this document dated 18-6-1988 will have to be permitted to be marked in evidence, without treating it as a deed of mortgage.

    6. The petitioner sought to mark another deed dated 20-6-1988, terms of which clearly indicate that it is a lease deed for 11 months, under which, the premises was purported to have been leased to the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 3,000/-. The terms of this deed are quite clear and unequivocal. It is not possible to read it as a mere agreement to lease. Admittedly it is not stamped as a lease for 11 months. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the said deed can be looked into for collateral purpose and could be relied upon to show the nature of the respondent's possession of the premises. The principle relied upon by the learned Counsel, is actually based on the proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act, according to which, a registerable document, if not registered, may be received in evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.

    7. Here, we are concerned with Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act under which instruments not duly stamped are not admissible in evidence for any purpose. There is no exception similar to the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. On this aspect of the question, the authoritative Decision of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand . AIR 1946 PC 51. is quite clear. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is similar to Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act. The Privy Council held that the words ‘for any purpose’ in Section 35 of the Stamp Act should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose. Where an unstamped document is admitted in proof of some collateral matter it is certainly admitted in evidence for that purpose which the statute has prohibited. Consequently an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purposes of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms. There is no scope to induct an exception for collateral purposes, under Section 34 of the Stamp Act.

    8. In the circumstances, it is clear that the order of the trial Court in respect of the document dated 20-6-88 purporting to be a lease deed, has to be held as not duly stamped.

    9. The Stamp Act, essentially is a fiscal legislation and its object is to collect revenue. It is a taxing statute. No equity governs its interpretation, unless there is ambiguity in the language employed by it.

    10. Proviso (a) to Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, however, provides for a procedure to pay the stamp duty and the prescribed penalty, if a party requires the document to be admitted in evidence. That procedure is still available to the petitioner.

    In the result, this petition is partly allowed, to the extent of reversing the order of the trial Court regarding the document dated 18-6-1988 which may be admitted in evidence without treating it as a deed of mortgage.

    It is ordered accordingly.

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    Comments

    Hanumanumul Baid v. Ananthapadmanabha
    (Dec 19, 1991)