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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the 1922 Act)
  • Section 147(b) of the present Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as the 1961 Act)
  • Act, 1957 (Central Act No. 27 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • provisions of the 1922 and 1961 Acts
  • Section 34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act
  • Section 147(b) of the 1961 Act
  • Section 17(1)(b) of the W.T Act.
  • Section 17(1)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the 1922 Act)
  • Section 147(b) of the present Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as the 1961 Act)
  • Act, 1957 (Central Act No. 27 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • provisions of the 1922 and 1961 Acts
  • Section 34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act
  • Section 147(b) of the 1961 Act
  • Section 17(1)(b) of the W.T Act.
  • Section 17(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Puttaswamy, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The matters were heard together because they raised common questions of law. The petitioners are Sri S.G. Kemptur (W.Ps. 6098 & 6099 of 1977) and his father Sri K. Gururaj Bhat (W.Ps. 6126, 6127 & 6128 of 1977). Both are individual assessees under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and their assessments were on the file of the II Wealth Tax Officer (WTO), Hubli.

For assessment years 1972–73, 1973–74 and 1974–75 the WTO completed assessments (orders dated in 1974) in respect of the petitioners. For the assessment year 1975–76 the WTO obtained a valuation report from the Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Wealth Tax Act and completed assessments (those assessments are separately appealed and their pendency or result is not relevant here).

Subsequently, on the basis of the Valuation Officer's report, the WTO issued notices (dated 22–11–1976 and 23–11–1976) under Section 17 of the Act calling upon the petitioners to file returns for the earlier assessment years. The petitioners challenged the validity of those notices by filing separate but identical writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the hearing, counsel for the petitioners confined the challenge to a single ground (discussed below).

After issuing rule nisi, the Court had stayed further proceedings before the WTO. This opinion disposes of the writ petitions and, while dismissing them, provides the petitioners with a time period to file returns and objections before the WTO.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the valuation report prepared by a Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Wealth Tax Act constitutes "information" within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act so as to justify reopening a concluded assessment.
  2. Whether the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer under Section 17(1)(b) based on the Valuation Officer's report were issued without jurisdiction or are otherwise illegal, warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Sri G. Sarangan)

  • The Valuation Officer's report for the subsequent assessment year 1975–76 is merely an opinion of that officer (a valuer) and, because it is only an opinion, it does not fall within the meaning of "in consequence of information" in Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act.
  • Accordingly, initiation of proceedings for reopening prior assessments on that basis was without jurisdiction and illegal.
  • The petitioners relied on several rulings (discussed in the opinion) to support the proposition that a mere change of opinion of an officer, or a mere valuation-opinion, cannot constitute information to reopen assessments.

Respondent's Arguments (Sri K. Srinivasan)

  • The valuation report of the Valuation Officer obtained under Section 16A is an "information" that justifies reopening assessments under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act.
  • To support this, the Revenue relied strongly on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (1979 119 I.T.R. 996).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. C.I.T. (1959) 35 I.T.R. 1 (S.C.) Interpreted the word "information" (in Section 34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act) to include not only facts or factual material but also information as to the true and correct state of the law. The Court applied this broad interpretation of "information" to the term as used in Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act, accepting that "information" may include more than mere raw facts.
C.I.T. v. Raman (A) and Co. (1968) 67 I.T.R. 11 (S.C.) Interpreted "information" (in Section 147(b) of the 1961 Income Tax Act) as "instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars, or as to law, relating to a matter bearing on the assessment." The Court relied on this formulation to support the conclusion that a Valuation Officer's report can be "information" within Section 17(1)(b) because it is knowledge from an external source concerning facts or particulars relevant to assessment.
Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (1979) 119 I.T.R. 996 (S.C.) Examined whether an opinion expressed by an internal audit party of the Income Tax Department would constitute information as to law or fact; reiterated principles from Maharaj Kumar and Raman and discussed the character of "facts" as having concrete existence and definitive vitality. The Court treated Indian & Eastern as reaffirming the precedents and used its reasoning to support the proposition that a valuation report may amount to information as to a fact for purposes of reopening assessments under the Act.
Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. v. Humphry (17 I.T.R. Suppl. 19 [HL]) Authority observing that "Valuation is an art, not an exact science" and that differences between experts do not mean absence of a valuation. The Court invoked this authority to emphasize that valuation necessarily involves judgment and expert assessment, but that does not negate the character of a valuation report as a valuation (i.e., a relevant source of information).
Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal I v. Simon Carves Ltd. (1976) 105 I.T.R. 212 (S.C.) Authority relied upon in other contexts concerning circumstances in which assessments may be reopened. The Court held that the precise question raised in the present cases did not arise for consideration in Simon Carves, and therefore its ratio does not bear on the specific point whether a Section 16A valuation report constitutes "information" under Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act.
Acchut Kumar S. Inamadar v. P.R. Hajarnavis (1981) 132 I.T.R. 331 (Bom.) One of several High Court decisions cited by petitioners' counsel in support of his contentions. The Court found that the precise question before it had not been decided in this case so that it did not directly bear upon the present point.
Brig B. Lall v. Wealth Tax Officer, A-Ward, Jodhpur (1981) 127 I.T.R. 308 (Raj.) Another High Court decision cited in argument. The Court observed that the precise question did not arise for consideration in that case, so its precedential value on the present point was limited.
Smt. Rajeswari Birla v. Wealth Tax Officer, 'H' Ward (1979) 119 I.T.R. P 629 Another decision relied upon in argument. The Court noted that the precise question in the present matter was not decided there and therefore the case did not directly resolve the present issue.
Tulsidas Kilachand v. D.R. Chawla (1980) 122 I.T.R. 458 (Bom.) The Bombay High Court (Pendse, J.) held that the mere change of opinion of an officer or conflicting reports of valuers is not, by itself, sufficient to reopen an assessment under Section 17(1)(b); on those facts the reopening was struck down. The Court distinguished Kilachand on the ground that in the present case the WTO seeks to reopen assessments based on an information constituted by a statutory Valuation Officer's report under Section 16A — which this Court held to be "information" as to fact — and therefore Kilachand's ratio did not determine the present question.
C.I.T. v. Dinesh Chandra H. Shah (1971) 82 I.T.R. 367 (S.C.) Recognized as authority for the proposition that mere change of opinion of a succeeding officer is not enough to confer jurisdiction to re-open assessments. The Court acknowledged this settled legal position but treated it as distinguishable because the present case involved reopening on the basis of a Valuation Officer's report treated as "information" rather than a mere change of opinion by a departmental officer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, closely following the arguments and precedents cited in the opinion:

  1. The Court recognized that the central contested statutory phrase is "in consequence of information" in Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act and observed that analogous language appears in earlier Income Tax statutes (Section 34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act and Section 147(b) of the 1961 Act). The Court therefore examined Supreme Court authorities construing that term.
  2. The Court relied on Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh and C.I.T. v. Raman to adopt a broad meaning of "information": it includes facts or factual material and may include information as to law; it means instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars, or as to law, relating to the assessment.
  3. The Court cited Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society to show the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of these principles and its discussion of the nature of facts (concrete existence and definitive vitality). The Court treated those meanings as applicable to Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act.
  4. The Court then considered the nature of a Valuation Officer appointed under Section 16A: such an officer is a statutory authority; a valuation made by that officer is binding on the Wealth Tax Officer (unlike a valuation by a registered valuer). The WTO is bound to complete an assessment in conformity with the Valuation Officer's valuation (subject to the assessee's right to challenge).
  5. Given that status, the Court held that a report prepared by the Valuation Officer under Section 16A, though it contains the officer's opinion, cannot properly be characterized as a "mere opinion" devoid of the character of "information as to a fact." On the Supreme Court's definitions, such a report amounts to information as to a fact and thus can furnish the basis for reopening an assessment under Section 17(1)(b), subject to the WTO being satisfied with the conditions precedent.
  6. The Court addressed the petitioners' alternate contention that even if it were treated as an opinion it would not qualify: the Court observed that even an opinion may be "a fact" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and thus still constitute information as to a fact for Section 17(1)(b) purposes.
  7. The petitioners argued that construing "information" so broadly would allow reopening of all assessments and lead to endless inquiries. The Court rejected this policy argument: the mere possibility of misuse or the consequences of a broad construction are not valid grounds for narrowing the statutory meaning where legal presumptions and the statute's language point otherwise.
  8. The Court examined and distinguished authorities relied upon by the petitioners (notably Tulsidas Kilachand and other High Court decisions). It concluded that in those cases the precise question whether a Section 16A statutory valuation report constitutes "information" did not arise or the facts were different (for example, mere conflicting reports by different valuers). The Court reiterated that the present case involves reopening based on a statutory Valuation Officer's report and so the ratios in those cases do not control.
  9. On this reasoning, the Court concluded that the WTO's notices for reopening assessments, issued on the basis of the Valuation Officer's report, did not suffer from lack of jurisdiction or manifest error of law that would justify interference under Article 226.
  10. Procedurally, because the Court had previously issued rule nisi and stayed proceedings, it was necessary to grant petitioners a specified time to comply with the WTO; the Court granted 35 days for filing returns and objections before the WTO.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Writ Petitions are dismissed and the Rule issued in them is discharged.

Immediate effect on the parties:

  • The Wealth Tax Officer's notices for reopening assessments issued under Section 17(1)(b) on the basis of the Valuation Officer's report are upheld as not being without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous in law.
  • The petitioners are granted 35 days from the date of the order to file their returns and objections before the Wealth Tax Officer.

Implications regarding legal principle:

  • The opinion applies existing Supreme Court interpretations of "information" (from Maharaj Kumar, Raman and Indian & Eastern) to conclude that a statutory Valuation Officer's report under Section 16A constitutes "information" as to a fact for purposes of Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth Tax Act.
  • The Court distinguished prior High Court decisions relied upon by petitioners and treated them as not deciding the precise question present here.
  • The opinion confines itself to application of existing precedent and statutory interpretation; it does not state that it is laying down a novel rule of law beyond the application of those precedents to a Section 16A valuation report. The direct consequence is limited to sustaining the reopening notices in these proceedings and providing the petitioners time to respond.


This summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not include information beyond that source.

    K.G Kemptur And Another v. The Ii Wealth Tax Officer, Hubli

    Puttaswamy, J.:—

    As common questions of law arise for consideration in these Petitions, I propose to dispose of them by a common order.

    2. Sri. S.G Kemptur of Hubli-petitioner in W.Ps 6098 and 6099 of 1977 is the son of Sri. K. Gururaj Bhat of Hubli who is the petitioner in W.Ps Nos. 6126, 6127 and 6128 of 1977 and they are assessees as individuals under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (Central Act No. 27 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the file of the II Wealth Tax Officer, Hubli Circle, Hubli (hereinafter referred to as the (WTO) who is the common respondent in these cases.

    3. For the Assessment years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 Kemptur filed his returns under the Act before the WTO, who on their examination, by his orders dated 2-12-1974 (Exhibits-J and L) making certain additions completed the assessments for the said years.

    4. For the assessment years 1972-1973, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 Gururaj Bhat filed his returns before the WTO, who on the examination of them, by his orders dated 6-11-1974 (Exhibits G, J and L) completed the assessment for the said years.

    5. For the assessment years 1975-1976 Kemptur and Gururaj Bhat filed their separate returns before the WTO. On those returns, the WTO obtained a valuation report from the Valuation Officer of the Department under Section 16A of the Act and, on that and all other relevant facts, has completed the assessments against them for the said year which are separately challenged by them in appeals under the Act and we are not concerned with their pendency or their result also.

    6. But, on the basis of the report of the Valuation Officer, which is also the stand taken by the Revenue at the hearing, the WTO by his separate and identical notices dt. 23-11-1976 and 22-11-1976 issued under Section 17 of the Act has called upon the petitioners to file their returns for the aforesaid years the validity of which are challenged by them in these separate but identical Writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution on diverse grounds. But, at the hearing their Learned Counsel Sri. G. Sarangan has confined their challenge, to only one ground that will be noticed and dealt hereafter.

    7. Sri. Sarangan has urged that the report of the Valuation Officer for the subsequent assessment year 1975-1976 was nothing but an opinion of that officer or valuer as against the opinion of the WTO who was also an expert valuer and did not fall within the meaning of the term ‘in consequence of information’ occurring in Section 17(1)(b) of the Act and the initiation of proceedings for the re-assessments was without jurisdiction and illegal. In support of is contention, Sri. Sarangan has strongly relied on several rulings that will be noticed and examined at the appropriate stage.

    8. Sri. K. Srinivasan, Learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue, has urged that the valuation report of the Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Act was an information to justify reopening of assessments under, Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. In support of this contention Sri. Srinivasan has strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi . 1979 119 I.T.R 996..

    9. A notice under Section 17 of the Act for reopening a concluded assessment can be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the same has been issued without jurisdiction or is barred by time or is issued by the authority without satisfying with the conditions precedent for the same is well settled. But, it is also well settled that a notice for reopening a concluded assessment will not be examined by this Court as if it is an appeal.

    10. The term ‘in consequence of information’ was found in Section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the 1922 Act) and is also found in Section 147(b) of the present Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as the 1961 Act) that has replaced the earlier Act.

    11. In Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. C.I.T . 1959 35 I.T.R 1 S.C. the Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘information’ occurring in Section 34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act ‘as to mean that it includes not only facts or factual material but to include also the information as to the true and correct state of the law.’ In C.I.T v. Raman (A) and Co. . 1968 67 I.T.R 11 S.C. the Supreme Court reiterating its earlier rulings interpreted the term ‘information’ occurring in Section 147(b) of the 1961 Act as “instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts of particulars, or as to law, relating to a matter bearing on the assessment.”

    12. In Indian & Eastern Newspaper's case, the Supreme Court examining whether the opinion expressed by internal audit party of the Income Tax Department, would constitute information as to law or fact, reiterated the principles stated in Maharajkumar and Raman cases and further expressed thus:

    “That definition has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases, and with it as the point of departure we shall now proceed.

    In so far as the word ‘information’ means instruction or knowledge concerning facts or particulars, there is little difficulty. By its inherent nature, a fact has concrete existence. It influences the determination of an issue by the mere circumstances of its relevance. It requires no further authority to make it significant. Its quintessential value lies in its definitive vitality.”

    These meanings placed by the Supreme Court on the analogous provisions of the 1922 and 1961 Acts are also applicable to the term ‘information’ occurring in Section 17(1)(b) of the Act and Sri. Sarangan also did not dispute the same. Bearing this in mind, it is now necessary to examine the contention urged for the Petitioners.

    13. As pointed out by Viscount Simon, an acknowledged authority of all times on Income Tax Law of England in Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. v. Humphry . 17 I.T.R Suppl. 19 26-7 [HL]. “Valuation is an art, not an exact science. Mathematical certainty is not demanded, nor indeed is it possible, in the very nature of things 2 persons agreeing on the valuation of any property or even 2 renowned experts agreeing on the valuation of one and the same property on a particular date or period is even difficult to expect. But from this it does not necessarily follow that there is no valuation of the property in dispute.”

    14. A Valuation Officer appointed under Section 16A of the Act to whom a reference can be made by a Wealth Tax Officer before completing his assessment is a statutory authority under the Act. A valuation made by a Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Act is binding on the Wealth Tax Officer unlike a valuation made by a registered valuer. A Wealth Tax Officer is bound to complete the assessment in conformity with the valuation of the Valuation Officer though the assessee is not precluded from objecting and challenging the same in appropriate legal proceedings.

    15. For the relevant assessment years, the WTO had not obtained the report of the Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Act and had not, therefore, considered them; but had made his assessments on his own valuation or on the valuation of another registered valuer, that the official valuer had made a valuation under Section 16A of the Act for the assessment years 1975-1976 that was binding on him and the same had been received by him later and that is the basis for reopening assessment are not in dispute.

    16. A report of a Valuation Officer made under Section 16A of the Act, though the same contains the opinion of that officer cannot be characterised as a mere opinion of that officer. The contention of Sri Sarangan, though attractive at the first sight and is even metaphysical, on closer examination, is devoid of merit. On any principle, it is not possible to hold that the report of the Valuation Officer is not an information as to a fact.

    17. On the meaning found by the Supreme Court on the term ‘information’, the report of the Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Act is an information as to a fact on the basis of which it is open to the WTO to reopen the assessment on being satisfied with the conditions precedent for the same.

    18. Assuming for purposes of argument that the report of the Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Act was only an opinion of that person or officer in such an event also, that would be a fact, within the meaning of that term occurring in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the same would thus be an information as to a fact to confer jurisdiction under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act.

    19. But Sri Sarangan with considerable vehemence urged that the aforesaid construction would result in reopening all assessments and endless enquires and should, therefore, be avoided.

    20. Firstly, this argument of despair cannot be a sound ground to place an unwarranted restriction on the construction of the Act. Secondly the possibility of misuse is not also a ground to restrict the meaning of the term ‘information’ and the power conferred by the Act. Lastly, all the legal presumptions to be applied in the enforcement of the Act militate against the acceptance of this contention. For all these reasons, I have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of Sri Sarangan.

    21. In Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal I v. Simon Carves Ltd. . 1976 105 I.T.R 212 S.C. in Acchut Kumar S. Inamadar v. P.R Hajarnavis . 1981 132 I.T.R 331 Bom. Brig B. Lall v. Wealth Tax Officer, A-Ward, Jodhpur . 1981 127 I.T.R 308 Raj. and in Smt. Rajeswari Birla v. Wealth Tax Officer, ‘H’ Ward, . 1979 119 I.T.R.P 629. relied on by Sri. Sarangan the precise question raised in these cases did not arise for consideration before the Supreme Court or the High Court of Bombay and Rajasthan and, therefore, the oratic in those cases does not really bear on the point.

    22. In Tulsidas Kilachand v. D.R Chawla . 1980 122 I.T.R 458 Bom.. on which great reliance was placed by Sri Sarangan, the facts were these. 1) Tulsidas Kilachand filed his return under the Act for the assessment years 1966-1967 to 1969-1970 supported by a valuation made by one of the registered valuers. On an examination of those returns and accepting the valuation report of the valuer, the Wealth Tax Officer completed his assessment for the years on 3-5-1971; 2) on 12-7-1972, the Executive Engineer (Valuation) of the I.T Department, Bombay, valued the properties and opined that the properties had been undervalued and on that report, the Wealth Tax Officer issued notices under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act to reopen the assessments the validity of which were challenged by the Assessee before the High Court of Bombay on somewhat a similar ground and Pendse, J. accepted the same in these words:

    “It was urged that, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Dinesh Chandra H. Shah (1971) 82 ITR 367 (SC) and in CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd., (1976) 105 ITR 212 (SC), the mere change of opinion of the officer does not confer jurisdiction to re-open the assessment. In my judgment, the submission is sound and must be upheld. It is now well settled that the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment orders which have become final can be exercised provided the officer has reasons to believe from information in his possession that the earlier orders escaped the net wealth chargeable to tax. Mere change of opinion of the succeeding officer is not enough and especially when before passing the assessment order the “officer could have easily ascertained the correctness of the statements made in the returns. In the present case, the only information available with the respondent No. 1 is a valuation report dated July 12, 1972. The mere fact the two valuers have given conflicting reports about the true value of the properties is not sufficient to reopen the assessment under Section 17(1)(b) of the W.T Act. In my judgment, the action of Respondent No. 1 in the present case is totally erroneous and Respondent No. 1 has assumed jurisdiction illegally and irregularly. The two interim notices dated March 26, 1973 and February 4, 1974 require to be struck down”.

    The one and the only reason given by his Lordship in this case is that mere change of opinion of the succeeding officer was not enough to reopen the assessment. If that is so, which is also the settled legal position, that is undoubtedly correct, but that is not the position in the present case. In these cases the WTO has proposed to reopen the assessments on the basis of an information as to a fact of the valuation officer under Section 16A of the Act, which I have earlier examined and held was an information as to a fact within the meaning of that term occurring in Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. In this view, the ratio in Tulsidas Kilchand's case does not bear on the point.

    23. Let me assume that the facts of these cases and the question that arises is similar to Tulsidas Kilchand's case and examine the same on that basis.

    24. Earlier I have held that the rulings of the Supreme Court in Simon Carves case does not bear on the point. What I have said on Simon Carves, case is also true of (1971) 82 ITR 367, but still Pendse, J. has held that the ratio in those cases concluded the contentions urged in Kilachand's case. With great respect to his Lordship, this does not appear to be correct.

    25. The very reasoning on which I have held that the report of the Valuation Officer, would constitute information as to a fact should also apply to hold that the latter report of the Executive Engineer that was not available and had not been considered would also constitute information as to a fact. In this view also, with respect I find it difficult to subscribe to the view expressed by Pendse, J.

    26. On the above discussion, I hold that the notices issued by the WTO for re-opening the assessments on the basis of the report of the Valuation Officer does not suffer from an error of jurisdiction or manifest error of law justifying this Court's interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this view, these Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed. But, after issuing rule nisi, this Court has stayed further proceedings before the WTO and therefore it is necessary to grant time to the petitioners to file their returns and objections before the WTO.

    27. In the light of the above discussion, I dismiss these Writ Petitions and discharge the Rule issued in all of them. But, the petitioners are granted 35 days' time from this day for filing their returns and objections before the WTO.

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    K.G Kemptur And Another v. The Ii Wealth Tax Officer, Hubli
    (May 30, 1983)