Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • s. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • provisions of section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • Act, 1947, the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948,
  • s. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • transfer.5. Sub-section (1) of s. 52
  • provisions of the G.T Act, 1958.
  • provisions of sub-section (1),
  • Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1949;
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Sub-section (2) to s. 52
  • Debtors Act, 1869.17.
  • s. 4(1) of that Act
  • Finance Act, 1964,
  • TRADE UNIONS ACT
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • s. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • provisions of section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • Act, 1947, the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948,
  • s. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • transfer.5. Sub-section (1) of s. 52
  • provisions of the G.T Act, 1958.
  • provisions of sub-section (1),
  • Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1949;
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Sub-section (2) to s. 52
  • Debtors Act, 1869.17.
  • s. 4(1) of that Act
  • Finance Act, 1964,
  • TRADE UNIONS ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rama Jois, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

(Narrative based only on the material contained in the provided opinion.)

The reference arises from income-tax proceedings concerning capital gains tax on an individual assessee who purchased a large plot in Bangalore in 1959 and later sold it in parts in 1965–66. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Bangalore Bench), pursuant to an earlier direction of this Court, referred two questions of law to this Court. The sales comprised three transactions with particulars (buyers, plot sizes, sale prices, dates and market values as on 31-3-64) summarized in the opinion. The ITO found that two of the sales showed sale prices materially lower than the market value (items 1 and 3). Relying on s. 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the ITO proposed to treat the market value as the full value of consideration for computing capital gains tax. The assessee objected, arguing that in aggregate the three sales did not show a deficiency and contested the application of s. 52(2).

The Assessing Officer proceeded to treat the higher market value as the correct consideration for items 1 and 3 (without any finding that additional undisclosed money was received), the AAC modified the view in a limited way but upheld the application of s. 52(2) to item 1 and agreed with the ITO's valuation of item 3; the Tribunal affirmed with a minor adjustment. The assessee sought and obtained a reference to this Court on two specific questions of law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are attracted to the instant case?
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the determination of the value of the properties in question is right in law?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • Sub-section (2) of s. 52 should be given its literal meaning: where the ITO finds that the fair market value exceeds the consideration declared by 15% or more, that difference is sufficient to invoke s. 52(2) and to treat the fair market value as the full value of consideration for capital gains purposes.
  • The mere existence of a 15% or greater difference is, in effect, conclusive proof of understatement of valuation (i.e., that a larger undeclared sum was received) and therefore s. 52(2) applies even if there is no independent evidence of receipt of unrecorded funds.
  • Decisions relying on marginal notes or other extrinsic aids (as in Ranga Pai) should not be followed to override plain statutory language; reliance on the marginal note was said to be impermissible per Supreme Court authority.

Assessee's Arguments

  • Sub-section (2) of s. 52 should be read to require proof of understatement or concealment of consideration (i.e., factual material to show that a higher undeclared consideration was received), analogous to the condition in sub-s. (1) though sub-s. (2) does not require a relationship between vendor and vendee.
  • In the absence of any evidence that the assessee received any money beyond the amounts recorded in the sale deeds, s. 52(2) should not be invoked merely because the ITO's ascertained market value exceeds the deed price by 15% or more.
  • Relied on this Court's decision in Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai ([1975] 100 ITR 413) as decisively interpreting s. 52(2) in the assessee's favour.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (how the opinion used the precedent)
I.C.I. (India) Private Ltd. v. CIT [1972] 83 ITR 710 Interpretation of s. 52(1): necessary ingredients—connection between parties, reason to believe avoidance of tax, and power to treat fair market value as consideration. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's statement of ingredients to show that s. 52(1) is clear in its requirements and distinct from the question arising under s. 52(2).
Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai [1975] 100 ITR 413 Interpretation of s. 52(2): requires evidence of understatement/avoidance; s. 52(2) not attracted to bona fide transfers for inadequate consideration. The Court followed and reiterated Ranga Pai as fully covering the present question: s. 52(2) applies only when there is an understatement (undeclared higher consideration), not to genuine sales for inadequate consideration.
Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, Poona AIR 1959 SC 586 Limits on reliance on marginal notes when interpreting statutes; marginal notes cannot be used to change plain meaning. The Court acknowledged the principle but explained that marginal notes can assist in resolving ambiguity; used this to justify Ranga Pai's use of the marginal note where ambiguity existed.
Muslim Wakf Board v. Radha Kishan (1979) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1979 SC 289 Interpretive principle: use of another enactment's provisions permissible when Acts are in pari materia. The Court cited it to support the use of pari materia reasoning (i.e., looking to the G.T. Act's definition of "gift") in construing s. 47(iii) and s. 52.
Navnitlal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen [1965] 56 ITR 198 (SC) Circulars issued by CBDT under s.119 are binding on subordinate authorities and can be considered in interpretation. The Court noted that Ranga Pai relied on such a circular indicating s. 52(2) was not intended to cover bona fide transactions; used to support Ranga Pai's interpretation.
Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 913 (SC) Similar to Navnitlal: administrative circulars and their bearing on subordinate authorities. The opinion referenced it as an authority for treating the CBDT circular as relevant in Ranga Pai.
Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. CIT, Mysore [1975] 101 ITR 234 Parliamentary speech by mover of a Bill can be used to ascertain statutory meaning where doubt exists. The Court noted Ranga Pai referred to the Finance Minister's statement (though Ranga Pai did not rely on it as primary material); cited Sole Trustee as authority permitting such recourse in case of doubt.
K.P. Varghese v. ITO [1970] 77 ITR 719 (Ker) Interpretation of s. 52(2) at the High Court level (Isaac J.'s view) — relevant interpretive authority. The Court in Ranga Pai had agreed with Isaac J.'s view in K.P. Varghese; the present Court noted this agreement and used it in support of Ranga Pai.
ITO v. K.P. Varghese [1973] 91 ITR 49 (Ker) [FB] Majority view contrary to Isaac J.'s; noted as contextual background to Ranga Pai's stance. The opinion observed Ranga Pai distinguished the majority contrary view and followed Isaac J.'s approach; cited for background and to show judicial treatment of the issue.
Addl. CIT v. P.S. Kuppuswamy [1978] 112 ITR 1012 (Madras HC) High Court agreement with this Court's interpretation in Ranga Pai. Referred to as judicial support for the construction that s. 52(2) does not apply to bona fide inadequate consideration transfers.
Addl. Commissioner of Income-Tax, A.P. v. S.R.Y. Ankeneedu Prasad [1978] 115 ITR 78 (Andhra Pradesh HC) High Court agreement with Ranga Pai's interpretation. Noted as another High Court decision endorsing the view that s. 52(2) requires proof of understatement rather than merely a 15% difference.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, M.P. v. Smt. Sethani Godwaribai (reported) High Court authority aligned with Ranga Pai (citation referenced in the opinion). Marked as further judicial corroboration of Ranga Pai's interpretation.
Bhinka v. Charan Singh AIR 1959 SC 960 Marginal note/heading can assist in resolving ambiguity in text of a statute. The Court relied on Bhinka to justify use of the marginal note where the wording raised interpretive doubt, as done in Ranga Pai.
Central Machine Tool Institute v. Assistant Labour Commissioner & Another [1978] 53 FJR 194; ILR 1979 KAR 484 Application of pari materia principle: using meaning from one enactment to construe another dealing with same subject-matter. Cited as an instance where this Court applied the pari materia principle to interpret a term used in related statutes.
Fendoch Investment Trust Co. v. IRC [1945] 2 All ER 140 (HL) Warning about over-extending the pari materia principle when construing tax statutes; exercise caution. The opinion quoted Fendoch to show the Court was mindful of caution in importing meanings across tax statutes while nonetheless applying the principle where appropriate.
Siraj-Ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Wakf Authority cited for constructional principles: give effect to all parts of statutory provisions and avoid rendering words otiose. The opinion relied on it to support the rule that statutory terms used in a later Act may be given the meaning from an earlier Act where the subject-matter is the same (avoidance of otiose provisions).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Fact assumptions clarified: The Court recorded there was no finding by any authority that the assessee received any amount beyond the consideration recorded in the sale deeds and proceeded on the premise that the assessee had received only the deed amounts while accepting the authorities' market valuations and that the differences exceeded 15%.
  2. Distinct natures of s. 52(1) and s. 52(2): The Court observed that s. 52(1) is clearly triggered where there is a direct/indirect connection between parties plus material leading the ITO to believe the transfer was for avoidance/reduction of capital gains tax. That subsection's requirements were clear and previously interpreted in I.C.I. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT.
  3. Interpretive question posed by s. 52(2): On a plain reading, s.52(2) might appear to impose liability merely on proof that fair market value exceeded declared consideration by 15% or more. The Court rejected the literal construction offered by the Revenue as producing unacceptable results: it would tax amounts never received and make liability turn on market valuations alone.
  4. Significance of the word "declared": The Court emphasized the repeated use of the word "declared" in s. 52(2) and read it to presuppose an undeclared (higher) sum actually received. The marginal note to the section ("consideration for transfer in cases of understatement") corroborated that the mischief targeted is understatement/concealment, not bona fide sales for inadequate consideration.
  5. Harmonizing statutory provisions and use of pari materia reasoning: The Court examined s. 47(iii) (exempting gifts from s. 45) and the extended definition of "gift" in the Gift-Tax Act, 1958, which treats transfers for inadequate consideration as gifts for the purposes of that Act. The Court held that to avoid rendering s. 47(iii) meaningless, the word "gift" in s. 47(iii) should take the same extended meaning as in the Gift-Tax Act. That reading produces harmony between s. 47 and s. 52: transfers for inadequate consideration are treated as gifts (thus outside capital gains) whereas s. 52(2) is aimed at understatement/concealment.
  6. Support from authorities and administrative materials: The Court accepted the reasoning in Ranga Pai (which itself relied on marginal note, CBDT circular and parliamentary assurances) and noted that several High Courts had followed Ranga Pai. The Court acknowledged precedents (Bhinka, Western India Theatres, Muslim Wakf Board) about the limited use of marginal notes but explained that marginal notes may aid interpretation where ambiguity exists and that reliance on administrative circulars and parliamentary material (where appropriate) had been used previously.
  7. Illustrations demonstrating absurd consequences of literal construction: The Court offered scenarios where the Revenue's literal approach would tax sums never received (e.g., a sale at an actual higher price but with a deed showing a lower price; or a sale executed pursuant to a specific performance decree years later at the original contract price) — demonstrating the untenability of treating every 15% difference as conclusive of understatement.
  8. Conclusion of legal effect: The Court concluded s. 52(2), properly construed, applies to cases of understatement of valuation in the sale deed—i.e., where the vendor has in truth received more consideration than declared and has concealed that amount (which would also attract penal consequences). A mere discrepancy of 15% or more between market value and declared consideration is a trigger for inquiry, not automatic imposition of capital gains tax; the actual existence (and extent) of undisclosed receipt must be established for liability.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the first referred question in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The Court held that s. 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, applies to cases of understatement (concealment) of consideration and not to bona fide transfers for inadequate consideration. Because of this answer, the Court declined to answer the second question.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Court concluded that s. 52(2) was not attracted to the two challenged sales in the absence of any evidence that the assessee received any sum over and above the consideration recorded in the sale deeds. The assessee thus prevailed on the primary referred question.
  • Practical consequence for tax administration: A difference of 15% or more between declared consideration and the ITO's ascertained market value furnishes a basis for the ITO to initiate enquiry/investigation into potential understatement; it does not by itself convert the market value into deemed consideration for capital gains unless evidence establishes actual undeclared receipt or agreement to receive such undeclared consideration.
  • Relationship with other provisions: The Court held that transfers for inadequate consideration fall within the extended notion of "gift" (as in the Gift-Tax Act) and are therefore outside the purview of capital gains under s. 45 (by virtue of s. 47(iii)); s. 52(2) is directed at concealment and does not override that structure.
  • Precedential stance: The opinion expressly follows and reiterates the decision in Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai ([1975] 100 ITR 413) and adopts the interpretive approach therein. The Court also explained its reasons for relying on marginal note, administrative circulars and other interpretive aids where ambiguity exists, while acknowledging authority that the marginal note cannot be used to alter the plain meaning of a statute.

This summary is prepared strictly from the material contained in the provided opinion; no facts, arguments or holdings beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion have been added.

    Sanjiv V. Kudva v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Karnataka

    Rama Jois, J.:— This income-tax reference arises out of proceedings for the levy of capital gains tax on the assessee who is an individual. Pursuant to the direction given by this court in C.P No. 40 of 1976, dated November 23, 1976, the following two questions of law have been referred for the opinion of this court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore Bench:

    “(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in its view that the provisions of section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are attracted to the instant case?

    (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the determination of the value of the properties in question is right in law?”

    2. The assessee had purchased a plot of 25,003 sq. yards, in the city of Bangalore for a sum of Rs. 3,55,000 from Indian Radiators Ltd., on August 25, 1959. In the year 1965-66, the assessee sold the property to three persons. The particulars relating to the sale, the date of sale as also the market value of the property as on March 31, 1964, according to the valuation made by the valuers, in connection with the assessment to wealth-tax are as follows:

    Sold to Plot Sale price Date of sale Market value as on 31-3-64 as per value Rs. Rs. M/s. Canara Public Conveyance Ltd. Plot of 6. 522 sq. yds. 90,000 17-2-66 1,12,000 Hindustan Milk Food Manufacturers Ltd. Plot of 6. 522 sq. yds. 3,75,000 23-9-65 3,00,000 Arpor Ram Mohan Rao & 7 ors. (Aroor family) Plot of 10, 746 + 1, 213 sq. yds. 1,40,000 15-11-65 1,92,000

    3. The ITO found that the sale price of items 1 and 3 above was less than the market value even as on March 31, 1964. He called upon the assessee to show cause as to why the difference between the price for items 1 and 3 sold and the market value of-the property as on the date of sale should not be subjected to capital gains tax under s. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The assessee objected to the proposal. He pointed out that though items 1 and 3 had been sold for a lower price, in the aggregate the assessee had made sufficient gains if the sale price of the second item was also taken into account. He pointed out that the total market value of all the three items as on March 31, 1964, was Rs. 6,04,000 whereas the total sale value of the three items came to Rs. 6,05,000. The ITO noticed that item 1 measuring 6,522 sq. yds. had been given on perpetual lease to the Canara Public Conveyance Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the C.P.C (P.) Ltd.”) on a rental of Rs. 600 per month and subsequently the property was sold for a sum of Rs. 90,000 only. He noticed that the assessee was the managing director of the C.P.C (P.) Ltd. and was associated with it right from its inception and, therefore, there was direct connection between the assessee and the C.P.C (P.) Ltd. The ITO ascertained the market value of the property by capitalising the rental income and arrived at the value of Rs. 1,12,000 and this was also the value of the plot which had been fixed by the valuers as on March 31, 1964, for purposes of wealth-tax. The ITO, therefore, considered that as the market value of the property as on the date of sale of the first item to C.P.C (P.) Ltd. was Rs. 1,12,000, and it was sold only for Rs. 90,000, in view of the connection between the assessee and the C.P.C (P.) Ltd. and also because the difference between the two figures exceeded 15 per cent, both the sub-sections of s. 52 were attracted. However, there was no finding that the assessee had received any money as consideration for the sale of the property from the C.P.C (P.) Ltd. over and above the amount mentioned in the sale deed. As regards the third item, namely, the plot sold to Aroor Ram Mohan Rao & others of Aroor family, the ITO after ascertaining the sale statistics of the sites in the vicinity as also the evidence given by an estate agent came to the conclusion that the market value of the site as on the date of sale, i.e, November 15, 1965, was Rs. 30 per sq. yd. and on this basis came to the conclusion that in view of s. 52(2) of the Act the sale consideration of the site sold to the Aroor family must be taken to be Rs. 3,35,000 as against Rs. 1,40,000 shown in the sale deed. In this case also, the ITO did not have any evidence and consequently did not record any finding that any money over and above the capital consideration mentioned in the sale deed had been received by the assessee. However, he fixed capital gains liability on the basis of the difference of the amount between the price mentioned in the sale deed and the market value of the property as ascertained by him as on the date of sale relying on sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act.

    4. The matter was taken up in appeal before the AAC. The appellate authority accepted the plea of the assessee that there was no connection between the assessee and the C.P.C (P.) Ltd. having regard to the fact that the C.P.C (P.) Ltd. was a limited company and, therefore, s. 52(1) of the Act was not attracted. However, he came to the conclusion that as regards the first item of property, its sale for Rs. 90,000 was for a value lesser than the market value of the property and as the difference was more than 15%, the sale consideration for purposes of capital gains had to be computed on the basis of the market value of the property on the date of sale in view of sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act. As regards the third item, the appellate authority observed that there had been an upward trend in the price of landed property since 1954 in the City of Bangalore owing to the influx of people from different parts of the country, and, therefore, the market value as fixed by the ITO was sound. He rejected the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the orders of the assessing authority and the appellate authority with a slight modification by reducing the market value of the land sold to Aroor family from Rs. 30 per sq. yd. to Rs. 25 per sq. yd. Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the decision of this court in the case of Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai, [1975] 100 ITR 413, in support of his contention that in the absence of evidence of under-statement of the valuation, the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 52 would not be attracted. The Tribunal, however, distinguished the said decision on the ground that the decision in Ranga Pai's case depended on the peculiar facts of that case. After the decision of the Tribunal, as the request of the assessee for referring the questions mentioned earlier to this court was rejected by the Tribunal, the assessee approached this court by means of a civil petition and pursuant to the order of this court, the questions have been referred for the opinion of this court. Before considering the rival contentions urged for the parties, it is convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Under s. 14E of the Act, capital gains are treated as a source of income liable to tax. Section 2(24) defines income as including capital gains chargeable to tax under s. 45 of the Act. Section 45 is the charging section as far as capital gains are concerned. It provides that any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “Capital gains” and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place. Certain exemptions are provided under ss. 53, 54, 54B and 54D of the Act with which we are not concerned. Section 48 of the Act is the section which provides for the mode of computing capital gains. It provides that the income chargeable under the head “Capital gains” shall be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset—(i) expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer; and (ii) the cost of acquisition of the capital asset and the cost of any improvement thereto. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 52 of the Act read as follows:

    “52. Consideration for transfer in cases of understatement.— (1) Where the person who acquires a capital asset from an assessee is directly or indirectly connected with the assessee and the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee under section 45, the full value of the consideration for the transfer shall, with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, be taken to be the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of the transfer.

    (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), if in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer the fair market value of a capital asset transferred by an assessee as on the date of the transfer exceeds the full value of the consideration declared by the assessee in respect of the transfer of such capital asset by an amount of not less than fifteen per cent, of the value so declared, the full value of the consideration for such capital asset shall, with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, be taken to be its fair market value on the date of its transfer.”

    5. Sub-section (1) of s. 52 was in existence as s. 52 at the time when the Act was enacted, there being no second sub-section. Sub-section (2) to s. 52 was introduced by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect from April 1, 1964. There is not much controversy about the interpretation of sub-s. (1) of s. 52 in view of its clear wordings. The section was also interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of I.C.I (India) Private Ltd. v. CIT, [1972] 83 ITR 710. The Supreme Court observed that the necessary ingredients of s. 52 (which is now sub-s. (1) of s. 52) are as follows (p. 713):

    “(i) there should be a direct or indirect connection between the person who acquires a capital asset and the assessee;

    (ii) the Income-tax Officer should have reason to believe that the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assssee to capital gains;

    (iii) if the first two conditions are satisfied then the full value of consideration for the transfer can be taken to be the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of the transfer.”

    6. In the present case, however, the question referred for our opinion depends on the interpretation of sub-s. (2) of s. 52. It is argued for the revenue by its learned counsel, Sri S.R Rajasekhara Murthy, that in view of the wording of the second sub-section of s. 52 the mere existence of a difference of 15% or more between the market value of the property as ascertained by the ITO as on the date of the sale and the actual price incorporated in the sale deed, is sufficient to incur the liability for payment of capital gains tax on such difference of amount and that the existence of such difference itself is conclusive proof of the fact that there has been understatement of valuation, i.e, a sum lower than the one actually received has been mentioned in the sale deed. Per contra Sri Sarangan, learned counsel for the assessee, argued that the condition imposed in sub-s. (1), namely, the existence of material to hold that there has been an understatement of consideration with the intention to avoid tax on capital gains is equally applicable to sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act and the only difference between the two sub-sections was, while sub-s. (1) is attracted only in cases where there has been direct or indirect connection between the vendor and the vendee, sub-s. (2) is attracted in all cases of sales where the difference between the market value of the property as on the date of sale and the consideration for sale mentioned in the sale deed is 15% or more irrespective of the fact whether there was any direct or indirect connection between the vendor and the vendee. He submitted that the answer to the question was concluded by the decision of this court in the case of Ranga Pai, [1975] 100 ITR 413.

    7. Learned counsel for the revenue, however, argued that the case of Ranga Pai was decided on the peculiar facts of the said case and, therefore, the said decision cannot be taken as a precedent. He further argued that the reliance placed on the marginal note to interpret the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 52, the language of which is clear and unambiguous, was clearly impermissible, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, Poona, AIR 1959 SC 586, and in Muslim Wakf Board v. Radha Kishan, (1979) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1979 SC 289.

    8. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the revenue that the case of Ranga Pai, [1975] 100 ITR 413 (Kar) is distinguishable and should be confined to the facts of that case. The learned counsel for the assessee is right in his submission that the decision in Ranga Pai's case fully covers the question of interpretation of sub-s. (2) of s. 52 arising for consideration in this case. In the said case,. Venkatesha Pai, the father of Ranga Pai had purchased a house property situated in the City of Mangalore for a sum Rs. 25,000 on March 24, 1950, from Manel Raghunatha Naik, who sold it when he was in financial difficulties. But, according to Ranga Pai, there was an oral agreement between the vendor and the vendee that the latter would execute a deed of reconveyance of the same property for the same amount in favour of the vendor at any time when the vendor was in a position to pay the amount of Rs. 25,000. It so happened that the father of Ranga Pai as also the vendor died and thereafter in the year 1963, M. Ranga Pai reconveyed the property to Manel Mukunda Naick, son of Manel Raghunath Naik, for the same amount of Rs. 25,000 respecting the agreement entered into by his father. The ITO was of the view that the sale of the property was for an inadequate consideration and, therefore, subjected the difference of the amount between the market value of the property in the year 1963 and Rs. 25,000 for which consideration reconveyance deed was executed to gift-tax under the provisions of the G.T Act, 1958. Thereafter, the ITO under a direction issued by the Commissioner under s. 263 of the Act, subjected the difference of amount between the market price of the property as on the date of reconveyance and the sum of Rs. 25,000 for which it was reconveyed, which exceeded 15%, to capital gains tax under sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act. When the matter reached this court, it was contended for the revenue that even though the property had been actually reconveyed for Rs. 25,000 only and no amount over and above the sale consideration was received by the assessee, the difference was liable to capital gains in view of sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act. This court interpreted sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act and held that the evidence regarding understatement as well as avoidance of tax, which was a condition precedent for invoking sub-s. (1) of s. 52 was equally applicable to sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act, even though there was no specific condition incorporated in s. 52 as the object of s. 52 as revealed from the marginal note was to deal only with cases of understatement and observed that the difference between the two sub-sections was as follows:

    (i) In order to attract sub-s. (1) there should be indirect or direct relation between the vendor and the vendee, whereas for invoking sub-s. (2) no such relationship is necessary.

    (ii) In order to invoke sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act, the difference between the market value of the property as on the date of sale and the consideration, mentioned in the sale deed should be 15% or more whereas such a condition was not necessary to invoke sub-s. (1).

    9. In that view of the matter, the court held that as on the facts of Ranga Pai's case, [1975] 100 ITR 413, there was no evidence of making an understatement of the valuation in the sale deed, sub-s. (2) of s. 52 was not applicable. Therefore, it is clear that the point arising for consideration in this reference is concluded by the decision in Ranga Pai's case.

    10. It is true that in interpreting sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act, reliance was placed by this court on the marginal note of the section. According to the learned counsel for the revenue, such a course was not permissible in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Western India Theatres' case, AIR 1959 SC 586, and the Wakf Board's case, (1979) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1979 SC 289. It is true that the marginal note cannot be relied on for purposes of interpreting a section in a manner so as to change its meaning. But the heading or marginal note to a section is regarded as preamble to the concerned section and though it cannot control the plain words of the section, it may explain ambiguous words and if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words of the section, the heading certainly helps the court to resolve that doubt as observed by the Supreme Court in Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960. It is for this purpose that the marginal note was used in Ranga Pai's case, [1975] 100 ITR 413 (Kar). It should, however, be pointed out that this court had also placed reliance on the circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in exercise of its power under s. 119 of the Act which is binding on all the subordinate authorities: See Navnitlal C. Javeri v. K.K Sen, AAC, [1965] 56 ITR 198, 200 (SC) and Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 913, 920, 921 (SC) and it was held that the said circular gave the indication that sub-s. (2) of s. 52 was not intended to cover bona fide transactions. This court also referred to the statement of the Finance Minister while moving the Finance Bill of 1964 in which also he assured that sub-s. (2) of s. 52 was not intended to cover bona fide transfers, but did not rely on it on the ground that it was not a material relevant for interpreting the provision. But as held by the Supreme Court in Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. Cit, Mysore, [1975] 101 ITR 234, 252, 253 recourse can be had to the speech by the mover of the Bill in Parliament for ascertaining the real meaning of a statutory provison in case of doubt. This court also observed that the acceptance of the interpretation suggested for the revenue would render s. 47(iii) of the Act which excludes gifts from the purview of s. 45 otiose. The decision in Ranga Pai's case, [1975] 100 ITR 413 (Kar) was rendered on January 2, 1975. It is not disputed that the said decision is not taken in appeal and is being followed by the department all these years. In Ranga Pai's case, this court agreed with the view taken by Isaac J. in K.P Varghese v. ITO, [1970] 77 ITR 719 (Ker) distinguishing the majority view taken to the contray in appeal against the said decision in ITO v. K.P Varghese, [1973] 91 ITR 49 (Ker) [FB]. Subsequently, the view taken by this court in Ranga Pai's case has been agreed to by the Madras High Court in Addl. CIT v. P.S Kuppuswamy, [1978] 112 ITR 1012 and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Addl. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, A.P v. S.R.Y Ankeneedu Prasad, [1978] 115 ITR 78 and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner Of Income-Tax, M.P v. Smt. Sethani Godwaribai (see p. 349 supra). However, in view of the submission made for the revenue, we proceed to have a second look at the provisions of s. 52.

    11. Before proceeding further it is necessary to state that the department is not in a position to contend that the assessee has received any money over and above the consideration mentioned in the two sale deeds. Learned counsel for the revenue, however, made a feeble attempt to make out that there has been a finding by the Tribunal about the understatement of valuation. But on going through the order of the Tribunal, we are satisfied that the submission made by the learned counsel for the revenue is based only on the difference between the market value and the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed and there is no iota of evidence to the effect that the assessee had received any money over and above the amounts mentioned in the sale deeds. There is no finding by any one of the authorities that the assessee had received any amount beyond the consideration mentioned in the two sale deeds. Therefore, we proceed to consider the question of law on the basis that the assessee had received only the amount mentioned in the sale deeds and that the market value fixed by the authorities was also correct and that the difference between the two figures exceeds 15 per cent.

    12. As stated earlier, as far as s. 52(1) is concerned, it gets attracted only when the vendor and the vendee are directly or indirectly related to each other and there has been an understatement of valuation in the sale deed with the intention of avoiding capital gains tax. Coming to the wording of sub-s. (2), at first sight it appears that the only condition necessary tp incur the liability to pay capital gains on effecting sale of a capital asset is that the difference between the value mentioned in the sale deed and the fair market value is not less than 15 per cent, even though the seller has received only the amount mentioned in the sale deed. This means that the moment the ITO ascertains the market value of a capital asset sold by its owner and finds that the difference between the market value of the sale price mentioned in the sale deed is 15 per cent, or more, it must be treated as capital gains in addition to the gains calculated on the basis of the price mentioned in the sale deed, even though in fact and in truth the vendor has sold only for the price mentioned in the sale deed. It is difficult to accede to the submission that the legislation which is intended to levy tax on capital gains received or accrued to a person has incorporated a provision to tax even if there is no gain either received or accrued, just because the owner has sold the property for a lower price. Circumstances are not wanting where persons either on account of urgent need for various reasons including financial difficulties or on account of ignorance or having been misled by some one, might sell their property for a price lesser than the market value, the difference being more than 15 per cent. It is also natural that when a person on account of his own urgency wants to sell the property immediately he is likely to get a lower offer. Similarly, it is not unnatural that a person though not willing to gift away his property may be willing to sell his property for a lesser value out of his affection or regard for a person or his noble occupation or for a laudable purpose and such value may be lesser by more than 15 per cent, of the fair market value. The question for consideration is, is the provision intended to make such persons liable to pay the tax for capital gains for the act of selling the property for a lesser value under unavoidable circumstances or with good intention as indicated above and to subject them to additional burden? Obviously not. According to sub-s. (2) of s. 52, if the fair market value of the capital asset transferred by an assessee, as on the date of transfer exceeds the full value of the consideration declared by the assessee in respect of such transfer by an amount of not less than 15 per cent, of the value so declared the full value of the consideration for such capital asset shall be taken to be its fair market value as on the date of transfer. The words “consideration declared by the assessee” and the words “value so declared” used in sub-s. (2) and in particular the word “declared” at both places is significant. It presupposes that the actual value received is the “undeclared value” which is something different and higher than the value declared in the sale deed. Any doubt in this regard is removed by the marginal note to the section which reads “consideration for transfer in cases of understatement”, because it is only in a case where the vendor having received a higher amount as consideration for the transfer of a capital asset makes an understatement of consideration in the sale deed obviously to avoid capital gains tax on the difference of amount and to return it as unaccounted money, the amount mentioned in the sale deed can be regarded as the declared value and the amount actually received as the undeclared value. In a case where the consideration actually recorded in the sale deed was also the amount actually received by the vendor, merely because the fair market value exceeds by 15 per cent, of the actual sale consideration, it cannot be said that it was a case of understatement or that the consideration declared is different from the undeclared consideration which is non-existent. Therefore, in our view the word “declared” used in s. 52(2) of the Act is significant which leads to the construction of that provision to the effect that it attracts a case in which it is established that a vendor has declared a lower consideration in the deed transferring his capital asset having received a higher amount as consideration. This construction fully receives support from the provisions of s. 47(iii) of the Act, which reads:

    “47. Nothing contained in section 45 shall apply to the following transfers: —

    (iii) any transfer of a capital asset under a gift or will or an irrevocable trust.” (underlining* by us)

    13. The meaning of the word “gift” as given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at page 956, is “a voluntary transfer of real or personal property without any consideration or without any valuable consideration The definition of gift given in s. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act is also identical. If the word “gift” was intended to be used in s. 47(iii) of the Act in the above sense then there was no necessity to use it at all, i.e, there was no necessity to except a “gift” from the provisions of s. 45 as that section speaks of profit or gain arising out of the transfer of a capital asset and, therefore, the question of taking a “gift” out of s. 45 would not arise. Therefore, in order to make the provision meaningful, the word “gift” used in s. 47(iii) of the Act should be given the same meaning as is given to that word in the G.T Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), which gives an extended meaning by including a transfer of property for inadequate consideration also within its meaning. The word “gift” is defined in s. 2(xii) of that Act which has to be read with s. 4 of that Act. The definition and relevant part of s. 4(1) of that Act read as follows:

    “2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, —…

    (xii) ‘gift’ means the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration in money or money's worth, and includes the transfer or conversion of any property referred to in section 4, deemed to be a gift under that section.

    4. (1) For the purposes of this Act, —

    (a) where a property is transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration, the amount by which the market value of the property at the date of the transfer exceeds the value of the consideration shall be deemed to be a gift made by the transferor….”

    14. If this definition is invoked to understand the meaning of the word “gift” used in s. 47(iii) of the Act, s. 45 and consequently all the other provisions pertaining to capital gains incorporated in the I.T Act including s. 52 would not at all be applicable to cases of transfer of capital assets for inadequate consideration. The objection of the learned counsel for the revenue, however, was that the word “gift” has been defined in the G.T Act only for purposes of that Act and the said definition cannot be invoked for understanding the said word used in the I.T Act. We are unable to agree with this submission for two reasons:

    (1) It is a well-recognised rule of construction that it is permissible to give meaning to a word used in a later enactment the same meaning as given to it in an earlier enactment if both the Acts are in pari materia.

    (2) If the word “gift” under s. 47(iii) of the Act is not given the meaning as used in the G.T Act, the use of that word in s. 47(iii) of the Act by the Legislature would be rendered meaningless and otiose. This is not a permissible rule of construction. An effort should always be made so as to give meaning to all parts of the provisions and to make the whole of it effective and operative. (See: Siraj-Ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Wakf).

    15. As regards the rule of construction regarding words used in a later enactment by resorting to the provisions in an earlier enactment, Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn.), at pages 134 and 141, states:

    “(1) Statutes in pari materia

    Where Acts of Parliament are in pari materia, that is to say, are so far related as to form a system or code of legislation the rule as laid down by the twelve judges in Palmer's case, [1785] 1 Leach C. C. 4th ed. 355 is that such Acts ‘are to be taken together as forming one system, and as interpreting and enforcing each other’. In the American case of United Society v. Eagle Bank, [1829] 7 Conn. 457, 470, Hosmer J., said: ‘Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similis. It is used in opposition to it, as in the expression magis pares sunt quam similes, intimating not likeness merely, but identity. It is a phrase applicable to the public statutes or general laws made at different times and in reference to the same subject.’

    As Knight Bruce L.J said in Ex. P. Copeland, [1852] 22 L.J Bank 17, 21 upon a question of construction arising ‘upon a subsequent statute on the same branch of the law, it is perfectly legitimate to use the former Act, though repealed’. ‘For this’, continued he, ‘I have the authority of Lord Mansfield, who in R. v. Loxdale, [1758] 1 Burr. 445, 447 thus lays down the rule, “Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system and as explanatory of each other”’…

    Presumption from use of same language in later Act.— It has been held that, where the legislature has given to words a statutory definition in one statute, and has used the same words in a similar connection in a later statute dealing with the same subject-matter, it may bepresumed, in the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, that the same meaning attaches to the words in the later as is given to them in the earlier statute.” (Underlining by us)

    16. Principles on the same lines are also set out in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., pp, 66 and 68-69:

    “Light may be thrown on the meaning of a phrase in a statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier statute dealing with the same subject-matter.”

    “The same words or phrases, when used in Acts dealing with the same subject-matter, often bear the same meaning. So Lord Parker C.J has said that it is a ‘fair inference’ that ‘agricultural land’ means the same thing in the Agriculture Act, 1947, the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, and even the Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1949; Cross J. has said that it would be ‘very astonishing’ if ‘premises’ meant different things in the Landlord and Tenant Acts of 1927 and 1954; and Lord Dilhorne L.C found it ‘inconceivable that Parliament intended that a different interpretation should be given to the words “obtained credit” in the Bankruptcy Act [1914] from that given to the same words in the Debtors Act, 1869….’

    17. In Fendoch Investment Trust Co. v. IRC, [1945] 2 All ER 140 (HL), Lord, Simonds (at p. 144) sounded a note of warning (more recently echoed by Harman L.J) in connection with the use of statutes in pari materia when construing a tax statute. ‘I do not doubt that in construing the latest of a series of Acts dealing with a specific subject-matter, particularly where all such Acts are to be read as one, great weight should be attached to any scheme which can be seen in clear outline and amendments in later Acts should if possible be construed consistently with that scheme. But this is a principle which can easily be pressed too far in the consideration of a body of legislation in which, if any prevaling motive can be found, it is in the attempt, as each loophole for escape from taxation is discovered, to close it as firmly as possible’.”,

    18. The Supreme Court has also observed in the case of Muslim Wakf Board, (1979) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1979 SC 289, that interpretation of the provision of an enactment with reference to the provisions of another enactment is permissible when the two Acts are in pari materia. This principle was applied by this court in relying on the definition of “industry” defined in the Industrial Disputes Act to interpret the said word in the Trade Unions Act as it was not defined in the latter. (See Central Machine Tool Institute… v. Assistant Labour Commissioner & Another…, [1978] 53 FJR 194; ILR 1979 KAR 484), From the principles set out above, it is clear that where two legislations are in pari materia in that they deal with the same subject-matter and are meant to enforce each other, it is permissible to assign the meaning given to a word in an earlier enactment, to the same word used in a later enactment. Bearing in mind the above principle, as also the word of caution given by Lord Simonds, regarding the application of the principle to taxing statutes, we consider its applicability to this case. The G.T Act was enacted in the year 1958 and the I.T Act was enacted in the year 1961 by Parliament. Both the enactments impose direct taxes and are administered by the same administrative agency, i.e, the I.T Dept, or the CBDT. In particular, the provisions of the I.T Act in so far as they relate to capital gains, and the provisions of the G.T Act are enacted to impose taxes in the context of tranfser of property, from one to another by sale or gift, respectively. In the case of transfer by sale, the provisions are intended to tax the gains calculated on the basis of the sale value minus the actual cost, cost of improvement and expenses incurred in connection with the sale transaction, whereas in the case of transfer by way of gift, the gift-tax is levied on the value of the property as on the date of gift, irrespective of the lesser value for which it was acquired. The Legislature gave an enlarged definition for the word “gift” in the G.T Act so as to include every sale for inadequate consideration so as to prevent evasion of gift-tax by clothing a gift in the form of sale for a notional consideration. It is for the reason that every sale for inadequate consideration had been defined as a gift and the provisions of the G.T Act were made applicable, the Legislature deliberately excepted the gifts from the provisions of s. 45, by s. 47(iii) of the Act. If the contention suggested for the revenue that every sale of capital asset for inadequate consideration also falls within the purview of s. 52(2) of the Act, if the fair market value as on the date of sale exceeds 15% of the consideration actually received is accepted, s. 47(iii) of the Act would be rendered meaningless, which is not a permissible rule of interpretation. On the other hand, by giving the word “gift” used in s. 47(iii) of the Act the same meaning as given in the G.T Act, there would be complete harmony between s. 47 and s. 52 of the Act. Every sale for inadequate consideration falls within the meaning of the word “gift” and consequently it would attract the levy of gift-tax and be outside the purview of capital gains tax and every sale in which there is understatement of the value falls within the mischief of s. 52 of the Act and attracts capital gains tax and not the provisions of the G.T Act. The provisions would be complementary to, and enforcing, each other. Hence, we hold that the word “gift” used in s. 47(iii) of the Act should be given the same meaning as given to it in the earlier G.T Act, and consequently neither s. 45 nor s. 52 of the Act are attracted to a case of the transfer of capital asset for inadequate consideration.

    19. It is also pertinent to point out that the acceptance of the literal construction suggested for the revenue would lead to incongruous and absurd results as demonstrated by the following illustrations:

    20. If the cost of acquisition of a capital asset is Rs. 50,000 and the vendor and vendee are strangers and the fair market value of the property as on the date of the sale as determined by the ITO is Rs. 1,00,000:

    (a) if it is found to have been sold for a fancy price of Rs. 1,20,000 which was paid by the purchaser owing to its special use for him and which price no other party would have paid and evidence is also available to that effect, but the consideration shown in the sale deed was Rs. 70,000, then applying s. 52(2) of the Act the sale consideration has to be taken only at Rs. 1,00,000, i.e, less than the actual consideration received, for the computation of capital gains;

    (b) if it is sold only for Rs. 90,000 and it is also proved, but the sale consideration shown in the sale deed is Rs. 70,000 then for purposes of computing capital gains, the sale value has to be taken at Rs. 1,00,000 only, i.e, Rs. 10,000 more than the actual amount received.

    (c) if there is an agreement to sell the property shortly after the property is acquired for a sum of Rs. 60,000 and for one reason or the other, the vendor failed to execute the sale deed and consequently the purchaser filed a suit for specific performance and secured a decree for specific performance of the agreement, and consequently the sale deed is executed after a period of five years on which date the fair market value of the property is Rs. 1,00,000 even though the sale deed is executed for a sum of Rs. 60,000 pursuant to the decree of the civil court and only a sum of Rs. 60,000 was received by the seller he will have to pay capital gains tax on a sum of Rs. 40,000 not gained or received by him.

    21. Learned counsel for revenue was not in a position to dispute that the consequence of acceptance of his construction of s. 52(2) of the Act would have the effect as indicated in the above illustrations. Therefore, in our opinion, sub-s. (2), like sub-s. (1) of s. 52 of the Act, is inapplicable to sales for inadequate consideration.

    22. Before concluding we consider it necessary to observe that s. 52 is not happily worded. Both sub-sections say that under the conditions stated therein, the fair market value as on the date of transfer of capital asset shall be taken to be the full value of consideration. It stops there without indicating as to what purpose. It nowhere states that such a value should be deemed to be the consideration received for purposes of computation of capital gains under s. 48 and for the levy of capital gains tax under s. 45. The wording is not clear. Further, appropriately such a provision should have figured as a proviso to s. 48. In view of the interpretation placed by us on s. 52(2), it appears to us that the difference of 15 per cent, between the fair market value of the property and the sale consideration declared in the sale deed mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act as a ground for invoking the said provision only means that the existence of such a circumstance would furnish the clue and constitute the basis for the ITO to initiate proceedings for levy of capital gains tax on that basis and to make an investigation and enquiry and if on such investigation and enquiry there is evidence of the vendor having received any amount more than the amount mentioned in the sale deed, to levy capital gains tax on such amount. In our opinion, ultimately, the capital gains liability has to be fixed only if the value declared in the sale deed is proved to be lower than the undeclared value received or agreed to be received and to the extent of the value so received or agreed to be received. To put it differently, a case which falls under sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act is one in which there has been concealment of income, which would also attract the penal provisions contained ins. 271(1) of the Act and not the one in which transfer of capital asset was for inadequate consideration, which obviously means that there was no concealment of any income and, therefore, to which s. 271(1-) of the Act is not attracted. In the result, we reiterate the view taken by this court in Ranga Pai's case, [1975] 100 ITR 413 and hold that sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the Act applies to cases of understatement of valuation made in the sale deed, to wit, where there is in truth a capital gain, but it is concealed by declaring a lower price in the deed of transfer with an intention to make unaccounted gains and avoidance or reduction of capital gains tax, and not to cases of transfer for inadequate consideration, whatever be the reason, resulting in the avoidance of the receipt of capital gains itself.

    23. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the first question in the negative, i.e, against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answer to the first question, we consider it unnecessary to answer the second question.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sanjiv V. Kudva v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Karnataka
    (Aug 7, 1980)