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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: B.B. Sandpaper, Jayakumar S. Patil, Padmanablia Mohale, R.B. Guttal, R.V. Jayaprakash, S.R. Bannunnath, T.S. Ramachandra, Advocates.
Judges
  • D.M Chandrashekhar, C.J
  • P.P Bopanna, J.
Acts
  • 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: B.B. Sandpaper, Jayakumar S. Patil, Padmanablia Mohale, R.B. Guttal, R.V. Jayaprakash, S.R. Bannunnath, T.S. Ramachandra, Advocates.
Judges
  • D.M Chandrashekhar, C.J
  • P.P Bopanna, J.
Acts
  • 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Division Bench: D.M. Chandrashekhar, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were referred to a Division Bench because they were inter-connected with Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978. Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978 challenged an order permitting withdrawal of Writ Petition No. 7584 of 1977. The appellant in the appeal, Basappa Gurusangappa Bargundi, was the power of attorney holder for Channappa Shanmukhappa Bargundi, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 7584/1977. Channappa had applied under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 before the Land Tribunal, Badami taluk, for registration as occupant of certain lands, as the 'Kartha' of a Hindu undivided family of which the appellant was also a member. Channappa subsequently withdrew the writ petition; the appellant contended that the withdrawal was contrary to his interests and pursued the appeal though not a party in his own right.

Separately, Writ Petitions Nos. 5715 to 5717 of 1978 were presented by Padappa Shivanappa Desai, challenging three separate orders of the Tribunal that granted occupancy rights to respondents 4, 5 and 6. Desai claimed ownership of the lands and contended that those respondents were not tenants and that the Tribunal was not justified in granting occupancy rights to them.

Respondents 9, 10 and 12 in the appeal raised a preliminary objection to the appellant's locus standi to file the appeal, arguing that because he was not a party in his own right to Writ Petition No. 7584 of 1977 and because the petitioner had withdrawn that petition, the appellant had no right to maintain the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who was not a party to the original proceeding (here, a power of attorney holder/member of the HUF) may be permitted to appeal from an order in that proceeding.
  2. Whether the appellant's application under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act was filed within time, in view of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978.
  3. Whether, and to what extent, the Land Tribunal is obliged to consider rival applications for occupancy rights in respect of the same land together and decide them by a common order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Channappa's application under Section 48-A was made as the 'Kartha' of the Hindu undivided family of which the appellant was a member; therefore the application should be regarded as being made on behalf of the appellant as well.
  • The withdrawal of the writ petition by Channappa was contrary to the appellant's interest, and so the appellant sought to challenge that withdrawal by appeal despite not being a party in his own right to the original petition.
  • The appellant produced a memo showing he filed his own application under Section 48-A before the Tribunal on 20-8-77.

Padappa Shivanappa Desai's Arguments

  • He challenged the Tribunal's orders granting occupancy rights to certain respondents, claiming to be the owner of the lands in question and contending that those respondents were not tenants entitled to occupancy rights.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents 9, 10 and 12 argued that the appellant lacked locus standi to file the appeal because he was not a party in his own right to Writ Petition No. 7584 of 1977 and the petitioner had withdrawn that petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shivaraya v. Siddavva (AIR 1963 Mys 127) The Court quoted Somnath Iyer, J.: "Leave to a person to appeal from a decree or order in a proceeding to which he was not a party should not be ordinarily granted unless he establishes that he has an interest which is affected by the order or decree from which he proposes to appeal..." and that the grant of leave depends on the facts of each case and is for the appellate court to decide. The Division Bench applied this principle to overrule preliminary objections to the appellant's locus standi: although the appellant had not filed a separate leave application, that omission was a formal defect and the Court found that the appellant had alleged an interest (a share in the lands) that would be affected by the withdrawal, making the appeal maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following steps, based on the material before it:

  1. Referral and scope — The petitions and the appeal were considered together because they were inter-connected; the Court heard arguments in the appeal and the petitions and issued a common judgment.
  2. Locus standi — Relying on Shivaraya v. Siddavva, the Court held that a non-party may be permitted to appeal if he establishes an interest affected by the order. The absence of a formal leave application did not oust the Court's jurisdiction. Because the appellant claimed a share in the lands and contended that withdrawal of the writ would affect that claim, the Court overruled the respondents' preliminary objection and held the appeal maintainable.
  3. Timeliness of appellant's application — The appellant produced a memo showing he filed an application under Section 48-A on 20-8-77. The Court noted that the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978 extended the time limit for filing under Section 48-A up to six months from the commencement of Section 1 of that Amendment (which came into force on 1-1-1979). On that basis the Court held that the appellant's application before the Tribunal was in time.
  4. Duty to consider rival applications together — The Court articulated a substantive principle: when rival applications for occupancy rights in respect of the same land are before the Tribunal, the Tribunal must consider those rival applications together and decide them by a common order. The Court explained that even if an earlier applicant had obtained an occupancy order that was valid when made, the Tribunal cannot refuse to consider a later application filed within the statutory time limit on the ground that the land is no longer available; instead, the Tribunal should set aside the earlier order and consider both applications together so that rival claims are properly adjudicated.
  5. Application of principle to present cases — Applying that principle, the Court concluded that several orders of the Land Tribunal (specified in the judgment) had to be quashed so that the Tribunal could consider together and dispose of all the rival applications (including the appellant's) by a common order. Because consolidation and re-hearing of those applications was required, the Court found it unnecessary to decide other contentions raised by parties.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978, reversed the order of the learned single Judge, quashed specified orders of the Land Tribunal, and allowed Writ Petitions Nos. 812 and 5715 to 5717 of 1978.

The Court specifically quashed multiple orders of the Land Tribunal, Badami (dates and K.L.R. references are set out in the opinion) and directed the Land Tribunal to consolidate all the identified applications, to hear them together after giving opportunity to applicants and objectors to file statements and adduce evidence, and to decide those applications by a common order. The Court ordered that the parties will bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Tribunal's earlier orders granting occupancy rights (as listed in the opinion) were quashed and the Tribunal was directed to consolidate and re-hear the rival applications together; parties must be given opportunity to present evidence and statements afresh.
  • Legal principle articulated: The opinion states that a tribunal must consider rival applications for the same land together and may have to set aside an earlier valid order to enable a proper joint adjudication of competing claims. The Court applied this principle to the facts before it.
  • Costs: Each party will bear its own costs.

Order accordingly.

Show full summary ...

    Basappa Gurusangappa Baragundi And Etc., v. The Land Tribunal, Badami And Others Etc. Etc.,

    D.M Chandrashekhar, C.J:— These four petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution have been referred to a Division Bench by Bhimiah, J., before whom they had come up in the first instance. The reason for so referring them is that they are inter-connected with Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978. We have heard arguments of learned Counsel in the appeal and in these petitions and we are deciding them by this common judgment.

    2. Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978 is from the order of Venkatesh, J., permitting Writ Petition No. 7584 of 1977 being withdrawn by the petitioner therein. This appeal is by Basappa Gurusangappa Bargundi, who was the power of attorney holder for Channappa Shanmukhappa Bargundi, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 7584/1977. The case of the appellant is briefly thus: Channappa Shanmukhappa Bargundi had made an application under 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Land Tribunal, Badami taluk, for being registered as occupant of certain lands. Channappa had made that application as the ‘Kartha’ of the Hindu undivided family of which the appellant was also a member. Hence, that application must be regarded as being on behalf of the appellant also. Subsequently Channappa withdrew the writ petition. Such withdrawal was contrary to the interest of the appellant. Therefore, the appellant has presented this appeal though he was not a party in his own right to Writ Petition No. 7584 of 1977, but was only a power of attorney holder for the petitioner therein.

    3. Writ Petitions Nos. 5715 to 5717 of 1978 have all been presented by Padappa Shivanappa Desai. Therein, he has challenged the three separate orders of the Tribunal, granting occupancy rights to respondents 4, 5 and 6 therein. He has claimed to be the owner of all the lands in respect of which the Tribunal had granted occupancy rights to respondents 4 to 6. His contention was that those respondents were not tenants of those lands and that the Tribunal was not justified in granting occupancy rights to them.

    4. Learned Counsel for respondents 9, 10 and 12 in the appeal, raised a preliminary objection as to the locus standi of appellant to file the appeal. They contended that as he was not a party in his own right in Writ Petition No. 7584 of 1977 and the petitioner therein, Channappa Shanmukhappa Baragundi, had withdrawn that writ petition he (the appellant) had no right to maintain this appeal from the order in that writ petition.

    5. The question whether a person who is not a party to an original proceeding can file an appeal therefrom was considered by this Court in Shivaraya v. Siddavva (AIR 1963 Mys 127). The law on the point was stated thus by Somnath Iyer, J. (as he then was):

    “Leave to a person to appeal from a decree or order in a proceeding to which he was not a party should not be ordinarily granted unless he establishes that he has an interest which is affected by the order or decree from which he proposes to appeal. If he establishes that he has such interest, it seems to me that it is not necessary for him to further establish that if he does not institute an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court, the consequence will be that the order or decree against which he proposes to appeal becomes conclusive without his being able to question such decree or order in other proceedings. In my opinion, the question as to whether leave should or should not be granted should depend upon the facts of each case and it is for the appellate Court to decide whether the case before it is a fit one for the grant of such leave.”

    6. No doubt the appellant had not made a separate application seeking leave of the Court to prefer this appeal. But, the absence of such application is only a formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the appeal. Since the appellant has contended that he has a share in the lands in respect of which Channappa Shanmukhappa Bargundi has made an application under Section 48-A of the Act, the withdrawal of the writ petition by Channappa is likely to affect his claim to those lands. Hence we overrule the objections of learned Counsel for respondents 9, 10 and 12 in this appeal and hold that the present appeal is maintainable.

    7. It is unnecessary to deal with several contentions urged by the learned Counsel in this appeal and these writ petitions because they can be disposed of on a short ground.

    8. The appellant has filed a memo producing a copy of the application made by him under S. 48-A of the Act before the Tribunal, on 20-8-77.

    9. By the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978, the time limit for filing an application under S. 48-A has been extended up to the expiry of six months from the date of commencement of S. 1 of that Act, which came into force on 1-1-1979. Hence, the appellants application before the Tribunal was in time.

    10. When rival applications are made before the Tribunal for grant of occupancy right in respect of the same land, it is, in our opinion, the duty of the Tribunal to consider together those rival applications and decide them by a common order. Otherwise, there cannot be a proper adjudication of the rival claims. Even if one of the rival applicants had filed his application earlier and the Tribunal had granted him occupancy right in respect of that land and subsequently another applicant makes an application within the time limit provided by S. 48A in respect of the same land, the Tribunal cannot decline to consider the subsequent application on the ground that it has already granted occupancy right in respect of that land to the earlier applicant. The Tribunal is bound to consider every application filed within the time limit provided by the Act and it is no answer to such application to say that land is not available for grant of occupancy right therein. The only way in which the Tribunal can be enabled to consider the later application, is to set aside its earlier order and to direct it (the Tribunal) to consider together both the rival applications and to decide thereon. It may look startling that an order of the Tribunal which was valid when it was made and did not suffer from any infirmity, should be set aside, merely because another person makes a rival application in respect of the same land after the Tribunal has granted occupancy right in respect of that land to the earlier applicant. But there is no other way in which the Tribunal can discharge its obligation to consider all applications filed in time.

    11. Applying the above principle, the orders made by the Tribunal on the applications of respondents 9, 10 and 12 in this appeal, and of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 812 of 1978, have to be quashed in order that the Tribunal may consider together and dispose of by a common order, the aforesaid applications and the application made by the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978. In this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider other contentions of parties in this appeal and these writ petitions.

    12. In the result, we allow Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1978, reverse the order of the learned single Judge and quash the orders of the Land Tribunal, Badami, dated 18-2-1977 in K.L.R LT. SR. 2223, 1597, 1995, 2194, 1629, 2206, 1635, 1874, 1624, 828 and 2209 and the order of the Land Tribunal, Badami, dated 25-2-1977 in K.L.R TSR Nos. 2195, 12, 1644, 1638, 11, 2293, 2215, 216, 1961, 1596, 2216, 1065, 2199, 2198, 2197, 1554, 2255, 2258, 2201, 2256, 1639, 1636, 1626, 1628, 1622, 1588, 2200 and 1637 (which have been produced as Exhibits-D and E in W.P No. 7584 of 1977). We allow Writ Petitions Nos. 812 and 5715 to 5717 of 1978 and quash the order of the Land Tribunal, Badami, dated 5-12-1977 in K.L.R LTSR, 1651, 1766, 1817, 1631, 1851 and 1941. We direct the Land Tribunal to consolidate all the aforesaid applications, to hear them together after giving opportunity to the applicants and the objectors before it to file their statements and to adduce evidence and to decide those applications by a common order.

    13. In these cases, the parties will bear their own costs.

    14. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Basappa Gurusangappa Baragundi And Etc., v. The Land Tribunal, Badami And Others Etc. Etc.,
    (Jul 10, 1979)