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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.R. Somnath Iyer, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, referred a question under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the High Court. The dispute arises from a land acquisition. By notification dated 13 January 1948 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, land of 20,000 square yards owned by the assessee was proposed to be acquired; possession was taken on 19 February 1949. The Land Acquisition Officer's award dated 2 June 1949 fixed compensation at Rs. 2 per square yard (with statutory allowance), aggregating to Rs. 46,000, and that amount was paid to the assessee on 31 December 1949.

There was a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Judge, who enhanced compensation to Rs. 5 per square yard. Both the assessee and the Land Acquisition Officer appealed to the former High Court of Mysore, which, by decree dated 30 March 1956, enhanced compensation to Rs. 7 per square yard. Appeals to the Supreme Court by both parties were dismissed on 7 March 1961.

As finally determined by the Supreme Court's decree, a total sum of Rs. 2,02,265 became payable to the assessee: Rs. 1,15,000 as compensation and Rs. 87,265 by way of interest (for the period from 19 February 1949 to 12 October 1961). That sum was paid to the claimant on 12 October 1961. In the return for the assessment year 1962-63 the assessee disclosed receipt of Rs. 2,02,265 but claimed it was wholly exempt as a capital accretion.

The Income-tax Officer accepted the exempt nature of the compensation (Rs. 1,15,000) but treated the interest (Rs. 87,265) as revenue and taxed it. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the assessee's appeal. The ITAT held that the interest was taxable income but only to the extent of the proportion attributable to the assessment year 1962-63; it refused to tax the entire interest amount in that year. The Commissioner of Income-tax referred the following question under section 256(1):

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the entire interest amount of Rs. 87,265 was not assessable in the assessment year 1962-63 and that only the proportionate interest referable to the assessment year 1962-63 was assessable in that year?”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ITAT was correct in law in holding that the entire interest (Rs. 87,265) paid in October 1961 was not assessable in the assessment year 1962-63, and that only the proportionate interest referable to that year was assessable.
  2. Relatedly, when did the right to receive the interest accrue: did it accrue periodically (as interest became due in earlier years) or only upon final quantification/payment; and whether the assessee's accounting method (mercantile vs. cash) affected the timing of taxation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Assessee) — summary of content in the opinion

  • The assessee contended that the entire amount (compensation and interest) was a capital accretion and therefore exempt from income-tax.
  • It was suggested (by Mr. Swaminathan for the assessee) that the right to the whole of the compensation and the interest which eventually becomes payable is born when acquisition starts and, in any event, when possession is taken; authority was cited (Commissioner of Income-tax v. K.R.M.T.T. Thiagaraja Chetty & Co. and Kesoram Industries) for the proposition that accrual of income which has become due does not wait until its quantification.

Respondent (Income-tax Department) — summary of content in the opinion

  • The Department (represented by Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy) argued that the ITAT misread Supreme Court decisions (Keshav Mills Ltd., E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd., and the more recent exposition in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. A. Gajapathy Naidu) and that the pendency of appeals introduced uncertainty which removed finality from the intermediate decrees; consequently, the argument was that the right to compensation and interest did not accrue until quantification following final adjudication.
  • Further, the Department argued that even if rights to interest had accrued periodically, since the assessee did not maintain accounts on the mercantile basis, the interest received in the previous year (relating to AY 1962-63) could be taxed in that assessment year — relying on the distinction explained in Gajapathy Naidu between mercantile and cash accounting systems.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Keshav Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bombay [1953] 23 I.T.R. 230 This case was relied on by the Department; the opinion records the Department's contention that the ITAT missed the true import of this decision. The Court noted the Department relied on this decision but did not treat it as displacing the principle adopted by the Tribunal; the opinion records reliance by the Department rather than a direct application of a specific proposition from this case.
E.D. Sassoon & Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 26 I.T.R. 27 Contains the proposition that the computation of profits cannot suspend their accrual and articulates that accrual requires acquisition of a right to receive income or that a right has become vested, even if valuation may be postponed. The Court identified this decision as stating the principle on which the Tribunal rested; the opinion treats this principle as continuing law and applies it to conclude periodic accrual of interest when it became recoverable.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. A. Gajapathy Naidu, Madras [1964] 53 I.T.R. 114 (S.C.) Explicates the familiar rule that income is taxable when it accrues if accounts are on the mercantile basis, but when received if the cash system is employed; it was cited for the accounting-basis distinction. The Court held that this decision does not impair the principle from E.D. Sassoon; and observed that since the Tribunal did not find which accounting method was used, accrual when legally due governed the case.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. K.R.M.T.T. Thiagaraja Chetty & Company [1953] 24 I.T.R. 525 Cited by the assessee for the proposition that accrual of income which has become due does not wait until its quantification. The Court noted this authority as supporting the assessee's contention that rights to income (once due) accrue notwithstanding later quantification; it forms part of the authorities the Court considered when rejecting the Department's postponement argument.
Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax [1966] 59 I.T.R. 767 (S.C.) Cited by the assessee for the proposition that accrual does not await quantification. The Court recorded reliance by the assessee on this authority in support of the view that the right to interest accrues when it becomes due and recoverable, and treated it as consistent with the Tribunal's approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining when the right to interest became legally due and recoverable and whether the pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court postponed accrual. The analysis followed these steps:

  1. Statutory liability and dates of accrual: When possession was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer (19 February 1949), he became liable under section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act to pay interest on the award where payment was not made at the time of possession; accordingly, the assessee acquired a right to recover such interest from that date.
  2. Effect of subsequent enhancements: When the District Judge enhanced compensation (decree dated 28 February 1951 referenced in the opinion) and directed payment of interest under section 28, the right to recover interest on the enhanced compensation accrued at the date of that decree. Likewise, when the High Court enhanced compensation and directed interest, the interest earned from 19 February 1949 became immediately due and payable under an executable decree.
  3. Pendency of appeals: The Court found it difficult to accept that pendency of the Supreme Court appeals arrested accrual. It was admitted there was no stay of execution during the pendency of the appeals; even if a stay had existed, its impact on accrual would have been debatable. Consequently, pendency did not defer the accrual of the right to interest.
  4. Accrual principle and authority: The Court identified the principle articulated in E.D. Sassoon — that computation cannot suspend accrual and that accrual requires acquisition of a right to receive income or vesting of such a right though valuation may be postponed — as the foundation of the Tribunal's finding. The Court held this principle remains law and is not undermined by Gajapathy Naidu.
  5. Accounting method issue: The Court addressed the Department's argument that absence of mercantile accounting would permit taxation on receipt. It explained the distinction between mercantile accounting (which recognizes income when due and recoverable) and the cash system (which recognizes income on receipt). Because the Tribunal did not find which system the assessee used, the Court applied the legal test of when the interest became legally due and recoverable; on that basis accrual occurred earlier, not merely at receipt.
  6. Consequence for assessment: Given that interest accrued periodically as it became recoverable, it was not permissible to attribute the whole interest to the year of receipt (assessment year 1962-63). Therefore, only the proportion of interest referable to the assessment year 1962-63 could be assessed in that year.
  7. The Court rejected the premise that the right to no part of the interest was born until the Land Acquisition Officer completed his arithmetic after the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court answered the referred question in favour of the assessee: the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the entire interest amount of Rs. 87,265 was not assessable in the assessment year 1962-63 and that only the proportionate interest referable to the assessment year 1962-63 was assessable in that year.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the assessable amount for the assessment year 1962-63 is limited to the proportion of interest referable to that previous year; the entire interest sum received in October 1961 cannot be taxed in that year alone.
  • The Court reaffirmed the principle (as articulated in E.D. Sassoon) that accrual occurs when a legal right to receive income arises or vests, even if quantification or computation takes place later; the subsequent decision in Gajapathy Naidu did not displace that principle in this context.
  • The omission by the assessee to include interest in earlier years' returns did not prove an election to treat the interest as income of the year of receipt, particularly when the assessee consistently contended that the interest was not a revenue receipt.
  • The Court awarded costs to the assessee (advocate's fee of Rs. 250) in the reference.

(End of summary based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.)

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Mysore v. V. Sampangiramaiah.

    A.R Somnath Iyer, J.:— The question referred to us under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, is:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the entire interest amount of Rs; 87,265 was not assessable in the assessment year 1962-63 and that only the proportionate interest referable to the assessment year 1962-63 was assessable in that year?”

    2. This is how the question arises:

    By a notification made on January 13, 1948, under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, a land owned by the assessee measuring 20,000 square yards was proposed to be acquired, and on February 19, 1949, possession was taken. The Land Acquisition Officer of the Corporation of the City of Bangalore made an award on June 2, 1949, by which he determined the compensation payable to the assessee to be a sum calculated at Rs. 2 a square yard. He also gave him the usual statutory allowance. This sum of money aggregating to Rs. 46,000 was paid to the assessee only on December 31, 1949. But there was a reference to the District Judge under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, and, in that reference, the District Judge enhanced the compensation to a sum calculated at Rs. 5 a square yard. From the decree made by the District Judge in that way, both the assessee and the Land Acquisition Officer appealed to the former High Court of Mysore, which, by a decree made on March 30, 1956, enhanced the compensation to a sum calculated at Rs. 7 a square yard. There was again an appeal to the Supreme Court by both the parties, and those appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court on March 7, 1961.

    3. A sum of Rs. 2,02,265 became payable to the assessee under the decree eventually made by the Supreme Court. This sum of money, which consisted of a sum of Rs. 1,15,000 which represented the compensation, and a sum of Rs. 87,265, which represented the interest, payable from the date on which delivery of possession was taken on February 19, 1949, till October 12, 1961, was paid to the claimant on October 12, 1961. In the return, which he produced in respect of the assessment year 1962-63, under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee disclosed the receipt of this sum of Rs. 2,02,265, but claimed that the whole of that amount was exempt from tax on the ground that it was a capital accretion. The Income-tax Officer upheld the contention that no tax was payable in respect of the compensation amounting to Rs. 1,15,000 but negatived the plea that the interest which was received by the assessee was a capital receipt. So, the sum of Rs. 87,265, which represented the interest paid to the assessee by the Land Acquisition Officer, was taxed as a revenue receipt. The appeal preferred by the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed, but, in the further appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal took the view that the interest paid to the assessee was taxable income, but that only so much of it which was payable during the relevant previous year could be taxed in the assessment year 1962-63. It said this:

    “In each successive year after February 19, 1949, the assessee acquired the right to receive the interest for that year. Although the amount of interest that was payable to the assessee was only determined in 1961, after the judgment of the Supreme Court, still, the right to receive the interest had accrued to the assessee even much earlier. The interest that was payable to the assessee in each successive year was liable to be assessed in that year itself and the assessment of that interest cannot be postponed till the date on which the interest became ascertained or when the interest was actually paid to the assessee……. The assessee all along possessed the right to receive the interest payment from 1949 itself and, therefore, the proportionate interest referable to each successive year during the period from February 19, 1949, to October 12, 1961, was assessable in that respective year. It follows that it is only the proportionate interest that is referable to the assessment year 1962-63 that can be assessed in the hands of the assessee in this year and that the entire interest which was actually paid to the assesee in this year cannot be assessed in his hands in this year alone.”

    4. On behalf of the department, Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy maintained that the Appellate Tribunal missed the true import of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Keshav Mills Ltd., v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bombay [1953] 23 I.T.R 230, and E.D Sassoon & Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 26 I.T.R 27, on which it depended as could be seen from the more recent enunciation in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras. v. A. Gajapathy Naidu, Madras [1964] 53 I.T.R 114 S.C..

    5. The pendency of the appeals before the Supreme Court, it was said, introduced an element of uncertainty as to the compensation really claimable which denuded the High Court decrees of the attribute of finality, and the argument was constructed that the right to compensation and the interest thereon did not accrue until there was their quantification by the Land Acquisition Officer on the basis of the decisions in those appeals.

    6. The proposition that the accrual of that right stood so postponed cannot be sound.

    7. When the Land Acquisition Officer made his award and possession was taken, he became liable under section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act to pay interest on the amount awarded if it was not paid when possession was taken. Similarly, when the compensation was enhanced by the district judge and again by the High Court and there were directions for payment of interest under section 28, such interest became payable when those directions were made.

    8. It was suggested to us by Mr. Swaminathan for the assessee that the right to the whole of the compensation and interest which eventually becomes payable is born when an acquisition starts, and, in any event, when possession is taken, and dependence was placed on the statement of the law by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K.R.M.T.T Thiagaraja Chetty & Company [1953] 24 I.T.R 525 and Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax [1966] 59 I.T.R 767 S.C. that the accrual of income which has become due does not wait until its quantification.

    9. But the question in this reference is, whether the right to the whole of the interest accrued only when it was paid. If it did not, and if the interest in respect of the period which commenced on April 1, 1961, and expired on October 12, 1961, was all that accrued during the relevant preceding year and the interest in respect of the antecedent period had accrued earlier, whatever may be the points of time when there was such accrual, the Appellate Tribunal's view would be irreproachable.

    10. Now, when possession was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer, he became liable to pay interest until the amount awarded by him was paid, and the assessee acquired the right to recover it from him. The direction of the District Judge for the payment of interest on the enhanced compensation, which, his decree made on February 28, 1951, incorporated, produced the right to recover such interest at least on the date of that decree. Then again, when compensation was further enhanced by the former High Court of Mysore which made a similar direction for the payment of interest on such enhanced compensation, all that interest which that amount so earned from February 19, 1949, became immediately due and payable under an executable decree.

    11. It is difficult to understand how the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court could arrest the accrual of that income. It did not. It is admitted that during the pendency of the appeals before the Supreme Court, there was no stay of execution. Even if there was, its impact on accrual is debatable.

    12. So, the premise that the right to no part of the interest was born until the Land Acquisition Officer made his arithmetic after the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals, cannot have the support of reason.

    13. There was thus a complete acquisition of the right to recover the accumulated interest on the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer when possession was taken, and on the enhancement, when the appropriate decree made such enhancement and to subsequent interest so long as it ran but was not paid. Such interest became income which accrued in the year in which it became so recoverable within the meaning of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, so long as that Act was in force, and, of section 5(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, when that Act commenced to operate. The attribution of the whole of that interest to the year of receipt is manifestly impossible.

    14. The omission by the assessee to include the interest which had so accrued to him in the returns of the earlier years cannot yield the deduction that he chose to treat the interest as the income of the year in which he received it. Indeed, no such theory was evolved at any stage. On the contrary, it should be remembered that the contention of the assessee has all along been that no part of the interest was a revenue receipt and it is not unintelligible that it is due to that reason that there was an omission to disclose the interest which had accrued due when he produced the returns for the earlier years.

    15. The principle on which the finding of the Tribunal rested, was that which emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court in E.D Sassoon & Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, in which it was observed:

    “‘The computation of the profits whenever it may take place cannot possibly be allowed to suspend their accrual.….’

    What has however got to be determined is whether the income, profits or gains accrued to the assessee and in order that the same may accrue to him it is necessary that he must have acquired a right to receive the same or that a right to the income, profits or gains has become vested in him though its valuation may be postponed or though its materialisation may depend on the contingency that the making up of the accounts would show income, profits or gains.”

    16. This enunciation continues to be the law and stands in no way impaired by the subsequent decision in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras. v. A. Gajapathy Naidu, Madras, on which Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy depends.

    17. If this was the principle by the application of which the Tribunal deduced its conclusion, very little could be said in criticism of the attribution made by it.

    18. But Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy asks us to say that even if the right to interest had accrued to the assessee periodically during the many years which preceded the assessment year 1962-63, so long as the assessee did not maintain his accounts on the mercantile basis, the interest received by him during the previous year relating to the assessment year 1962-63, could be taxed during that assessment year. In support of this argument, he depended upon the observations in Gajapathy Naidu's case, in which there was an explanation of the familiar rule that income is taxable when it accrues or is earned, if the assessee's accounts are maintained on the mercantile basis, and when it is received, if the method of accounting is the cash system. But this elucidation does not take the department far enough. The mercantile system which, when regularly employed, credits income immediately after it becomes due and recoverable, dispenses, in a proper case, with further proof, that it then accrued, while the cash system which displays the choice of the assessee to treat the income as having arisen when it was received, regulates computation accordingly. And, in the case before us, in which the Appellate Tribunal did not find that the method of accounting employed was the one or the other, the income became taxable when it became legally due and recoverable, for, it is then that it accrued. That being so, we must answer the question referred to us in favour of the assessee, and our answer is that the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the entire interest amount of Rs. 87,265 was not assessable in the assessment year 1962-63 and that only the proportionate interest referable to the assessment year 1962-63 was assessable in that year.

    19. The assessee will get his costs in this reference. Advocate's fee Rs. 250.

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    Comments

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Mysore v. V. Sampangiramaiah.
    (Aug 21, 1967)