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Summary of Opinion — Full Bench on Limitation for Co-mortgagor's Claim

Factual and Procedural Background

The present matter was an appeal referred to a Full Bench because of doubt about the correctness of the view expressed in 47 Mys HCR 337 on the question of limitation. The dispute concerns a mortgage transaction and subsequent payments made by the plaintiff (who was adopted as a son by defendant 3).

Key admitted or proved facts in the opinion:

  • Immovable property (described in Schedule B of the plaint) was hypothecated by defendant 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2 by a registered deed dated 7-6-1927.
  • The plaintiff, later adopted by defendant 3, filed a partition suit; portions were allotted such that the A schedule went to the plaintiff and the C schedule to defendant 3.
  • Representatives of the mortgagees (defendants 1 and 2) sued the plaintiff and defendant 3 in O.S. 50/34-35 for recovery of the mortgage debt; that litigation ended by a decision of the High Court in R.A. No. 95/36-37.
  • To avert sale of the mortgaged property, the plaintiff made payments between 1944 and 1948 satisfying the decree; he subsequently instituted the present suit on 21-1-1949 to recover Rs. 4,306-10-0 by sale of the C schedule property on the ground that it remained liable to that extent.
  • All issues the court framed were found in the plaintiff's favour on the facts; the only ground for dismissal by the lower Court was that the suit was time-barred.
  • It was conceded that Article 132 of the Limitation Act governs the matter; the central controversy was the date from which limitation is to be computed — whether from the date of the mortgage/debt or from the date of the payments made by the plaintiff.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. For a co-mortgagor who pays off a mortgage-debt and seeks contribution or subrogation, does the period of limitation under Article 132 of the Limitation Act begin to run from the date the mortgage-debt fell due (date of the mortgage/debt) or from the date on which the co-mortgagor made the payment (date of payment)?
  2. Can the charge enforceable under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act be availed of against a purchaser who is a bona fide transferee for value, where the purchaser had knowledge of the payor's rights and the discharge effected by him?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The plaintiff had discharged the decretal debt by payments made between 1944 and 1948 to avert sale; the present suit (filed 21-1-1949) for recovery of Rs. 4,306-10-0 from C schedule property was within 12 years of those payments.
  • Article 132 governs the limitation question, but the proper starting point for limitation in a co-mortgagor's claim for contribution/subrogation is the date of payment (when the right to contribution accrued), not the date of the original mortgage.
  • The plaintiff relied on authorities and reasoning distinguishing the position of a co-mortgagor from that of a puisne mortgagee; co-mortgagor has limited subrogation rights and a separate right to contribution under Section 82, enforceable as a charge under Section 100.

Respondents' Arguments (Defendants 1 and 2)

  • The lower Court dismissed the suit on the sole ground of limitation, following the principle stated in 47 Mys HCR 337 that, for a puisne mortgagee suing by subrogation, limitation runs from the date on which the mortgage-money became due (i.e., the date of the mortgage) and not from the date when the subsequent mortgagee paid it off.
  • Defendants 1 and 2 further contended that, even if the charge under Section 100 existed, it could not be enforced against a bona fide transferee for value; they relied on a sale in their favour in execution of a decree and maintained they should be able to claim exemption of the C schedule property if they were bona fide purchasers for value.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
47 Mys HCR 337 (referred to as (A)) Held that where a puisne mortgagee sues by subrogation and the first mortgagee's suit is time-barred, the puisne mortgagee's suit is also time-barred; limitation runs from date the money under the first mortgage became due, not from the date on which the subsequent mortgagee paid it off. The lower Court relied on this decision. The Full Bench distinguished the situation of a co-mortgagor from that of a puisne mortgagee and stated that the statements in 47 Mys HCR 337 suggesting the limitation runs from the date of the mortgage (for a co-mortgagor's contribution claim) are incorrect and overruled.
ILR 50 All 569; AIR 1928 All 241 — Ahmad Khan v. Chhote Lal Explained that a co-mortgagor seeking contribution is not identically in the position of the mortgagee; subrogation is qualified and the right of contribution must be sought proportionately; and that a right of contribution comes into existence only upon payment. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the right to contribution accrues on payment and therefore limitation for contribution must run from the date of payment rather than the date of mortgage.
Kidar Lall v. Hari Lall (Supreme Court) (referred to) Supports the proposition that a co-mortgagor is entitled to recover only the amount paid in excess of his share — i.e., the right of contribution is limited. Used to show that the co-mortgagor's remedies are restricted to what was paid in excess of his liability, supporting the distinction between co-mortgagor and mortgagee rights.
Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad (Supreme Court) (referred to) Similar principle supporting the restricted recovery available to a co-mortgagor (amount recoverable is what is overpaid beyond his share). Relied upon to confirm that contribution rights are limited to excess payments and thus represent an independent right that accrues on payment.
Alam Ali v. Beni Charan, AIR 1936 All 33 (Full Bench) Held that limitation of 12 years under Article 132 runs from the date when the decretal amount was paid off and the statutory right was acquired (i.e., from date of payment). Cited as authority opposed to the view in 47 Mys HCR 337 and supportive of computing limitation from the date of payment for the subsequent claimant.
Brij Bhukhan v. Bhagwan Datt, AIR 1942 Oudh 449 Laid down that the period of limitation for the kind of suit in question must be computed from the date of payment and not from the date of mortgage. Adopted by the court as supporting the proposition that a co-mortgagor's limitation runs from payment.
Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali, AIR 1931 Cal 251 (Full Bench) Considered the question of limitation and overruled Rajkumari Debi v. Mukundalal (which had held time begins from date of mortgage). Applied as precedent that the earlier conclusion (time runs from mortgage date) was incorrect; supports computation from date of payment.
Rajkumari Debi v. Mukundalal, AIR 1921 Cal 166 Earlier held that time begins to run from the date of the mortgage (mentioned as overruled). Not followed; the Full Bench noted it was overruled by Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali.
Sheosaran Singh v. Ania Co-op. Credit Society Ltd., AIR 1945 Pat 192 Patna High Court decision reiterating that limitation runs from the date of payment (after statutory analysis). Used as supporting authority that high courts (Patna, Calcutta, etc.) favor reckoning limitation from the date of payment for contribution claims.
Rameshwar Pd. Missir v. Ramnath Khemka (Patna decisions referred to) Reiterated the view that limitation should be computed from the date of payment. Relied upon to demonstrate a pattern of decisions favoring the date-of-payment rule.
47 Mys HCR — decision at page 515 (referred to as (K) in the opinion) Decision in same volume that was said to help the appellant; indicated that being within 12 years from the payments is not time-barred. Relied on by the Full Bench as local authority that supports computing limitation from date of payment for contributions.
47 Mys HCR — decision at page 530 (referred to as (L)) Held that when a mortgage is renewed by means of another mortgage, the period of limitation runs from the date of the latter mortgage. Noted as further support for the proposition that the operative date for limitation can be the later act (here, payment or renewal), thereby favouring a date-later-than-original-mortgage approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench analyzed the problem by distinguishing the legal position of a co-mortgagor who pays off a mortgage and seeks contribution from that of a puisne mortgagee who sues by way of subrogation:

  1. The court observed that the lower Court had relied on 47 Mys HCR 337, which dealt with a puisne mortgagee's right by subrogation and held that limitation runs from the date the original mortgage-money became due. The Full Bench found that decision concerned a different factual and legal posture (a puisne mortgagee treated as an assignee of the mortgage) and failed to note distinguishing features applicable to a co-mortgagor.
  2. The Full Bench explained that a co-mortgagor, upon discharging the mortgage, does obtain subrogation rights under Sections 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act, but those rights are qualified. The co-mortgagor does not acquire all the mortgagee's rights (for example, he cannot enforce sale of all properties to realise the entire money), and must seek contribution proportionately from owners of the other properties.
  3. Independently, a co-mortgagor acquires a right of contribution under Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act and this contribution is a charge on the property of those benefited, enforceable under Section 100. The court emphasized these are "remedies independent of each other and not mutually exclusive."
  4. The Bench relied on authority (Ahmad Khan v. Chhote Lal, ILR 50 All 569) which states that a right of contribution "comes into play only when a payment is made" and that it would be absurd to say that limitation had already run before the right accrued. Based on this, the court reasoned limitation for a co-mortgagor's contribution claim must run from the date of payment.
  5. The court surveyed authorities (including Full Bench and High Court decisions from Calcutta, Patna, Oudh and other benches) and concluded there was a preponderance of judicial opinion favoring computation of limitation from the date of payment rather than from the date of the mortgage. The statements in 47 Mys HCR 337 suggesting otherwise with respect to co-mortgagors were held to be incorrect and overruled.
  6. On the respondents' contention regarding a bona fide transferee for value, the court analyzed the facts: defendants 1 and 2 had purchased the property in execution of a decree and were aware of the plaintiff's rights and of the effect of the plaintiff's discharge of the decretal debt. Given their knowledge, the court held they could not claim the protection of a bona fide transferee to exempt the property from liability.
  7. Applying the legal conclusions to the facts (payments made 1944–1948; suit instituted 21-1-1949), the court found the suit to be within time when limitation is computed from the date of payment; consequently the lower Court's dismissal on limitation grounds was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Full Bench allowed the appeal. It held that for a co-mortgagor's claim for contribution (and related limited subrogation remedies), the period of limitation under Article 132 of the Limitation Act runs from the date on which the co-mortgagor made the payment (i.e., when the right to contribution accrued), and not from the date the mortgage-money fell due. Statements to the contrary in 47 Mys HCR 337 (insofar as they apply to co-mortgagors) were declared incorrect and overruled.

Direct Consequences / Orders:

  • The decree of the lower Court dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation was set aside.
  • The suit was decreed as prayed by the plaintiff (appellant).
  • Time for payment was fixed at three months from the date of the Full Bench decision.
  • The appellant was awarded costs both in the Full Bench and in the Court below.
  • The appeal was formally allowed.

Implications beyond the case: The opinion identifies and accepts a line of judicial authority that limitation for a co-mortgagor's contribution claim begins on payment; it expressly overrules statements suggesting the contrary in 47 Mys HCR 337 as applied to co-mortgagors. The opinion confines its holdings to the distinctions and authorities discussed in the text.

    Kenchappa v. Rokhade Nagappa And Ors.

    1. This appeal has been referred to a Full Bench by the Division Bench before which it was posted for hearing as doubt was felt about the correctness of the view expressed in 47 Mys HCR 337 (A),. on the question of limitation. It was held in that case

    if therefore at the time when the puisne mortgagee sues to enforce the first mortgage by virtue of subrogation a suit by the first mortgagee is barred by time, the puisne mortgagee's suit is equally barred by time. This is the position which is accepted by the Calcutta, Madras and Patna rulings ..... Limitation counts from the date on which the money under the first mortgage became due and not from the date on which the subsequent mortgagee paid it off whether the money paid was still due under the mortgage or under a decree obtained on that mortgage
    .

    Applying this principle, the lower Court has dismissed a suit filed by a person in the position of a co-mortgagor for recovery of amounts paid by him in excess of his liability as the interval between the due date for payment under the mort.-gage deed and the suit was more than 12 years although the suit was filed within that period from the date of payment.

    The material facts either admitted or proved are, that immovable property described in Schedule B of the plaint was hypothecated by defendant 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2 under a registered deed dated 7-6-1927, the plaintiff who was subsequently adopted as a son by defendant 3 filed a suit against him for partition of the family properties and in execution of the decree passed therein, the portion thereof described in the A schedule was allotted to plaintiff and the C schedule to defendant 3.

    Representatives of the mortgages viz., defendants 1 and 2 sued the plaintiff and defendant 3 in O. S. 50/34-35 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Shimoga, for recovery of the mortgage-debt. The suit finally came to an end by a decision of the High Court in R. A. No. 95/36-37 and to avert the sale of the mortgaged property for realisation of the decree debt, the plaintiff made payments from time to time between 1944 and 1948 in full satisfaction of the decree. The present suit was instituted, on 21-1-1949 for recovery of Rs. 4306-10-0 by sale of C schedule property, on the ground of its being subject to liability to that extent.

    2. Several issues were framed in the case and the findings on these are all in plaintiff's favour. There is no dispute about the correctness of the amount or its being a charge on the C schedule property. The suit has been dismissed on the sole ground of being barred by time. The question of limitation, on the determination of which the decision depends, is not raised in issue and the omisson of this is regrettable but not material as both parties have directed their attention to it as the lower Court has given consideration to it.

    3. It is conceded that Article 132, Limitation Act governs the case, put the controversy is about the starting point, the date from which time is to run. If it is the date of the mortgage as considered by the lower Court, the dismissal of the suit is justified as it was filed beyond 12 years prescribed by the Article.

    The lower Court (SIC) relying on 47 Mys HCR 337 (A), has failed to notice the distinguishing features of a claim of a co-mortgagor in comparison with that of a puisne mortgagee with which that case was concerned and has overlooked decisions relating to the time available to a co-mortgagor for enforcing his right.

    The view that the period is to be reckoned from the date of mortgage when the suit is by the puisne mortgagee for the amount paid towards an earlier mortgage is based on the consideration that as a result of such payment the puisne mortgagee is an assignee of the mortgage and as such bound by its terms and conditions. A co-mortgagor cannot be said to be in an exactly identical position.

    The discharge of the mortgage does not confer on him all the rights of the mortgagee and gives him the right to proceed against part of the mortgaged property (since what is this is excluded) and part of the amount paid (excluding what was payable by him). As pointed out in --'Aziz Ahmad Khan v. Chhote Lal', ILR 50 All 569 at p. 579: (AIR. 1928 All 241 at pp. 244-245) (B).

    ''Where a suit is brought to enforce a contribution, which is based on the maxim "equity is equality", it is only partially right to say that the party making the payment and relieving the co-mortgagor's property from burden is subrogated o the position of the mortgagee. It is clear that he cannot enforce the right of the mortgagee to sell all or any of the properties to realise the entire money recoverable by him.

    The mortgagee would be entitled, without any restriction, to enforce the payment of the entire mortgage-money against any one of the properties he might choose to proceed against; but the mortgagor seeking contribution has to exempt his own property (if it has not 'been sold) and must bear a proportionate part of the mortgage-money. Then, he has to split up his claim and must ask for a proportionate payment from the owners of the re-laining properties.

    Properties would contribute, some more and others less, according to the respective values of the properties. Thus it is clear that a co-mortgagor seeking contribution is not exactly in the same position, in all respects, as the mortgagee whom he has redeemed."

    Besides the right of subrogation under Ss. 92 and 95 subject to the qualifications mentioned above, the co-mortgagor by discharging the mort-gage also acquires a right of contribution under Section 82, Transfer of Property Act and the amount recoverable will be a charge on the property of the persons benefited from payment and enforceable under S. 100 of the Act.

    These are remedies independent of each other and not mutually exclusive. His right to contribution under S. 82 of the Act on the basis of the value of properties is clear and this entitled him to get only what is paid in addition to the amount due by him in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, -- 'Kidar Lall v. Hari Lall', (C), and -- 'Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad, (D).

    4. As regards the , time within which the charge may be enforced the observations at page 581 of 50 All 569: (at p. 245 of AIR 1928 All 240 (B), are

    there can be no doubt that where a right of contribution exists, that right comes into play only when a payment is made. It would be absurd to say that although the right to exact contribution arose ............ on 19-7-1916, the limitation against him had begun to run on 23-9-1899, (the date of the mortgage), and that it had already been time barred on 23-9-1911, i. e., even before the right accrued.

    The decisions of the Calcutta and Patna High-Courts stated in 47 Mys HCR 337 (A), to be of support for the disposal of that case are not adverse to the appellant. -- 'Alam Ali v. Beni Charan', AIR 1936 All 33 (FB) (E), was a case in which a property was subject to three simple mortgages and the question was whether third mortgagee could set up in a suit by second mortgagee, right of subrogation for the amount paid in discharge of the decree in the suit by the first mortgagee, even though the suit on the first mortgage would now be barred.

    The opinion of the Full Bench was that limitation of 12 years would run under Article 132 from the date when the decretal amount was paid off and the statutory right acquired. This is definitely opposed to the ruling in '47 Mys HCR 337 (A)'. It is laid down" by a Full Bench in -- 'Brij Bhukhan v. Bhagwan Datt', AIR 1942 Oudh 449 (F), that the period has to be computed for a suit of the present kind from the date of payment and not from the date of mortgage.

    In 'Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali', AIR 1931 Cal 251 (FB) (G), the question of limitation was considered by a Bench of five learned Judges and the earlier decision in--' Rajkumari Debi v. Mukundalal', AIR 1921 Cal 166 (H), that the time begins to run from the date of the mortgage was overruled. The Patna High Court has reiterated the same view after consideration of the statutory provision and cases bearing on the point in a number of decisions (See 'Sheosaran Singh v. Ania Co-op. Credit Society Ltd., AIR 1945 Pat 192 (I); and 'Rameshwar Pd. Missir v. Ramnath Khemka', (J) ).

    5. There is no want of authority in our own Court to treat the suit as being filed within time. In the same Volume, 47 Mys HCR, there is a decision at page 515 (K), to help the appellant. The facts stated at page 528 are:

    being within 12 years from those payments is not time-barred. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether in a case of subrogation pure and simple the period of limitation is that applicable to the original incumbrance or whether it Starts from the date of payment by the subsequent mortgagee."

    6. In another case reported at page 530 (L), in the same volume it was held that when a mortgage is renewed by means of another, the period of limitation runs from the date of the latter and not of the former. There is thus preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that the starting point of limitation under Article 132, Limitation Act for a contribution by a co-mortgagor is the date on which he pays off the mortgage-debt and not the date on which the debt fell due. Statements suggesting anything to the contrary in 47 Mys HCR 337 (A), are therefore incorrect and overruled.

    7. Sri M. K. Srinivasa Iyengar finally urged on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 that though there is no bar of time for the enforcement of the charge on the property under S. 100 of the Act it cannot be availed of against bona fide transferee for value. This contention of defendants 1 and 2 is put forward on the strength of a sale in their favour of the property in execution of a decree obtained by them for recovery of amount due under a mortgage deed executed by defendant 3.

    Plaintiff who was impleaded in that case intervened and by consent a decree was passed for realisation of the debt by sale of the C schedule property belonging to the father. This was subsequent to the litigation with respect to the first mortgage of 1927 and defendants 1 and 2 were well aware of plaintiff's rights and the effect of the discharge of the decretal debt by him.

    Defendants 1 and 2 cannot profess to have been ignorant of the liability of C schedule property for rateable contribution towards the debt. Having purchased it with knowledge of what had transpired and the consequences of purchase they are not entitled to claim exemption of C schedule property from liability.

    8. The decree of the lower Court is, therefore, set aside and the suit is decreed as prayed for. Time for payment three months from this date. The appellant will have his costs both here and in the Court below.

    9. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Kenchappa v. Rokhade Nagappa And Ors.
    (Mar 15, 1956)