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  • CCS Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
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  • CCS Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, initially Chief General Manager (Personnel) with Coal India Limited, was appointed as Director (Personnel) — a fixed five-year tenure post — on 27 May 1997 and had his tenure extended from time to time. His tenure as Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited, was brought to an end effective 19 February 2003. The respondents did not allow the petitioner to resume duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel) immediately upon expiry of the tenure post.

The petitioner filed W.P. (S) No. 1036 of 2003; the learned single judge partly allowed the writ petition by order dated 8 April 2003, holding (inter alia) that the petitioner was entitled to continue in the Chief General Manager post and directing the respondents to issue an office order forthwith. Pursuant to that judgment, the respondents issued communications (notably Annexure-2 dated 11 April 2003 and other consequential letters: Annexures 4, 10, 11 and 16) which permitted the petitioner to join as Chief General Manager but stated that the period from 20 February 2003 until his date of joining would be treated as "dies-non".

The petitioner objected to this conditionalization, contending that the single judge's order did not include such a condition and that the respondents had no rule basis for treating the period as "dies-non". The petitioner also filed L.P.A. No. 269 of 2003; the Division Bench confirmed the single judge's decision by order dated 19 December 2003 (specifically paragraph 14 of that judgment).

In the present petition, the petitioner challenged the respondents' letters and sought payment of pay, allowances and other service benefits for the period 20 February 2003 to 7 May 2003. The contested communications are Annexure-2 (11 April 2003), Annexure-4 (6 May 2003), Annexure-10 (7 May 2004), Annexure-11 (6 July 2004) and Annexure-16 (5 December 2005).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the meaning of the term "dies-non"?
  2. Under what circumstances can a period of service of an employee be treated as a "dies-non" period?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner had substantive lien on the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel) and, after expiry of his tenure as Director (Personnel), he was entitled to resume that post; the writ court's order granted that right without any condition.
  • The respondents' communication that the period from 20 February 2003 until joining would be treated as "dies-non" was not directed by the writ court and could not be added unilaterally.
  • The petitioner relied on dictionary meanings and on CCS (Central Civil Services) Rules, 1965 read with Post and Telegraph Manual (Vol. III) Rule 62, to submit that the period in question could not be treated as "dies-non".
  • The petitioner sought quashing of the communications (Annexures 2, 4, 10, 11 and 16) and payment of salary, allowances and other service benefits for 20 February 2003 to 7 May 2003.

Respondents' Arguments

  • After the writ decision, the respondents permitted the petitioner to resume duties by letter dated 11 April 2003, but the petitioner did not join immediately; therefore the period for which he did not perform duties should be treated as "dies-non" and he is not entitled to salary or allowances for that period.
  • In some communications (e.g., Annexure-10 dated 7 May 2004) the respondents stated that the "dies-non" period would be regulated as per "extant rules".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
W.P. (S) No. 1036 of 2003 (Order dated 8 April 2003, single judge) Held that petitioner was entitled to continue as Chief General Manager (Personnel) and directed respondents to issue office order forthwith. The court relied on the single judge's directions (paras 21, 22, 23 and 26) to conclude that the writ order did not attach any "dies-non" condition and that the petitioner was entitled to continue without a break in service.
L.P.A. No. 269 of 2003 (Division Bench, order dated 19 December 2003) Confirmed the single judge's view; paragraph 14 held the petitioner's lien would be deemed continuing in the peculiar circumstances. The court treated this confirmation as further support that no condition of "dies-non" was imposed by the higher court, and used it to reject respondents' unilateral condition that the relevant period be treated as "dies-non".
Havens v. Stiles, 56 LRA 736 (as cited in Advanced Law Lexicon) Used in subsequent lexicon discussion to illustrate the phrase "dies non juridicus". The court quoted law lexicons (which in turn cite this authority) to explain the ordinary/legal meaning of "dies-non". The opinion did not apply the case substantively beyond its appearance in the lexicon citation.
State v. Ricketts, 74 N.C. 187 Quoted in Advanced Law Lexicon to demonstrate exceptions where judicial action may occur on a "dies non". Included within the lexicon citation relied upon to explain the meaning and ordinary usage of "dies-non"; the court used the lexicon material to elucidate the term rather than to apply the foreign case as binding precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a fact-focused and textual analysis, applying service-law principles concerning lien, the content of the earlier writ order and the ordinary/legal meaning of "dies-non":

  1. Establishment of background facts: The petitioner originally held a substantive post (Chief General Manager), was appointed to a tenure post (Director (Personnel)) for a fixed five-year term (with extensions), and his tenure as Director ceased on 19 February 2003. The respondents did not allow immediate resumption of the substantive post and the petitioner filed W.P. (S) No. 1036 of 2003.
  2. Interpretation of the writ orders: The single judge's order (8 April 2003) and the Division Bench's confirmation (19 December 2003) were examined. The court noted that those orders directed reinstatement to the substantive post and used language such as "entitled to continue", which the court interpreted to mean there was no break in service and no conditional resumption directed by the writ court.
  3. Assessment of respondents' unilateral condition: The respondents' subsequent communications (starting with Annexure-2 dated 11 April 2003) made joining conditional by treating the period 20 February 2003 to the date of joining as "dies-non". The court emphasized that the respondents could not add a condition that was not written into the writ order and that the respondents had not challenged the writ order by appeal (the writ order was, in fact, confirmed on appeal by the Division Bench).
  4. Meaning and applicable scope of "dies-non": The court examined dictionary and lexicon definitions (Black's Law Dictionary, New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Advanced Law Lexicon, Wharton's Law Lexicon, etc.) and summarized the lawful circumstances in which a period may properly be treated as "dies-non". From the materials and authority, the court distilled that "dies-non" generally denotes days when legal business is not ordinarily transacted and, in administrative/service contexts, may be used to denote periods not counted as service or treated as neither service nor a break in service when sanctioned by rule or authority.
  5. Identification of permissible grounds for treating a period as "dies-non": Drawing on service practice as described in the opinion, the court set out three specific circumstances in which an absence may be treated as "dies-non":
    • (a) where an official remains absent from duty without prior permission;
    • (b) where, while on duty, an official leaves the office without prior permission; and
    • (c) where an official remains in office but refuses to perform duties assigned to him.
    The court expressly limited the circumstances to these three factual situations (as stated in the opinion) when the period can be so treated.
  6. Examination of "extant rules" claim: The court observed that respondents repeatedly referred to regulation by "extant rules" (Annexure-10), but the respondents failed to identify any such rules in their counter-affidavit or through counsel. The court noted this absence of any shown rule to justify treating the period as "dies-non".
  7. Application of principles to the present facts: Because the petitioner had been prevented by the respondents from resuming his liened substantive post, pursued and obtained relief in W.P. (S) No. 1036 of 2003 (confirmed on appeal), and because none of the three permissible circumstances for treating a period as "dies-non" applied here, the court concluded the period from 20 February 2003 to the date of joining (7 May 2003) could not be treated as "dies-non". The court also underscored that respondents could not take advantage of their own wrong (i.e., the respondents' failure to restore the liened post) to deny pay or other benefits.
  8. Relief granted: On that basis, the court quashed and set aside the respondents' communications (Annexures-2, 4, 10, 11 and 16) insofar as they treated the period 20 February 2003 to 7 May 2003 as "dies-non", and directed respondents to pay salary and other admissible allowances and benefits for that period.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was allowed. The court's core rulings are:

QUASHED: The communications at Annexure-2 (11 April 2003), Annexure-4 (6 May 2003), Annexure-10 (7 May 2004), Annexure-11 (6 July 2004) and Annexure-16 (5 December 2005), insofar as they treated the period from 20 February 2003 to 7 May 2003 as "dies-non", were quashed and set aside.

DIRECTED: The respondents were directed to make payment of salary for the period 20 February 2003 to 7 May 2003 along with other admissible allowances and the benefits attached to the service of the petitioner as Chief General Manager (Personnel).

Implications

  • Direct effect on parties: The immediate consequence is that the petitioner is entitled to remuneration and service benefits for the period 20 February 2003 to 7 May 2003 and the respondents' letters imposing a "dies-non" label for that period are void as applied to him.
  • Principled guidance on "dies-non": The court articulated and limited the factual circumstances in which a period may be treated as "dies-non" (absence without permission, leaving duty while on duty without permission, or refusal to perform duties while in office). The court also required an identifiable rule or sanctioning authority for treating a period as "dies-non" when it is relied upon to deny pay or benefits.
  • No retroactive addition to court orders by respondents: The court reaffirmed that administrative authorities cannot lawfully add conditions to a judicial order that the court itself did not impose, particularly when the relevant judicial order was not successfully challenged by the authority.
  • Precedential effect: The judgment resolves the dispute between these parties and articulates the limited factual categories in which "dies-non" may be invoked; beyond that immediate availability to the petitioner, the opinion may be used as authority in similar fact patterns, but the court's directive was primarily remedial and fact-specific to the petitioner’s circumstances.

Disposition: The petition was allowed and disposed of. The court ordered payment for the specified period and quashed the challenged communications to the extent indicated.

    Deobrat Sahay v. Coal India Limited. Kolkata And Others

    1. The present petition has been preferred for challenging the orders/communications/letters issued by the respondents, which are at Annexure 2 dated 11th April, 2003, Annexure-4 dated 6th May, 2003, Annexure-10 dated 7th May, 2004, Annexure-11 dated 6th July, 2004 and Annexure-16 dated 5th December, 2005, whereby, the present petitioner was denied the benefit of continuation of services for the period running from 20th February, 2003 to 7th May, 2003. Against this decision of the respondents, the present petition has been preferred by the petitioner and thereby, the petitioner has also prayed that the respondents be directed to make payment of attached pay allowances and such other service benefits for the aforesaid period.

    2. The main issue raised in this petition is as under:

    “What is the meaning of the term ‘dies-non’ and under what circumstances the period of service of an employee can be treated ‘dies-non’ period?”

    3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was initially appointed as Chief General Manager (Personnel), Coal India Limited and, thereafter, he was appointed as Director (Personnel), Eastern Coalfields Limited, which was the tenure post i.e for the particular period only. There after, time and again tenure of the present petitioner as a Director (Personnel) was extended and he was transferred at Central Coalfields Limited. The petitioner was appointed as Director (Personnel) on 27th May, 1997 and again the tenure of the present petitioner was extended time to time and ultimately the tenure of the present petitioner was brought to an end with effect from 19th February, 2003 as a Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited and, thereafter, he was also not allowed to join his original post of Chief General Manager (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited.

    4. Aggrieved with the same, the present petitioner had preferred a writ petition bearing W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003, which was partly allowed by this Court vide order dated 8th April, 2003 (Annexure 1), wherein, it has been held by this Court in paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 26 as under:

    “21. Now, the question that consequently arises for consideration is whether the petitioner would be entitled to continue on the post which he was holding prior to his appointment on lien on a tenure post.

    22. It is well known that lien, in service law connotes the right of a public servant to hold the post substantively to which he is appointed. Existence of such lien and the incidents thereof are dependent on the service rules or terms and conditions by which public servant is governed. Generally when a person with a lien against a post is appointed substantively to another post, he acquires a lien against the later post and lien against his previous post automatically disappears. But if the rules pro vides to the contrary, a public servant holding substantively a permanent post retains a lien on that post during the period provided in the rule. There are circumstances where the lien of a government servant is suspended on a permanent post which he holds substantively on his appointment on a tenure post in a substantive capacity.

    23. Admittedly before appointment as Director (Personnel) in Western Coalfields Limited on substantive post the petitioner was holding a substantive post of Chief General Manager in Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. There is no dispute that all these Central Coalfields Ltd., Western Coalfields Ltd., Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. are the subsid-iary companies of Coal India Ltd. Both in the capacity of Chief General Manager and Director (Personnel), petitioner was in the service of the Coal India Ltd. There is nothing in the letter of appointment or in the terms and conditions annexed therewith which expressly provides that after the expiry of the period of five years, petitioner shall cease to be the employee of the subsidiary company of Coal India Ltd. In the impugned order dated 19-2-2003 whereby extension of the tenure was not approved, it is directed that the petitioner is relieved from his duties as Director (Personnel) Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi. The respondents have not shown any rule or service conditions whereby in the event of non-extension of tenure, petitioner shall ceases to be the employee of the Coal India Ltd. In any circumstance, the petitioner cannot and shall not be deemed to have been removed from the service of the subsidiary company before attaining the age of superannuation only because the tenure of service as Director expired. In that view of the matter, in my considered opinion, petitioner is entitled to continue as Chief General Manager of the subsidiary company of Coal India Ltd.

    26. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the law discussed hereinabove, in my considered opinion, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order cannot be held to be illegal, arbitrary, mala fide, discriminatory or violative of principle of natural justice and the same needs no interference by this Court. However, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to continue in the post of Chief General Manager which he was holding prior to his appointment as Director (Personnel). The respondents are directed to issue office order forthwith latest by 15th April, 2003 posting the petitioner as Chief General Manager in the respondent-company”.

    5. In view of the aforesaid decision, the petitioner was not allowed to continue as Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited rather he was allowed to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), Coal India Limited. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that in pursuance of the aforesaid decision, an order was passed by the respondents dated 11th April, 2003 (Annexure-2) to the effect that the petitioner may join as Chief General Manager (Personnel) but the period running from 20th February, 2003 till his date of joining will be treated as “dies-non”. This condition has been continued in several other consequential written letters. The petitioner has objected this conditional joining.

    6. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the learned single Judge has never quoted such type of condition regarding joining of the petitioner and, therefore, such condition can never be added by the respondents. The order passed by the learned single Judge has never been challenged by the respondents in the Letters Patent Appeal. On the contrary, the present petitioner had preferred a Letters Patent Appeal bearing L.P.A No. 269 of 2003, wherein, the order passed by the learned single Judge in the writ petition was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19th December, 2003. It has been held in paragraph 14 of the said Letters Patent Appeal, which reads as under:

    “14. The peculiar circumstance in this case is that on the date on which lien granted to him for the lower post expires, the appellant was already on the Board Level Post, when extension matter was also being considered. Therefore, if the authority was not willing to extend, then they should have asked the appellant to join the lower post prior to the date of expiry of his lien on the lower post, which was not done. It, thus, leaves the appellant in quandary because on the one hand, he is not given the extension and on the other hand, his lien expired, meaning thereby that the appellant had no post to revert back. This situation is the creation of the authorities themselves. Therefore, in this peculiar circumstances, his lien despite the existence of the circulars, will be deemed to have been continuing after its expiry and the appellant can hold that post of GM”.

    7. In view of the aforesaid decision also, the petitioner was allowed to join the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel) without any condition and, therefore, this condition which is added by the respondents that the period running from 20th February, 2003 till his date of joining will be treated as “dies-non” deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in various communications, this phraseology has been used with one more rider given in the order dated 7th May, 2004 (Annexure 10) that “dies-non” period is regulated as per extant rules. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that there are no such type of rules. This contention is raised in paragraph 19 of the petition, which has not been replied by the respondents that which are these rules and what is the meaning of the words ‘extant rules’. In fact, the petitioner ought to have been allowed to join the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited without any condition, as per the order passed in the writ petition and confirmed in the Letters Patent Appeal.

    8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court to various dictionary meanings as well as reference has also been pointed out to CCS Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 to be read with post and telegraph Manual (Vol. III) Rules 62 thereof and it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the period running from 20th February, 2003 to 7th May, 2003 cannot be treated as “dies-non”. In the facts of the present case, there was no error on the part of the petitioner and wrongly the petitioner was not allowed to join the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel) with effect from 20th February, 2003 and, therefore, the petitioner was compelled to file the writ petition bearing W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003 and even after the decision in the writ petition a rider/condition has been added which was never directed in the writ petition's order passed by this Court and, hence, the orders/communications/letters at Annexures-2, 4, 10, 11 and 16 deserves to be quashed and set aside and the respondents may be directed to make payment of salary and other allowances and to provide him the service benefits for the period running from 20th February, 2003 to 7th May, 2003.

    9. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after the decision rendered by this Court in W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003 dated 8th April, 2003, a letter at Annexure 2 to the memo of the petition dated 11th April, 2003 was written and the petitioner was permitted to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), but, as the petitioner has not joined the duties, the period for which the petitioner has not worked as Chief General Manager (Personnel) should be treated as “dies-non” i.e the period for which the petitioner has not performed his duties and, therefore, in the communications, which are referred hereinabove, the clause “dies-non” has been used by the respondents and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any salary, allowances and other benefits for the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the date of joining of the present petitioner as Chief General Manager (Personnel).

    10. Having heard learned counsels for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I hereby quash and set aside the orders/communications/letters, issued by the Government, which are at Annexures-2, 4, 10, 11 and 16 mainly for the following facts and reasons:

    (i) The present petitioner was initially working as Chief General Manager (Personnel) with Coal India Limited and, thereafter, he was appointed for a fixed term as Director (Personnel), Eastern Coalfields Limited with effect from 27th May, 1997.

    (ii) The aforesaid post of the Director (Personnel) was a tenure post for a period of five years and his term was extended upon completion of the fixed tenure.

    (iii) It appears from the facts of the case that the services of the present petitioner were not extended as Director (Personnel) with effect from 19th February, 2003 and he was also not allowed to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), Coal India Limited.

    (iv) It also appears from the facts of the case that thereafter a writ petition bearing W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003 was preferred by the present petitioner, which was partly allowed, as stated hereinabove, since the petitioner was not allowed to continue as Director (Personnel), rather he was allowed to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), Coal India Limited and considering his lien upon the said post, the directions have been given in paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 26 of the aforesaid writ petition.

    (v) It further appears from the facts of the case that after this decision, conditional joining was allowed to the petitioner as per communication dated 11th April, 2003 (Annexure-2), wherein, it was stated by the respondents that the petitioner is allowed to join the post as Chief General Manager (Personnel) and the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the date of his joining, will be treated as “dies-non”. This rider has again given another cause of dispute between the parties and consequently the petitioner pursued that the aforesaid period cannot be treated as “dies-non”. This contention cannot be allowed to be attached with the joining letter at Annexure-2 because there was no fault lies on the part of the petitioner. Moreover, the order passed in the aforesaid writ petition is also not a conditional one. Unconditionally, the petitioner was permitted to join the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel). What is not written in the order passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition cannot be permitted to be presumed by the respondents. Initially, the petitioner was already working as Chief General Manager (Personnel) and for a limited period of five years, the petitioner was appointed as Director (Personnel), which is a tenure post. Once the tenure is over, as per the lien of the petitioner, he will be again reverted back to his original post i.e the Chief General Manager (Personnel), which was a mistaken belief of the respondents while not extending the period of the Director (Personnel) that the petitioner cannot also have a lien upon the original post i.e of Chief General Manager (Personnel). This mistaken belief is corrected by the order of this Court in the writ petition and the respondents were directed to allow the petitioner to have his lien upon the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel). In paragraph 26 of the aforesaid writ petition, it has been directed by this Court that the petitioner is entitled to continue on the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel), which he was holding prior to his appointment as Director (Personnel) because the respondents were directed to issue office order forthwith. It ought to be kept in mind by the respondents that always the judgment delivered by a Court of law is after some time from the date of dispute between the parties and, therefore, whenever the decision is rendered by a Court, it will have its effect from the retrospective date. The petitioner was wrongly not allowed to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), upon completion of his tenure post as Director (Personnel) and, therefore, a direction was given in the writ petition vide order dated 8th April, 2003.

    (vi) Looking to the order passed by this Court in W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003, it appears that no such condition was attached that the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the date of joining as a Chief General Manager (Personnel) by the petitioner will be treated as “dies-non” period. On the contrary, looking to paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 26 of the order of the writ petition, it appears that clear direction was given to the respondents to issue office order forthwith to the petitioner and it was held that the petitioner is entitled to continue. These words, “entitled to continue”, state that there is no break in service and as such, the period cannot be treated as “dies-non”. No such condition was ever granted by this Court for resuming the duties. The order passed by this Court in W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003 was never challenged by the respondents by way of appeal and, therefore, such condition can never be attached in the communication at Annexure-2 dated 11th April, 2003 and, therefore, the communication at Annexure-2 was wrong as it treats the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the date of joining of the petitioner on the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel) as a “dies-non”, deserves to be quashed and set aside.

    (vii) It further appears from the facts of the case that the aforesaid decision was challenged by the petitioner in L.P.A No. 269 of 2003 and the decision of the writ petition was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court and it was held in paragraph 14 of the said judgment that in the peculiar circumstance, his lien despite the existence of the circulars, will be deemed to have been continuing after its expiry and the appellant (petitioner herein) can hold the post of General Manager. Thus by the Division Bench of this Court also no condition during the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the date of joining was put, directing the respondents to consider the said period as “dies-non” period. Looking to the paragraph 14 of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid L.P.A, it appears that condition attached by the respondents in their communications at Annexures-2, 4, 10, 11 and 16 that the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the joining of the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel) will be treated as “dies-non” period, deserves to be quashed and set aside.

    (viii) The meaning of “dies-non” as per different dictionaries and Law Lexicon is as under:

    “(a) Black's Law Dictionary. (6th edition at Page 455) gives the following meaning:

    “Dies non - An abbreviation of Dies non juridicus.

    Dies non - A day not juridical; not a Court day. A day on which Courts are not open for business, such as Sundays and some holidays”.

    (b) The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Thumb Index Edition Vol. I at page 667):

    “Dies non - dies non juridical.

    Dies non juridical - Law: a day on which no legal business is done”

    (c) Advanced Law Lexicon P. Ramantha Aiya (3rd Edition 2005 at page 1372):

    “Dies non. (Lat.) A day which is regarded by the law as one on which no judicial act can be performed, or legal diligence used. (Trayner)

    An abbreviation of the phrase “dies non juridicus”, non-judicial days-days during which the Courts do not transact any business — as Sunday or the legal holidays. (Havens v. Stiles, 56 LRA 736). It is frequently said that Sunday is “dies no juridicus” but this means only that process cannot ordinarily issue or be executed or returned, and Courts do not usually sit, on that day. It does not mean that no judicial action be had on that day. On the contrary, it is laid down in books of authority that warrants for treason, felony and breach of the piece may be issued and executed on that day. (State v. Ricketts, 74 N.C 187, 193).

    A day on which the Courts do not ordinarily sit or carry on business; a day on which general business may not lawfully be transacted.

    A day on which a law-Court is not held.

    A day that is not counted for some purpose.

    For example, Saturday and Sunday are not counted as days of the working week. See also Non-business days. (Trade Finance)”

    (d) Legal Maxims & Phrases - Law Lexi con cum Digest - N.M Mulchandani (Daulat Publications, at page 22):

    “Dies non: An abbreviation of the phrase ‘dies non juridicus’ : non judicial days, days during which the Courts do not”.

    Dies: “A day”

    Dies Fasti: “Business day”

    Dies Feriati: “Holidays”

    Dies Soils: “Sunday”

    (e) Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th edition at page 329):

    “Dies non juridicus, or Dies non, not a Court-day”.

    (ix) It further appears from the correspondence at Annexure 10 dated 7th May, 2004 that the “dies-non” period will be regulated as extant rules. It appears that there are no such extant rules as referred at communication at Annexure-10. The allegation levelled in paragraph 19 has not been properly answered in the counter-affidavit. Even, on being asked, learned counsel for the respondents is unable to point out what are those extant rules and how any period can be treated as “dies-non” period.

    (x) In fact, the period running from 20th February, 2003 till date of joining of the present petitioner cannot be treated as “dies-non” period. Absence of an official from duty without prior permission or while on duty, if the officer leaves the office without prior permission or while in the office, any officer refused to perform his duties asked to him is subversive of discipline. In such type of cases, the period can be treated as “dies-non” period. In case of such absence of work, the rule sanc-tioning authority may order that the post on which the work is not performed be treated as “dies-non” i.e it will neither be counted as service nor be construed as break in service. Thus, only in three circumstances, a period can be treated as “dies-non” period, which are as under:

    (a) where any official remains absent from duty without prior permission:

    (b) while on duty, in office, any official has left the office, without prior permission; and

    (c) when the official remains in office, but, refuses to perform the duties assigned to him.

    In these three circumstances, the period can be treated as a “dies-non” period.

    (xi) In the facts of the present case, it appears that the respondents have not allowed the petitioner to retain the lien upon the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel). Consequently, the petitioner has to pursue the respondents that he should be retained on lien against the original post, when the tenure post comes to an end, but, because of the behaviour of the respondents, the writ petition bearing W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003 was instituted and it was decided in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 8th April, 2003 that the petitioner retains the lien upon the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel) and the respondents were directed to issue the joining order of the petitioner. This order was even confirmed in the L.P.A No. 269 of 2003 by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19th December, 2003 especially in paragraph 14 thereof. Thus, the respondents cannot be allowed to take benefit of their own wrong. It is the respondents, who have not allowed the petitioner to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel) and, therefore, some time has gone in the litigation and further directions by this Court and once the tenure post comes to an end, the petitioner ought to have been allowed to resume the duties as Chief General Manager (Personnel), immediately, because there was lien on the same post. In view of the order passed in W.P (S) No. 1036 of 2003 and the order passed in L.P.A No. 269 of 2003, the period running from 20th February, 2003 till the joining of the petitioner as Chief General Manager (Personnel) i.e up to 7th May, 2003 cannot be treated as “dies-non” period.

    (xii) I therefore quash and set aside the orders/communications/letters, which are at Annexure-2 dated 11th April, 2003, Annexure-4 dated 6th May, 2003, Annexure-10 dated 7th May, 2004, Annexure-11 dated 6th July, 2004 and Annexure-16 dated 5th December, 2005, so far as it affects the present petitioner, and the condition attached with the joining of the post of Chief General Manager (Personnel) by the petitioner for the period running from 20th. February, 2003 to 7th May, 2003 cannot be treated as “dies-non” period. I therefore direct the respondents to make the payment of salary for the period running from 20th February, 2003 to 7th May, 2003 along with other admissible allowances and the benefits attached with the service of the present petitioner as Chief General Manager (Personnel).

    11. The petition is, hereby, allowed and disposed of.

    12. Petition allowed.

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    Deobrat Sahay v. Coal India Limited. Kolkata And Others
    (Jan 18, 2011)