1. This petition seeks invoking of inherent jurisdiction of
this Court under section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash a
complaint(application) under section 12(1) of the
Jammu and Kashmir Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2010 (for short the Act) filed
against the petitioners by the respondent as also the
order dated 27.01.2014 passed by the trial
Magistrate.
2. Heard. I have perused the record.
3. Petitioner No. 1 and the respondent are husband and
wife, their marriage was solemnized on 18.09.2012.
Petitioners 2 and 3 are the parents of petitioner No. 1
and petitioner No. 4 is his sister. Petitioner No. 5 is
the husband of petitioner No. 4.
4. In her application under section 12(1) of the Act filed
before learned Special Excise Magistrate, Jammu,
respondent has leveled various allegations of violence
and harassment against the petitioners. I may state
briefly; the respondent has alleged that petitioner
Nos. 1 to 3, who constitute a joint Hindu family, were
not happy with the items of dowry brought by her so
immediately after marriage they started subjecting
her to physical and mental torture. They subjected
her to physical torture publically during short span of
her stay at her matrimonial house. On every
occasion, petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 would encourage
petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 and thus to add fuel to fire.
Respondent has contended that an agreement was
executed by petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 in which they had
admitted that they will not desert or maltreat her but
in spite of that the petitioners had been beating her
severely. She has stated further that she lodged a
complaint to SHO, Women Cell, Jammu but no action
was taken. Respondent has alleged also that
petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 did not allow her to share room
with her husband whenever he came to his house
from Jalandhar, where he is working as a Team Leader
in Airtel Company. They also did not allow her to go
with her husband to Jalandhar. She has alleged that
in April, 2013, petitioners gave her a severe beating
and demanded two lac rupees or a car from her
parents. In May, 2013, petitioner Nos. 1 to 3, after
giving her a beating, threw her out of the matrimonial
house at the instance of petitioner Nos. 4 and 5. They
again demanded two lac rupees from her, which she
could not pay and the petitioners subjected her to
starvation. She was left with no option than to file a
petition under section 488 Cr.P.C. against petitioner
No. 1. She has contended that in the course of
pendency of petition under section 488, petitioner
No. 1 came to Jammu and with the intervention of
some relatives took her to Jalandhar. However, 4-5
days later, petitioner No. 1 subjected her to physical
thrashing in the night of 18th January, 2014. At that
time other petitioners had been guiding the petitioner
No. 1 telephonically from Jammu. She, however,
managed to come back to Jammu, narrated the
incident to her parents and report was lodged with
Women Cell, Police Station, Jammu on 19th January,
2014.
5. Having alleged as above, the respondent in her
application before the Magistrate has sought order of
protection under section 18 of the Act prohibiting the
petitioners from committing any act of violence
against her and consequential relief under section
19(1)(f) of the Act by providing suitable
accommodation to her with her husband at
Jalandhar.
6. Respondent also filed an application for grant of
interim relief seeking a direction that till disposal of
the main application, petitioner No. 1 should provide
her accommodation with him at Jalandhar or where
he presently resides as also a direction to officer
incharge of the nearest Police Station to provide her
protection against domestic violence and to assist her
in implementation of the order to be passed by the
Magistrate.
7. Learned Magistrate, on taking cognizance of the
applications, seems to have recorded preliminary
statement of the respondent and has issued notice to
the petitioners. Besides, the learned Magistrate in
exercise of power under section 23 of the Act has
granted interim relief by issuing a direction to
petitioner No. 1 (husband) to provide accommodation
to the respondent (wife) with him at Jalandhar and a
direction to Additional SSP, Jalandhar to extend full
police protection to the applicant in terms of section
19(5) of the Act.
8. Petitioners seek quashing of the application mainly
and precisely on the ground that the allegations are
totally imaginary, false, frivolous and baseless and the
filing of the application is sheer abuse of process of
court and actuated with mala fides. It is contended
that from last about one year the respondent is
residing with her parents at Jammu, she is getting
regular maintenance allowance under section 488
Cr.P.C. from petitioner No. 1 so question of harassing
or maltreating her does not arise. It is contended
further that application has not been filed in Form (II)
as prescribed under Rule 6(1) of the Rules framed
under the Act (for short the Rules) and has not been
verified as required under law. It is also contended
that petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 are not the members of
the family of petitioner No. 1 to 3 so no application
under the Act against them is maintainable.
9. Petitioners seek quashing of the impugned order
dated 27.01.2014 granting interim relief to the
respondent on the ground that learned Magistrate
has passed the order arbitrarily without holding any
inquiry and appointment of counselor. The same has
been passed arbitrarily without application of mind
and notice to petitioners.
10. Mr. B. B. Kotwal, learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that an application leveling false and
absurd allegations amounts to abuse of process of
court and is liable to be quashed. Mr. Kotwal relied
upon a judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in Jeewan Krishan Raina v Chandoo Devi, 2013 (3)
Crimes 564. Mr. Kotwal submitted further that
arraying sister and brother-in-law of petitioner No. 1
as non applicants in the application is not permissible
because they cannot be said to have any domestic
relationship with the respondent and cannot be
proceeded against for an act of domestic violence. In
support, Mr. Kotwal relied upon Ashish Dixit and ors v
State of U. P, 2013 (1) Crimes 216 (SC). Mr. Kotwal
would say further that neither the application nor the
supporting affidavit is in the prescribed forms so
complaint is not maintainable and the impugned
order is without jurisdiction. Mr. Kotwal would say
further that the impugned order dated 27.01.2014
has been passed by the learned Magistrate without
recording satisfaction as required under section 23 of
the Act and calling and taking into consideration the
report of a Protection Officer or a counselor which is
a mandatory requirement under proviso to section
12(1) of the Act. In support, Mr. Kotwal relied upon
judgment dated 11.07.2014 rendered by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in 561-A No. 356/2013, CMA No.
434/2013.
11. Per contra, M/s. V. S. Saini and I. H. Shah, Advocates
supported the application and the impugned order.
They submitted that under the Act an aggrieved
person can straightway make an application to the
Magistrate without first approaching any Protection
Officer or a counselor or service provider.
Consideration of Protection Officers report therefore,
cannot be taken as mandatory requirement under
section 12(1) of the Act. Learned counsel relied upon
Milan Kumar Singh v State of U. P, 2007 Cr.LJ 4742.
Learned counsel also submitted that the application
clearly makes out a case of domestic violence against
the petitioners and that a Magistrate is empowered
to grant interim relief under section 23 of the Act.
12. To accord consideration to respective pleas and
submissions made at the Bar, I may refer to some of
the relevant provisions of the Act:
12.1 Under section 12(1) of the Act an aggrieved person
or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf
of the aggrieved person may lodge an application to
the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the
act. clause (a) of section 2 defines aggrieved person
as:
(a) aggrieved person means any woman
who is in a domestic relationship with the
respondent and who alleges to have been
subjected to any act of domestic violence by
the respondent.
(Emphasis added)
12.2. Clause (f) of section 2 defines domestic
relationship:
(f) domestic relationship means a relationship
between two persons who live or have, at any
point of time, lived together in a shared
household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.
(Emphasis added)
12.3. Domestic violence in relation to clause (a) of section 2
and for the purpose of the Act is defined in section 3
of the Act.
13. Section 12, section 3 and section 2 (a) and (f) of the
Act when read in juxtaposition, would make it clear
that an application under section 12(1) can be filed by
or on behalf of a woman against a person or persons
who has/have subjected her to any act of domestic
violence and further that an act of domestic violence
can be said to have been committed only by a person
who is in a domestic relationship with that woman.
A domestic relationship is a relationship between
two persons who live or have, at any point of time,
lived together in a shared household, when they are
related by consanguinity, marriage, adoption or are
family members living together as a joint family. An
act of domestic violence cannot be said to have been
committed when the person alleged to have
committed the violence and the woman against
whom the violence has been committed do not live or
had never lived together in a shared household.
14. Applying the above principles envisaged under
the Act, there will be no hesitation in holding
that petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 cannot be said to
have subjected the respondent to any domestic
violence and are not liable to be proceeded
under section 12(1) of the Act for the reason
that it is not the respondents case that they and
the respondent live or had ever lived together in
a shared household. Application filed by the
respondent before the learned Magistrate on its
plain reading would show that at no point of
time petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 had shared any
household or resided with the respondent. The
only allegation of the respondent against them
is that they had been adding fuel to the fire and
that at their instance, petitioners 1 to 3 had
thrown her out of the matrimonial house. No
act of domestic violence therefore, can be said
to have been committed by the petitioners 4
and 5 on a bare look at the application filed by
the respondent and learned Magistrate should
not have proceeded against them. In somewhat
similar situation Supreme Court in Ashish Dixits
case (supra) has quashed proceedings against
respondents, other than husband and his
parents and I may quote paras 3 and 4 of the
judgment:
3. In the petition filed by respondent No. 2,
apart from arraying her husband and her
parents-in-law as parties to the proceedings,
has included all and sundry, as respondents. To
say the least, she has even alleged certain
actions said to have been done by the tenant
whose name is not even known to her.
4. In a matter of this nature, we are of the
opinion that the High Court at least should have
directed that the petition filed by respondent
No. 2 be confined to her husband as also her
parents-in-law and should not have allowed the
impleadment of respondent Nos. 4 to 12.
15. Viewed thus, the application and the proceedings to
the extent of petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 are liable to be
quashed. However, all the ingredients of commission
of an act of domestic violence by petitioner Nos. 1 to 3
are prima facie made out on a bare reading of the
application made by the respondent and no reason
for disbelieving or rejecting the allegations and
quashing the application at its threshold on that score
in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court is
made out. High Court under section 561-A Cr.P.C.
(sec. 482 of the Central Code) is vested with inherent
jurisdiction to make such order as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under the Code or to
prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. The jurisdiction of the High
Court is vast indeed but it is well settled that this
jurisdiction is to be exercised cautiously, carefully and
sparingly and the High Court has not to function as a
Court of appeal or revision.
16. Payment of maintenance allowance under section 488
Cr.P.C. by petitioner No. 1 to the respondent cannot
be taken as a bar to filing an application under section
12(1) of the Act by the respondent given the relief
sought by her. Respondent has sought firstly,
protection order as provided under section 18 of the
Act and secondly, the residence order as provided
under section 19 of the Act. Seeking such reliefs is
independent of and unconnected with the relief of
maintenance available under section 488 Cr.P.C.
17. Contention raised by the Mr. Kotwal, learned Counsel
for the petitioners also is that learned Magistrate has
proceeded against the petitioners without calling and
taking into consideration the report of a Protection
Officer or a Service Provider. It is seen in this relation
that under section 8(1) of the Act, Government has to
appoint Protection Officer (s) for specified area(s),
who shall exercise powers conferred on him/them by
or under the Act. Under section 4 of the Act read
with Rule- 4 of the Rules any person who has reason
to believe that an act of domestic violence has been,
or is being or is likely to be committed, may give
information about it to the Protection Officer . Rule 5
casts a duty on the Protection Officer to prepare
Domestic Incident Report (DIR) in Form-1 on receipt
of a complaint of domestic violence and submit the
same to the Magistrate and forward copies thereof to
the Police Officer, Incharge of the Police Station
within the local limit of jurisdiction of which the
domestic violence alleged to have been committed
has taken place as also a copy to the Service Provider
of that area. Section 9(1) lays down the duties and
functions of a Protection Officer. They include inter
alia duty; i) to make a Domestic Incident Report to
the Magistrate upon receipt of a complaint of
domestic violence and ii) to make an application in
prescribed form and manner to the Magistrate, if the
aggrieved persons so desires, claiming relief for
issuance of protection order. Contextually, Rule 8(1)
also lays down the duties and functions of the
Protection Officer and casts a duty on him/her inter
alia to assist the aggrieved persons in making the
application under the Act, if the aggrieved persons so
desires. Rule 8(2) empowers a Magistrate to direct
the Protection Officer to conduct home visit of shared
household premises and make preliminary inquiry in
regard to granting ex parte interim relief to the
aggrieved person(s) under the Act and file a report to
the Magistrate on the emoluments, assets, bank
accounts or any other documents as may be directed
by the Magistrate.
18. Section 10 of the Act, requires a voluntary association,
registered under the Societies Registration Act, or a
company, registered under Companied Act or any
other law for the time being in force with the
objective of protecting the rights and interests of the
women by any lawful means, to register itself with
the Government as Service Provider for the purpose
of the Act. Such a Service Provider has power inter
alia to record the domestic incident in the prescribed
form if the aggrieved person so desires and forward
a copy thereof to the Magistrate and the Protection
Officer having jurisdiction in the area in which the
domestic violence takes place.
19. It is seen that under section 4 of the Act any person
can give information of domestic violence to the
Protection Officer and under section 10 an aggrieved
person may approach a Service Provider to record a
domestic violence report. Under section 12 of the Act,
application for seeking one or more reliefs under the
Act can be made primarily by an aggrieved person or
a Protection Officer or any other person on her
behalf. Proviso to section 12 is important in context of
the submission that before passing any order on the
application made under section 12(1), the Magistrate
has to call and accord consideration to a Domestic
Incident Report from the Protection Officer or the
Service Provider. Proviso to section 12(1) reads:
Provided that before passing any order on such
application, the Magistrate shall take into
consideration any domestic incident/report
received by him from the Protection Officer or
the service provider.
20. Question thus raised is whether calling and according
consideration to Domestic Incident Report of a
Protection Officer or the Service Provider is sine qua
non for passing an order, interim or final, on an
application under section 12(1) of the Act?
21. A comparative reading of sections 4, 9 and 10 of the
Act and Rules 4 and 8 of the Rules on one hand and
section 12 of the Act on the other would make it clear
that giving of information about domestic violence to
the Protection Officer under section 4 or to Service
Provider under section10 and making an application
seeking relief under section 12(1) or two different and
independent aspects of the Act. Making an
application under section 12(1) to the Magistrate is no
way linked with or dependent upon providing
information to the Protection Officer or the Service
Provider. To say the other way, giving information to
Protection Officer or Service Provider and their report
to the Magistrate in no way can be taken as a sine qua
non for making an application under section 12(1) to
the Magistrate. It is open to an aggrieved person to
straightway make an application to the Magistrate
under section 12(1) seeking one or more reliefs under
the Act. The only interpretation that can be given to
the proviso to section 12(1) of the Act is that the
Magistrate before passing any order on the
application of the aggrieved person will have to
accord consideration to a Domestic Incident Report of
a Protection Officer or a report of a Service Provider,
if such a report has been received by the Magistrate.
Key to such interpretation seem to have been made
available in the proviso itself by use of word any.
Proviso does not mandate calling for a report from a
Protection Officer or Service Provider but refers to
any report received from a Protection Officer or
Service Provider, which, however, would be available
only in a case where information to the Protection
Officer or a Service Provider about an act of domestic
violence had been given by the aggrieved person
himself or by any person. I, therefore, find no
substance in petitioners contention that calling and
according consideration to report of Protection
Officer or a Service Provider is imperative or sine qua
non for proceeding and passing an order on an
application under section 12(1) of the Act and would
hold that such a report is not necessary in every case.
Similar view has been taken by the High Court of
Allahbad in Milan Kumar Singhs case relied upon by
learned respondents counsel. Similar contentions
having been raised in that case, High Court after
referring to relevant provisions of Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the
rules framed thereunder, which are similar to the Act
(J&K Act), High Court held:
7. A plain reading of the Section shows that the
aggrieved person can file complaint directly to
the Magistrate concerned. This is the choice of
the aggrieved person that instead of direct
approaching the Magistrate, he or she can
approach the Protection Officer and in case of
emergency, the service provider and with their
help to the Magistrate concerned. The word "or"
used in Section 12 of the Act is material, which
provides a choice of the aggrieved Oh to
approach in the aforesaid manner. There is no in
direct approaching the Magistrate for taking
cognizance in the matter. This is for the
Magistrate concerned to take help of Protection
Officer and service provider after receiving the
complaint provided, he feels it necessary for final
disposal of the dispute between the parties. If
the parties concerned or Magistrate takes help of
the Protection Officer, he, will submit a Domestic
Incident Report to the Magistrate concerned.
22. I am not in agreement with the contention of Mr.
Kotwal, learned counsel for the petitioners that the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in judgment dated
11.07.2014 in Vinay Sharmas case (supra) has taken a
view as propounded by Mr. Kotwal. Learned
Coordinate Bench in that case has also emphasized
necessity of according consideration to
domestic/incident report but that necessity would
arise only if such a report is there and not calling the
report.
23. Another ground taken for quashing of the application
is that the same has not been filed in Form-II as
prescribed under Rule 6(1) of the Rules and verified in
the prescribed manner. Rule 6(1) reads as under:
6. Applications to the Magistrate.-
(1) Every application of the
aggrieved person under section 12 of
the Act shall be in Form II or as nearly
as possible thereto.
24. On its plain reading, it would be clear Rule 6(1) does
not make it mandatory for the applicant to prepare
an application under section 12(1) of the Act in Form
II only. The Rule provides also that it may be as nearly
as possible to Form-II. Form-II on its reading would
show that it mainly provides for giving the name of
the person (aggrieved person/Protection Officer/any
other person on behalf of aggrieved person) who
makes the application and details about the order(s)
sought from the Magistrate, that is, Protection Order
under section 18/Residence Order under section 19/
Monetary Reliefs under section 20/ Custody Order
under section 21/Compensation Order under section
22. A copy of the application under section 12(1)
made by respondent before the Magistrate is
available on the file. All the requisite information as
contemplated in Form-II and even much more is
stated in the said application. Petitioners contention
in this regard, therefore, not only is without any
substance but is misconceived too. It may be stated in
this regard that the Act is a welfare legislation to
provide for effective protection of rights of women
guaranteed under the Constitution, who were victims
of domestic violence. A relief sought under the Act
will not be defeated merely on technical defects like
application having not been filed in prescribed form
unless the application does not convey or make out
what is required and sufficient for grant of the relief.
25. For all that said and discussed above, I find no merit
in the prayer for quashing the application insofar as it
relates to petitioner Nos. 1 to 3, though it has merit,
as said above, in regard to petitioner Nos. 4 and 5,
who are the sister and sisters husband of petitioner
No. 1 and are/were not in domestic relationship with
the respondent.
26. Besides the application, petitioners have also sought
quashing of the interim and ex parte order passed by
learned Magistrate on 27.01.2014 in terms of section
23 of the Act. Section 23 reads as under:
23. Power to grant interim and ex
parte orders.-
(1) In any proceeding before him under this
Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim
order as he deems just and proper.
(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an
application prima facie discloses that the
respondent is committing, or has committed
an act of domestic violence or that there is a
likelihood that the respondent may commit
an act of domestic violence, he may grant an
ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in
such form, as may be prescribed, of the
aggrieved person under section 18, section
19, section 20, section 21 or section 22, as
the case may be, against the respondent.
27. Sub-section 1 of section 23 empowers the Magistrate
to pass interim order and sub-section 2 lays down the
requirements to be fulfilled before passing ex parte
interim order, granting relief(s) as contemplated
under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22. Section 23 on its
plain reading would show that Magistrate can grant
ex parte interim relief only on prima facie satisfaction
that respondent is committing or has committed an
act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood
that respondent may commit an act of domestic
violence. Such a satisfaction must be recorded in the
order passed by the Magistrate or should be evident
by sufficient implication.
28. The impugned ex parte order passed by the learned
Magistrate on 07.06.2014 on its plain reading would
show that the same is not in conformity with section
23 of the Act and seems to have been passed in
disregard of sub-section (2) thereof. Learned
Magistrate has not recorded his prima facie
satisfaction about commission of any domestic
violence and has rather made the respondents
willingness to reside with her husband as basis for
recording an out of context observation that real
differences and discomfort are/is interse the
respondent and her parents-in-law. The interim order
passed by the learned Magistrate is not legally correct
and deserves quashing.
29. There is yet another reason that calls for
reconsideration of the interim relief granted by the
learned Magistrate. The relief granted is the
Residence Order in terms of Section 19(f) of the Act
as sought by the respondent. Section 19(f) reads as
under:
19. Residence Order.-
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level
of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved
person as enjoyed by her in the shared household
or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances
so require.
30. Learned Magistrate has directed the petitioner No. 1
(husband) to provide accommodation to the
respondent (wife) with him at Jalandhar where he is
reportedly putting up. It appears as if the petitioner
No. 1 has been directed to keep the respondent with
him in the accommodation he is using at Jalandhar. It
needs to be pointed out in this relation that section
19(f) contemplates alternate accommodation of the
level as enjoyed by the aggrieved person in the
shared household or to pay rent for the same. What
sort of accommodation should be granted under
Section 19(f) and whether the respondent can be
compelled to accommodate the applicant with him
are the questions to be considered while granting
relief of accommodation? I, however, would leave
this question for the consideration of the learned
Magistrate for the reason that such questions were
not raised at the time of hearing of this case before
this Court.
31. For the aforementioned, the application made by the
respondent insofar as it relates to petitioners Nos. 4
and 5 is quashed. Order dated 27.01.2014 to the
extent of grant of ex parte interim relief is also
quashed keeping it open for the learned Magistrate to
pass fresh interim order after hearing both the sides.
Petition to the extent of quashing the application qua
petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 is dismissed.
32. Petition disposed of accordingly. A copy of this order
be sent to the trial court.
(Janak Raj Kotwal)
Judge
Jammu
21.10.2014
Rakesh