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Case Number

C.I.M Appeal No. 119 of 1988

Advocates

R. P. Bakshi
T. S. Thakur

Judges

Hon'ble Sh. Justice B.A. Khan

Acts

Sec. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short the Act).
provisions of Sub-section (2),
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Section 110-D

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from a claim petition filed by respondent No. 1, a lawyer, who suffered multiple injuries when his scooter was hit by a truck on 20-3-1986. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), Jammu awarded Rs. 1.16 lakhs with 12% interest per annum to the claimant. Appellants (the owner of the vehicle and the insurer) filed an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the award primarily on the question of compensation. Respondent filed cross-objections after the appeal was admitted to hearing. The High Court considered preliminary objections to the maintainability of the appeal (whether appellants were "persons aggrieved" within Section 110-D and whether the insurer could challenge the quantum of compensation given restrictions in Section 96(2) of the Act).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the term "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act includes the owner of the vehicle (appellant No. 1) merely because a finding of negligence was made against him, even if no direction was made against him to pay compensation.
Whether the insurer (appellant) is competent to maintain an appeal under Section 110-D on grounds challenging the quantum of compensation, given the limitations of defences available to an insurer under Section 96(2) of the Act.
If both appellants are individually incompetent to maintain the appeal, whether their joint appeal can still be held maintainable.
Whether the cross-objections filed by the respondent survive despite the appeal being held not maintainable, and, separately, whether the Tribunal's assessment of compensation should be re-examined on account of alleged excessive, speculative or duplicate awards on certain heads.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Thakur, Learned Counsel)

The appeal is not maintainable because the appellants are not "persons aggrieved" under Section 110-D.
The owner (appellant No. 1) is not a "person aggrieved" since the award does not operate against him (i.e., no direction to pay compensation), and any grievance of the owner would be consequential rather than immediate.
The insurer is not competent to challenge the award on grounds other than those available to it under Section 96(2) of the Act.
A joint appeal can be entertained only if one of the appellants is competent to maintain it; since neither is competent, the joint appeal should fail.

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bakshi and by the memo of appeal)

The memo of appeal primarily disputed the quantum of compensation and the basis for the award.
Mr. Bakshi relied upon a set of authorities (including several ACJ decisions) to argue that an insurer can challenge the award on grounds other than those enumerated in Section 96(2), and that the owner/driver and the insured owner have a right of appeal to challenge findings of fault and consequent primary liability.

Table of Precedents Cited

For a just decision on liability, driver and insured owner have a right of appeal under Section 110-D to challenge finding of fault and consequent primary liability against them (contrary view).

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Buxton v. Minister of Housing & Local Govt., (1961) 1 QB 278	The expression "person aggrieved" given a restricted meaning: denotes a person who has suffered a legal grievance and has been wrongfully deprived of or refused something or whose title has been wrongfully affected; the person should be immediately aggrieved not consequentially.	The court relied on the restricted meaning to support the proposition that mere findings against a person (without an order making him liable to pay) do not make him a "person aggrieved" under Section 110-D.
King v. Middlex Justice	Clarification that the person should be immediately aggrieved and not consequently aggrieved; nominal or speculative adverse effect is insufficient.	Used to underscore that an aggrievement must be immediate and not merely consequential or nominal in the context of Section 110-D.
AIR 1976 SC 578 (Supreme Court decision cited)	The expression "person aggrieved" is elastic and elusive; its scope depends on content and intent of the statute and the nature and extent of prejudice suffered.	The court cited this rule to justify interpreting "person aggrieved" in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act and to adopt a fact-sensitive approach rather than an expansive one.
United Fire and General Insurance Company v. Laxmi Shori, AIR 1982 J & K 105 (Full Bench)	In context of Section 110-D, a disappointed party is not necessarily a "person aggrieved"; he must have been deprived of a benefit to which he was entitled. If he was not entitled to the relief in the first place, denial does not make him aggrieved; if he was entitled and it was denied, he would be a "person aggrieved".	The court treated this Full Bench view as authoritative and used it to hold that the owner was not a "person aggrieved" since the award did not directly and immediately deprive him of any right or impose liability upon him.
AIR 1985 All 44 (Division Bench, Allahabad High Court)	Finding that owner/driver was responsible for an accident does not make them "persons aggrieved" unless the award directs them to pay some part of the compensation; owner can be aggrieved if ordered to pay.	Cited for the narrow proposition that a mere finding of negligence is insufficient to confer aggrieved status unless a direction to pay is made; used to support the conclusion about the owner's incompetence to appeal.
AIR 1979 Cal 152 (Calcutta High Court)	No legal grievance exists (and thus no right to appeal) where there is no denial/deprivation of a legal right or financial interest and no liability to pay compensation.	Used to reinforce the position that absent any order imposing liability, owners cannot be treated as "persons aggrieved".
AIR 1987 MP 244 (Madhya Pradesh High Court)	The test is whether the person can obtain relief in appeal; owner cannot act as a proxy for insurer; mere finding against owner does not make him "person aggrieved" if no award is made against him.	Cited as establishing the practical test to determine who is a "person aggrieved" in MV Act cases; the court adopted this approach in assessing the owner's competence.
1990 ACJ (MP) 888 (Division Bench, Madhya Pradesh High Court)	The court noted this as a contrary view but did not follow it, preferring the preponderance of decisions holding otherwise.
1989 ACJ (Ker) 600 ; AIR 1989 Ker 192 (Kerala High Court)	Held that material deprivation is not essential; even absent immediate financial liability, the owner may be a "person aggrieved" (example: loss of no-claim bonus).	The judgment was acknowledged as taking a contrary view (relied upon by Mr. Bakshi) but the court declined to follow it because it was bound by the Full Bench decision of this court.
1985 ACJ 775; 1988 ACJ 813; 1989 ACJ 961 (authorities relied upon by Mr. Bakshi)	Authorities cited to canvass that insurer can file appeal on grounds other than those in Section 96(2) (specific principles varied across decisions).	The court considered these authorities were not persuasive in view of the binding Full Bench decision of this court and therefore did not accept them.
AIR 1992 J & K 105 (Full Bench of this Court)	Held that limitations in Section 96(2) are implicit in Section 110-D: an insurer cannot challenge awards on grounds other than those in Section 96(2), except where insurer's rights are expressly reserved in policy, or where collusion is shown, or where permission is granted under Section 110-C(2-A) to defend on all grounds.	The court treated this Full Bench decision as binding and decisive for the case: it held the insurer incompetent to challenge the quantum of compensation (grounds in the memo lay outside Section 96(2)); no reservation or collusion was pleaded; therefore insurer's appeal was not maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by observing that the phrase "person aggrieved" cannot be given a rigid universal definition; its meaning depends on the context of the particular statute. Citing authorities, the court accepted that the term should be interpreted in a restrictive, context-sensitive manner under the Motor Vehicles Act. The court distilled a three-part practical test (expressed in the opinion) to determine who qualifies as a "person aggrieved" under Section 110-D:

A "person aggrieved" must have a genuine grievance that is immediate and direct and not merely consequential, nominal or speculative.
The award must prejudice the person's interests adversely and deprive him of something to which he was otherwise entitled — the effect must be substantial rather than nominal.
A mere finding of negligence or responsibility is insufficient; the award must make the person liable to pay some part of the compensation (i.e., there must be material deprivation).

Applying these tests to the facts, the court examined the competence of appellant No. 1 (the owner). Although the owner was the legal person whose act made the insurer potentially liable, the court held that the owner's grievance was only consequential because the award did not direct any payment by the owner and thus did not directly or immediately prejudice the owner's rights. Consequently, appellant No. 1 did not qualify as a "person aggrieved" under Section 110-D and was not competent to maintain the appeal.

Turning to the competence of the insurer-appellant, the court analysed the statutory restriction in Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It recited and relied upon the binding Full Bench decision of this court (AIR 1992 J & K 105) which held that the limitations in Section 96(2) must be read into Section 110-D — in short, insurers cannot challenge awards on grounds other than those available to them under Section 96(2), unless (a) a right of contest was expressly reserved in the insurance policy, (b) there is proof of collusion between claimant and insured, or (c) permission has been granted under Section 110-C(2-A) to defend on all grounds. The court found that in the present case no reservation of rights in the policy was asserted, no collusion was alleged, and no special permission was sought or granted. The grounds in the memo of appeal were directed to the quantum of compensation (which is outside the insurer's permissible grounds). Therefore, the insurer was incompetent to maintain the appeal.

Because neither appellant individually possessed competence to maintain the appeal, their joint appeal likewise failed. The court, however, emphasised that the appeal's incompetence did not render the cross-objections non-justiciable — the cross-objections, filed after admission of the appeal, survived and gave the court occasion to re-examine the Tribunal's assessment of compensation.

On the merits of quantum (as part of the cross-objections/review), the court found certain heads of compensation to be speculative, duplicated or excessive. Specifically, the court identified:

Rs. 15,000 awarded for a possible future surgery (speculative).
Rs. 20,000 awarded during hospitalisation for mental shock, pain and suffering, and a further Rs. 20,000 for the future for the same head — treated as a duplicate award.
Rs. 20,000 awarded for loss of amenities of life on the ground of loss of marriage prospects, which the court observed to be inconsistent with the fact that the claimant was married and enjoying conjugal life.

The court therefore deducted Rs. 15,000 (future surgery), Rs. 20,000 (duplicate mental shock award), and reduced the loss of amenities award by Rs. 10,000 — totaling a deduction of Rs. 45,000 from the Tribunal's award. The balance amount was ordered to be payable with 12% interest per annum from the date of the Tribunal's award to the date of realisation, within three months from the date of the High Court judgment if not already paid. The court modified the Tribunal's award to this extent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The court held that:

The owner (appellant No. 1) was not a "person aggrieved" under Section 110-D because the award did not directly or immediately make him liable to pay compensation; any grievance was consequential and not immediate.
The insurer-appellant was not competent to maintain the appeal because the grounds taken in the memo (challenging the quantum) were outside the grounds available to an insurer under Section 96(2), and there was no reservation of rights, no allegation of collusion, nor any permission under Section 110-C(2-A).
Because neither appellant was competent, a joint appeal by them was also not maintainable.
The cross-objections by the respondent survived and on scrutiny the Tribunal's award was modified by deducting Rs. 45,000 from the total award; the balance was ordered to carry 12% interest from the date of the Tribunal's award until realisation, payable within three months if not already paid.

Implications: The direct consequences are the dismissal of the appeal and the reduction of the Tribunal's award by Rs. 45,000 with the balance payable with interest as ordered. The court applied pre-existing authority (including a binding Full Bench decision of this court) to interpret "person aggrieved" narrowly in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act and to limit an insurer's right to appeal to grounds available under Section 96(2). The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying and following the cited precedents; it applies established tests and binding Full Bench authority to the facts before it.

Appeal dismissed.

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Nahar Singh And Another v. Manohar Kumar And Others

1. Who is a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of Sec. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short the Act). Is he any Tom, Dick and Harry or whose interests stand prejudicially effected by the award? What should be his qualifications to get him this status. An answer to these questions will decide the fate of this appeal. Section 110-D of the Act reads thus:—

“Appeal:— (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of Claims Tribunal may within 90 days from the date of award prefer an appeal to the High Court.”

As it is, the expression “person aggrieved” defies an exact definition. Its meaning varies with the context of statutes wherein it occurs and depends upon diverse and varied factors. This is not to suggest that it admits of no fair interpretation, but to underscore the elusiveness of the concept which has constrained the courts to define it variedly. Sometimes liberally and at other times rigidly depending upon the circumstances of the case. Taking the word as it is understood in common parlance a “person aggrieved” should include a person whose interests are prejudicially affected by a decision — a person who has a genuine grievance that the decision has adversely hit him, denied him something which was otherwise legally due to him and has imposed some burden on him to be discharged.

2. These broad tests have been deduced by the courts from time to time depending upon the nature of the statute in the context of which the expression is required to be interpreted. In Buxton v. Minister of Housing & Local Govt., (1961) 1 QB 278, the words were given a restricted meaning and it was held that the expression “person aggrieved” meant a person who has suffered a legal grievance and against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. In King v. Middlex Justice it was further clarified that the person should be immediately aggrieved and not consequently aggrieved. A nominal or speculative adverse effect on the right or interest of a person is insufficient.

3. The legal position on the point has proceeded, by a large, on similar lines in our country also. In this regard it should suffice to briefly extract the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 SC 578 (at page 581):

“The expression denotes an elastic and to an extent an elusive concept. It can't be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and a comprehensive definition. At best its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends upon diverse and variable factors such as content and intent of the statute, the nature and extent of the prejudice and injury suffered by him.”

Following this decision, Full Bench of this Court in United Fire and General Insurance Company v. Laxmi Shori, AIR 1982 J & K 105, interpreted the expression as used in Motor Vehicles Act and observed as under (at page 115):—

“Expression “aggrieved party” contains the inherent limitations in the matter of filing of an appeal. The expression in the context of Section 110-D has to be interpreted and understood in common parlance. It is not possible to give an exhaustive definition of the expression which has to be interpreted in the context in which it appears in a particular statute. As a general principle, it has to be held by the court that a person who feels disappointed with the result of a case is not necessarily a “person aggrieved” to be so classified, he must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone other way. The order must cause him the legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. If he was not entitled to relief in first place, he cannot be aggrieved if the relief was denied to him. But if he was entitled and the same has been denied to him, he would be a “person aggrieved”. Thus, a party would be regarded as an “aggrieved party” for the purpose of Section 110-D where the claim or defence available to the party do not find favour with the Tribunal in making an award.”

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1985 All 44 grappied with the point in more precise terms and held as under (at page 50):—

“A finding that the owner/driver was responsible for causing accident or a finding that the accident was as a result of rash and negligent act of the driver would not make them “persons aggrieved” unless there was a direction in the award that they were liable to pay some part of the entire amount of compensation awarded. The owner of a vehicle can be an “aggrieved person” if he has been ordered to pay some part of the compensation awarded by the Claim Tribunal. It would then be a legal grievance and the order would be such as may, if not challenged, injure him.”

The Calcutta High Court followed suit and reiterated the view in AIR 1979 Cal 152 as under (at page 156):

“There had been no legal grievance, denial or deprivation of a legal right or financial interest, nor any order affecting or prejudicing the interest of the owner. There had been no legal or practical injuries to the owners as no liability of paying compensation was placed upon them. Therefore, there was no occasion or right to prefer an appeal by them.”

A similar view was taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in AIR 1987 MP 244 and considering decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court, it laid down the following test:—

“The test really is the question of relief which the person can obtain in appeal. Owner cannot act as a proxy for the insurer. There is no award against him, i.e if he is not liable to pay, he cannot be a “person aggrieved” because he cannot have any grievance against the award. Merely because there is a finding against him by the Tribunal does not make him the “person aggrieved”.”

4. On the other side of the spectum are some judgments relied upon by Mr. Bakshi and two of these i.e 1990 ACJ (MP) 888 and 1989 ACJ (Ker) 600 : (AIR 1989 Ker 192) deserve mention for taking a contrary view. In 1990 ACJ (MP) 888, A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held thus:

“For a just and fair decision between the parties on the question of liability, it must be held that the driver and the insured owner have a right of appeal u/S. 110-D to challenge the award, if they dispute the finding of fault and consequent primary liability against them.”

In 1989 ACJ 600 : (AIR 1989 Ker 192), Kerala High Court opined thus:

“The material deprivation is not essential. Assuming such an incident to be essential, even then the owner becomes the “person aggrieved” as the award till deprives him of no claim bonus, which he would otherwise be entitled to get under the contract of insurance.”

A review of the judgments port ways a hazy scenario with courts taking divergent view while interpreting the expression. Nonetheless, some broad tests are deducible which can be summarised as under:—

a) A “person aggrieved”, when interpreted in the context of Motor Vehicles Act means the person who has a genuine grievance and not a camouflaged or proxy one, against the award. He must feel aggrieved immediately and directly and not consequently or nominally.

b) The award must prejudice his interests adversely and deprive him of something which he was otherwise entitled to get. Its effect on his right or interest must be substantial in contract to being speculative or nominal.

c) A mere finding that a person was negligent and responsible for accident is not enough. The award must make him liable to pay some part or the other of compensation. He must suffer some material deprivation.

Having crystallised the legal position, it becomes fairly easy to appreciate the nuances of the present controversy. Mr. Thakur, LC for respondents has objected to the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that appellants are not the persons aggrieved. He submits that a joint appeal by them could lie if either of them was otherwise competent to maintain it. According to him, appellant No. 1 (owner) is not competent because he is not the person aggrieved as the award does not operate against him. Similarly, appellant-Insurance Company is incompetent as it challenges the award on grounds of defence not available to it under Sec. 96(2) of the Act.

5. This appeal, which primarily, disputes the question of compensation, arises out of a claim petition filed by respondent No. 1, a lawyer by profession. He was riding a scooter on 20-3-1986 when it was hit by a truck resulting in multiple injuries to him. He filed a claim petition and MACT, Jammu awarded him a compensation of Rs. 1.16 lacs with 12% interest p.a

6. In the light of the contention raised, it requires to be seen whether this appeal can be held to be maintainable on the part of appellants jointly or severally. Appellant No. 1 is the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident and it is to be conceded that but for him, the other appellant would not have incurred the liability. It is primarily the judgment passed against the owner, that has made the Insurance Company liable. Even so can it be said that owner is the person aggrieved within the meaning of S. 110-D and competent to maintain the appeal. Going by the preponderance of judicial opinion on the point, the answer is in the negative. This is so because the expression has to be given a restricted meaning in the context of the content and intent of the Motor Vehicles Act. The owner, obviously, does not qualify the test for his grievance against the award can be only consequential and not immediate. His interests cannot be said to adversely and prejudicially affected, nor is he deprived of anything which was otherwise due to him. The award does not direct him to pay any compensation. It does not affect any of his interests directly and immediately. Viewed thus, it is difficult to declare appellant No. 1 as “person aggrieved” and, as such, he is not competent to maintain this appeal.

7. This takes me to examine the competence of appellant-Insurance Company. It is well settled that an Insurance Company can take only those grounds in appeal which are available to it under Sec. 96(2) of the Act. Where the appeal proceeds on grounds other than those contemplated in the aforesaid section, it will be misconceived and not maintainable.

8. I have gone through the grounds set out in the memo of appeal and I find that all these grounds dispute the quantum of compensation and the basis thereof. Since the Insurer can't challenge the quantum of compensation, that being extraneous to the grounds envisaged in S. 96(2) he has no other grounds to sustain this appeal.

9. Mr. Bakshi has relied upon 1985 ACJ 775, 1988 ACJ 813, 1989 ACJ 600 : (AIR 1989 Ker 192) and 1989 ACJ 961 to canvass that an insurer can file an appeal on grounds other than those contained in S. 96(2). But I am unable to follow these as I am bound by the Full Bench judgment of this court on the point.

10. Therefore, it will be no use burdening this judgment by discussing the ratio of the decisions referred. A Full Bench of this court, dealing with the point in AIR 1992 J & K 105 laid down as under (at page 115):—

“It could not be contended that the limitations which are set out in S. 96(2) of the Act in the matter of defending claim petition before the Tribunal do not extend to appeals filed under S. 110-D of the Act by the Insurer or that S. 96(2) is not exhaustive. The limitations which are set out in S. 96(2) of the Act are implicit and inherent in S. 110-D of the Act and have to be read in that section. Therefore, an insurer cannot resist the claim before the Tribunal or challenge the award of the Tribunal in appeal on grounds other than those enumerated in S. 96(2) of the Act, except where the insurer has reserved a right in the policy of Insurer has reserved a right in the name of insurer himself or where the Tribunal or the court is satisfied that the I usurer/Claimant have colluded with each other and in exercise of powers under S. 110-C (2-A) has granted permission to the insurer to defend the claim on all the grounds on which the insurer could defend the claim”.

It is not anybody's case that any right of contest stood reserved in the Insurance Policy in the present case, nor is there any complain of any collusion between the claimant and the Insured. Therefore, it has to be held that this appeal proceeds on grounds other than those contemplated in S. 96(2) and this is not maintainable on behalf of appellant-Insurance Company also.

11. Could a joint appeal by the two be still held maintainable. It could be if appeal of one of appellants had been held competent. Since the appeal by each one of them has been held incompetent, their joint appeal should suffer the same fate.

12. How about the cross-objections filed by the respondent? Do these survive even after the appeal has been held not maintainable. These do because the appeal has not become no-existent. As a matter of fact, cross-objections were filed after it was admitted to hearing. Therefore, if the appeal is held incompetent on final hearing, respondent's right to seek adjudication of cross-objections remains intact. That also provides me an occasion to scrutinise the assessment of compensation made by the Tribunal and to examine whether it has been fairly awarded.

13. A close look at the award reveals that Tribunal has been both liberal and casual in awarding compensation in some respects. It has awarded Rs. 15,000/- to the claimant for some future surgery, which he may or may not undergo. Similarly, it has made a duplicate award for mental shock, pain and suffering. It has awarded Rs. 20,000/- on this head during claimant's hospitalisation and Rs. 20,000/- for future. An amount of Rs. 20,000/- has been given for loss of amenities of life on the ground that claimant had lost chances of marriage when in fact he is married and enjoing his conjugal life. It seems to me that Tribunal has gone out of its way in some areas and has not adhered to laid down norms in the matter. It has been unduly presumptuous and speculative. Therefore, compensation awarded on the heads referred to hereinabove deserves to be deducted or reduced. I accordingly deduct Rs. 15,000/- awarded for future surgery and Rs. 20,000/- awarded in duplicate for mental shock, pain and suffering. I also reduce the award for loss of amenities of life by Rs. 10,000/-. In this manner, an amount of Rs. 45,000/- shall stand deducted from the total amount of compensation awarded. The balance amount shall be payable with 12% interest p.a from the date of award to the date of realisation within three months from today, if not already paid. The award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the extent indicated.

14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objections disposed of accordingly.

Appeal dismissed.

Nahar Singh And Another v. Manohar Kumar And Others

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Thakur, Learned Counsel)

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bakshi and by the memo of appeal)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Nahar Singh And Another v. Manohar Kumar And Others

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