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Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This litigation arises from a suit by Jai Ram and Ganga Ram (the plaintiffs) against Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram (the defendant) for recovery of money said to be due: originally pleaded as Rs. 30,534/10/-. The factual core is that three firms — “Jai Ram Ganga Ram”, “Bijai Ram and Co.” and “Daya Ram Jai Ram” — ceased as separate concerns and, on 31-3-1936, their assets and liabilities were purportedly taken over and a new firm “Bhandari Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co.” was formed with capital of Rs. 1,04,000/-. The plaintiffs alleged that on account-taking at that time it was found that Rs. 26,054/13/3 (after adjustments) was due to the firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram and that the defendants (through Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram) undertook to pay that sum; after a conceded credit of Rs. 2,420/8/3, the District Judge decreed Rs. 23,634/5/- in favour of the plaintiffs but declined interest.

The trial Court found the suit competent and made findings on representation, necessity of parties, and the existence of the liability alleged by the plaintiffs. Both sides appealed. First Appeal No. 34 of 1951 was filed by the plaintiffs seeking interest (claimed Rs. 6,900/-). First Appeal No. 37 of 1951 was filed by Kanshi Ram seeking dismissal of the suit. The present opinion disposes both appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint, filed in the name of a firm that had been dissolved, was incompetent or fell foul of limitation (Section 22 Limitation Act) because one co-plaintiff (Ganga Ram) did not sign the plaint until later.
  2. Whether the suit was defective for non-joinder of necessary parties (specifically whether Ganga Ram, Ram Lal, Daya Ram and Ved Vrat were necessary parties) or because Bijai Ram (deceased) could not be sued.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs should have sued for rendition of accounts rather than for a specific sum claimed to be due on account settlement between the old and new firms.
  4. Whether, on the evidence, Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram took over the assets and liabilities of Jai Ram Ganga Ram and undertook to pay the sum alleged to be due (the plaintiffs' primary substantive claim).
  5. Whether documents not produced at trial (an agreement dated 1-4-1935) ought to be admitted under O. 41, R. 27 CPC on appeal.
  6. Whether interest is payable to the plaintiffs on the decretal amount, and if so at what rate and for what period.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / Kanshi Ram's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The suit was defective because it was instituted in the name of the firm after its dissolution; Ganga Ram was a necessary party and his late signing amounted to addition of a party (invoking Section 22 of the Limitation Act).
  • Bijai Ram (father) had died before the suit; consequently he could not be sued and other partners (e.g., Ram Lal) should have been impleaded.
  • All partners of the former firm Bijai Ram & Co. should have been made parties.
  • Because the new firm (Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co.) was dissolved (per plaintiffs' case), the proper remedy would be rendition of accounts rather than suit for a specific sum.
  • Kanshi Ram categorically denied purchase of the plaintiffs' firm or any agreement to pay the alleged amount and asserted the plaintiffs ran the business and retained account books; plaintiffs had not contributed their share of capital (Rs. 4,000/-) to the new firm, so plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.
  • On appeal, sought allowance to admit a document (agreement dated 1-4-1935) under O.41 R.27 said to show Bijai Ram was partner in Jai Ram Ganga Ram and thus material to the appeal.
  • Opposed grant of interest; argued that interest is discretionary and pre-suit interest requires an agreement, usage or substantive law; relied on Privy Council authority to that effect.

Appellants / Plaintiffs' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The omission of Ganga Ram's signature before presentation of the plaint did not amount to an addition of a new party but at worst was a misdescription which could be condoned; Section 22 Limitation Act was inapplicable.
  • The suit was maintainable in the name of the firm even after dissolution for recovery of sums due for pre-dissolution transactions and the firm continued to exist for winding up and recovery purposes.
  • The claim was not an item in the accounts of the new firm but represented a settled balance due on taking accounts on 31-3-1936; therefore a suit for the specific sum was appropriate (not a rendition suit against the new firm).
  • Evidence (oral and documentary) including statements taken on commission supported the plaintiffs' case that the defendants undertook liability to pay the specified sum and that interest had been agreed; this evidence included testimony that interest at 10% per annum or 6% per annum had been promised.
  • On appeal they sought interest (claimed Rs. 6,900/-) arguing trade/mercantile dealings and testimony showed an agreed rate (or at least justification under equitable principles and mercantile usage) to award interest.
  • Opposed the admission of the late-produced agreement (1-4-1935) on the ground it had been deliberately withheld and was immaterial to disposal of the appeal given the court's findings on the takeover and investment in the new firm.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
South India Industrials, Ltd. v. Mothey Narasimha Rao, AIR 1927 Mad 468 When a party is added on application, the addition takes effect from the date of the application (relevance to Section 22 Limitation Act). Cited by the respondent to argue Ganga Ram's late signing amounted to addition of a party; the Court considered this but held Section 22 inapplicable because the omission was not an addition.
Firm Mohan Lal v. Udai Ram Sewa Ram, AIR 1936 Pat 140 O.30 R.1 permits suing in firm's name without individual names; signing by an individual proprietor may indicate suit in his own name rather than in firm's name. Referred to in assessing whether the plaint was misdescribed or an improper individual suit; Court treated the issue as one of misdescription and condoned it.
Bhagirath Singh v. Munga Lal, AIR 1939 Pat 40 Deletion of the word 'firm' can be a mere misdescription and not an addition of parties under S.22; misdescription does not necessarily attract limitation provisions. Relied on by plaintiffs' counsel to support the contention that the original description was a misdescription and not the addition of a new plaintiff; Court applied this reasoning in holding omission of signature not fatal.
Municipal Commissioners, Dacca v. Gangamani Chaudhurani, AIR 1940 Cal 153 The name is not always the true criterion; the nature of allegations and relief must be considered to determine who is really sued. Used to emphasize that substance (allegations and relief) matters over form; supported the conclusion that the plaintiffs had instituted the suit on behalf of both partners despite the procedural lapse.
Ganga Ram v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 Pesh 17 A co-plaintiff need not sign or verify the plaint to be treated as a plaintiff; such a defect is not ground for rejection and co-plaintiff may be allowed to sign later. Cited and followed by the Court to hold that Ganga Ram's initial failure to sign did not invalidate the suit or affect limitation.
Wali Mohammad Khan v. Ishak Ali Khan, AIR 1931 All 507 Absence of signature/verification/presentation by some plaintiffs does not affect jurisdiction if the suit was filed with their knowledge and authority. Applied to accept that the suit was instituted on behalf of both plaintiffs though only Jai Ram signed initially; Court accepted the defence evidence that Jai Ram acted with authority.
Agarwal Jorawarmal v. Kasam, AIR 1937 Nag 314 Dissolution does not prevent suits in the firm's name for transactions entered into before dissolution; the firm continues for winding up and recovery. Relied upon to reject the argument that a suit in the name of the dissolved firm was incompetent; Court held plaintiffs could sue in the firm's name for the pre-dissolution balance.
Muthu K.M. Mayappa Chettyar v. Periah, AIR 1931 Rang 74 Where after dissolution assets are divided, a partner may still use old firm's name in suits/execution for recovery of debts falling to his share. Cited in support of the plaintiffs' position that the old firm's name could be used to recover sums due from the takeover.
Siluvaimuthu v. Muhomad Sahp, AIR 1927 Mad 84 If a suit is to recover a debt due to joint promisors, all must be impleaded and the claim cannot be split up among them. Cited by respondent to argue non-joinder; Court found it inapplicable because the plaintiffs asserted the firm still had a recoverable balance and therefore the firm (through plaintiffs) could sue.
Ghisulal Ganeshi Lal v. Gumbhirmull, AIR 1938 Cal 377 A partner has no right of action against another for the balance until after final settlement, except where the debt is independent of partnership accounts. Used as the legal framework to decide whether the plaintiffs' claim was an independent debt arising from a settled account; Court accepted plaintiffs' claim that it represented a settled sum independent of the new firm's accounts.
Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra, AIR 1940 Pat 633 When witnesses of a party are not cross-examined, their evidence is to be accepted unless there are inherent improbabilities. Applied to accept statements of three plaintiff witnesses whose evidence taken on commission was not tested by cross-examination because defendant failed to appear before the Commissioner.
Mahomed Abdul Gaffur v. Hamida Bivi Ammal, AIR 1919 Mad 164 The Interest Act is not exhaustive; courts of equity may allow interest under the proviso where equitable circumstances exist. Cited by plaintiffs in support of awarding interest as equitable relief; Court accepted equitable basis for awarding interest in the circumstances found.
Aijaz Hussain v. Maqbul Hussain, AIR 1925 Lah 307 Where a just claim is resisted on unsubstantial grounds and defendants are responsible for prolongation, it is just and equitable to award interest. Relied upon by plaintiffs' counsel to support an award of interest; Court considered equitable considerations and awarded interest accordingly.
Jagat Kishore Pd. Narain Singh v. Parmeshwar Singh, AIR 1951 Pat 348 Deprivation of money includes loss of interest which should be accounted for in damages (interest may be awarded as damages). Cited to justify awarding interest as compensatory in nature; the Court awarded a sum (Rs. 6,900) as interest over and above the decretal amount.
Sewak Ram v. Municipal Board, Meerut, AIR 1937 All 328 Where the plaintiff has been kept out of money for a considerable time by the defendant's conduct, a reasonable rate of interest should be awarded. Invoked in argument for interest; Court accepted the principle of compensatory interest given the delay and conduct reflected in the record.
B.N Rlv. Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramir, AIR 1938 PC 87 Interest prior to suit may be awarded only if there is agreement, usage with force of law, or substantive law; equitable jurisdiction requires appropriate circumstances. Cited by respondent to challenge award of interest; Court acknowledged the discretionary and equitable nature of interest but awarded it based on its factual findings of agreement and circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured fashion, addressing first the procedural and framing objections, then the merits, then collateral applications and finally the question of interest.

  1. On the procedural objections about the plaint being in the firm's name after dissolution and Ganga Ram's delayed signature, the Court examined:
    • the plaint heading which described the plaintiffs as "Firm (1) Jai Ram (2) Ganga Ram",
    • the explanation that Jai Ram had filed with knowledge and authority on behalf of both and that Ganga Ram later signed when he was able,
    • authorities showing a late signature or deletion of the word "firm" often amounts to a misdescription rather than an addition of a party.
    Conclusion: The omission of Ganga Ram's signature when the plaint was presented was not fatal and did not attract Section 22 of the Limitation Act; the suit as framed was competent.
  2. On the contention that a suit in the name of a dissolved firm is incompetent, the Court noted authorities establishing that a dissolved firm continues for winding up and recovery of pre-dissolution transactions. The plaintiffs asserted that an account-taking on 31-3-1936 showed a balance due to Jai Ram Ganga Ram and that this balance remained recoverable. The Court found it open to the plaintiffs to sue to recover that balance and rejected the objection that the suit must be a rendition suit or that additional parties (Ram Lal, Daya Ram, Ved Vrat) were necessary.
  3. On the central substantive factual issue — whether the defendants took over the assets of Jai Ram Ganga Ram and undertook to pay the sum claimed — the Court reviewed oral and documentary evidence on record. It accepted the evidence of several plaintiffs' witnesses whose statements were recorded on commission and not cross-examined due to the defendant's failure to appear before the Commissioner, applying the principle that such evidence is to be accepted unless inherently improbable. After considering all evidence, the Court found the trial Court's conclusion in favour of the plaintiffs justified.
  4. On the respondent's contention that Rs. 4,000 (the plaintiffs' share of capital in the new firm) should be deducted from the claim, the Court held that that sum pertained to the new firm's accounts and was irrelevant to the specific settled balance claimed by plaintiffs for the period up to 31-3-1936; therefore no such deduction was appropriate in this suit.
  5. Regarding the application under O.41 R.27 CPC to admit a late-produced agreement (1-4-1935), the Court reviewed the materiality claim and the record: given its conclusion that the liability sued upon had been carried as part of the personal investment of Rs.1,04,000 by Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram in the new firm, the Court held the disputed document was immaterial to the disposition of the appeal and rejected the application.
  6. On interest: the Court examined competing authorities and the evidence. The Court found on facts that the defendants had taken over the plaintiffs' assets on 31-3-1936 and agreed to pay the amount found due; witness testimony supported a promise to pay interest (variously described in testimony). The debt was identified as having arisen on 31-8-1936 and the suit was instituted on 13-3-1942. Considering equitable principles, mercantile context and the authorities cited, the Court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to interest at 6% per annum and allowed the plaintiffs' claim for Rs. 6,900/- as interest in addition to the decretal amount.

Holding and Implications

Holding: (a) First Appeal No. 37 of 1951 (Kanshi Ram) is rejected with costs; the trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs is upheld as to liability and the principal sums awarded. (b) First Appeal No. 34 of 1951 (plaintiffs) is allowed in part: the plaintiffs are awarded interest of Rs. 6,900/- in addition to the decretal amount and recover costs of this appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiffs' decree for the principal sum as previously assessed by the trial court is affirmed; they also recover Rs. 6,900/- by way of interest and costs of the appeal. Kanshi Ram's appeal fails and he is ordered to pay costs.
  • On procedure: The opinion reinforces that mere non-signature by a co-plaintiff at presentation, or description of plaintiffs as a firm post-dissolution, will not be fatal if the material allegations and authority show the suit was instituted on their behalf; such defects may be treated as misdescription rather than addition of parties.
  • On evidence and admissibility: The Court accepted un-cross-examined commission evidence where witnesses were not tested through cross-examination due to the opposite party's default, and refused to admit a late document under O.41 R.27 CPC when it was held immaterial to the appeal.
  • On interest: The Court exercised equitable discretion to award interest where it found an undertaking to pay and reasoning supported by mercantile context and cited precedents; the Court treated the awarded amount as compensatory interest pursuant to its findings.
  • No statement in the opinion purports to lay down a novel rule of law; the Court's conclusions rest on application of existing authorities and the facts of this case. Therefore, the decision's principal consequence is the definitive resolution between the parties rather than establishment of a new legal precedent.

Order according to the judgment: the appeals are disposed as described above; costs awarded as indicated in the opinion.

    Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram And Another v. Jai Ram Ganga Ram And Another

    1. These are two cross appeals and they arise out of a suit filed by Jai Ram and Ganga Ram against Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 30,534/10/-. The plaintiffs' case was that they were carrying on business at Simla styled as “Firm Jai Ram Ganga Rain”, while the defendants, similarly, carried on business in the name of Firm ‘Bijai Ram and Co.’ On 31-3-1936, the latter took over the assets and liabilities of the former firm for a sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3. They also took over the business of a third firm styled as “Firm Daya Ram Jai Rani.”

    2. In place of the three firms, a new firm styled “Bhandari Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram and Co.” came into existence with a capital of Rs. 16,000/-. Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram had eight-anna share in the fine, while Jai Ram Ganga Ram and Daya Ram had four anna share each. The plaintiffs' case was that the sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3, plus interest thereupon, was due to them from the defendants less a sum of Rs. 2,420/8/3, for which they had been given credit by the defendants.

    3. The suit was resisted by Kanshi Ram on various grounds. In the first place, he contended that the suit, as filed, was defective, since it purported to have been instituted on behalf of Firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram, which had already been dissolved. He maintained that Ganga Ram was a necessary party to the suit.

    4. In the second place, he pointed out that his father, Bijai Ram, had died long before the institution of the suit and, consequently, he (Bijai Ram) could not be sued. He urged that his brother, Ram Lal, who was joint with him, should have been impleaded as a defendant. Another objection, taken by him, was that all the partners of the former firm Bijai Ram and Co. should have been made parties to the suit.

    5. He further pleaded that since the Firm Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram and Co. had been dissolved, according to the plaintiffs, on 4-12-1994 B., the proper course for the plaintiffs would have been to sue for the rendition of accounts. Kanshi Ram further categorically denied that he had purchased the plaintiffs' firm, or agreed to pay them any amount.

    6. According to him, the business of the firm Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram and Co. was being run by the plaintiffs, who had all the account books in their possession. The plaintiffs did not contribute the sum of Rs. 4,000/-, their share of the capital of the new firm, as alleged by them. Consequently, Kanshi Ram contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief.

    7. The learned District Judge, who tried the suit, found that the suit, as framed, was competent, that Ram Lal, Daya Ram and Ved Vrat were not necessary parties and further that Bijai Ram and Kanshi Ram constituted a joint Hindu family. He also found that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram took over the assets of the three firms, i.e (1) Bijai Ram and Co. (2) Daya Ram Jai Ram and (3) Jai Ram Ganga Ram, for a sum of Rs. 1,04,000/- and invested the same, as their personal capital in the new firm, “Bhandari Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co.”

    8. He also came to the conclusion that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram undertook to pay the sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3 to Jai Ram Ganga Ram. This figure was arrived at after adjusting a sum of Rs. 9,760/- due to Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram from Jai Ram Ganga Ram. After allowing for the sum of Rs. 2,420/8/3, credit admittedly afforded to the plaintiffs, the learned District Judge granted the plaintiffs a decree for Rs. 23,634/5/-. Interest was disallowed.

    9. Aggrieved by this decision, both the parties have come up in appeal. First Appeal No. 34 of 1951 has been filed by Jai Ram Ganga Ram and the relief sought for therein is that the plaintiffs be awarded interest as claimed by them. First Appeal No. 37 of 1951 has been filed by Kanshi Ram and the prayer made therein is that the decision of the trial Court be set aside and the suit be dismissed.

    10. These appeals were heard at Bilaspur in the March circuit, but judgment could not be delivered earlier, since there was one other connected appeal (First Appeal No. 12 of 1950), which could be taken up at Simla only last month. Subsequent to that, I have been busy with the meetings of the Himachal Pradesh Transport Advisory Committee. I am now delivering judgment in all the appeals simultaneously.

    11. Learned counsel for Kanshi Ram, Mr. D.K Mahajan, argued, firstly, that the suit was bad, as it was filed in the name of the firm after its dissolution. The plaint was instituted on 13-3-1942 with the following heading: “Firm (1) Jai Ram (2) Ganga Ram, sons of Tikku Ram.” The plaint was signed by Jai Ram alone. It was as late as 13-3-1947 that Ganga Ram applied to the Court for permission to sign the plaint.

    12. Permission was granted and he then signed the plaint. Mr. Mahajan contended that this was tantamount to addition of a new party and, consequently, as far as Ganga Ram was concerned, the suit must be deemed to have been instituted on that date. He pointed out that limitation had already expired on 31-3-1942. He relied on the provisions of Section 22 of the Limitation Act. Reference was also made by him to — ‘South India Industrials, Ltd. v. Mothey Narasimha Rao’, AIR 1927 Mad 468 (A), where a Division Bench of that High Court indicated that:

    “When a party is added on application, the addition must be deemed to have effect from the date of the application.”

    13. My attention was also drawn to — ‘Firm Mohan Lal v. Udai Ram Sewa Ram’, AIR 1936 Pat 140 (B), where a Division Bench of that High Court observed that:

    “What is contemplated by O. 30, R. 1 is that two or more persons under a firm may sue, without mentioning the names of the individuals.”

    “That is not the case, where the plaint describes the plaintiff himself as the ‘firm X, situate in Y, etc., through B, proprietor of the said firm’ and the plaint is signed by B, as the plaintiff cannot be deemed to be suing in the firm's name but in his own name, and the mere fact of the firm's name being mentioned, in no way affects the matter.”

    14. Mr. Tek Chand for Jai Ram Ganga Ram, on the other hand, argued — and, in my opinion, not without justification — that this was not a case of addition of a new plaintiff and, therefore Section 22 of the Limitation Act has no application here. He drew my attention to the heading of the plaint, which, as already shown, runs as “Firm (1) Jai Ram (2) Ganga Ram …” It was contended by Mr. Tek Chand that, at the worst, this was a case of miss description, which could be condoned.

    15. He referred me, in this connection, to — ‘Bhagirath Singh v. Munga Lal’, AIR 1939 Pat 40 (C), where the facts were that plaintiffs who were a joint family of a Hindu father and a son and who alone did the business in their joint name, described themselves in the plaint by their two names with the addition of the word ‘firm’. Upon objection as to registration of the firm being taken, plaintiffs amended the plaint by deleting the word ‘firm’. But this amendment was made after limitation had expired. James J. held, in the circumstances, that:

    “The suit was not barred under S. 22 as the deletion of the word ‘firm’ was no addition of parties within, the meaning of S. 22, the original description of the plaintiffs as partners being mere miss description.”

    16. My attention was also invited to — ‘Municipal Commissioners, Dacca v. Gangamani Chaudhurani’, AIR 1940 Cal 153 (D), where a Division Bench of that High Court observed that:

    “The name is not always the true criterion for determining the party really sued. The nature of the allegations in the plaint and the nature of the relief sought should be considered.”

    17. Mr. Tek Chand further invited my attention to the statement of Jai Ram under O. 10 of the CPC. Therein, Jai Ram deposed that the suit was instituted by him both on behalf of Ganga Ram and on his own behalf. Ganga Ram did not sign the plaint as he (Jai Ram) was responsible for him from the beginning. In his application dated 25-12-2003 B. to the District Judge, Ganga Ram stated that the suit had been filed by Jai Ram with his consent and approval and he could not sign the plaint, as he was away in connection with forest contract business.

    18. The application was allowed by the Revenue Minister in the absence of the District Judge and Ganga Ram then signed the plaint. In — ‘Ganga Ram v. Secretary of State’, AIR 1937 Pesh 17 (E), referred to by the learned District Judge, Mir Ahmad A.J.C held that:

    “There is no rule that a person named as a co-plaintiff is not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signs and verifies the plaint. The defect is not such, as to justify the rejection of the plaint, but the co-plaintiff should be allowed to sign it.”

    19. In — ‘Wali Mohammad Khan v. Ishak Aii Khan’, AIR 1931 All 507 (SB) (F) also referred to by the District Judge, a Special Bench of that High Court was of the view that:

    “The absence of signature or verification or, for the matter of that, the absence of presentation on the part of some of the plaintiffs, out of several, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court, and the suit must be deemed to have been instituted on their behalf, if it was filed with knowledge and authority.”

    20. Under these circumstances, I agree with the Court below that the omission, on the part of Ganga Ram to sign the plaint before it was presented to the Court, was not fatal to it, and did not affect limitation.

    21. As regards the plea that a suit in the name of a dissolved firm was not maintainable, Mr. Tek Chand cited — ‘Agarwal Jorawarmal v. Kasam’, AIR 1937 Nag 314 (G), where Vivian Bose J. observed that:

    “The mere fact of dissolution does not prevent suits being instituted in the name of the firm with respect to transactions, which were entered into before the date of dissolution. The effect of dissolution is not to render the firm non-existent. It continues to exist for all purposes necessary for its winding up, one of these being the recovery of moneys due to it, by suit or otherwise. Two or more of the partners, therefore, can institute the suit under O. 30. R. 1 of the CPC.”

    22. The District Judge has referred to the above authority as well as to — ‘Muthu K.M Mayappa Chettyar v. Periah’, AIR 1931 Rang 74 (1) (E), where Carr J. held that:

    “Where, after dissolution of a certain firm, the assets are divided between the partners, one of the partners can make use of the old firm's name in suits and execution proceedings for the recovery of the debts which fell to his share at the division.”

    23. Mr. Mahajan argued that the above ruling was not applicable, since there were no partnership assets of the old firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram left and, consequently, there was nothing to be wound up. In this connection, he cited — ‘Siluvaimuthu v. Muhomad Sahp’, AIR 1927 Mad 84 (I) where Reilly J. observed that:

    “If a, suit is brought to recover a debt due to joint promises all of them must be impleaded and the suit must be for the entire debt. They are not entitled to split up their claim and each sue separately for his own share.”

    24. it is not correct, however, to say that there are no partnership assets left. The plaintiffs' case, as already stated, was that when the firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram was taken over by the new firm Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co., the previous accounts were gone into and settled and a sum of Rs. 23,054/13/3 was found due to the former. This sum, according to the plaintiffs, was still due to them. Therefore, it is open to the) plaintiffs to say that the firm must still be deemed alive for the purpose of recovering this amount.

    25. In view of what has been said above, the suit, in my opinion, cannot fail on these grounds.

    26. Another point, taken in appeal, is that the proper course for the plaintiffs was to sue for rendition or accounts and not for the specific amount mentioned in the plaint. It was further contended that Ram Lal, Daya Ram and Ved Vrat were necessary parties to the suit.

    27. At the risk of repetition, I must point out that the plaintiffs' case was that on 31-3-1936, when the three old firms were dissolved and in their place, a new firm ‘Bhandari Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co.’, came into existence, the accounts of the old firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram were worked out and it was found that the sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3, was due to the latter as it represented the value of the assets of Jai Ram Ganga Ram, which were taken over by Kanshi Ram Bijai Ram.

    28. As Mr. Tek Chand rightly pointed out, the new firm had nothing to do with the transaction completed on 31-3-1936. The sum claimed by the plaintiffs obviously is not an item in the partnership accounts of the new Ann Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co. As was pointed out by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in — ‘Ghisulal Ganeshi Lal v. Gumbhirmull’, AIR 1938 Cal 377 (J):

    “It follows that one partner has no right of action against another for the balance owing to him until after final settlement of the account; but a partner may have a right of action against another for a debt which is independent of the partnership accounts.”

    29. I shall presently discuss whether the plaintiffs succeeded in establishing that the defendants took upon themselves the liability to pay them i.e the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3. The plaintiffs' allegation was that this sum represented the balance of a settled account and had nothing to do with the business transactions of the new firm Bhandari Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram & Co.

    30. Therefore, there was no question of rendition of accounts as between the plaintiffs and the new firm; nor was it necessary to implead Ram Lal, Daya Ram and Ved Vrat, The suit was against the joint Hindu family of Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram, through Kanshi Ram, Manager. Bijai Ram, no doubt, had died, but the joint Hindu family assets were adequately represented by Kanshi Ram.

    31. So much for the arguments that were advanced against the frame of the suit. I now come to the main issue in the suit, namely, whether Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram took over the assets of Jai Ram Ganga Sam and undertook to pay Rs. 26,354/13/3 to the plaintiffs. The burden of proof lay on the plaintiffs.

    32. They produced oral and documentary evidence in support of their case, while the defendants produced oral evidence. Let us go through this evidence and see how far the plaintiffs have been able to substantiate their case. (After discussing evidence of three witnesses examined by plaintiffs his Lordship observed:)

    33. The statements of the above three witnesses were recorded on commission. The defendant, despite notice, did not appear before the Commissioner in person, or through pleader Consequently, these witnesses were not cross-examined. The result would be that the evidence of these witnesses must be accepted, unless there are some inherent improbabilities.

    34. If any authority is necessary for this proposition, reference may be made to — ‘Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra’, AIR 1940 Pat 633 (K), where a Division Bench of that High Court observed that:

    “It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be accepted unless of course there are any inherent improbabilities.”

    (Then after discussing other evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendants his Lordship concluded:)

    35. In this state of evidence, I consider that the Court below was justified in finding in favour of the plaintiffs. One of the grounds taken, in appeal, by Kanshi Ram is that the lower Court has erred in not deducting from the plaintiffs' claim the sum of Rs. 4,000/- which, according to the terms of the partnership deed, were to be invested by the plaintiffs in the new firm.

    36. Obviously, this sum has nothing to do with the subject-matter of the suit. As already pointed out, the suit is in respect of the sum found due to Jai Ram Ganga Ram on taking accounts on 31-3-1936. The accounts of the new firm are a different matter and must be gone into in a separate suit. Consequently, no deduction, as claimed by Kanshi Ram, can be made from the plaintiffs' claim.

    37. There is an application under O. 41, R. 27 of the CPC, by Kanshi Ram, wherein I am requested to admit into evidence an agreement dated 1-4-1935, alleged to have been executed by Daya Ram, Bijai Ram and Jai Ram, Ganga Ram. It is said that this agreement was not available to Kanshi Ram during the pendency of the suit. It is stated that this document would show that Bijai Ram, father of Kanshi Ram, was a partner in the firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram and, consequently, this would be of material help to this Court in pronouncing judgment.

    38. This application is opposed by the other side (Jai Ram Ganga Ram), who contended, firstly, that the document was deliberately withheld by Kanshi Ram during the trial and, secondly, that the agreement is not material for the disposal of the appeal. Earlier, I have discussed the evidence produced by both the parties and given my reasons for upholding the view of the trial Court that, on 31-3-1936, the assets and the liabilities of the old firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram were worked out and after adjusting all amounts due to Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram, a sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3 was found due to Jai Ram Ganga Ram and Kanshi Ram took upon himself the liability to pay this amount.

    39. This sum of Rs. 26,054/13/3 was carried over by Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram as part of their personal investment of Rs. 1,04,000/- in the new firm. Therefore, it is immaterial if Bijai Ram was, or was not, a partner in the firm Jai Ram Ganga Ram for the purpose of disposing of this appeal. Consequently, the application under O. 41, R. 27, is rejected.

    40. The learned District Judge, while passing a decree in favour of the plaintiffs has deducted a sum of Rs. 2,420/8/3, representing credit afforded to plaintiffs by the defendants. For reasons stated earlier in the course of this judgment, I agree with the finding of the trial Court to the effect that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram took over the assets of Jai Ram Ganga Ram amounting to Rs. 25,054/13/3 (after setting off the sum of Rs. 9,760/- due to them from Jai Ram Ganga Ram) and undertook to pay that amount to Jai Ram Ganga Ram. Under the circumstances, the appeal of Kanshi Ram, First Appeal No. 37 of 1951, cannot succeed. It is, accordingly, rejected with costs.

    FIRST APPEAL NO. 34 OF

    41. In this appeal by the plaintiffs, Jai Ram Ganga Ram, it was strenuously urged that the trial Court has deprived the plaintiffs of interest without any justification. The relief, sought in the appeal, is that this Court award to the plaintiffs the amount of Rs. 6,900/-, as interest, over and above the sum decreed by the District Judge.

    42. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the appellants (Mr. Tek Chand) pointed out that the parties were traders and the sum in suit was advanced in the course of commercial dealings. Consequently, the appellants were entitled to interest, not only on the basis of the covenant to pay interest, but also on that of mercantile usage.

    43. The learned District Judge framed a specific issue regarding interest, but disposed of the same in three short sentences. His finding was that the record did not disclose that the interest was stipulated. Further, he remarked that no custom had been alleged by which interest was due to the plaintiffs.

    44. Consequently, he expressed his opinion that no interest was due to the plaintiffs. Mr. Tek Chand rightly pointed out that having relied upon the testimony of Raghunand (P.W 4), Kura Mai (P.W 6) and Jai Ram, plaintiff, on the main issue in the case, it was not proper that the District Judge should have ignored their evidence to the effect that interest was stipulated, for instance, Raghunand (P.W 4) stated that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram had promised to pay interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum if the sum in suit was not repaid within a month.

    45. Again, Kura Mai (P.W 6) made a similar statement. Jai Ram, plaintiff, also deposed that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram promised to pay interest at -/10/- per cent per mensem. Lachman Singh (D.W 4) stated in a guarded manner that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram “might have stipulated for interest on the sum of Rs. 1,04,000/- invested by them in the new firm.”

    46. The new partnership deed, Ex. C.W 1/1, provides for six per cent interest on the sum of Rs. 1,04,000/-, invested by Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram. Under these circumstances, learned counsel urges that the plaintiffs were entitled to interest.

    47. Reliance was placed by him on the following rulings: (a) — ‘Mahomed Abdul Gaffur v. Hamida Bivi Ammal’, AIR 1919 Mad 164 (L), where a Division Bench of that High Court observed that:

    “The Interest Act (32 of 1839) is not exhaustive of all cases where interest is allowable. The Act while specifically allowing interest in all cases of ‘debts or sums certain payable at a certain time or otherwise’ saves by its proviso other cases in which it is legally allowable.

    48. Where the suit was for a sum of money which would be payable to the plaintiff (a Muhammadan lady) as for her share on taking accounts of the business which was carried on by her father while he was alive and which was continued by her brothers, the defendants, after his death, wherein the amount due to the plaintiff was utilized by her brothers.

    49. Held, (1) that the proviso in the Interest Act applied to the case and (2) that 6 per cent interest was payable as damages on the amount due to the plaintiff.”

    (b) — ‘Aijaz Hussain v. Maqbul Hussain’, AIR 1925 Lah 307 (M), wherein Tek Chand and Skemp JJ. held that:

    “Where a just claim has been resisted on wholly unsubstantial grounds and the defendants have been responsible for the prolongation of litigation it is just and equitable to award interest.”

    (c) — ‘Jagat Kishore Pd. Narain Singh v. Parmeshwar Singh’, AIR 1951 Pat 348 (N), wherein a Division Bench of that High Court observed that:

    “The act of the decree-holder deprived the plaintiff not only of the money, but the interest which he could earn and that should be taken into account in fixing the measure of damages and, therefore, the plaintiff should be allowed something by way of interest, though, strictly speaking, it should be described as damages and not interest.”

    (d) — ‘Sewak Ram v. Municipal Board, Meerut’, AIR 1937 All 328 (O). There, a Division Bench of that High Court remarked that:

    “Where the plaintiff has been kept out of his money for a considerable time by the conduct of the defendant, it is only fair and proper that the defendants should pay a reasonable rate of interest upon the sum awarded by the Court.”

    50. Mr. D.K Mahajan for Kanshi Earn, respondent, on the other hand, cited — ‘B.N Rlv. Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramir’, AIR 1938 PC 87 (P), where their Lordships of the Privy Council were of the view that:

    “Interest for the period prior to the date of the suit may be awarded, if there is an agreement for the payment of interest at a fixed rate, or it is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law, or under the provision of any substantive law entitling the plaintiff to recover interest as for instance the Court may award interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, when no rate of interest is specified in a promissory note or bill of exchange under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    51. The proviso to S. 1 applies to a case in which the Court of equity exercises jurisdiction to allow interest. But in order to invoke a rule of equity, it is necessary, in the first instance, to establish the existence of a state of circumstances which attracts the equitable jurisdiction.”

    52. Mr. Mahajan suggested that grant of interest is discretionary with the Court and in this case, discretion should not be exercised in favour of the plaintiffs.

    53. On facts, I have held that Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram took over the assets of Jai Ram Ganga Ram — found to be Rs. 25,054/13/3 — and agreed to Bay interest thereupon. The plaintiff's claimed interest at -/8/- per cent per mensem i.e 6 per cent per annum. The debt was created on 31-8-1936. The suit was instituted on 13-3-1942.

    54. Interest at six per cent on the principal amount unto the date of the institution of the suit comes to about Rs. 9,379/-. The plaintiffs have claimed only a sum of Rs. 6,900/- and that is the valuation of the anneal. I may point out that the suit remained pending for about nine years.

    55. In my view, for reasons given above, the learned District Judge was not justified in denying the plaintiffs the interest claimed by them.

    56. Consequently, I allow the appeal of the plaintiffs (First Appeal No. 34 of 1951), i.e the plaintiffs will get a sum of Rs. 6,900/- as interest, from the defendants i.e over and above the sum decreed by the District Judge. The appellants will get their costs of this appeal from the respondents. This judgment will be read in both the appeals, i.e 37 and 34 of 1951.

    D.H.Z

    57. Order accordingly.

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    Bijai Ram Kanshi Ram And Another v. Jai Ram Ganga Ram And Another
    (Aug 10, 1955)