1. This Appeal is directed against the award of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Kachchh at Bhuj in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 37 of 1999 dated 30-09-2000. Claimants filed petition for claiming compensation for the death of Kantilal Dayaram Rajgor on 20-01-1999 while going from Anjar to Sura in truck No. GH-12-U-6684 as driver. He was driving the truck on the left side of the road with moderate and controllable speed. Around 1 km. away from Bachau on Bachau- Samakhiyali road, opponent-1 in the employment of opponent-2 came from opposite direction driving truck No. GJ-12-V-6442 rashly, recklessly and negligently at excessive speed without observing rules of the road and collided with truck No. GJ-12-U-6684. Deceased sustained serious injuries and died on the spot. Accordingly, the death of the deceased is the direct result of sheer negligence of the opponent-1 (driver) and opponent-2 owning the truck No. GH-12-U-6442. This vehicle was insured with opponent-3. Claimants further state that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs.6000/- per month, therefore, compensation of Rs.7,72,500/- is claimed from the opponents jointly and severally impleading the owner and the Insurance Company of the other vehicle also. Objections were filed by the opponents. Thereafter, award under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act') has been passed. Apart from application under Section 163-A of the Act, claimants had also filed application under Section 166 of the Act claiming compensation of Rs.10 lacs. While examining this matter, counsel for the claimants submitted that he would like to pursue and claim compensation awarded under Section 163-A of the Act and withdraw the application filed before the Claims Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act. Accordingly, this application has been withdrawn, therefore, matter for consideration in this Appeal is whether this order is legally sustainable as to claimants claiming compensation, quantum of compensation and interest awarded by the Tribunal.

2. Ms Lilu K. Bhaya, learned counsel for the appellant contended that claimants are not entitled to compensation, being brother's son and brother's wife, therefore, the award should be set aside. Further submission is that assessment of compensation is not proper since there is no evidence for coming to the conclusion that deceased was earning Rs.2500/- per month and he was driver of the vehicle in question. The last submission is that interest awarded @ 12% per annum is excessive, therefore, it should be reduced to 9% per annum.

3. Shri Shah, learned counsel for the claimants, submits otherwise. He submits that the Act is a benevolent legislation, which calls for legal and broad interpretation so that the real purpose of the enactment is achieved and full effect is given to the legislative intent. The purpose of legislation is to benefit the claimants against tort feasers. Action benefiting the tort feasers is not the purpose of legislation, but to compensate the claimant, who suffers on account of the death of the deceased.

4. Question with regard to claimants being legal heirs/legal representatives of the deceased should not detain us for long keeping in view the broad and liberal nature of the legislation and the decision of this Court in Megjibhai Khimji Vira and Anr. v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai and Ors. (AIR 1977 Gujarat 195) wherein the Division Bench speaking through Ahmadi J. (as His Lordship then was) held that claims for compensation arising out of the use of a motor vehicle can be maintained by the brothers and nephews of the deceased who are legal representatives. This decision is approved by the Apex Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr. (AIR 1987 SC 1690). In paragraph 9, the Apex Court said:

"Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec.(1) of S.110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-s. (1) of S.110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression `legal representative' has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines `legal representative' as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S.110A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and Cl.(c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-s.(1) of S.110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representative of the deceased or their agent and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the person for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in S.110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of S. 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that "every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased." While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased, S.110-A(1) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from S.110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provision takes the place of the third paragraph of S. 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every such action, the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by S.110-A and S.110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in so far as motor vehicles accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies."

In paragraph 11, the Apex Court further said:

"We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by S.110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in S.110-B of the Act to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by S.110B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under S.110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, (AIR 1977 Guj 195) (supra) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under S.110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased."

5. In the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, brothers' son is class II heir. Therefore, the petition is maintainable, claimants being legal representatives/heirs of the deceased within the meaning of Section 166/163-A of the Act. Deceased was bachelor and left no other heir/representative in class I to represent him in his estate, except the claimants, according to learned counsel for the claimants.

6. Next question is whether compensation has been properly assessed. There is no dispute that the deceased was driver in truck No. GJ-12-U-6684. This fact is mentioned in the claim petition and appellant has not been able to disprove this fact. Therefore, there should be no doubt about the fact that the deceased was the driver of the truck being driven by him at the time of accident. Claimants submit that he was earning Rs.6000/per month. In the absence of satisfactory evidence to justify this claim, Claims Tribunal is absolutely justified in taking into consideration the prevalent salary of drivers, fix the income at Rs.2500/and award compensation of Rs.3,27,200/- as per Schedule II. Payment of compensation with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of application awarded by the Claims Tribunal is also fully justified at prevalent rate of interest and does not call for any interference at our hands.

Consequently, as a result of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in this Appeal and the same is dismissed. Claims Tribunal to pay compensation to the claimants on proper verification. Registry to transmit Rs.25,000/- to the Claims Tribunal, which will refund the same to the appellant, in case the deposit exceeds the amount awardable to the claimant as per the award.

In view of the aforesaid, stay granted earlier stands vacated. Accordingly, Civil Application is disposed of.