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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.J. Vaidya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No. 1, Dipak Chimanlal Patel (trading as Jigar Engineering Industries), filed a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court No. 7, Ahmedabad, against the petitioners—Dipendra G. Choksi and Ashaben G. Choksi (partners/director and managing director of Sunchem Enterprise).

The complainant alleged that the petitioners purchased ice on credit in three periods (Feb 1–28, 1989; Mar 1–31, 1989; Apr 1–30, 1989) totalling Rs. 67,428.08 and issued three cheques in his favour which, on presentation, were returned by the bank with the endorsement "refer to drawer". After assurances from the petitioners, the cheques were presented a second time and were again returned "refer to drawer". The complainant issued a registered demand notice dated June 20, 1989, and, on non-payment, filed the complaint on July 24, 1989. The Magistrate issued process under section 138, and the petitioners moved under section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the process.

The matter came on before this court; the petitioners' counsel and the complainant's counsel were absent on repeated listings, and the court heard the matter with assistance of the APP and disposed of it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when the allegations in a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also prima facie disclose the material ingredients of an offence punishable under section 420 IPC, the court taking cognizance should confine itself to issuing process only under section 138 or is it equally the duty of the court to issue process under section 420 IPC as well.
  2. Whether the requirements of sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were complied with in this case, thereby precluding quashing of the process issued under section 138.
  3. Whether re-presenting a cheque once returned with endorsement "refer to drawer" is impermissible or may be lawfully done (and whether such re-presentation can be the basis for quashing proceedings as a device to bypass time limits).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petition sought quashing under section 482 CrPC arguing lack of compliance with the provisions of sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (the opinion describes an attempt to quash the process on those grounds).
  • The petitioners argued (by implication in the petition) that a cheque once returned with endorsement "refer to drawer" cannot be lawfully re-presented and that the second presentation was an attempt to bypass statutory limits and to cover lapse in filing the criminal complaint in time.

Complainant's Allegations / Respondent No. 1

  • The complainant alleged sale of goods (ice) on credit to the petitioners in three specified periods and amounts aggregating Rs. 67,428.08.
  • The petitioners issued three cheques as payment; the cheques were deposited within six months of drawing but were returned with the endorsement "refer to drawer".
  • After assurances by the petitioners, the complainant re-presented the cheques, which again were returned with the same endorsement due to insufficient funds.
  • The complainant issued a registered demand notice dated June 20, 1989 (within the statutory time after receiving bank intimation), and when payment was not made, filed the complaint on July 24, 1989.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, strictly grounded in the statutory text contained in sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:

  1. Statutory requisites: The court recited the relevant statutory requirements of section 138 (including provisos (a), (b) and (c) and the Explanation) and section 142 (conditions for cognizance), and examined the complaint against those provisions.
  2. Application to the facts: The court found all statutory conditions satisfied on the face of the complaint:
    • Proviso (a): each of the three cheques had been presented within six months of drawing.
    • Proviso (b): the complainant was a "holder in due course" and served a written demand notice within 15 days of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheques.
    • Proviso (c): the drawers (petitioners) failed to make payment within 15 days of the notice.
    • Section 142(a) and (b): the complainant made a written complaint and did so within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose.
  3. On that basis the court concluded there was no legal flaw in the process to justify quashing under section 482 CrPC.
  4. Re-presentation issue: The court addressed the petitioners' contention that a cheque once returned with endorsement "refer to drawer" cannot be re-presented. The court rejected that contention, observing there is no express statutory prohibition against re-presenting a cheque after such a return. The court reasoned that a payee may re-present a cheque, especially where the drawer gives assurances that funds will be made available and the cheque will be honoured on subsequent presentation. Therefore the mere fact of re-presentation does not establish an attempt to bypass statutory time limits.
  5. Section 420 (cheating) overlay: The court examined the nature of allegations and concluded that, in addition to constituting an offence under section 138, the material allegations in the complaint also prima facie disclosed ingredients of section 420 IPC (cheating). The court held that even if the complainant inadvertently omitted a specific charge under section 420, where the complaint's allegations manifestly demonstrate the offence, the court is obliged to ensure that process is issued for all offences properly made out by the material facts and not confined to the single statutory head invoked by the complainant.
  6. Duty of the Magistrate: Building on the above, the court held that a magistrate, while taking cognizance and issuing process, must screen allegations carefully and, where prima facie material discloses other offences (such as cheating under section 420 IPC), issue process for those offences in addition to section 138. The court emphasized administering substantive justice over formality.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition under section 482 CrPC was dismissed. The court directed the learned Magistrate to add section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in the proceedings and to conduct the trial accordingly and expeditiously. The earlier ad interim relief (if any) was vacated and the court discharged the rule.

DISPOSITION: The petition fails and is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The complaint under section 138 remains valid; the trial is to proceed, and the Magistrate is directed to add and proceed on section 420 IPC in addition to section 138 where the complaint's allegations prima facie disclose that offence.
  • Magisterial duty articulated: The opinion instructs that magistrates should examine complaints for all offences disclosed by material allegations and issue process for each such offence rather than confining proceedings to the provision expressly invoked by the complainant. The court frames this as a matter of doing substantive justice rather than mere formality.
  • Precedential posture: The opinion states this duty and approach as the court's view; the decision resulted in dismissal of the quashing petition and in an order to add section 420 IPC. (No distinct judicial precedents were cited or catalogued in the opinion itself.)

    Dipendra G. Choksi And Another v. Dipak Chimanlal Patel And Another

    K.J Vaidya, J.:— “Whether in cases wherein the allegations made in the complaint filed by a payee of the cheque against the drawer under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, also further disclose the material ingredients which prima facie do constitute an offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the court to which such a complaint is presented for taking the cognizance of offence, should confine itself merely to issue process under section 138 of the Act, or secondly whether under such circumstances it is equally the duty of the court also to see that along with the process to be issued for the alleged offence under section 138 of the Act, it also issues process under section 420 of the Code against the accused?”

    2. Respondent No. 1, Dipak Chimanlal Patel—Jigar Engineering Industries, GIDC, Vatva, Ahmedabad, filed a complaint before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Court No. 7, Ahmedabad, against the petitioners —Dipendra G. Choksi and Ashaben G. Choksi—partners, director and managing director, respectively of Sunchem Enterprise, situated at Plot No. 41, GIDC, Vatva, Ahmedabad, for the alleged offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the Act”).

    3. According to the complainant, he is doing the business of manufacturing and selling ice. Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 (original accused Nos. 1 and 2) purchased ice from him on several occasions. Accordingly, it is the case of the complainant that the petitioners first purchased ice from him in between the period from February 1, 1989, to February 28, 1989, to the tune of Rs. 43,768.28; thereafter from March 1, 1989, to March 31, 1989, to the tune of Rs. 20,849; and from April 1, 1989, to April 30, 1989, to the tune of Rs. 2,810.80 on credit. In these three transactions, in all the accused purchased the goods worth Rs. 67,428.08. Towards these three transactions, according to the complainant, the petitioners gave him three different cheques of different dates, which he had deposited in the bank within the period of six months from the date on which it was drawn, however, the same were returned by the concerned bank with the endorsement “refer to drawer”. Under the circumstances, when the complainant contacted the petitioners, they assured that the outstanding bill amounts would be paid up in a few days with a request to present the cheque once again in the bank. This was done, however, once again all the aforesaid three cheques bounced back with an endorsement “refer to drawer” as there was no balance in the account of the petitioners. It is further alleged that despite the repeated demands, since the outstanding amounts towards the bills were not paid, the complainant gave a registered notice on June 20, 1989, to the petitioners requesting them to remit the outstanding bill amount with interest, giving further warning that if any default was committed in payment of the money, the complainant would be constrained to file a criminal complaint. Despite service of the said notice, since the outstanding bill amounts were not paid by the petitioners, respondent No. 1 filed a complaint in the court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Court No. 7, Ahmedabad, on July 24, 1989, against them, on the basis of which, the court issued the process for the alleged offence under section 138 of the Act, giving rise to the present petition under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, inter alia, praying for quashing the same.

    4. This matter was called out yesterday twice, but Mr. A.S Kothari, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. S.V Raju, the learned advocate for respondent No. 1 were absent, the matter was adjourned to today. Today also when the matter was called out, both the learned advocates were absent. It is under these circumstances that with the assistance of Mr. D.N Patel, the learned APP, this court has heard and disposed of the same.

    5. In order to find out whether there was any breach of compliance with any provision of sections 138 and 142 of the Act, entitling the petitioners to pray for quashing and setting aside the process, it is indeed necessary first of all to advert to the said two sections, which read as under:

    “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

    Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

    (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

    (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and

    (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

    Explanation— For the purposes of this section ‘debt or other liability’ means a legally enforceable debt or other liability”.

    “142. Cognizance of offences.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):

    (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

    (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138;

    (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138”.

    6. Now, examining the allegations made in the complaint in the light of the aforesaid provisions contained in sections 138 and 142 of the Act, it is indeed very clear that the requirements of the same are duly complied with. Bearing in mind first of all clause (a) to proviso to section 138 of the Act, it is clear that all the three cheques were presented to the bank within the stipulated period of six months from the date on which they were drawn. Secondly, bearing in mind clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act, it is further clear that the complainant was a “holder in due course” and that he had made demand for the payment of the amount in question by giving a statutory notice in writing to the petitioners—drawers of the cheques within 15 days of the receipt of the information by him from the bank regarding return of the cheques as unpaid. Thirdly, bearing in mind proviso (c) to section 138 of the Act, the petitioners—drawers of the cheques in question have failed to make payment of the amount in question to the complainant within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. Not only that but fourthly, bearing in mind the provision regarding cognizance of offence engrafted in section 142(a) of the Act, respondent No. 1 who is “a holder in due course” of the cheque has filed a complaint in writing, and, fifthly, as further envisaged in section 142(b) of the Act, the complaint was made within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act. In this view of the matter, there is indeed no legal flaw on the basis of which the petitioner can be permitted to urge to quash the process.

    7. However, the matter does not and cannot simply rest here, as on going through the petition, absolutely a lame attempt appears to have been made by twisting and harping upon the fact that there is no provision in the Act whereby a person in whose favour a cheque is drawn can be permitted to once again deposit the same having once already been rejected by the bank with the endorsement “refer to drawer”. On the basis of this bald innovation, assertion, it is further faintly attempted to be urged by the petitioner that action of depositing the cheque in the bank a second time was only with a view to bypass the provision of the Act in order to cover the lapse of not filing the criminal complaint in time after the cheques for the first time came to be refused with the endorsement “refer to drawer”. Now the entire angle of the petitioner raising these points is not only misconceived, fallacious and a misleading but mischievous too !! It is too well known to be stated even that even if on the first occasion once the bank returns the cheque with an endorsement “refer to drawer”, the payee is still legally entitled to once again deposit the very same cheque before the bank more particularly when he was so assured by the drawer of the cheque that the due amount will be deposited in the bank in a few days and that the said cheque thereafter on second presentation would be honoured. In this view of the matter, once we find that there is indeed no such express statutory prohibition mandating the payee of the cheque not to repeatedly present the cheque, once it was returned with endorsement “refer to drawer”; there is indeed nothing on the basis of which such hopeless plea can be allowed in favour of the petitioners !! Once this legal position is made clear and understood properly, it is quite trite to say that because the cheque in question having once been returned with an endorsement “refer to drawer” and was presented second time, it was done with a view to bypass the provisions of the Act. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as stated in the complaint, the complaint is filed within the stipulated statutory period of one month from the date of arising of the cause of action. In this view of the matter, there is indeed nothing on the basis of which remotely even it can be said that sections 138 and 142 of the Act have not been complied with warranting quashing of the process.

    8. Further still, the matter also does not and cannot be simply permitted to rest here. Looking to the nature of allegations in the complaint, it is very clear that the alleged offence is not only an offence punishable under section 138 of the Act, but the same also as well attracts the ingredients of section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Accordingly, merely because for whatever reason the complainant inadvertently failed to add section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for being cheated and particularly more when the allegations in the complaint manifestly demonstrate that an offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was committed that does not mean that the court which is bound to do justice is required to take into consideration only the alleged offence under section 138 of the Act and frame the charge accordingly only under the said section 138 ignoring altogether section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In this view of the matter, assuming for the sake of argument that in such type of cases even if there are some such non-compliance of sections 138 and 142 of the Act, if the material facts alleged in the complaint otherwise prima facie disclose the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, then such dishonest person who dupes the otherside, turns his back, backing out from paying the cheque amount, he has indeed no right or business to throw dust of technical points in the eyes of the court and pray for quashing the process issued against him/them conveniently taking unjust shelter under some non-compliance of sections 138 and 142 of the Act. The person having committed a wrong cannot be allowed to wriggle out of the clutches of the law, denying justice to the aggrieved citizen who on being duped knocks at the door of the court for justice. In this view of the matter, whenever any complaint is filed merely and only for the alleged offence under section 138 of the Act then even it is the foremost duty of the learned Magistrate to carefully screen and examine each and every allegation in the complaint and if there is/are a manifest circumstances prima facie constituting an offence of cheating under the Indian Penal Code, then while taking cognizance and issuing the process he should see to it that it is not confined only to section 138 of the Act but shall also issue process under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as well. The learned Magistrates should know and know for ever and accordingly bear in mind that doing justice is not a mere a matter of formality, but it is a matter of substance, where a person committing offences under several Acts should be duly served with processes for all the alleged offences.

    9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, since there is no substance in the petition, the same deserves to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate is directed to add section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in this case and conduct the trial accordingly and as expeditiously as possible.

    10. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. Ad interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. The learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the trial by giving notice to the complainant and accused. Rule discharged.

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    Dipendra G. Choksi And Another v. Dipak Chimanlal Patel And Another
    (Jan 7, 1997)