1. The question that arises before this Full Bench is the interpretation of judgment of another Full Bench in the case of Gorva Vibhag Co-op. Housing Society Association v. State 1992 (1) GLR 654 on the question as to what is that "reasonable period" under Section 32A(1) of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 for initiating action by the registering officer. The said provision did not prescribe any time limit and, therefore, it was contended before the earlier Full Bench that it gave arbitrary powers to the registering authority to initiate proceedings after lapse of reasonable time and to harass the citizens by misusing powers contained in Section 32A. The Full Bench negatived this contention holding that:

In our view, this contention requires to be rejected because it is a settled law that the powers under the statutory provisions are to be exercised within the reasonable period.

The relevant paragraph of the Full Bench judgment is paragraph 36 which reads as follows:

It was also contended that as no time limit is prescribed for initiating the action by the registering officer it gives arbitrary powers to the registering officer to initiate proceedings after lapse of unreasonable time and to harass the concerned person by misusing the provisions contained under Section 37A. In our view, this contention requires to be rejected because it is a settled law that the powers under the statutory provisions are to be exercised within the reasonable period. The reasonable period varies in the facts and circumstances of each case and various provisions of the Act. It should be noted that under Section 32A(4) the legislature has prescribed maximum period of two years from the date of registration of any instrument for initiating suo motu proceedings by the Collector for examining the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the consideration or the market value of the property which is subject-matter of the conveyance and the duty payable thereon. Therefore, in no set of circumstances the registering officer can exercise his power of referring the instrument to the Collector beyond the reasonable period (under Section 32A) Not only this, the learned Advocate General has stated that the Superintendent of Stamps and Inspector General of Registration, Gujarat State, has issued a Circular dated 7th December, 1991 to the effect that the registering officer should issue a notice within one month from the date of presentation of the document for registration for payment of the amount of difference in stamp duty within one month from the date of receipt of the notice. If the difference in stamp duty is not paid he should immediately refer the case to the concerned Deputy Collector (Stamp Duty-Valuation Department). The learned Advocate General further stated that the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department has informed that in Rules 3(2), 4(2) and (3) appropriate time limit ranging from one month to three months would be prescribed. Considering the aforesaid statements made by the learned Advocate General and the amended provisions of the Act, in our view even prior to issuance of Circular dated 7th December 1991 by the Superintendent of Stamps and Inspector General of Registration, Gujarat State, three months period can be considered to be the reasonable period for issuance of notice by the registering officer under Section 32A(1) read with Rule 3 Clause (2) of the Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules. 1984. If the power is exercised beyond that period then the order can be set aside unless the facts justifying delay are pointed out.

2. The question that arises before this Full Bench is whether the period of two years mentioned by the earlier Full Bench is the rigid and maximum period being "reasonable period" or whether it is open to the authority to point out facts justifying delay beyond two years.

3. In Special Civil Application No. 744 of 1992 and other cognate matters, a Division Bench (of which one of the Judges was the member of the Full Bench), held that there was no question of justifying the delay beyond two years.

4. Before another Division Bench where another member of the Full Bench was also a party, the matter had come up and it appeared that the earlier Division Bench had not correctly interpreted and followed the Full Bench judgment. Since the Division Bench was in disagreement with the view of the earlier Division Bench, the subsequent Division Bench referred these two Special Civil Applications to Full Bench.

5. Though the question is a short one, it has great impact in respect of the past period (as regard future, no difficulty arises) concerning thousands of documents of citizens and crores of rupees of public revenue. In fact, we are told that on this question, more than 4000 writ petitions are pending in this Court.

6. Regarding the past period, the situation is very peculiar. In Special Civil Application No. 6262 of 1984, this High Court had granted interim injunction restraining the State Government and its agencies from enforcing and/or implementing the Circular/Instructions issued by the State Government/ Chief Controlling Revenue Authority fixing the market value of land and buildings in the State of Gujarat and from levying stamp duty on the basis of the said market value by registering authority. The Full Bench considered the validity of this Circular and the valuation tables in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 30 and 31 and observed that:

In our view the contention that the method of valuation of property is unreasonable, arbitrary and invalid, is raised without referring to the detailed statutory provisions prescribed under the Act and the Rules. On the face of it, in our view, the said procedure is scientific, reasonable and cannot be termed as irrational by any standard.

7. The Registering Officers are revenue officers charged with the duty of registration of documents. They are not valuation experts. The valuation tables are the necessary guides to enable the Registering Officer to form a reasonable belief about the prima facie valuation or undervaluation of the property. It is the State-wide valuation organisation which has been set up for making continuous valuation which works out minimum values of properties of different Kinds in different localities in all the cities and towns. These minimum values are conservatively estimated market values and are the guiding norms for Registering Officers. The Valuation Organisation Department was established in 1982 at State level and Divisional level and the valuation of properties in different cities, different zones and localities was worked out by different methods and on consideration of all that, the Full Bench, with emphasis, came to the clear conclusion that these minimum values would in effect be conservatively estimated market values and would become the norms that would be given to the Registering Officers and upheld the validity of such valuation method.

8. However, till that was done by the Full Bench judgment dated May 5, 1992, these valuation tables could not be acted and relied upon and no guidance could be drawn therefrom by the Registering Officers by virtue of the interim injunction of the High Court. The Registering Officers were, thus, deprived of the most important and crucial clue and guide to enable them to form their belief in the matter of thousands of properties and the documents went on accumulating and at the hearing before the earlier Full Bench in 1992, it was mentioned that about 4 lacs documents had accumulated. After the Full Bench judgment, clearing the way of the Registering Officers to avail of the tool and guide of the valuation tables prepared by the State Valuation Organisation, a drive was undertaken to clear lacs of documents which had remained pending and accumulated before the Registering Officers.

9. We are informed that by now, nearly 95% of the documents have been returned.

In this background, the question has to be considered as to whether the Full Bench in Gorva case has prescribed any fixed and rigid time limit of reasonable period or not and whether it is open to the authorities to justify reasons as to why the Registering Officers could not refer the instrument to the Collector within two years.

10. With great respect, the earlier Division Bench view that there is no question of explaining any delay beyond the period of two years, it not consistent with the reasoning and the ratio of the Full Bench.

11. The Learned Counsels for the petitioners and the interveners have submitted that under Section 32A(4), the Legislature has prescribed the maximum period of two years within which a Collector can suo motu initiate proceedings and there is no provision for explaining the time limit beyond two years for the Collector and, therefore, the Full Bench has observed that in no set of circumstances, the Registering Officer can exercise his power of referring the instrument to the Collector beyond the reasonable period (under Section 32A). It is true that the Full Bench has observed that the reasonable period would vary in the facts and circumstances of each case and various provisions of the Act and it has specifically referred to Section 32A (4) whereby the Legislature has prescribed maximum period of two years for initiating suo motu proceedings by the Collector and the Full Bench has also observed that in no set of circumstances, the Registering Officer can exercise his power of referring the instrument to the Collector beyond reasonable period. However, the Pull Bench did not use the words "two years", but used the words "reasonable period". Further, the Full Bench also referred to the provisions in the rules and the assurance of the Government to prescribe appropriate time limit under Rules 3 and 4 for the Registering Officers to refer the instrument to the Collector and considering the same, the Full Bench observed that three months period would he considered to be a "reasonable period" for issuance of notice by the Registering Officer, but while doing so, the Full Bench had taken extra care to observe that even beyond that period, it was open to the authority to explain the delay and justify the exercise of power and while doing so, the Full Bench had not restricted any outer limit of the reasonable period of two years. The Full Bench was careful to hold that if the power is exercised beyond that period, then the order can be set aside unless the facts justifying the delay are pointed out. It is clear that the earlier Full Bench has not prescribed any fixed or rigid time limit of two years of reasonable period. In fact, the basic observation of the Full Bench is that the "reasonable period" varies in the facts and circumstances of each case and the provisions of the Act and the Full Bench was clear that it is not the judicial function to legislate and prescribe any time limit. These observations were made in the context of validity of the provision where the grievance was made that there was no time limit prescribed and that the power may be exercised after unreasonable period. The Full Bench held that the power has to be exercised within reasonable period and the reasonable period varies in the facts and circumstances of each case and various provisions of the Act. The Full Bench has nowhere laid down and prescribed the rigid time limit of two years.

It is also to be borne in mind that interpretation of a statute or Statutory provision is one thing and the same cannot be mechanically applied to the language of a judgment. Judgments cannot be construed as statute and no line or paragraph of a judgment can be read as a section of a statute. The judgment as a whole gives true colour and meaning to the various expressions used in the course of its discussion.

12. The Learned Counsels for the petitioners submitted that if no time limit is prescribed, the authority may exercise power after lapse of several years and it can be exercised after 10, 20 or 30 years and there will be a hanging sword over the head of every citizen executing a document. There is no basis for this argument. The earlier Pull Bench has clearly laid down that the power has to be exercised within a reasonable period and, therefore, if the power is exercised beyond reasonable period, the orders can be set aside. What is "reasonable period would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If a delay of few months cannot be explained, it would be beyond reasonable period. If a delay of years can be explained and justified, it would be "within reasonable period". When the power is exercised "within reasonable period", it cannot be successfully attacked. When this power of reasonableness is read into the provision, the provision does not become unreasonable or arbitrary. The view of the Division Bench in Special Civil Application No. 744 of 1992 that there is no question of explaining delay beyond two years is, in our view, contrary to what the Full Bench has held.

13. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors. v. Ms. Omkarmal Nathmal Trust . In that case, Assam Taxation (On Goods Carried by Road or on Inland Waterways) Act, was under consideration. Section 7(2) of that Act provided for issuance of a notice within two years from the end of return period and best judgment assessment under Section 9(4). The time limit was prescribed by the provision of Section 7(2) of the Act and the contention of the State was that because of injunction obtained by the assessee against the State in these proceedings challenging the validity of the Act, the State could not act within the prescribed period of two years. The Supreme Court held by a majority of 3: 2 that there is no waiver of statutory provision. The statutory provision prescribed for limitation of two years. The Supreme Court also observed that if the State had asked for variation or modification of the order of injunction by pointing out that the proceedings are likely to be barred by time, the Court would have passed appropriate orders to protect the interest of the parties and not prejudiced either party. The Supreme Court observed that it was a question of lack of power. The State had no power under Section 9(4) to pass an order of best judgment assessment and period of two years under Section 7(2) was fatal on the power of authority and was not just a bar of time and no assessment could be made under Section 9(4) without service of notice under Section 7(2) within two years which was held to be an imperative requirement for reassessment. The Supreme Court further observed that there could not be any waiver of statutory requirement of a provision and the injunction order did not amount to waiver of statutory provision.

14. In the present case, there is no such statutory provision. It is only the concept of "reasonable period" and this reasonable period would naturally vary in the facts and circumstances of each case and it cannot be fixed or rigid. This is not the case of a statutorily fixed period of limitation. Here, it is neither statutory nor fixed and when the reasonable period depends on facts, the Courts cannot be oblivious of facts and the most crucial fact is that the Registering Officers were denied the most important tool and guide and virtually their hands and wings were cut off. Each Registering Officer would be receiving large number of documents everyday and if he is not allowed to take guidance from the valuation tables which are prepared after years of exercise and continuously revised by the experts and Statewide Valuation Organisation, they would naturally be totally handicapped and disabled. One has to look at these valuation tables to really understand and appreciate as to what amount of effort is required for making such valuation tables. We have been shown such samples of Ahmedabad and Baroda. One book of such valuation table would run into hundreds of pages. It would deal with each zone, ward, street and indicate minimum values. These values are arrived at by following scientific methods. If the Registering Officer is to restrained from looking at it and acting on it, he will have no material to form his reasonable belief in respect of hundreds of documents which are presented to him for registration everyday from different areas and localities. These valuation tables are a kind of reckoner. If the Valuation Officer finds that valuation indicated in the conveyance approximates the valuation shown in the valuation table or if the difference is less than 10% or 15%, he may have no reason to believe that there is undervaluation and the matter might come to an end. If the difference is large, the Registering Officer will have to look into the particulars submitted by the parties and taking into consideration the relevant considerations mentioned in Rule 8 referred to in para 33 of the Full Bench judgment, he has to form his belief, therefore, the Full Bench held that the principles for determining the market value can be said to be most reasonable and scientific by any standard.

15. When the Registering Officers are deprived of the assistance of this scientific and rational guide, they would not be in a position to exercise their power and to form a reasonable belief. It is also to be noted that this exercise of preparing valuation table and having Statewide Valuation Organisation was undertaken long before this Amendment Act and introduction of the concept of "market value" for the purpose of stamp duty. The Legislature was fully aware that without this kind of Valuation Organisation and the valuation tables, the Registering Officers would not be in a position to function. Therefore, even before enacting the Amendment Act of 1984, this extensive exercise was undertaken by establishing a State Valuation Organisation and getting from them voluminous valuation tables prepared. It was with this background that Legislature had enacted the provision of section 32a. In fact, this provision of valuation table was in the interest of citizens because these valuation tables would ordinarily be the conservative estimate of minimum value and would enable an honest citizen to get his document registered expeditiously. It is only in a case where the Registering Officer prima facie finds that the document is under-valued, he only forms a reasonable belief and does not adjudicate or finally decide anything. He has only to refer an instrument to the Collector who will decide the same according to law and the principles laid down in Rule 8 and the Full Bench judgment in Gorva case, but when these valuation tables and circulars could not be acted upon, there was virtually freezing of the department and in these circumstances, when such injunction was in operation for about eight years from 1984 to 1992, it cannot be said that when the Full Bench referred to the provision of section 32a(4) regarding two years limitation of the power of the Collector, it had rendered lacs of documents pending with the Registering Officers immune from any consideration by the Registering Officers or by any authority. The Full Bench has carefully and cautiously not prescribed two years as the period of limitation or as fixed and rigid period as reasonable period.

Strong reliance has been placed by the petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad and it is submitted that the reliance placed by the authorities on the valuation tables is illegal. In that case, under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act for determination of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired, the claimants claimed that they should be award enhanced compensation not on the basis of the market value but on the basis of these valuation tables prepared under the stamp act. the provision under section 47a as enacted by Andhra Pradesh State Legislature has made a similar provision for determination of the market value of conveyance. The Supreme Court held that the A.P, Government had unilaterally fixed the valuation of land in the Basic Valuation Register and it had no statutory foundation and it did not bind the parties nor the Registrar nor the vendor was bound by it and the market value of the land for proper stamp duty had to be determined as per law under Section 47A itself and such valuation tables would not be the basis to determine market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act whereunder the lands acquired in that area or town or the locality possessing same or similar advantageous features would furnish the basis to determine the market value on the basis of evidence of bona fide sales between willing and prudent vendor and vendee.

Relying on the aforesaid judgment, the Learned Counsels for the petitioners have contended that the reliance placed by the Registering Officer on the valuation tables is wholly illegal. The concern of the Registering Officer is not to finally determine the market value. He is only to have a reasonable belief as to the proper valuation. He does not have the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate the question if the question is required to be adjudicated. He takes into consideration all the material that is placed before him and these valuation tables and if he finds that there is substantial difference, he can legitimately think and can have reason to believe that the valuation made in the document is not proper. It is not for him to finally adjudicate the matter and in the event of the party pot agreeing with him and not paying the proposed deficit stamp duty, he only makes a reference to the Collector who will adjudicate the matter on the basis of the evidence and the material in accordance with law after giving an opportunity to the party. This judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be mechanically applied when the question is of reasonable belief as to whether the valuation made by the party is required to be inquired into and adjudicated upon at a proper biparte hearing before the proper authority.

It is also submitted on behalf of the petitioners that when the reference is to be made by the Registering Officer, the Registering Officer should apply his mind and should have material before him to find out whether there was a prima facie case for a reference. Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat . There cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law, but in the present case, it cannot be said that the references have been made without applying mind or mechanically or without any material. The very fact that out of four lacs documents which had accumulated, more than 95% of the documents have been returned without making references is a clear proof of the fact that the things are not done mechanically. When cases are in very large number and when there are similar features and large number of cases are referred and large number of cases are not referred and documents are returned to the parties, it cannot be said that things are done mechanically and without application of mind and without any material.

Similar is the case of Bapalal Khushaldas GhosaHya v. R. Prasad, AIR 1965 Guj. 135: (1964 GLR 633) wherein it is held that "reasonable belief of the seizing officer is a condition precedent before seizure of goods is effected.

It was submitted that the Registering Officer was exercising quasi judicial function and he must record reasons in support of his order and he must follow the principles of natural justice before making a reference and reliance was placed on Supreme Court judgments in the case of Siemens Engineering v. Union of India and Maneka Gandhi's case . Again the reliance placed on these judgments by the petitioners is misconceived. The Registering Officer is not exercising quasi judicial function, but he is referring the matter for quasi judicial process and adjudication to the Collector and it is the Collector who has to exercise quasi judicial function. He follows the principles of natural justice, gives opportunity of hearing and passes an order in support thereof.

Against administrative decision of the Registering Officer referring the document to the Collector, a party has ample opportunity before the Collector to show that his valuation was proper and he will have a reasonable opportunity to place his case before the Collector and the grievance made by the petitioners to challenge the reference has no merit in law or in facts.

16. The Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Government has assured the Court and has also issued circulars directing the Registering Officers to make a reference to the Collector within a period of three months and it is, therefore, submitted that the Government having prescribed such a period, now, no question arises for interpreting the Full Bench judgment and giving the Registering Officers any time in the name of reasonable period, beyond the time prescribed by such circulars. These circulars do not prescribe any such time as suggested by the Learned Counsels for the petitioners. On the contrary, the circulars indicate that the Registering Officers are directed to undertake the proceedings for making reference to the Collector. The Circulars dated 18-6-1991 and 7-12-1991 are even before the judgment of the Full Bench. The Circular of 18-6-1991 in para 3 refers to the interim order of the High Court against valuation tables and in the consequent circular, in pursuance of the interim injunction, the Government had directed that the valuation tables of the Government and the proceedings under Rules 3(2) and 3(3) were stayed. It has also been brought to our notice that the large number of posts of Valuation Officers were also put in abeyance. The Circular also refers to a clarification by the High Court that the injunction was restraining the Valuation Officers from taking into consideration and acting on the valuation tables and the Registering Officers were free to proceed to make reference to the Collector without taking into consideration the valuation tables. It was in light of this that on June 18, 1991, the Government directed to initiate the proceedings expeditiously and if after giving notice, the party did not give reply or file objections within one month, the reference was to be made to the Collector. The Circular of December 7, 1991 also only states that the Registering Officer shall send notice to the concerned party within one month of the date of presentation of the document regarding deficit stamp duty and if the sufficient stamp duty is not paid, the reference shall be made to the Collector expeditiously. These circulars cannot be treated as laying down any period of limitation more so in the case of documents which had been pending with the Registering Officers since years.

17. After the Full Bench judgment in Gorva case, the Government issued a Circular on July 14, 1992 and taking into consideration the observations of the High Court and assurance given to the High Court, directed that the Registering Officers shall give notice to the parties within three months of the date of presentation of the documents asking them to pay the deficit duty within a month and if such duty is not paid, a reference shall be made to the Collector. This mention of time limit in the executive circular cannot be treated as a statutory period of limitation more so in the cases which are pending since years. In fact, that circular refers to those cases and it states that a special drive and campaign regarding disposal of such cases was undertaken and cases upto July, 1990, were covered and for cases after 1st August, 1990 the instructions have been given. Therefore, when the circular was issued in July 1992, it was clearly in the mind of the Government that the pending cases are also to be processed and in appropriate cases, references are to be made and it was not at all intended that this reference to "expeditious disposal" and "time limit" was intended to apply to the documents which were pending since years. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold this contention that a time limit has been prescribed by the executive circular. These circulars only impress upon the Registering Officers that they have to act expeditiously and within reasonable time and in the light of Full Bench judgment, the reasonable time (in absence of any justifying circumstances) would be three months.

18. Since the entire matter was before the Full Bench, the Learned Counsels for the petitioners made a strenuous effort to pursued us and convince us that on the question of validity of the Amendment Act and the competence of the State Legislature to pass that law, the earlier Full Bench view requires to be reconsidered and the matter is required to be referred to a larger bench. However, we are not convinced. On the contrary, after considering their arguments, the view taken by the earlier Full Bench about the Legislative competence of the State Legislature and the validity of the Amendment Act, seem to be absolutely correct. We respectfully agree with the same. The argument that the field is occupied by the Indian Stamp Act is without merit because Section 76 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 with the assent of the President, has repealed the Central Act so far as relevant field in Gujarat State is concerned. Therefore, in this field, there is no competing Central Legislation and, therefore, no Presidential assent would be necessary for the Amendment Act of 1984. The argument that the State Legislature cannot repeal the Central Law has been fully dealt with in the earlier Full Bench judgment. The Indian Stamp Act, 1989 has been repealed by the competent Legislature as provided in Article 372 of the Constitution. The only competent Legislature to repeal that Act in a particular State is the State Legislature and the only requirement is of obtaining the assent of the President and that has been obtained while repealing that provision in the Bombay Stamp Act of 1958.

19. Even otherwise, the argument of lack of competence of the State Legislature is not tenable. The State Legislature is competent to legislate regarding the rates of stamp duty under Entry 63 of State List. The prescribing of the rates of duty on the basis of market value is a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature and it is not in the Concurrent List Entry No. 44 which relates to stamp duty. Conveyance is the subject-matter of stamp duty, but the rate of the stamp duty and the basis of that rate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 63 of the State List. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that there is any lack of competence in the State Legislature to pass the impugned Amendment Act of 1984.

20. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioners that in fact There was no order of reference made by the Registering Officer. On perusal of the record which was shown in the Court on behalf of the Department, it is clear to us that references were duly made. Merely because hundreds of documents are sent together, it cannot be said that there is no reference. The tabular statement of the documents sent clearly shows huge difference in the valuation of the party and the valuation in the Table. This does call for inquiry and adjudication and there can certainly be reason to believe that the valuation of the party is not proper.

Moreover, such question has to be raised before the Collector and if such question is not raised at that stage, it cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition. Further no prejudice is shown or can occur on account of this because the Collector has to adjudicate the matter regarding valuation on the basis of relevant material. If the Collector comes to the conclusion that there is under-valuation or proper valuation, the question of reasonable belief is automatically answered. The further limb of this argument was that the Registering Officer has not issued any notice to pay the deficit duty and, therefore, person would lose an opportunity to pay the deficit and avoid penalty. This also has become academic because even in reply to the notice of the Collector, the petitioners had not shown willingness and had not paid the deficit stamp duty. Only in such case of payment of deficit stamp duty, a person can avail of this argument that he has been deprived of an opportunity of avoiding penalty.

21. The Learned Counsels for the petitioners had also submitted that the notices under Rule 4(4) of the Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules, 1984, as amended in 1990 provide that the Collector shall issue a notice showing the basis on which true market value of the property has been provisionally determined by him and it is submitted that the notice does not show such basis for provisional determination and, therefore, the notice is bad and subsequent proceedings are illegal. It cannot be said that the notice does not indicate the provisional market value. The provisional market value is indicated and that is usually on the basis of valuation tables. If there is, any vagueness or omission, it is a curable irregularity and not a basic illegality and that would not vitiate the issuance of notice. In a given case, if any party feels prejudiced or handicapped, the party can request to know the basis of the provisional determination of the market value. This question has also to be raised before the Collector in reply to the notice and cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition. If such question is not raised before the authority, the party should be deemed to have waived the irregularity and the decision of the Collector has to be examined only on merits and not on procedural aspects. Therefore, this contention regarding illegality of the notice must be rejected.

In the result, our conclusions are as follows:

(1) The Full Bench in Gorva case (supra) has only held that the Registering Officer has to exercise his powers of making a reference within a reasonable period and that reasonable period would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Full Bench has not laid down that any period beyond three months should be considered to be unreasonable for issuance of notice by the Registering Officer. If there are reasons justifying exercise of power, it is open to exercise that power even beyond the period of three months. The Division Bench judgment in Special Civil Application No. 744 of 1992 and other cognate matters wherein it was held that there was no question of justifying the delay beyond a fixed period is overruled.

(2) In the extraordinary situation of nearly four lacs documents having been accumulated over years and there being no clarity as to whether the Registering Officers could or could not have the assistance of valuation tables, the delay in making the references is wholly explained and justified and the references are not bad on account of so-called delay.

(3) The Registering Officer had applied his mind and had reasonable belief to make references and, therefore, references made by him are competent.

(4) The notices issued by the Collector under Rule 4(4) are not illegal and the proceedings taken in pursuance of those notices are not vitiated on the ground that the notices did not indicate the basis of provisional determination of market value.

All the contentions fail and the petitioners are not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in either of the petition. Hence, both the petitions are dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.