1. The order dated July 8, 1992 passed below Exh. 13 in M.A.C.P No. 597/91 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Kutch at Bhuj under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act” for short) directing the petitioner and opponents Nos. 2 & 3 herein to pay an amount of Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees Twelve thousand) with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application till realisation, is the subject matter of challenge in the present Revision Application which is instituted under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. The opponent No. 1 i.e M.D Motiyar is the original claimant in M.A.C.P No. 597/91. The accident in question took place on November 11, 1991. The (sic) was travelling by Truck bearing registration No. GJ-12-T-5601 which is owned by opponent No. 3 herein and which was being driven at the relevant time by the opponent No. 2 herein. The case of the claimant is that because of rash and negligent driving of the Truck by the opponent No. 2, the Truck turned turtle, as a result of which he sustained several fractures and injuries and has suffered permanent disablement. Under the circumstances, by filing Claim Petition, the claimant has claimed compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs).
3. During the pendency of the Claim Petition, the claimant presented an application at Exh. 13 under Section 140 of the Act and prayed the Tribunal to direct the opponents to pay a sum of Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees Twelve thousand) together with interest at the rate of 12% from the date of accident till realisation. The petitioner i.e The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. contested the said application on the ground that the claimant was a passenger travelling in a goods vehicle without any goods and, therefore, Insurance Company was not liable to satisfy the claim by the claimant under Section 140 of the Act.
4. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the defence that the claimant was a passenger travelling in a goods vehicle without any goods and, therefore, the Insurance Company was not liable to satisfy claim made under Section 140 of the Act, was not available to the Insurance Company in a proceeding under Section 140 of the Act. In that view of the conclusion, the Tribunal has ordered the petitioner and opponents Nos. 2 & 3 herein to pay a sum of Rs. 12,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application till realisation, giving rise to the present Revision Application.
5. The submission of Mr. P.F Makwana, learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the claimant was travelling in a goods vehicle without any goods and, therefore, Insurance Company should not have been saddled with any liability under Section 140 of the Act, has no substance. Section 140 of the Act replaces old Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989 and the only change introduced is that the amount of compensation for death and permanant disablement in the old Section were respectively Rs. 16,000/- and Rs. 7,500/- which have now been raised to Rs. 26,000/- and Rs. 12,000/-. Section 140 of the Act is a piece of beneficial and ameliorative legislation providing for immediate aid to the victims. In view of fast increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330 as roads of the country not only from the pedestrian point of view, but also from the passenger point of view have been rendered highly dangerous. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the Society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents, there was a continuous agitation throughout the nation to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles as a liability without fault. In order to meet the above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission, Chapter VIII-A (New Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) was introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989.
6. Section 140 provides that where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said Section. The amount of compensation which is payable thereunder in respect of death of any person is a fixed sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand) and the amount of compensation payable in respect of the permanent disablement of any person is a fixed sum of Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees Twelve thousand). Sub-section (3) of Section 140 provides that in any claim for compensation under sub-section (1) of Section 140, the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. It is, thus, that to a limited extent relief has been granted under Section 140 of the Act to the victim who has suffered permanent disablement. Such victim can claim Rs. 12,000/- without proof of any negligence on the part of owner of the vehicle or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent substantive law of the Country stands modified.
There is no manner of doubt that Section 140 of the Act is a beneficial and social welfare piece of legislation. It is well settled that in construing social welfare legislation, the courts should adopt a beneficial rule of construction and in any event, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of legislation. The construction to be adopted on a statute should be such so as to achieve the purposes for which it is enacted and in favour of those in whose interest the Act has been passed. The liability under this Section is made indefeasible, peremptory and total. It has been put beyond dispute that insurer is clearly liable under Section 140 of the Act in view of the provisions contained in Sections 145 & 147 of the Act.
7. Rule 231 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 contains adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of matters necessary for awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 231 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall proceed with the application for compensation, on the basis of—
(i) First Information Report;
(ii) Injury certificate or Post-mortem report in case of death;
(iii) Registration certificate of the motor vehicle involved in the accident;
(iv) Cover note, certificate of insurance or the policy, relating to the insurance of the vehicle against third party risks;
(v) The nature of the treatment given by the medical officer who has treated the victim.
While making an order under Section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal is not required to follow the procedure contained in Rules 211 to 230 and 232 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Where compensation is claimed in respect of death or permanent disablement under Section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 140 of the Act is required to be disposed of in the first place in view of sub-section (2) of Section 140 of the Act. For awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the following matters:—
(i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle.
(ii) the said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or death of the person whose legal representative to making the claim;
(iii) the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
8. The question that falls for consideration is as to at what stage the Tribunal is to inquire into objection raised to the Insurance Company under the Act. Should such objections to treated as preliminary issue and be decided by the Tribunal in the first instance which in the nature of things would result in delay in regard to the payment of amount under Section 140 of the Act to the claimant and defeat the very purpose underlying the enactment of the said provision? The object underlying enactment of Section 140 is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs. 12,000/- in case of permenent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under Section 168 of the Act. It must be seen that Section 140 of the Act speaks of peremptory awards in cases of permanent disablement or death. The object underlying this consideration is the immediate relief to the disabled victim of accident in case of permanent disability. Provision of Section 140 is a piece of beneficial and ameliorative legislation providing for an immediate aid to the hapless and helpless victims of the motor vehicle. The objects for which Section 140 of the Act is enacted would be defeated if the claims Tribunal is required to hold regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim made in a petition filed under Section 168 of the Act. Having regard to the purpose underlying the enactment of the said provision. I am of the opinion that the defences raised by the insurer or other objections of the insurer or the owner should be examined later when the claims petition is decided on merits. The Claims Tribunal would be entitled to make award under Section 140 of the Act as soon as it conies to the conclusion that the owner of the vehicle was involved and insured. The persons primarily responsible to pay compensation or damages for the accident to the injured or the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased are normally driver and owner of the offending vehicle. The liability of the insurer is spelled out qua the person or classes of persons specified in the policy that is qua the insured under Section 147(1) of the Act, and also qua the claimant of compensation under Sections 147(2) and 149(1) of the Act. If an award is given against insured holding him liable to pay certain amount as compensation or damages in regard to the claim arising out of an accident with his motor vehicle, then the liability of insurer is absolute and the insurer cannot question its liability on the ground that the amount is awarded on the principle of no fault liability. Moment either it is admitted by the owner of the vehicle that his vehicle is involved in the accident or from the evidence adduced on the record, the Tribunal positively holds that the vehicle of the owner in question was involved in that accident, then Tribunal without inquiring into correctness of other objections that may be raised by the Insurance Company would be entitled to make the award under Section 140 and require the Insurance Company to pay specified amount to the claimants forthwith and thereafter investigate and inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the other objection that are raised either by the Insurance Company or by the owner of the offending vehicle at the time of deciding main claim petition.
9. From sub-rule (5) of Rule 231 of he Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 it is clear that a summary trial is contemplated for making an award or order under Section 140 of the Act. The defence as presently raised by the insurer is naturally an issue in the main petition and it will have to be disposed of in that petition and perhaps by elaborate evidence. This type of evidence necessary for disposal of an issue which is required to be dealt with in the main petition cannot be permitted to be led at the stage of making an order under Section 140 of the Act and in this view of the matter, I am unable to accept Mr. Makwana's challenge to the impugned order. Ultimately, if the defence of the insurer is upheld, the insurer would be entitled to claim the amount awarded against it from others i.e from driver and owners, but not from the claimant.
In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in not entertaining the defence raised by the petitioner when application under Section 140 of the Act came to be decided. No jurisdictional error is committed by the Tribunal necessitating interference of this Court with the impugned order while exercising powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Revision Application, therefore, fails. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief granted earlier is hereby vacated.
Application dismissed.