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  • Recruitment Rules (Rule 2(a)(3)
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners were employed as Gate Clerks by respondent No.1 (the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Kalavad) on an ad hoc and temporary basis beginning in or around 1983–84. Those appointments were for short durations (documents indicate periods of 29 days) and were made without inviting public applications. Following an audit objection prompting the Committee to propose creation of sanctioned posts (four Gate Clerks and two Watchmen), the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance (respondent No.2) sanctioned the staff increase by letter dated 17 June 1986 but expressly required that appointments be made in accordance with the Recruitment Rules and warned that unlawful prior appointments would be the Committee's responsibility.

Despite the Director's conditions, the Committee passed a resolution on 18 July 1987 attempting to make the petitioners permanent. Respondent No.3 filed a civil suit in the Civil Court challenging that resolution. The Director wrote on 11 August 1987 reiterating that recruitment must follow the Rules and that irregular recruits should be relieved. Thereafter, on 26 August 1987 the Committee resolved to terminate the petitioners' services and notices dated 29 August 1987 were served. The petitioners challenged the termination by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. All three petitions were consolidated and disposed of by a common judgment at the request and with the consent of the parties.

The Court found that the petitioners did not disclose the pending civil suit challenging the earlier resolution regularizing them; the Court characterized this as suppression of material facts and an abuse of court process. For that reason the Court stated the petitions should be rejected on that ground, but the judgment also proceeded to consider the merits. The petitions were ultimately rejected summarily; however, interim relief previously granted was extended until 15 June 1988 to permit the petitioners to approach a higher forum.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a claim by ad hoc/temporary appointees to protect possession of their posts — described in the petition as a demand that others be denied entry so petitioners may "protect our occupation of the seat which we have occupied without going through selection process" — is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the petitioners, who were initially appointed on an ad hoc and temporary basis (without advertisement or following Recruitment Rules), acquired permanent employment rights such that the Committee could not validly terminate their services.
  3. Whether the Committee's resolution terminating the petitioners' services (after the Director's direction that recruitment must comply with Recruitment Rules) was arbitrary, mala fide, or violative of principles requiring an opportunity to be heard before termination.
  4. Whether previous judicial authorities relied upon by the petitioners support regularization of employees appointed ad hoc where initial recruitment was irregular or otherwise not in accordance with Recruitment Rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended that the Committee's Resolution dated 18 July 1987 regularizing their services made them permanent and that, therefore, their services could not subsequently be terminated.
  • They also relied on duration of service (continuing in service since December 1983) to contend permanency and to resist termination.
  • To support their entitlement to regularization and permanency, counsel for the petitioners relied on several judicial decisions (detailed in the precedents section), including decisions of the Supreme Court and this High Court, arguing those precedents required or supported regularization in comparable circumstances.

Respondent No.3's Arguments

  • Respondent No.3 sought and was permitted to be joined; he had filed a civil suit in the Civil Court challenging the Committee's 18 July 1987 resolution. He argued that the petitioners failed to disclose that pending suit and that they obtained interim relief from this High Court despite knowledge of that suit and despite a caveat filed by respondent No.3. For those reasons he urged rejection of the writ petitions as being founded on suppression of material facts.

Respondent No.1 (Committee) and Respondent No.2 (Director) Positions

  • The Committee (respondent No.1) terminated the petitioners on 26 August 1987 after receiving the Director's instructions; counsel for the Committee conceded that the petitioners' initial appointments were not in accordance with Recruitment Rules.
  • The Committee obtained an opinion from the District Government Pleader; the Court treated that opinion as irrelevant and possibly part of a device to cover up irregularity, but noted the Committee's termination action was nonetheless justified on the ground that appointments were irregular.
  • The Director (respondent No.2) had sanctioned the sanctioned establishment on 17 June 1986 but expressly required that further appointments follow the Recruitment Rules and warned that irregular prior appointments would be the Committee's responsibility; the Director later instructed that irregular appointees and those in excess of sanctioned staff should be relieved.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India & Others (1988-I-LLJ-370) Used by petitioners to argue for regularization of long-serving casual labourers; Court observed the Supreme Court directed preparation of a scheme to absorb casual labourers who had served continuously for more than one year. Court held this decision is inapplicable: it concerned numerous helpless casual labourers serving many years where initial recruitment was not unlawful; the Court emphasized the decision was fact-specific and did not mandate regularization where initial recruitment was unlawful or by "back door" entry.
U.P. Income-tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India & Others (1988-I-LLJ-396) Relied on by petitioners as similar in principle to Daily Rated Casual Labour (regarding absorption/regularization of casual/contingent staff). Court treated this decision as being on lines of Daily Rated Casual Labour and therefore not helpful because the facts and legal posture differ (not a case of initial unlawful recruitment through back door).
Delhi Municipal Karmchari Ekta Union v. P. L. Singh & Others (AIR 1988 SC 519) Relied upon by the petitioners; Court notes it follows the trend of the earlier Supreme Court decisions on regularization and absorption of casual employees. Court held it is of no help to petitioners for the same reasons as the other Supreme Court decisions—those decisions were context-specific and did not establish a universal rule regularizing initial unlawful recruits.
Unreported Supreme Court decision in Writ Petitioners Nos. 822, 875, 180 and 200 of 1987 (24 September 1987) An unreported order directing regularization of certain ad hoc Assistant Divisional Medical Officers; cited by petitioners as supportive of regularization of ad hoc appointees. Court observed the Supreme Court itself prefaced its order by noting it was passing orders "having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances" and held that this decision is confined to its particular facts and does not lay down a universal rule that irregular initial appointments must be regularized.
Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat (1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41) Earlier High Court decision where repeated short-term appointment orders led the Court to find the petitioner had almost acquired status of a temporary Government servant; used in arguments about acquisition of permanency via artificial breaks. Court distinguished Ghanshyam's case from the present facts: in Ghanshyam there were many shorter-duration orders amounting to artificial breaks; here there was no comparable pattern and the initial appointments were irregular and not against sanctioned posts, so Ghanshyam is inapplicable.
Patel Evelin Ranchhodbhai v. Gujarat Ayurved University (1988-I-LLJ-447) High Court decision (M. B. Shah, J.) distinguishing Ghanshyam and holding that appointments in violation of Recruitment Rules are illegal and ad hoc appointees do not automatically acquire the right to be permanent. Court agreed with M. B. Shah, J.'s reasoning and applied it to hold that appointments in violation of Recruitment Rules do not confer rights to permanency; used to reject petitioners' claim to permanence.
Calico Mills v. Union of India (1983 (1) 24(1) GLR 1) — Full Bench Full Bench guidance on reading Supreme Court decisions: only the ratio decidendi is binding; observations must be restricted to the context in which they are made. Court relied on this Full Bench principle to limit the applicability of the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by petitioners, emphasizing that remarks in judgments must be read in context of the facts decided.
Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 1384) Referenced for established theory of precedents; used in the opinion's discussion of how to interpret higher court decisions. Court cited the case to support the proposition that precedents must be applied by reference to the precise issue and facts; used to narrow the precedential weight of decisions relied upon by petitioners.
Ambica Quarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat & Ors (AIR 1987 SC 1073) Supreme Court observation that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts; used to caution against over-broad application of authority. Court applied the same interpretive principle to restrict other authorities to their factual contexts and to deny petitioners broad entitlement to regularization on the basis of those authorities.
Quinn v. Leathem (House of Lords) (1901 AC 495) Quoted in Ambica Quarry Works and relied upon to support the timeless principle that a case is authority only for what it actually decides, not for what logically follows. Court invoked this classic statement of precedent theory to reinforce its approach of limiting the applicability of prior decisions to their facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal stages: first addressing procedural impropriety (suppression of material facts) and then, notwithstanding that impropriety, examining the merits of the petitions.

1. Suppression of material facts and procedural bar: The Court found that the petitioners did not disclose the civil suit in the Civil Court filed by respondent No.3 challenging the Committee's 18 July 1987 resolution that purported to regularize them. The Court concluded that the petitioners were aware of that suit, that a caveat was on file, and that by failing to disclose these material facts before obtaining interim relief in the High Court the petitioners had abused the process of the Court. On that basis the Court held that it would be improper to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and that the petitions should be rejected for suppression and distortion of material facts. The Court also observed that this conduct could attract contempt proceedings, though the judge refrained from initiating those proceedings.

2. Merits — interpretive approach to authorities: Before dealing with the merits, the Court emphasized interpretive principles drawn from a Full Bench decision (Calico Mills) and Supreme Court authority (Dalbir Singh, Ambica Quarry Works): only the ratio decidendi is binding and judicial observations must be read in the context of facts. Using those principles, the Court restricted the precedents relied upon by petitioners to their factual contexts and found they did not establish a universal rule requiring regularization of employees whose initial appointment was unlawful.

3. Legal standard for a claim to permanency: The Court articulated two essential factors that must be established for an employee appointed intermittently to claim permanency benefits:

  • That the employer adopted a device of invoking artificial breaks (i.e., repeated short-term engagements designed to evade employment protections); and
  • That there were vacancies in the regular establishment at the relevant time and the device of temporary employment was used to deny appointment on the regular establishment.
The Court said that if both factors are proved, a claim to permanency may succeed; but if a temporary appointment was genuinely required by exigencies and conferring permanency would work an injustice to others, the claim may fail.

4. Application of the standard to the facts:

  • It was admitted (by the Committee's counsel) that initial appointments of the petitioners were not in accordance with Recruitment Rules and that there were at the time no sanctioned posts for Gate Clerks until the Director sanctioned posts on 17 June 1986.
  • The Recruitment Rules (Rule 2(a)(3) as quoted in the opinion) required public advertisement for recruitment; in the present case no advertisement was issued and no public applications were invited, i.e., an entry "through the rear gate." Thus initial recruitment was irregular and unlawful.
  • The two essential factors for claiming permanency (artificial breaks and pre-existing sanctioned vacancies) were not established: there was no showing that the appointments were part of an artificial-break strategy to deny permanency, and until 17 June 1986 there were no posts on regular establishment for Gate Clerks.
  • The Director's letter of 17 June 1986 expressly required compliance with Rules and warned of the Committee's responsibility for prior unlawful appointments; accordingly, the Director was justified in directing compliance and in instructing that irregular recruits be relieved. The Court also referred to Section 47 of the Act (as a source of power to give directions) in support of the Director's communications.
  • Termination by the Committee was not by way of penalty nor was it shown to be arbitrary or mala fide: it was an exercise of the Committee's power to remedy earlier irregular appointments and to ensure recruitment in conformity with the Rules. The Committee could not, by an internal resolution, confer permanency contrary to the Recruitment Rules.

5. On fairness and collateral matters:

  • The Court found some substance in allegations of collusion between the Committee and the petitioners and criticized the relevance and propriety of the legal opinion obtained from the District Government Pleader; however, the Court did not base its decision solely on that aspect.
  • The petitioners' argument that they were entitled to a hearing prior to termination was rejected because termination of ad hoc appointments that confer no vested right to permanency does not necessarily attract the procedural protections reserved for penal or arbitrary dismissals where a vested status exists.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the petitions lack merit and that the petitioners were not entitled to the relief sought. In the words of the opinion: all the three petitions are hereby rejected summarily.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Committee's resolution terminating the petitioners' services was upheld as lawful; the petitioners did not acquire permanent status by virtue of prior ad hoc appointments or the Committee's internal resolution; they must be relieved if their appointments were irregular and not in accordance with Recruitment Rules.
  • Procedural consequence: The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts (the existence of the pending civil suit) constituted an abuse of process that would have, on its own, justified rejection of the writ petitions.
  • Scope as precedent: The opinion restricts its reasoning to the facts presented and relies upon established interpretive rules limiting the reach of prior decisions; the Court did not purport to lay down a new, broadly applicable precedent changing the law on regularization of ad hoc appointees. No broad, novel principle supplanting earlier case-law was announced; the decision primarily applies existing principles to the facts before the Court.

Disposition and Interim Direction

The petitions were rejected summarily. Notwithstanding that disposition, the Court allowed the existing ad interim relief previously granted to continue until 15 June 1988 to enable the petitioners to move the appropriate appellate forum.

This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion.

    Ghelabhai Popatbhai Tarpara And Others v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Kalavad And Another

    1. Petitioners are Gate Clerks working with respondent No. 1 Committee, who were appointed ad hoc and temporary basis. Their services terminated since the appointment on the post is to be made in accordance with the provisions Recruitment Rules. Petitioners challenge the order of termination and in substance claim

    "Deny entry to all others who may stand in queue seeking entry through regular gate and protect our occupation of the seat which we have occupied without going through selection process"
    . Can such a claim be entertained in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India ? Shorn of all verbosity and legal niceties, this in short is the question to be examined in these petitions.

    1/A. As common questions of law and facts arise, at the request of and with the consent of the parties, all the three petitions are being disposed of by common judgment and order.

    2. Each of the petitioners has been appointed as Gate Clerk on ad hoc basis by respondent No. 1-Agricultural Produce Market Committee. Kalavad (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee"). Sometime in the year 1981-82 there was audit objection pointing out that respondent No. 1-Committee should have adopted the procedure for Gate Pass. Hence respondent No. 1-Committee made proposal for increasing its sanctioned establishment and recommended that four posts of Gate Clerks be created and two posts of Watchman be created. Pending the approval of the proposal by the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance, Gandhinagar (respondent No. 2 herein), the Committee made appointments of Gate Clerks purely on ad hoc and temporary basis and that too for a period of 29 days. The relevant orders are produced at Annexures "G/1", "G/2", and "G/3" and they are dated : July 12, 1983, March 22, 1984 and December 15, 1983. Respondent No. 2-the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance, Gandhinagar (hereinafter referred to as "the Director") sanctioned the proposal for increasing the staff by his letter dated : June 17, 1986 (Annexure 'H'). In this letter it has been clearly mentioned that the appointment should be in accordance with Rules and Regulations and for the previous appointments made by the Committee if anything unlawful is found, the responsibility will be that of the Committee. However, the Committee resolved by passing Resolution dated : July 18, 1987 to make each of the petitioners permanent. This was done after taking legal advice. Respondent No. 3 herein has filed a suit in Civil Court and has challenged this Resolution. Respondent No. 2-the Director informed the Chairman of the Committee by his letter dated : August 11, 1987 that the appointments should be in accordance with Regulations rules framed and sanctioned under by-law No. 60. It was further informed that the recruitment will be considered lawful only if the same is made in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and it was stated that the recruitment made in haphazard manner shall be considered irregular and unlawful. Therefore, the employees who might have been recruited in that manner and in excess of the sanctioned staff would be required to be relieved immediately. In the letter it was specifically mentioned that if any liability arises on that count the members of the Committee shall be responsible for the same.

    3. Thereafter, the Committee passed Resolution in its meeting held on August 26, 1987 and decided to terminate the services of the petitioners. Notice of termination of service dated : August 29, 1987 has been served upon each of the petitioners. The petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of the Resolution terminating their services and have also challenged the legality and validity of the notice, both of which are produced at Annexure "A" and Annexure "B" respectively. (Annexures referred to herein are of Special C.A. No. 4385 of 1987. However, it is stated at the Bar that Annexures produce in all the petitions are almost identical and there is no substantial difference in factual position).

    4. Respondent No. 3 has been permitted to be joined as party respondent as per order passed below in Civil Application No. 1799 of 1987 in Spl. C.A. No. 4385 of 1987. Similar orders have been passed in different C.As. filed in two other petitions also. On behalf of respondent No. 3 the learned Counsel submitted that he had filed a Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) Kalavad and challenged the legality and validity of Resolution dated : July 18, 1987 by which the petitioners were sought to be made permanent. It is submitted that when the petitioners filed these petitions in this High Court the petitioners were aware about the aforesaid suit. Moreover, respondent No. 3 had also filed a Caveat application in this High Court and the same was served upon the petitioners and yet respondent No. 3 has not been joined in the petition. Moreover, without mentioning anything about the Civil Suit pending in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) Kalavad, petitioners have obtained interim relief. Thus according to respondent No. 3, Petitioners have suppressed material and important facts and, therefore, the petitions should be rejected on this ground alone.

    5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that no reference whatsoever to the aforesaid suit has been made in the petition because the suit was against the Resolution dated : July 18, 1987 passed by respondent No. 1-Committee. By this Resolution services of petitioners were regularized and they were made permanent, while in this petition legality and validity of Resolution dated : August 26, 1987 is challenged by which the services of the petitioners are sought to be terminated. By the aforesaid explanation justification is sought to be advanced for not mentioning the fact regarding the pendency of the Civil Suit. The explanation given by the learned Counsel for the petitioners clearly indicates that the petitioners were aware of the factum of the suit having been filed and the same being pending. The contention that the suit is not on the same subject matter and it is in respect of different Resolution and, therefore, it was not necessary to mention it in the petition cannot be accepted. It is nothing but a deliberate distortion of the facts. In both the proceedings subject matter is similar, if not identically same. At any rate the subject matter of the petition and the subject matter of the suit are inter-connected with each other. In the suit legality and validity of Resolution making the petitioners permanent is that they have been made permanent of that they have become permanent. Therefore, by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that facts and circumstances regarding the Civil Suit filed against the petitions in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) Kalavad are not relevant and material for the purposes of decision of these petitions. The explanation rendered by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, to say the least, is hyper-technical. Very probably had the petitioners disclosed these facts in the petitions before the High Court, the Court might not have exercised its power of granting interim relief. The petitioners are guilty of suppression of material facts and they have deliberately distorted the facts by making material suppression as regards the pendency of the suit in Civil Court.

    6. In this view of the matter it would not be proper for this Court to exercise its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and extend the protection of high prerogative writs to the petitioners. Not only the petitioners have abused the process of the Court, they have taken interim relief by making deliberate distortion of facts and by suppressing important relevant material. Such situation was found in Spl. C.A. No. 2641 of 1986 which has been decided by me on March 28, 1988. For the aforesaid reasons and for the reasons stated in aforesaid Spl. C.A. No. 2641 of 1986 petitioners are not entitled to be heard on merits. Therefore, all the petitions are required to be rejected on this ground alone. Moreover, petitioners are liable for Contempt of Court also. Despite this position, pragmatic considerations compel me to refrain from initiating contempt proceedings and for the same reasons, I deal with the contentions raised by the petitioners on merits.

    7. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that after the Resolution dated : July 18, 1987 regularizing the services of the petitioners has been passed by respondent No. 1-Committee their services cannot be terminated. In his submission, even otherwise, since the petitioners continued in service for a pretty long time since December 1983 onwards, their services cannot be terminated by the Committee. In support of the aforesaid submission the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following decisions :

    (1) (1988-I-LLJ-370) (Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India & Others).

    (2) (1988-I-LLJ-396) (U.P. Income-tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India & Others).

    (3) (AIR) 1988 SC 519, (Delhi Municipal Karmchari Ekta Union v. P. L. Singh & Others).

    (4) Unreported decision of Supreme Court in Writ Petitioners Nos, 822, 875, 180 and 200 of 1987 decided on September 24, 1987.

    (5) Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat, 1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41.

    8. None of the aforesaid decisions help the petitioners. In the case of Daily Rated Casual Labour (supra) the question before the Supreme Court was with regard to the unfair and improper manner and method adopted by the P & T Department with respect to the conditions of casual labourers. In that case no question arose as regards the propriety and validity of an order of termination of service passed in respect of a temporary employee, who claimed to have achieved permanent status and who was initially appointed otherwise than in accordance with law and who had entered in the services through back door. The learned Courses for the petitioner has relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court made in Para 9 of the aforesaid judgment. By making the aforesaid observations the Supreme Court directed me respondents therein to prepare a scheme on a rational basis for absorbing as far as possible the casual labourers, who have been continuously working for more than one year in the P & T Department. On the basis of the aforesaid observations it is submitted that the petitioners' services should be regularised and if respondent No. 1-Committee has regularized the same no exception whatsoever could have been taken by the Director respondent No. 2 herein.

    9. The contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the Supreme Court has made the aforesaid observation in respect of numerous helpless casual labour, who were being exploited by a Central Government Department. These workmen were serving with the Government Department for large number of years. There was no question of their initial recruitment being unlawful. They were being paid at different rates of wages. Even for the casual labourers three different rates of wages were in vogue. In this background the Supreme Court observed that the Government as a model employer should not have adopted such methods. In the last paragraph of the judgment the Supreme Court made the aforesaid observation for regularizing the services of the workmen. Even while making the observation the Supreme Court has qualified the same by inserting the phrases 'on a rational basis' and 'as far as possible.' The Supreme Court has not laid down the principle that even in case of initial irregular and unlawful recruitment and even when it is found that the initial recruitment was not in accordance with law, the same should be regularized by a decree or order of the court. Therefore, the reliance placed on this judgment is of no help to the petitioners.

    10. The other two decisions of Supreme Court reported in (1988-I-LLJ-396) (U.P. Income-tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India & Others) and (AIR) 1988 SC 519 (Delhi Municipal Karmachari Ekta Union V. P. L. Singh & Other) are on the lines of its earlier decision in the case of Daily Rated Casual Labour (supra). Hence for the reasons stated herein above these two decisions are also of no help to the petitioners.

    11. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Writ Petitions No. 822, 875, 180 and 200 of 1987. The very first paragraph of the judgment, which is important, is reproduced :

    "After hearing learned Counsel for the parties at great length, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases we pass the following order in the above writ petitions."

    Thereafter, the Supreme Court directed the Government to regularize the services of certain Assistant Divisional Medical officers, who were initially appointed on ad hoc basis. By these directions the Supreme Court has changed the manner and method of evaluation to be made by Union Public Service Commission. Instead of passing of the regular examination by the exployees concerned, the Supreme Court indicated the way in which their competency and suitability should be adjudged. The Supreme Court did not say that though the initial appointment of employees concerned was otherwise than in accordance with law the same should be regularized. No such principle of universal applicability has been laid down in this decision. In fact this decision has applicability to the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case only.

    12. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court reported in Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat (supra). In that case the services of the petitioner was sought to be terminated by invoking the device of artificial breaks. There were as many as 32 appointment orders for shorter durations. In the context of the facts of the case this Court, (Coram : R. C. Mankad, J.) observed that the petitioner had almost acquired the status of a temporary Government Servant. Therefore, his services could not have been terminated by oral order. That is not the case in these petitions. Here there is no oral order of termination of service and there is no question of invoking artificial device for purposes or putting an end to the services of the petitioners. In the case before the High Court there was no question of initial irregular appointments and no question arose as to whether such initial irregular appointments should be regularized and the services of such appointees could be terminated or not.

    13. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 has drawn my attention to a decision of this High Court, (Coram : M. B. Shah, J.) reported in Patel Evelin Ranchhodbhai v. Gujarat Ayurved University) (1988-I-LLJ-447). In that case an employee of Gujarat Ayurved University, who was appointed as midwife, had prayed that she should be treated as permanent employee, as she had continued in service since the year 1985 except for artificial breaks. In that case, petitioner relied on the decision of this High Court, (Coram : R. C. Manked, J.) reported in 1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41. Distinguishing the decision in Para 6 of the judgment it is observed as follows at pp. 449 - 450 :

    "In may view, the ratio laid down in that case 1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41 would have no bearing in this case. Once there are Recruitment Rules which provide for appointment to a particular post by following the Recruitment Rules, any appointment in violation of the said Rules would be an illegal and arbitrary one. May be that till the vacancies are filled in by regular appointees, the authority may appoint some persons on ad hoc basis, but these appointees would not get any right to be permanent servants."

    I agree with the reasons given by M. B. Shah, J. for distinguishing the judgment rendered by R. C. Mankad, J. reported in Ghanshyam's case 1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41. For the same reasons the judgment rendered by R. C. Mankad, J. is of no help to the petitioners.

    14. Since the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court and this High Court, it would be proper at this stage to refer to a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1983 (1) 24(1) GLR 1 (Calico Mills v. Union of India) wherein guidelines have been given as regards the correct manner of reading and understanding the decisions of the Supreme Court. In para 5 of the judgment it is observed as follows :

    "It is not everything said by the Supreme Court in its judgment which is binding as law declared by the Supreme Court. What is considered binding to all the Courts is the ratio decidendi of the decision which is to be gathered from the statements of principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts of the case decided by the Supreme Court."

    15. After referring to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab. (AIR) 1979 SC 1384, wherein well settled theory of precedents has been explained, and after referring to other decisions of the Supreme Court, the Full Bench has further observed :

    "It is, therefore, evident that the decision of the Supreme Court is only an authority for what is actually decided and the observations made in the judgment should be restricted to the context in which they are made after relating the observations to the precise issue before the Court taking care to interpret the observations in the context of the question before the Court even though the same are expressed in broad terms."

    16. The same principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (AIR) 1987 SC 1073. After referring to a decision of the House of Lords in the case of Quinn v. Leathem. 1901 AC 495, in para 18 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.

    17. In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court itself, the various decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners have got to be restricted to the context in which they are made and have got to be understood in their proper context. As stated above, none of the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is of any help to the petitioners.

    18. It is submitted that once the Committee passed Resolution dated : July 18, 1987 regularizing the services of the petitioner and making them permanent their services could not be terminated. That argument cannot be accepted. When the Committee passed Resolution dated : July 18, 1987 it was obvious that the Committee was not doing something which was permissible. In fact the petitioners as well as the respondent-Committee were aware of the fact that initial appointment was purely temporary and on ad hoc basis. When the initial appointment was made there was no regular vacancy. It appears from initial appointment orders produced at Annexures "G/1", "G/2" and "G/3" that applications from other candidates by giving public advertisement were not invited. In view of the contents of the letter of approval dated : June 17, 1986 written by the Director-respondent No. 2 herein it was not at all necessary for the Committee to seek legal opinion. In the aforesaid letter it is clearly stated that the appointments shall be made in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and for any appointment formerly made by the Committee, if found unlawful, liability will be that of the Committee. The Committee very well knew that the initial appointment was not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules. Initial appointments were not made even by inviting applications from all the members of the public. It was probably a closely guarded secret affair. Services of employees recruited on temporary basis are not required to be regularized in all cases. Moreover, when it is shown that initial appointment was for a temporary period and there were genuine reasons for appointment for shorter durations on account of exigencies of the situation, and when it is shown that in the circumstances then prevailing procedures for appointment on regular basis could not be followed, such appointments are not required to be regularized. An employee cannot claim any right to become permanent in cases where it is shown that appointment is not made as and by way of device to avoid the provisions of labour legislations or other provisions of law. Even when it is shown that the intermittent appointments of shorter durations are made as and by way of law, it should also be shown that there was vacancy on regular establishment end despite the vacancy on regular establishment the device of temporary employment and artificial break was resorted to by the employer concerned with a view to deny the permanency benefits to the employee.

    19. The aforesaid discussion clearly shows that for claiming benefits of permanent status in service, two things are necessary to be established. It should be shown that the employer adopted a device of invoking artificial breaks with a view to avoid and/or evade the provisions of law. It should also be shown that there were vacancies in the regular establishment and for not giving appointment on regular establishment the aforesaid device was invoked by the employer. If the aforesaid two factors are established an employee may successfully claim that he cannot be deprived of the permanency benefits. Such a claim may be defeated by showing that, for genuine and valid reasons temporary appointment was given and if benefits of permanency are conferred on the employee, that would result into injustice to others, whose claims are not considered at all.

    20. In the instant case either of the aforesaid two conditions are not present. It is an admitted fact that upto June 17, 1986 there were no posts of Gate Clerks on regular establishment of respondent No. 1-Committee. For the first time the Director-respondent No. 2 herein sanctioned the posts of Gate Clerks by his letter dated : June 17, 1986. Therein also it was specifically provided that appointments to the post should be in accordance with Rules and Regulations and for any appointment made otherwise than in accordance with Rules and Regulations, the Committee shall be liable. In this view of the matter, only after June 17, 1986 the question of appointment on regular vacancy could have arisen. In fact it is conceded by learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1-Committee that the appointment of the petitioners was not in accordance with Recruitment Rules. The relevant Recruitment Rules (Rule 2(a)(3) provides that the Committee shall give public advertisement in cases where the recruitment of officers and other workmen is to be made. In the instant case no such advertisement has been given and no applications were invited. Thus it is obvious that it is a case of entry through rear gate. The petitioners were "fortunate" in getting initial appointment on intermittent basis without there being any scrutiny of selection process. The allegations of mala fides and nepotism have been made by respondent No. 3 in the applications submitted by him for being joined as a party. In the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the factual discussion and legal position enunciated hereinabove, it is not necessary to go into the allegations of mala fides. The fact remains that the appointments of the petitioners were on ad hoc basis and the same was not against any regular vacancy. There was no post on regular establishment of Gate Clerks at the relevant time. Simply because the petitioners served on temporary and ad hoc basis for some time they cannot claim that after the posts have been sanctioned they have right to continue on the posts, and that they need not be subjected to the rigorous selection process.

    21. The Director-respondent No. 2 herein was justified in giving instructions to the respondent No 1-Committee. This he could have done in view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Act which, inter alia, provides for giving certain directions in respect of the actions taken or to be taken by the Committee. It may be assumed that the instructions given by the Director by his letter dated : August 11, 1987 are not strictly within the scope of his power. Even so respondent No. 1-Committee has not done anything wrong when it terminated the services of the petitions. When right thing is done on account of the instructions received from someone who has power to give such instructions or that particular thing is done on account of the instructions having been received from someone who had no power to give such instructions, makes no deference whatsoever. The question is whether the action taken by Committee is right or wrong. The Committee has not done anything wrong when it has terminated the services of the petitioners, who were not appointed in accordance with Recruitment Rules.

    22. In view of the fact stated hereinabove it can never be said that the petitioners could have claimed permanency benefits for the post in question. The Resolution passed by the Committee could not have bestowed any permanency benefits on the petitioners because the Committee has no power to make such permanent appointment otherwise than in accordance with Rules and Regulations. When the Committee has realized its mistake (or having been made to realize that its device to circumvent the provisions of law would not work) it has passed the Resolution terminating the services of the petitioners. The termination of services of the petitioners is neither by way of penalty nor in any way unjust or arbitrary. On the contrary continuation of the petitioners in services and conferring the permanency benefits on them would amount to denial of justice to many others who are clamouring for employment and who are waiting in queue. Simply because the petitioners could get in through back door entry they cannot say that now those who are waiting to get entry through the regular door be denied their right to be considered because they (i.e. petitioners) have been able to get their seat through back door. To do so would amount to perpetuating injustice by exercising power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. For such purposes the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised.

    23. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-Committee states that the Committee had acted in accordance with the opinion of the District Government Pleader. In fact it was not at all necessary for the Committee to obtain any opinion in view of the clarification by Director-respondent No. 2 in his letter dated : June 17, 1986. Therein it is specifically mentioned that the appointments shall be made in accordance with the Recruitment Rules. Even the learned Counsel for the Committee has conceded that the appointment of the petitioners was not in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. Therefore, there was no reason whatsoever for the Committee to refer the matter to District Government Pleader for his opinion. There is some substance in the allegation of collusion between petitioner and respondent No. 1-Committee. In the background of the facts it is evident that the Committee obtained the opinion as a part of its device to cover up something, which was otherwise irregular and arbitrary. The Committee did so with a view to save its skin and to use the same as a shield for their defence in case question adjudging its liability arose. The opinion of the learned Advocate rendered to the Committee, to say the least, is irrelevant and of no importance whatsoever. It is hoped that law officers appointed by the State Government would be little more careful while rendering such opinion and it would be better if they refrain from showing their status as Government Pleader while rendering such opinion to private persons and to the bodies for whom they are not supposed to work in their capacity as Govt. law officer.

    24. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners ought to have been offered an opportunity of being heard before passing the order of termination. The order of termination of service is not passed by way of penalty nor the same can be termed unreasonable or arbitrary. Similarly it is not actuated by mala fides. It is not even contended that the impugned ordered is penal in nature or that it is unjust and arbitrary. The sole basis of the petitioner is that they have become permanent. But as discussed hereinabove the petitioners have not acquired any permanent status. Therefore, the petitioners' services could have been brought to an end by passing an order of termination simpliciter and that is what has been done by respondent No. 1-Committee. Therefore, the contention that the petitioners ought to have been offered an opportunity of being heard has no merit and the same requires to be rejected.

    25. No other contention is raised. There is no substance in the petitions. Hence all the three petitions are hereby rejected summarily.

    26. At this stage the learned Conceal for his petitioners requests that ad interim relief grants earlier be continued for some time so as to enable the petitioners to approach the superior forum as it may be available to them for challenging the legality and validity of the aforesaid order,. In the facts and circumstances of the case, request in granted. Ad interim relief granted earlier shall continue till June 15, 1988.

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