Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Appln. No. 4287 of 1984 in Letters Patent Appeal Stamp No. 14169 of 1984 with Civil Appln. No. 4286 of 1984 in C.R.A No. 808 of 1984

Advocates

J. M. Thakore
Advocate General with S.M. Shah
G.N. Desai with D. D. Vyas
for Respondents (Nos. 3 and 4)

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Batukumar Kantiprasad Mehta
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dhruvkumar Harshadrai Shukla

Acts

provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act.

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — B.K. Mehta, J.

Source opinion excerpt: Judgment of B.K. Mehta, J.; matter concerns leave to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal and directions to convene a meeting of the Sthanakvasi Jain Mota Sangh of Rajkot.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from multiple interconnected suits and revision proceedings concerning the Sthanakvasi Jain Mota Sangh of Rajkot. Some members of the Sangh served a requisition on the President (Respondent No. 1) by letter dated 24 December 1981 seeking a meeting to consider, inter alia, election of a new Managing Committee and a vote of no-confidence. Numerous legal proceedings followed (noted as many as twenty-two), of which three series of proceedings are summarized in the opinion:

Regular Civil Suit No. 106 of 1982: Filed by Respondent No. 1 (the President) in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Rajkot, seeking, among other reliefs, an injunction restraining the requisitionists from convening the meeting. The trial court made the injunction absolute. On appeal (Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1982) the District Court confirmed the injunction conditionally, directing that the President convene a special general meeting within three months or else the injunction would be vacated and the requisitionists could assemble; any resolution affecting the Trust's constitution would not take effect until registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act.
Regular Civil Suits Nos. 839 of 1983 and 712 of 1983: These suits were brought by the present applicants (Applicants Nos. 1 and 2) to restrain the President from acting upon the District Court's conditional order. In No. 712 of 1983, notice was issued and the matter remained to be heard; in No. 839 of 1983 an injunction was granted restraining the President from acting on the District Court order. The President filed Civil Revision Application No. 1079 of 1983 in this Court; a Single Judge by order dated 6 February 1984 directed the President to convene the meeting by 30 April 1984 (the period was later extended, but the record before the Court did not make the later extension dates clear).
Regular Civil Suit No. 497 of 1984: Filed by Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (members of the Sangh) seeking injunction to prevent the President from ruling out a proposed vote of no-confidence at a meeting convened by the President on 22 April 1984. The trial court granted the injunction; the District Court confirmed that injunction on appeal (Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1984). The President and Secretary preferred Civil Revision Application No. 808 of 1984 in this Court. By interim order dated 24 September 1984 the learned Single Judge (A. M. Ahmadi, J.) directed the President to convene the meeting before 31 October 1984; a review application of that order was dismissed on 16 October 1984.

The applicants in the present civil application were not parties to Revision Application No. 808 of 1984 but were aggrieved by the Single Judge's order dated 24 September 1984 and sought leave to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal against it. The present proceedings (Civil Application No. 4287 of 1984) challenge whether leave should be granted for that purpose and also address an application to extend the time for convening the meeting.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether leave should be granted to permit the applicants to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal against the learned Single Judge's order dated 24 September 1984 (in Civil Revision Application No. 808 of 1984) directing the President to convene a meeting.
Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is competent against an order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (and whether the impugned order was made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in exercise of original jurisdiction).
Whether the Court should extend the time for convening the meeting so that the applicants may approach the Supreme Court, and the conditions (if any) on such an extension.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (and their Advocate General's) Arguments

The applicants sought leave to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal against the Single Judge's order of 24 September 1984. Their contention was that the impugned order was an interim order not made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and thus a Letters Patent Appeal was competent.
The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the applicants further urged that the impugned order was effectively an order made in exercise of the Single Judge's original jurisdiction (though in revision proceedings) and therefore the Letters Patent Appeal would lie.
The applicants also asked the Court to extend the time for convening the meeting so they could take the matter to the Supreme Court and obtain appropriate orders therefrom.

Respondents Nos. 3 and 4

Opposed any extension of time for convening the meeting. They argued that no time should be granted to Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (the President and Secretary), who were bound by the Single Judge's order to convene the meeting and carry out specified preliminaries (such as giving a fortnight's public notice), and who had failed to comply with those directions. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 reserved the right to take appropriate action against the President for non-compliance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra De, AIR 1932 PC 165	Relevantly cited for the principle that revisional jurisdiction is part of the general appellate jurisdiction.	The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that revisional jurisdiction is ultimately part of appellate jurisdiction, but that this fact alone does not make a Letters Patent Appeal competent against revisional orders.
Shankar Ramchandra v. Krishnaji Dattatraya, AIR 1970 SC 1	Cited alongside Nagendra Nath Dey for the same proposition: revisional jurisdiction as part of appellate jurisdiction.	Used to reinforce the legal understanding that revisional jurisdiction falls within the broader appellate framework, yet does not entitle parties to Letters Patent Appeals from revisional orders under Clause 15.
Navivahoo v. Turnar (1889) 16 Ind App 156 at p. 162	Cited for the description of ordinary original jurisdiction — i.e., that ordinary original jurisdiction is exercised in the ordinary course of law without special steps to assume it.	The Court referenced this case in considering whether the Single Judge could have made the impugned order dehors (outside) revisional proceedings by exercising original jurisdiction; the opinion concludes the matter was within revisional jurisdiction.
A. Das Gupta v. Nath Bank, AIR 1971 SC 218	Cited for the proposition concerning the ordinary original jurisdiction and its nature.	Relied upon in addressing the applicants' contention that the impugned order was an exercise of original jurisdiction; the Court concluded that even if original jurisdiction were considered, it would not make the order appealable by Letters Patent if statute or procedure precludes such an appeal.
South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S. B. Sarup Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1442	Cited for the principle that where a specific enactment renders an order non-appealable, a Letters Patent Appeal will not prevail over that statutory provision.	The Court applied this principle to conclude that if the Civil Procedure Code or a specific enactment makes the impugned order not appealable, a Letters Patent Appeal cannot be used to circumvent that statutory bar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed its analysis around the competency of a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order made in revisional proceedings. The central steps of the Court's reasoning, drawn from the opinion, are:

It is a settled position that an order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction falls within Clause 15's bar on Letters Patent Appeals; the Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal is not competent from an order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
The applicants argued the impugned order was merely an interim order or was made in exercise of original jurisdiction and therefore not caught by the Clause 15 bar. The Court rejected this contention as specious, noting that treating the exception as applying only to final orders in revision would lead to the absurd consequence that LPAs would lie from interim revisional orders but not final ones.
The Court acknowledged that revisional jurisdiction is ultimately part of the general appellate jurisdiction (citing Nagendra Nath Dey and Shankar Ramchandra), but reasoned that this fact alone does not make LPAs competent from revisional orders: the mere inclusion of revisional jurisdiction within appellate jurisdiction does not transform revisional orders into ones subject to Letters Patent Appeals.
The Court considered whether the Single Judge could have made the impugned order dehors (outside) the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by invoking original jurisdiction in substantive proceedings independent of the revision. The Court concluded that if the Single Judge could not have validly made the order outside the revisional proceedings, the impugned order must be treated as made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the impugned order was made in exercise of original jurisdiction, the Court observed that not all orders made in original jurisdiction are appealable. If the Civil Procedure Code or a specific enactment does not provide an appeal from an order of the nature in question, a Letters Patent Appeal will not lie. The Court invoked the principle (citing South Asia Industries) that a statutory bar on appeal cannot be circumvented by Letters Patent.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, the Court concluded it was not justified in granting leave for a Letters Patent Appeal against the Single Judge's revisional order.
Separately, the Court addressed the applicants' request to extend time for convening the meeting to enable recourse to the Supreme Court. While recognizing the force of respondents' objections (that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had failed to comply with the Single Judge's directions), the Court nonetheless exercised its discretion to extend the time — directing Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to hold the meeting by 2 December 1984 with a prior fortnight's notice to members and extending the time for convening the meeting as directed by the Single Judge up to December 1984, subject to the other directions in the Single Judge's order. The Court also ordered that interim relief in Civil Application No. 4286 of 1984 would stand vacated on 2 December 1984.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Leave to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal is refused; Civil Application No. 4287 of 1984 fails and stands dismissed. Notice discharged with no order as to costs. The Letters Patent Appeal therefore does not survive.

Additional operative directions (direct effect on parties):

The Court extended the time to convene the meeting ordered by the learned Single Judge and directed Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (the President and Secretary) to hold the meeting by 2 December 1984, after giving a fortnight's prior notice to the members concerned.
Interim relief in Civil Application No. 4286 of 1984 shall stand vacated on 2 December 1984.

Implications:

The direct consequence is that the applicants' application for leave to file a Letters Patent Appeal has been dismissed and the LPA will not proceed. The Court also afforded a limited extension of time for convening the meeting to 2 December 1984 with prescribed notice. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond the application of existing authority on the competency of Letters Patent Appeals from revisional orders; no broader precedent was announced beyond the application of settled law as described in the reasoning above.

Order: Ordered accordingly (dismissal of Civil Application No. 4287 of 1984; leave refused; extension to convene meeting up to 2 December 1984 subject to existing directions; interim relief to be vacated on 2 December 1984).

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Jayant Vrajlal Ajmera v. Jayantkumar Motichand Doshi

JUDGMENT B.K. Mehta, J.

1. Since we are not inclined to grant leave to the applicants herein for preferring Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge (Coram: A. M Ahmadi, J.) dated September 24, 1984, in Civil Revision Application No. 808 of 1984 directing, inter alia, the respondent No. 1 to convene a meeting of the Sthanakvasi Jain Mota Sangh of Rajkot latest by the end of October, 1984, after giving a fortnight's notice of the meeting to the members concerned by public advertisement in the newspaper, a few relevant facts need be noticed in order to appreciate the reliefs which have been claimed by the applicants in the present civil application, before we state our reasons in support of our view.

2. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the President and Secretary respectively of the said Sangh. It appears that by letter of December 24, 1981, some members of the Sangh served a requisition on respondent No.1 for calling a meeting of the Sangh and the items of the agenda for the proposed meeting, inter alia, included the topic of election of the new Managing Committee as well as the vote of no confidence against the said respondents. It appears that in light of this requisition letter a number of legal proceedings ensued between the parties. It is not necessary to refer to all the legal proceedings which have ensued which are as many as twenty two but it would be pertinent to refer shortly to three suits and the proceedings arising therefrom for purposes of appreciating the reliefs of this application. Respondent No. 1, on behalf of himself and for and on behalf of the Sangh filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) Rajkot praying amongst other reliefs for injunction restraining the requisitionists to convene the meeting in case the President fails to convene the meeting as required in the requisition. This suit, being Regular Civil Suit No. 106of 1982 was filed on January 25, 1982. In course of the hearing of the suit, the trial court made the Rule of injunction absolute restraining the requisitionists from holding the meeting. The matter was taken in appeal before the District Court, Rajkot by way of Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1982 by the requisitionists where the District Court confirmed the injunction on the condition that the President shall convene a special general meeting within a period of three months from the date of the order failing which the injunction shall stand vacated and the requisitionists shall have right to assemble and discuss the items of the agenda as per the requisition letter and in the event of the paid meeting passing any resolution affecting the constitution of the Trust, the said resolution shall not take effect till the same is r6gisteired as changes as per the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act.

3. The second important legal proceeding was the suit filed by the present applicants Nos. 1 and 2, who are the members of the Sangh being Regular Civil Suits Nos. 839 of 1983 and 712 of 1983, in the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) Rajkot for injunction restraining the President from acting upon the order of the District Court in the aforesaid appeal. It appears that in Civil Suit No. 712 of 1983 which is at the instance of Applicant No.2 notice as to why injunction as prayed for should not be granted has been issued and is still to be heard while in Civil Suit No. 839of 1983 which is at the instance of Applicant No. 1, the trial Court granted injunction restraining the President from acting upon the aforesaid order. It appears further that the President Respondent No. 1 herein has meanwhile preferred Civil Revision Application being Civil Revision Application No. 1079 of 1983 in this Court, against the conditional order of injunction granted by the District Judge, Rajkot as aforesaid. The learned single judge while disposing of the said revision application has by his order date 6th February, 1984 directed the President to convene the meeting of the Sangh latest by April. 30.1984. The learned single Judge, however, partially allowed the revision application by deleting part of the permission which the learned District Judge granted to the requisitionists to convene the meeting and discuss the resolutions and adopt them. The period for convening the meeting we are told has been extended from time to time though it is not clear from the record as it stands before us as to up to what date it has been extended.

4. The third proceeding which is to be referred to in the suit, being regular Civil Suit No. 497 of 1984 Mod by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Rajkot Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the members of the Sangh. The reason for them to file the aforesaid suit was that on 22nd April, 1484 the President had convened the meeting in which as intimated by Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 to the President, they, intended to move a resolution for expressing a vote of noconfidence in him apprehending that the President may not allow such a resolution to be taken on hand, the third suit was filed by them praying, inter alia, for injunction restraining the President from ruling out the said resolution from consideration. The learned Civil Judge granted the injunction restraining the President from ruling out such a resolution, if moved That order of injunction was confirmed by the District Court in appeal being Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1984 preferred by President and the Secretary with the result that they preferred revision application, being Civil Revision Application No. 808 of 1984 in this Court. The learned Single Judge ( Coram A. M. Ahmadi,J.) by an interim order directed the President to convene the meeting before October, 31, 1984 by his order dated 24th September, 1984. It appears that a review application was preferred by the President and the Secratary for reviewing the aforesaid order of 24th September, 1984, being Civil Application No. 4426 of 1984 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by his order dated October 16, 1984. It is this order of the learned single Judge of 24th September 1084 which has aggrieved the present applicants who were not parties to the said revision application No.808 of 1984 and, therefore since they are aggrieved, they intend to prefer an appeal and seek permission to file the appeal as stated above.

5. It is only in order to understand the entire backdrop of the present proceedings before us that we have traced briefly the relevant history of the relevant part of the litigations which have ensued between the parties. We are of the opinion that since the Letters Patent, Appeal is not competent from the order made by the learned Single Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, we do not think that we would be Justified in granting the leave as prayed for. The reasons are obvious. It cannot be a matter of debate that Letters Patent Appeal is not competent from an order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters patent. This position is not capable of being seriously contested. The contention urged oil behalf of the applicants is that the impugned order is an interim order not made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. According to the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the applicants, the order in question is an order made in exercise of the original jurisdiction though of course, in. revision proceedings and, therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal is competent. We are afraid this is too specious a contention with which we can agree. In. the first place, the contention amounts to saying that the exception carved our in clause 15 applies only to a final order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and not an interim order made in revisional proceedings. In our opinion, this interpretation would lead to such an absurd position Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent from final order though it would be competent from interim orders made in course of revisional proceedings. It is no doubt true that revisional jurisdiction is ultimately, a part of the general appellate jurisdiction (see:Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra De AIR 1932 PC 165 and Shankar Ramchandra, v. Krishnaji Dattatraya, AIR 1970 SC 1). It would not, however, follow from this settled position of law that a Letters Patent Appeal is competent from an order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction because the revisional jurisdiction is ultimately a part of the larger appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Even examining this contention, it would amount to an order made in proceedings with would be tantamount to numerically a second appeal and, therefore, also Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent. The learned Advocate General, however, urged that the point which is being canvassed is that the impugned order which has been made is one made in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the learned single Judge who was seized of the revisional proceedings. The contention. though appears to be attractive on the face of it, would with respect to the learned Advocate General, not stand the scrutiny. Admittedly this is not the case of exercise of extraordinary original jurisdiction. The ordinary original jurisdiction embraces all such as is exercised in the ordinary course of law and without any special steps being necessary to assume it (see: Navivahoo, v. Turnar (1889) 16 Ind App 156 at p. 162 and A. Das Gupta v. Nath Bank AIR 1971 SC 218). The crux of the problem, in order to determine as to whether what is the nature of the problem which the learned single Judge was exercising in the present case, is that could he have made this order dehors the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in substantive proceeding which might have been moved before him independent of the revisional proceedings of which he was seized. If the answer is in the negative, then it cannot be gainsaid that the impugned order is an order made in exercise of the revisional proceedings notwithstanding the fact that he was not finally disposing of the revision before him. Even assuming that this is an order made in exercise of the original jurisdiction, all orders made in exercise of the original jurisdiction are not appealable and in as much as the Civil Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal from an order of the nature as the one with which we are concerned in the present proceedings, Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent. If a specific enactment makes an order of the teamed single Judge not capable of being appealed against, the appeal provided by Letters Patent will not prevail. (see: South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S. B. Sarup Singh AIR 1965 SC 1442). In the circumstances; therefore, we do not think that we would be justifed in granting the leave which has been asked for.

6. The result is that Civil Application No. 4287 of 1984 fails and it stands dismissed and the leave refused. Notice discharged with no order as to costs. Letters Patent Appeal therefore does not survive.

7. The learned Advocate General on behalf of the applicants urged that this Court should extend the time for convening the meeting so as to enable the applicants to carry the matter to the Supreme Court and obtain appropriate orders from the said Court. On behalf of respondents Nos.3 and 4. who are effectively contesting this application this prayer is opposed and it is urged that no time should be granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who are the President and Secretary of the Committee bound under the order of the learned Single Judge to convene the meeting and to comply with certain preliminaries in that behalf, namely of inserting the public notice etc. for which the learned single Judge has prescribed a fortnight's time and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to carry out the directions of the Court for which respondents Nos. 3and 4 reserve right to take appropriate action against the him but under no circumstances any tune should be granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2. We do see some force in this opposition on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. However, in order to give justice to the applicants, we think that if we extend the time and direct respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to hold the meeting by 2nd December, 1984 with prior notice of afortnight to the members concerned, it would meet with the ends of justice and will also serve the interest of all the parties. We accordingly extend the time for convening the meetings directed by the learned Single Judge up to December 1984 subject to the other directions issued by the learned Single Judge under the said order in appeal. Interim relief in, Civil Application No. 4286 of 1984 shall, therefore, stand vacated on 2nd December. 1984.

8. Ordered accordingly.

Jayant Vrajlal Ajmera v. Jayantkumar Motichand Doshi

Judgment Summary — B.K. Mehta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (and their Advocate General's) Arguments

Respondents Nos. 3 and 4

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Jayant Vrajlal Ajmera v. Jayantkumar Motichand Doshi

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