Citation Codes

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Case Number

First Appeal No. 830 of 1976*

Advocates

S.S.Belsare
P.M.Raval
P.L.Kamdar

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Narayanlal Himatlal Bhatt
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manharlal Bhikhalal Shah

Acts

provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935
provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act
S. 96 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960,
provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act
Section 3 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act
S. 95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act
provisions of S. 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
code of Civil procedure 1908." Section 100
provisions of S. 14 of the limitation Act
Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. 1961.
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act
S. 96 of the Co-operative Societies Act
LIMITATION ACT 1908
Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act
Code of Civil Procedure. Section 97
SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
S. 14 of the Limitation Act. 1963
S. 14(2) of the Limitation Act.
S. 14 of the Limitation Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (a Co-operative Society) filed Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 1971 seeking recovery of Rs. 1,89,630-93 from the respondents. The plaintiff alleged that it produced salt and sold it, and that on 7-4-1964 the defendant had agreed to purchase the salt at an agreed rate but breached the contract and did not pay the remaining price. The plaintiff had earlier prosecuted remedies before the Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act and had filed Levadi Suit No. A.B.N. 194 of 1965 on 17-1-1965. Those proceedings culminated in a Gujarat High Court judgment dated 29-9-1970 holding that the authority constituted under the Act had no jurisdiction in disputes between a co-operative society and a third party. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the present suit on 12-4-1971.

The learned trial judge dismissed the suit on a preliminary issue as barred by limitation, holding that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would not apply because the Registrar's Nominee was not a "Court" and Section 14 applied only to proceedings before a Court. The plaintiff appealed against that judgment and decree.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act (the provision excluding time spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding from the period of limitation) applies to proceedings prosecuted before the Registrar or the Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act.
Whether the Registrar or the Registrar's Nominee (or Board of Nominees) under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act is to be treated as a "Court" and the proceedings before them as a "civil proceeding" for the purposes of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Whether the trial court correctly held the suit barred by limitation given the earlier proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee, the Co-operative Tribunal and the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The plaintiff (appellant) contended that they bona fide prosecuted proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, including Levadi Suit No. A.B.N. 194 of 1965, and thereafter before the Co-operative Tribunal and the High Court. The time spent in those proceedings should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act when computing limitation for the present suit.
The appellant relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op Bank (AIR 1967 SC 1494) to support the proposition that a Registrar (or his nominee) exercising powers under provisions analogous to those in the Gujarat Act is to all intents and purposes a "Court".

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents' advocate submitted that proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act cannot be said to be a "civil proceeding" or before a "Court" as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, so Section 14 would not apply to exclude the period spent in those proceedings.
The respondents relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Ramrao v. Narayan (AIR 1969 SC 724) which, in that context, held that a Registrar's Nominee under the Maharashtra Act was not a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195 Cr.P.C. and was analogous to an arbitrator; the respondents used that decision to support non-applicability of Section 14.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
M. G. Patel & Co. v. Alka Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., 1981 Guj LH 311 (Division Bench)	The Division Bench held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to a "civil proceeding" prosecuted before a Registrar's Nominee and that the civil proceeding need not be prosecuted strictly in a Court; the time taken in prosecuting such a proceeding is to be excluded from computing limitation.	The Court relied directly on this clear pronouncement and treated it as dispositive on the applicability of Section 14 to the present case, stating that the point did not require further discussion and that on this short ground the appeal required to be allowed.
Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1494	Held that, under provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act (similar to Gujarat Act), the Registrar (or Assistant Registrar acting as Registrar) has the trappings and many powers of a Civil Court and, in adjudicating disputes under the Act, is to all intents and purposes a "Court".	The appellant relied on this Supreme Court authority; the Bench accepted this reasoning as supportive that the Registrar/nominee under the Gujarat Act would be a "Court" and the proceedings a "civil proceeding" for Section 14 purposes.
Ramrao v. Narayan, AIR 1969 SC 724	The Supreme Court held that a Registrar's Nominee appointed under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act was not a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195 Cr.P.C.; the nominee's powers were analogous to an arbitrator and derived from the Registrar's discretion.	The Court considered this authority but distinguished it on statutory grounds: the Maharashtra Act specifically defined "arbitrator" to include the Registrar's Nominee, whereas the Gujarat Act does not contain a similar definition; hence Ramrao was not treated as controlling and did not prevent the Court from holding the Registrar/nominee a "Court" under the Gujarat Act for Section 14.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of textual and precedential steps:

The Court first identified the pivotal legal question: whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply to time spent prosecuting proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act.
The Court observed that the Division Bench decision in M. G. Patel & Co. v. Alka Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (1981 Guj LH 311) squarely covered the question and contained a clear pronouncement that Section 14 applies where a plaintiff is prosecuting "another civil proceeding" and that such a civil proceeding need not have been prosecuted strictly in a Court. The Court treated that authority as dispositive and sufficient to allow the appeal on that short ground.
The Court addressed the respondents' contention (that proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee are not "civil proceedings" or before a "Court" within Section 14) and rejected it in light of the M. G. Patel decision.
The Court then examined the statutory scheme of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. It identified specific provisions conferring powers on the Registrar or his nominee:
- Section 96: disputes touching constitution, management or business of a society may be decided by the Registrar;
- Section 97(2): provides that the period of limitation for disputes required to be referred to the Registrar shall be regulated by the Limitation Act "as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court;"
- Section 99: prescribes that the Registrar/nominee/board shall have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses, compel production of documents, and hear disputes "as far as possible in the same manner as provided in the case of a Civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure;"
- Section 100: attachments before award have the same effect as if made by a competent civil court;
- Section 150 and Section 152: provide appellate/revisional forum and invest the Tribunal with powers akin to Courts; and
- Section 166: bars Civil or Revenue Courts from having jurisdiction in respect of disputes required to be referred to the Registrar or nominee, making the Act's decisions final subject only to statutory appeals/revisions.
From these provisions the Court concluded that the Registrar (or his nominee/board) discharges duties and exercises powers analogous to those of ordinary Civil Courts: power to summon and compel attendance, to compel production of documents, to decide finally after taking evidence, and to order attachments. Section 97(2) explicitly treated such disputes and the Registrar as if they were suits and a Civil Court for limitation purposes.
The Court considered and accepted the Supreme Court's reasoning in Thakur Jugal Kishore that where a statutory official is vested with the trappings and substantive powers of a Civil Court, that official is for the relevant statutory purpose to all intents and purposes a "Court". The Court applied that reasoning to the Gujarat Act.
The Court analyzed Ramrao v. Narayan (AIR 1969 SC 724) and found it distinguishable because the Maharashtra Act explicitly defined "arbitrator" to include the Registrar's Nominee, and Chapter IX of that Act was titled "Disputes and Arbitrations." The Gujarat Act contains no similar definition or framing, and its provisions treat the Registrar/nominee in terms that align them with judicial functions. Thus Ramrao did not dictate the result under the Gujarat Act.
Because the plaintiff had, as admitted, prosecuted previous proceedings in good faith and with due diligence before the Registrar's Nominee, the Co-operative Tribunal and the High Court, the time spent in those proceedings must be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in computing the limitation period for the present suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the Registrar or Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act is a "Court" for the purposes of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and the proceedings before him are "civil proceedings." Consequently, the time spent by the plaintiff prosecuting those proceedings is excluded when computing the period of limitation.

DISPOSITION: The appeal is allowed with costs.

Direct consequences and orders:

The learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Surendranagar is directed to decide the suit within six months from the date of receipt of the record from the High Court.
The suit was not to be treated as time-barred because the period spent prosecuting the earlier proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee, the Co-operative Tribunal and the High Court is excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

Broader implications: The Court applied existing authorities (including the Division Bench decision in M. G. Patel and the Supreme Court decision in Thakur Jugal Kishore) and distinguished Ramrao v. Narayan on statutory grounds. The opinion does not expressly purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it; its immediate practical effect is to allow the appeal and remit the matter for trial within the specified period.

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Dhrangadhra Taluka Sahakari Kharid Vhechan Sangh Ltd. v. Rampratap Hakimchand And Company, Bombay And Others

1. The appellant had filed Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 1971 for recovering Rs, 1,89,630-93 from the respondents contending that the plaintiff Co-operative Society was producing salt and was selling it. The defendant had agreed to purchase the salt from the plaintiff on 7-4-64 at the rate agreed between the parties. As there was breach of contract between the parties and also the defendants were not paying the remaining price of the goods, the plaintiff had filed the aforesaid suit for recovery, of the amount is stated in the plaint.

2. In the plaint itself the plaintiff has averred that previously they were bona fide prosecuting proceeding before the Board of Nominees under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. 1961. Before the Registrar they had filed Levadi Suit No. A. B. N. 194 of 1965 on 17-1-65 for this very purpose. Finally the said proceedings were terminated by the judgment of the Gujarat High court on 29th September 1970wherein it was held that the dispute being between a co-operative society and a third party, the provision giving exclusive jurisdiction to the authority constituted under the Act is not applicable and the authority has no jurisdiction to deal with it. Subsequently therefore they have filed the aforesaid suit before the court on 12th April 1971. The suit was dismissed by the learned judge on a preliminary issue that it was barred by the period of limitation and he held that the provisions of S. 14 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable in the present case as the Registrar's Nominee was not a Court and S. 14 of the Limitation Act was applicable only to the proceedings before the Court. Against this judgment and decree the plaintiff has preferred the aforesaid appeal.

3. In our opinion, whether S. 14 of the Limitation Act. 1963 would be applicable or not to the present proceedings is directly Covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of M. G. Patel &Co. v. Alka Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., reported in 1981 Guj LH 311, wherein the Court in para 15 has held as under:

"Mr. Oza had then urged that both the suits were barred by limitation and S. 14 of the Limitation Act did not intervene to save their being dismissed as time-barred. Mr. Oza urged that the Registrar acting under S. 96 of the Co-operative Societies Act is not a Court and, therefore, the time spent by these plaintiffs in prosecuting their remedy before the Registrar cannot be excluded by recourse to S. 14 of the Limitation Act. We do not agree. What S. 14 requires is that the plaintiff must be prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant. The proceedings prosecuted by the plaintiff before the Registrar's Nominee was a civil proceeding. They do not say that the civil proceedings must have been prosecuted in a Court as such. All that section 14 says is that a civil proceeding, whether it is prosecuted in the original forum or in appellate or revisional forum, is a proceeding, the time taken to prosecute which, will be excluded from Computing the period of limitation."

In view of this clear pronouncement by the Division Bench of this Court, the point does not require any further discussion Therefore on this short ground the appeal requires t be allowed.

4. However, the learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act cannot be said to be civil proceeding and before the, 'Court' as contemplated Linder S. 14 of the Limitation Act. In our opinion, this contention of the learned Advocate is of no Substance in view of the aforesaid decision.

5. Further, under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act the Registrar is empowered to decide any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society as contemplated under S. 96 of the Act. The Registrar or his nominee would have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with or decide the said dispute. The Civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly barred under S. 166 of the Act. It states that no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee or Board of Nominees for decision. It further provides that the decision or award passed in accordance with the Act or rules subject to the provisions for appeal or revision in the Act would be final and no such order, decision or award shall he liable to be challenged, set aside, modified revised or declared void in any, Court upon merits or upon any other ground whatsoever except for want of jurisdiction. Section 97(2) provides that the period of limitation in the case of, any dispute other than those mentioned in sub-section (1) Which are required to be referred to the Registrar under S. 96 shall be regulated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court. Section 98 of the Act empowers the Registrar to refer the said disputes for disposal to the Nominee or Board of Nominees appointed by the Registrar. Under S. 99 of the Act the procedure for deciding the dispute is provided. It provides as under: -

"99. (1) The Registrar, or his nominee or board of nominees, hearing a dispute under S, 98 shall hear the dispute in the manner prescribed, and shall have power to summon and therefore attendance of witnesses including the parties interested or any of them and to compel them to give evidence, and to compel the production of documents by the Same means and as far as possible in the same manner as provided in the case of a Civil Court by the code of Civil procedure 1908."

Section 100 provides for attachment before award and it in terms says that such attachment shall have the same effect as if made by a competent civil court. Under S. 150 an appeal is provided to the co-operative Tribunal and under. S. 152 of the Act the Tribunal has same powers as are vested in court as stated in the said section. In view of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that the Registrar or his Nominee or Board of Nominees while exercising power under S. 90 are discharging the duties which would otherwise be required to be discharged by ordinary Civil and Revenue Courts of the State. Under S. 99 the Registrar or his Nonninee or Board of Nominees is given the same powers as are given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and to compel them to give evidence and to compel the production of documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same manner as provided in the case of a Civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 97 specifically lays down that the period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in sub-section (I) which are required to be referred to the Registrar tinder section 96 shall be regulated by the provisions of the limitation act as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court. The Registrar is also entitled to pass an order for attachment before award and such attachment shall have the same effect as if made by a competent Civil Court. Therefore, the Registrar while adjudicating the dispute referred under S. 96 of the Act is for all intents and purposes a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do and, therefore, the Registrar or his Nominee or Board of Nominees would be a Court, Admittedly, the dispute which is decided is a civil dispute and, therefore, it would be a civil proceeding. From the provisions of S. 166 of the Act it is clear that all orders, decisions or awards passed in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the rules are final subject to the provisions for appeal or revision in the Act. Therefore, the essential conditions to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term that the Court should have, apart from having some trappings of a Judicial Tribunal, power to give a decision or definitive judgment, which has finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of judicial pronouncement, are fully satisfied. Hence section 14 of the Limitation Act would be clearly applicable in the present case.

6.The learned advocate for the appellant for his contention that S. 14 of the Limitation Act Could be applicable as the Registrar or -his Nominee or Board of Nominees will be a Court and the proceeding before him will be a 'civil proceeding', has relied upon the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank, AIR 1967 SC 149-4. In the said case after considering the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 the Court has held that an Assistant Registrar discharging the function of Registrar under S. 48 read with S. 6(2) of the Act is a Court. After considering the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act which are to a large extent similar to the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act the Supreme Court in Para 11 has held as under:

"The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a Court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to. summon and examine witnesses on oath, the powers to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of Courts mentioned in S. 151 of the Civil P.C. In such a case there is no difficulty in holding that in adjudicating upon a dispute referred under S. 48 of the Act, the Registrar is to all intents and purposes, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do."

7. However, the learned advocate for the respondents relied upon the decision in the case of Ramrao v. Narayan AIR 1969 SC 724, wherein the Supreme Court has held that Nominee of Registrar appointed under S. 95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act is not a 'Court' within the meaning of S. 195, Cr. P.C. In the said decision the Supreme Court has held that the Nominee has the power to summon witnesses, to compel them to produce documents and is required to hear the dispute in the same manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereby he is required to act judicially i. e. fairly and impartially, but the obligation to act judicially will not necessarily make him a Court within the meaning of S. 195, Cr. P.C. The Court has further observed that the position of a Nominee of the Registrar is analogous to that of an arbitrator designated under a statutory arbitration to which the provisions of S. 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 apply, The learned Advocate for the respondents heavily relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in para 25 which read as under:

"After carefully considering the powers conferred and the source of authority of the nominee, we have no doubt that the nominee exercising power to make an award under S. 96 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, derives his authority not from the statute but from investment by the Registrar in his individu4i discretion. The power so invested is liable to be suspended and may be withdrawn. He is therefore not entrusted with the judicial power of the State he is merely an arbitrator authorised within the limits of the power conferred to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him."

In our view, the said decision is mainly based upon the definition of word 'arbitrator' in S. 2(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Under S. 2(2) of the said Act "arbitrator" is defined as meaning "a person appointed under this Act to decide disputes referred to him by the Registrar and includes Registrar's Nominee or Board of Nominees." It is, therefore, clear that by a specific inclusion of the Registrar's Nominee or Board of Nominees in the definition of the word 'arbitrator', the position of the Registrar's Nominee or Board of Nominees would be that of arbitrator. In the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act the caption of the Chapter IX is "Disputes and Arbitrations" while Chapter IX given in the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act provides procedure for deciding disputes. Further there is no similar definition of the word "arbitrator" under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, which would include Registrar's Nominee or Board of Nominees. In this view of the matter, in our view the Registrar's Nominee cannot be said to be an arbitrator. Section 3 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act specifically provides that for carrying out the purposes of this Act the State Government shall appoint to assist the Registrar in his functions under the Act such number of Additional Registrars, Joint Registrars, Deputy Registrars, Assistant Registrars and other persons with such designations as it may think fit. Sub-see. (3) Provides that the State Government may, by general or special orders confer on a person or persons appointed under sub-see. (2) All or any of the power's of the Registrar under the Act and under sub-section (4) he shall work under the general guidance and the superintendence and control of the Registrar. Section 2(17) defines "Registrar as under:

"2(17) "Registrar" means a person appointed to be the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under this Act; and includes to the extent of the powers of the Registrar conferred on any other person under this Act, such person and includes an Additional or Joint Registrar;"

It is an inclusive definition and for the purposes i of the Act Registrar's Nominee would also be' included in view of this definition of "Registrar". In our view, therefore, considering the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act and the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore' Case (AIR 1967 SC 1494) (supra) the Registrar's Nominee would be a 'Court' for the purposes of S. 14 of the Limitation Act and the dispute before him would be a civil proceeding. A Registrar or Registrar's Nominee therefore for all intents and purposes is invested with- all the powers of the Court and he has to decide the dispute finally by pronouncing a judgment after taking into consideration the evidence, if adduced, and hearing the arguments advanced and disposing of the dispute as per the law, Section 166 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar or his Nominee or Board of Nominees for decision. Therefore, to that extent ordinary Civil Court's jurisdiction is taken away and conferred upon the Registrar or his Nominee or Board of Nominees.

8. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff Co-operative Society was prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence the previous proceedings before the Registrar's Nominee, before the Co-operative-Tribunal and before the High Court on the ground that the Registrar's Nominee had jurisdiction to decide or deal with the said question. Hence the said period is required to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing the present suit under S. 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

9. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Surendranagar is directed to decide the suit within six months from the date of the receipt of the record from the High Court.

10. Appeal allowed.

Dhrangadhra Taluka S... v. Rampratap Hakimchand...