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  • Indian Electricity Rules, 1956
  • rules. Rule 29(1)
  • Rule 50(1)(f)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Indian Electricity Rules, 1956
  • rules. Rule 29(1)
  • Rule 50(1)(f)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 24.10.1973 two young boys, Chandrasinh and Dalsukhbhai, died when they came into contact with an electric live wire while passing along a foot-track between village Rundha and Kabirgaon. The parents of Chandrasinh filed Special Civil Suit No. 55 of 1974 against the Gujarat Electricity Board claiming Rs. 50,000. The widow, minor children and the parents of Dalsukhbhai filed Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 claiming Rs. 67,340. Both suits were tried together, evidence being recorded in Special Suit No. 55 of 1974, and both suits were dismissed by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Broach by judgment dated 30.10.1975. These appeals challenge that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Gujarat Electricity Board (respondent) was negligent and thus liable for the deaths of Chandrasinh and Dalsukhbhai arising from contact with a live electric wire found on the foot-track.
  2. Whether the circumstances and evidence attract the inference of negligence (including consideration of the principle of res ipsa loquitur) or require specific proof of a particular individual's negligence.
  3. Whether statutory duties (specifically under the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 — Rule 29(1) and Rule 50(1)(f)) and common-law duties required the Board to take precautions, and whether the Board discharged that burden.
  4. If liability is established, what is the appropriate quantum and distribution of compensation to the plaintiffs in Special Civil Suit No. 55 of 1974 and Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Plaintiffs (as presented)

  • Evidence (oral and documentary) showed a live electric wire lying on the foot-track where the deceased were walking; multiple contemporaneous reports and panchnamas (Exhs. 27, 35, 53, 60 and others) supported this account.
  • The Board owed a statutory and common-law duty to ensure live wires were not exposed and to take adequate precautions; absence of evidence of precautions or checks after the storm/following monsoon established negligence.
  • Reliance on the submissions made by Mr. Desai: the trial judge gave undue importance to minor contradictions and wrongly rejected the plaintiffs' evidence.

Respondent / Gujarat Electricity Board (as presented)

  • The defence suggested the wire might have been broken by the wind and fallen on a tree and that the boys could have climbed the tree, causing the accident; this was advanced as a scenario alternative to Board negligence.
  • Defence witnesses (including the Executive Engineer Exh. 58 and Deputy Engineer Exh. 61) provided technical evidence about short-circuits and the condition of the conductor; the Deputy Engineer said there had been a storm and that no complaints were received at Chikhli, and that the line had been checked before monsoon (though the register was not produced).
  • Mr. Modi (for the defendant) argued that the principle of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Quebec Railway, Light, Heat and Power Company Limited v. Vandry (Privy Council) (1920 A.C. 662) Held that a company was liable for damage without proof of negligence where it failed to show it could not have prevented the escape of electric current; statutory powers were not a defence for escape of current. The court invoked the principle to show that where damage is attributable to electric installations, the person or body having control must show prevention measures; it used the case to support that in India similar responsibility attaches to the Electricity Board and that pinpointing a single negligent individual is unnecessary when the Board as an entity is shown to be responsible.
Buckland v. Guild for Gas, Light and Coke Co. (1948) 2 All E.R. 1086 Affirmed duty to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury; it was negligent to have high-voltage wires above a tree that could be easily climbed and where foliage obscured the wires. The court relied on this authority to emphasize foreseeability and the Board's duty to anticipate that people (including children) might be affected by exposed electrical apparatus and to take precautions accordingly.
Halsbury's Laws of England (authoritative legal encyclopaedia) — Vol. 34 (paras 35, 36, 57) and Vol. 16 (para 213) Vol. 34 paras 35–36: Nature of duty in relation to dangerous activities and articles; higher care required for handling dangerous things such as electricity. Para 57: Where a dangerous thing is under defendant's management, absence of explanation may afford evidence of negligence. Vol. 16 para 213: Electricity boards must cause as little detriment as possible and make full compensation for damage caused by exercise of their powers. The court used these passages to reinforce that electricity operations demand special precautions, that management of a dangerous thing without explanation permits an inference of negligence, and that electricity boards have duties to compensate for damage resulting from their works.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed oral testimony and documentary evidence and found the trial judge had approached the evidence erroneously by placing undue weight on certain minor contradictions while disregarding consistent and contemporaneous materials. The opinion proceeds through the following analytical steps (as expressed in the text):

  1. Fact-finding: The court accepted documentary exhibits and contemporaneous reports produced by village and taluka officials (panchnama Exh. 35, report to District Development Officer Exh. 27, panchnama Exh. 53, engineer's report Exh. 60, and related materials) which consistently described a broken conductor lying on the road/foot-track near Tokri Khari on 24.10.1973 and indicated that the two boys died from electric current while passing that way.
  2. Evaluation of witness evidence: The court analysed oral testimony from parents (Exh. 44 and Exh. 46), the sarpanch (Exh. 52), the labour leader (Exh. 54), and defence engineers (Exhs. 58 and 61). It found that (a) the evidence of presence of the live wire and that the deceased were on the foot-track was consistent and corroborated by independent contemporaneous documents; (b) some minor discrepancies (such as how the wire lay relative to the two bodies) were unduly magnified by the Civil Judge and should not defeat the overall consistency of the account; and (c) certain criticisms of witnesses (for instance timing or distance of a witness) were not persuasive enough to discredit their observations.
  3. Assessment of defence explanations: The defence offered that the conductor might have broken in the storm and that the boys might have climbed a tree (and been electrocuted there). The court reviewed the timeline (early morning, labourers going to work) and noted the absence of evidence showing that the Board inspected or took remedial steps immediately after the storm or during/after the monsoon. It observed that the trees were not attractive for climbing and that the suggestion the boys climbed trees was implausible in the circumstances.
  4. Statutory and normative duties: The court cited the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 (Rule 29(1) and Rule 50(1)(f)) to show a statutory duty on the Board to construct, install and maintain supply lines so as to prevent danger and to take precautions in the supply and use of energy. These statutory duties reinforced the existence of a duty of care.
  5. Application of authorities: The court invoked Quebec Railway (Vandry) to show that where escape of electric current occurs from installations under a defendant’s care, the defendant must establish it could not have prevented the escape; Halsbury was used to stress that electricity is a dangerous thing and operations with electricity call for special precautions; Buckland supported foreseeability where installations are placed where persons (including young persons) may be affected. The court also relied on Halsbury's text to note that absence of explanation by those managing the dangerous thing may afford reasonable evidence of want of care (res ipsa loquitur type inference), and that electricity boards must make full compensation for damage caused by their works.
  6. Burden and inference: Given the documentary and oral record showing the conductor was defective, hanging, and ultimately touching the foot-track where the deceased passed, the court concluded the Board failed to demonstrate that it had taken adequate precautions or that the accident could not have been prevented by reasonable care. The court found that the only explanation offered (a storm) was not supported by evidence of subsequent remedial action or inspection, and that the respondent bore the burden to show precautions had been taken.
  7. Conclusion on liability: On the cumulative documentary and oral evidence, statutory obligations, and cited authorities, the court concluded the Gujarat Electricity Board was liable for want of care and negligence in respect of both deaths.
  8. Assessment of damages: The court calculated compensation on the record before it rather than remitting the question for fresh enquiry because it found the necessary evidence already on record. For each deceased, the court assessed annual loss, applied a multiplier (16) given young age, added a specific amount for loss of expectation of life (Rs. 5,000 each), and calculated totals with directions about interest and distribution (details below in Holding and Implications).

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The court held that the Gujarat Electricity Board was liable for negligence and must pay compensation to the plaintiffs in the two Special Civil Suits.

Direct orders and monetary awards (as set out in the opinion):

  • Special Civil Suit No. 55 of 1974 (plaintiffs for deceased Chandrasinh): award of Rs. 24,200 with running interest at 6% from the date of filing of the suit until realisation, with proportionate costs throughout; the text states "and the defendant-respondent shall bear their own costs throughout."
  • Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 (plaintiffs for deceased Dalsukhbhai): award of Rs. 29,000 with running interest at 6% from the date of filing of the suit until realisation, with proportionate costs throughout; the text states "and the defendant-respondent shall bear their own costs throughout."
  • Distribution directions for Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974: Rs. 9,000 to be paid to plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 (parents of the deceased) with proportionate interest and costs; the remaining Rs. 20,000 to be equally distributed between plaintiff Nos. 3, 4 and 5. The shares of minor plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 5 are to be deposited in a fixed deposit with a nationalised bank for 37 months (renewable) until they attain majority, interest to be paid to plaintiff No. 3 for their maintenance, and the minors' shares to be handed over on majority.

Implications and observations recorded by the court:

  • The opinion emphasises that the Board had statutory duties (Indian Electricity Rules, 1956) and common-law duties to take special precautions when supplying and maintaining electricity, and that absence of evidence of having taken such precautions supported a finding of negligence.
  • The court relied on established authorities to support the inference of liability where dangerous things are under the defendant's control and where escape of energy/injury occurs absent adequate explanation from the defendant.
  • No novel legal principle or binding new precedent is stated to be created by the opinion; the court applied existing statutory standards and well-known authorities to the facts and reached a liability and quantum determination affecting only the parties before it.

Note: This summary is confined to material explicitly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal holdings beyond the text supplied.

    Madhinabhai Nimatbhai And Others v. Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda .

    1. These two appeals are directed against the common judgment rendered by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Broach in Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 and Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 on 30.10.1975. The facts which gave rise to these two appeals may be stated as under:

    On 24.10.1973 on the foot-track between village Rundha and Kabirgaon two young boys Chandrasinh and Dalsukhbhai expired because while passing on that foot track they came in contact with an electric live wire. The parents of Chandrasinh filed Special Civil Suit No. 55 of 1974 against the respondent-Gujarat Electricity Board and claimed a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. The widow of Dalsukhbhai and minor children of Dalsukhbhai and the parents of Dalsukhbhai filed Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 and they claimed a sum of Rs. 67,340/-. Both the suits were heard together and the evidence was recorded in Special Suit No. 55 of 1974 and ultimately the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Broach dismissed both the suits. The dismissal of these suits is challenged by filing these two appeals.

    2. The learned advocate, Mr, Desai took us through the relevant evidence and also the important part of the judgment. The learned Civil Judge while discussing the evidence gave importance to some of the contradictions which appeared in the evidence of the witnesses and he totally neglected the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs and came to the conclusion that negligence of the respondent-Gujarat Electricity Board was not established. Having gone through the evidence it clearly appears to us that an erroneous approach was made to the entire evidence. There was ample evidence on record by which one can come to the conclusion that the electric live wire was on the foot-track and admittedly Dalsukhbhai and Chandrasinh did pass through that foot track as they were proceeding towards Kabirgaon. On that very day Police Patel of Chikhi made a report to the Taluka Development Officer. In that report which in Exh. 35 it is clearly stated that the labourers of village Rundha were going to Kabirgaon for labour work and at that time near Tokri Khari electric live wire was lying broken and two persons by name Dalsukhbhai and Chandrasinh expired on the spot because of the electric current. The Taluka Development Officer also made a report to the District Development Officer which was produced at Exh. 27. In that report it was stated that he having received the information had gone to the spot and he had found the electric wire lying on the road near Tokri Khari. It is also stated that Chandrasinh and Dalsukhbhai while passing on that road tried to put aside that wire because it was obstructing the way and they immediately expired on the spot because electric current was passing from that wire. He recommended to the District Development Office that the panchayat should at least pay a sum of Rs. 250/- to the members of the family of each one of the deceased. Similar recommendation was made to the District Development Officer by Taluka Development Officer, Valia which is produced at Exh. 28. Thereafter there is panchnama Exh. 35 which is prepared on the same day, i.e., on 24.104973. In that panchnama it is clearly stated that on the place of the incident electric wire which was broken was lying there. At that place there were two khokra trees and the electric wire had broken on the trees and thereafter it had come down on the road. In panchnama Exh. 53 which is prepared on the next day and which is signed by four persons it is stated that the electric wire was lying on the road. Thereafter there is a report of the Engineer of the respondent which is produced at Exh. 60 in which also it is stated that the top face conductor was broken near the pole. It is also stated that, the conductor had become weak. Thereafter in that report there is an inference and by the inference it is stated that the incumbent must have tried to touch the conductor while crossing this part and hence the accident would have occurred. Now therefore, from the documentary evidence on record it was clear that while Dalsukhbhai and Chandrasinh were proceeding towards Kabirgaon from village Rundha they were walking on the foot track and they expired because of an electric wire which was lying on that foot track. We may here mention that in the written statement it was suggested by way of defence that the electric wire might have broken because of the wind and may be on the tree and the boys must have climbed the tree and, therefore, the incident must have occurred. We may here mention that it was early morning and there is evidence on record which goes to show that they were going for labour work and they had to reach in time at a place where they were expected to work. Further the trees were not fruit trees and one would not be tempted to climb the tree which had no fruit. Under these circumstances the suggestion is such which cannot be accepted and there is ample evidence also on record by which one can come to an independent conclusion that this incident occurred while two boys were walking on the foot track and they had not even touched the tree.

    3. Witness Amarsinh Exh. 44 who is the father of deceased Chandrasinh in his evidence, clearly stated that the incident occurred in the early morning and as soon as he heard about the incident he went on the spot and he saw that his son was lying on the road and there was one electric wire adjacent near to his son. He also stated that at a distance of one hand away from his son he saw Dalsukhbhai Madhya lying on the road. Both persons were lying dead. He being the villager went to the extent of saying that when he saw the electric wire he saw the current passing from the wire. That may or may not be true and in cross-examination the only question asked in regard to this aspect was that he had not touched electric wire which was lying. The fact that the two persons were lying dead and the fact that the electric wire was lying on that particular place could not be disputed.

    4. Witness Madhia, father of Dalsukhbhai in his evidence stated that he had also gone to the site and he had also seen electric wire quite near to his son.

    5. Witness Gokalbhai Desai Exh. 52 was examined on behalf of the plaintiff. He at the relevant time was sarpanch of Chikhli gram panchayat. In his evidence he stated that the distance between his house and the place of the incident was about one furlong. According to him he had seen two passersby lying on the ground. According to him one of the two persons had wire rolled over his body while the other person was lying in such a way that the wire was not touching him. According to him he had reached the place of the incident within about 7 or 8 minutes. We may here mention that the witness Amarsinh Uga Exh. 44 and Madhia Exh. 46 did not say that one of the persons was lying in such a way that the wire was not touching and the other person was lying in such a way that the wire rolled over his body. The learned Civil Judge unfortunately gave too much importance to this particular contradiction which occurred in the evidence of Gokalbhai Exh. 52. The evidence was consistent and that consistency is overlooked and, therefore, a wrong conclusion has been reached. The conclusive evidence on record was that the two persons had started from village Rundha and they were proceeding to village Kabirgaon for the purpose of labour work. They were lying on the foot track and at that particular place on the road there was electric wire and these two persons had died because of the electric current. These facts were such which could not be disputed.

    6. Another witness is Naran Exh. 54. According to him he was leading the gang of labourers for the purpose of working and he was also going to village Kabirgaon. According to him two persons were going ahead and he was at a distance 50 ft. In cross-examination he stated that the labourers were to commence work in the early morning while he was to commence work at about 10-00 a.m. The learned Civil Judge here heavily came down on this witness and he came to the conclusion that this witness either could not have witnessed the incident because he was 50 ft. away or he would not have been present because he was to join duty at 10-00 a.m. It was forgotten that it was his duty to take the labourers and, therefore, he was most likely to accompany them. He had no reason to support the evidence of the plaintiffs. If he was at a distance of 50 ft. he would be the first person to reach the place of the incident immediately after the incident and he did see the two persons lying dead and the electric wire lying at the particular place.

    7. Now on behalf of defendant No. 1, Dalsukhbhai Patel is examined at Exh. 58. He is Executive Engineer working in Gujarat Electricity Board, He explained in his evidence as to what short circuit would mean and how the person would die because of short circuit. According to him in the event of short circuit current will continue to flow in wire for about 45 minutes. He had to admit that the condition of the wire had become weak but he added that it may be the result due to fault on line and also due to short circuit. Another witness examined on behalf of the defendant is one Shantilal Chimanlal Shah at Exh. 61 who was working as Deputy Engineer. According to him he had inspected the site on 26.10.1973 and he had made the report Exh. 60 which we have already discussed. According to him there was storm in Chikhli during the night on 23.10.1973. However, he stated that at Chikhli no complaint was received. In cross-examination he had to admit that the line in question was checked before the monsoon. He immediately thereafter stated that the board maintains a register to note the date of checking and rectification work on the line. That register was not produced. If line was checked before the monsoon here was a month of October which comes immediately after monsoon. According to him R.R. Prajapati was a helper who had informed him about the incident from R.R. Prajapati and the defendant chose not to examine him. Even this witness admitted that he had learnt from Prajapati that the conductor was resting on the tree and its end was lying on the ground. He further stated that he had inquired in the matter and he recorded the statement of Police Patel and also his helper Prajapati whom the defendant chose not to examine.

    8. Thus the evidence was complete to show that the line was defective, the wire had become loose, it was hanging on the tree and ultimately touching the foot track from which the persons have got to pass. There is nothing to show on which date wire was checked. They might have checked the wire if the evidence of the defendant is believed, in the month of May, 1973. Therefore, there was no checking during the monsoon or after the monsoon. If this was the situation the evidence itself would show that Gujarat Electricity Board was negligent. There was a duty cast by Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 and we may only refer to two rules. Rule 29(1) reads as under:

    29. Construction, installation, protection, operation and maintenance of electric supply lines and apparatus.--(1) All labric supply lines and apparatus shall be sufficient in power and size and of sufficient mechanical strength for the work they may be required to do, and so far as is practicable, shall be constructed, installed, protected, worked and maintained in accordance with the standards of the Indian Standards Institution so as to prevent danger.

    Rule 50(1)(f) reads as under:

    50. Supply and use of energy.--(1) The energy shall not be supplied, transformed, converted or used for continued to be supplied, transformed, converted or used unless the following provisions are observed:

    Thus there is a statutory duty fastened upon Gujarat Electricity Board to see that the live wires are not so exposed as to cause danger and they are expected to take adequate precautions. Now, therefore, in such a situation it was for the defendant to show that they did take adequate precautions. There is no evidence led on behalf of the defendant to show that any precautions were ever taken immediately after the storm or during the monsoon season or immediately after monsoon season.

    9. We may refer to Privy Council case reported in Quebec Railway, Light, Heat and Power Company Limited v. Vandry 1920 A.C. 662. That was a case where article 1054 of the civil code of quebec was considered. The facts found were as under:

    The appellant company, acting under statutory powers, had erected along a road in Quebec two overhead cables for the distribution of electric current at tensions of 2200 volts and 108 volts respectively, and they supplied current at 108 volts to the respondents' premises. A violent wind (not amounting to force majeure) tore a branch from a tree growing about 28 feet away from the cables, and drove it against them. In consequence the cables were broken down, and the high-tension current found its way along the low-tension into the respondents premises, and caused a fire.

    It was held as under:

    that the appellants were liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent, since they had failed to establish that they could not have prevented the escape of the electric current; further that the appellants" statutory powers afforded no defence, since the escape of the current was not necessarily incident to the exercise of those powers.

    We may here reproduce Articles 1053 and 1054 of the Civil Code of Quebec:

    Art. 1053. Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.

    Art. 1054. He is responsible not only for the damage caused by his own fault, but also for that caused by the fault of persons under his control and by things which he has under his care (sous sa garde).

    The father, or, after his decease, the mother, is responsible for the damage caused by their minor children;.

    Tutors are responsible in like manner for their pupils;.

    Curators or others having the legal custody of insane persons, for the damage done by the latter;.

    Schoolmasters are artisans, for the damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while under their care.

    The responsibility attaches in the above cases (is responsabilite eidessus a liev) only when the person subject to it fails to establish that he was unable to prevent the act (le fait) which has caused the damage.

    Masters or employees are responsible for the damage caused by their servants and workmen in the performance of the work for which they are employed.

    Now, therefore, the principle in this country is not different. Wherever the person is negligent he is responsible sot only for the damage caused by his own fault but also by; the fault of the persons under his control. Now therefore, here in this country also as soon as it is shown that there was damage which could be attributed to negligence it is sufficient if any officer of Gujarat Electricity Board was held to be negligent. It is not necessary to point out a finger at a particular person.

    10. We may also refer to Halsbury's Law of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 34. Paragraphs 35 and 36 read as under:

    35, Nature of Duty.--The performance of dangerous work and the possession, use or supply of dangerous things impose a duty to take special precautions. There is no legal classification of work or things as dangerous or not dangerous. Danger is a matter of degree and every activity is fraught with some possible element of danger to others. The law in all cases exacts a degree of care commensurate with the risk created, and the more dangerous the act the greater the care that must be taken in performing it. However, the liability of the person on whom the duty is imposed is not absolute: it arises only where there is some element of negligence on his part.

    36, Duty to take special precautions.--Work or articles which have been held to call for special precautions include the launching of a ship, the use of a traction engine, fire works, firearms, a soldering lamp, a calor gas cylinder, explosives and surgical treatment. Operations connected with the handling of petroleum and the distribution of gas and electricity also call for special precautions and are in addition subject to statutory provisions for safety. Persons who leave dangerous things where they are likely to be used or affected by others, and particularly by young persons, are responsible if the interference should reasonably have been foreseen and results in injury.

    Therefore, special precautions are required to be taken while handling operations connected with electricity and those precautions are in addition and subject to the statutory provisions for safety. Now, therefore, Gujarat Electricity Board as respondent No. 4 was bound to show that they had taken all care which was necessary for the purpose of handling the electric live wires while they were passing from a particular area.

    11. The learned advocate Mr. Modi tried to submit that this is not a case where the principle of ses ipsa loquitur will apply. We have already stated that there is ample evidence to show that the electric live wire was on the foot track where the persons are normally expected to walk. This act itself is an art of negligence. Now, therefore, the defendant had to establish that it was not their fault that the wire was lying at that particular place. They were expected further to establish that as soon as they came to know about the storm or as soon as they came to know about the electric live wire lying at a particular place, precautions were required to be taken to see that no person walks on that foot track, and a board cautioned with red flag was put at that place. In paragraph 57 of Halsbury's Law of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 34, it is clearly stated as under:

    However, where the thing which causes the accidents is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his employees, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

    The only explanation given by the defendant is that there was storm on the previous night. Even the time is not suggested and it is not suggested asto what they did immediately after the storm.

    12. We may also refer to a case of Buckland v. Guild for Gas, Light and Coke Co. (1948)2 All E.R. 1086. This was a case where a child was electrocuted when he was climbing the tree. It was held:

    The defendants owed a duty to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which they could reasonably foresee would be likely to injure a person so closely and directly affected by their acts or omissions that the defendants ought to have had such a person in contemplation as being so affected, they should have known that it was dangerous to have high-voltage wires immediately above a tree which could be easily climbed and the foilage of which was so dense that the presence of the wires could not epsily be seen; and, therefore, as the deceased girl was a person whom the defendants ought to have had in contemplation as being directly affected by their failure to take proper precautions, they were guilty of breach of duty amounting to negligence.

    13. We may also refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 16. Paragraph 213 runs as under:

    213. Compensation for damage by electricity boards. In the exercise of the powers in relation to the execution of works given them by the Electricity (Supply) Acts, 1882 to 1936, or any local enactment applicable to them, electricity boards must cause as little detriment and inconvenience and do as little damage as possible, and must make full compensation to all bodies and persons interested for all damage sustained by them by reason or in consequence of the exercise of those powers, the amount and application of the compensation in case of difference to be determined by arbitral-tion.

    Therefore, on oral and documentary evidence which we have discussed we come to a definite conclusion that the defendant-respondent was liable for want of care and negligence.

    14. The next question which is required to be considered is what amount is required to be awarded to the plaintiffs in each case. The learned Civil Judge has unfortunately in the alternative not calculated the amount which was required to be awarded in case it was found that the defendant was negligent. This ordinarily would result in remanding the matter for the purpose of determining the amount but in this case it is not necessary to do so because all the evidence which is necessary for that purpose is already on record.

    15. So far as Chandrasinh is concerned there is evidence that he was a labourer. He was earning a sum of Rs. 3/- to Rs. 5/- per day. This would mean that he would contribute Rs. 4/- for the family. Assuming that he would work for 25 days in a month, the loss in one month would be Rs. 100/-. The yearly loss would come to Rs. 1,200/-. Looking to the young age the multiplier of 16 is required to be taken. The amount would come to Rs. 19,200/- plus Rs. 5000/- are required to be awarded for loss of expectation of life. The total sum, therefore, comes to Rs. 24,200/- and, therefore, the plaintiffs of Civil Suit No. 55 of 1971 will recover a sum of Rs. 24,200/- from the defendant with running interest at 6% from the date of the filing of the suit till realisation with proportionate costs throughout and the defendant-respondent shall bear their own costs throughout.

    16. Coming to the case of Dalsukhbhai, there also the evidence is that he was earning Rs. 3/- to Rs. 5/- per day. However, he was doing agricultural work also at his house. The total yearly income is shown to be Rs. 900/-. Thus his contribution to labour so far as his field is concerned would be Rs. 300/- per year. Now, therefore, looking to the wages that he used to earn would come to Rs. 1,200/- per year. So far as the compensation of the family is concerned, Rs. 300/- are required to be added because he was also doing agricultural work at his place. The total loss, therefore, would come to Rs. -1,500/- per year. The multiplier of 16 is required to be applied and the total would come to Rs. 24,000/-. To that amount a sum of Rs. 5,000/- is required to be added for loss of expectation of life. The total amount comes to Rs. 29,000/. The plaintiffs of Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 would, therefore, recover a sum of Rs. 29,000/- from the defendant with running interest at 6% from the date of filing of the suit till realisation and proportionate costs throughout and the defendant-respondent shall bear their own costs throughout. We may here mention that so far as the plaintiffs in Special Civil Suit No. 56 of 1974 are concerned, a sum of Rs. 9,000/- may be paid to plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 who are the parents of deceased Dalsukhbhai with proportionate interest and costs. The remaining amount of Rs. 20,000/- may be distributed equally between plaintiff Nos. 3, 4 and 5. So far as the shares of the plaintiff Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned they may be deposited in a fixed deposit account with any nationalised bank for 37 months which may be renewed from time to time till the minors attain majority and interest whenever accrued may be paid to plaintiff No. 3 for maintenance of the minors. The shares of minor-plaintiff Nos. 4 and 5 may be handed over to them when they attain the majority.

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    Comments

    Madhinabhai Nimatbhai And Others v. Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda .
    (Oct 12, 1982)