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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner seeks a writ directing respondents to restore possession of Shed No. 23 at Subhash Part Market, Khowai, which was allotted to him by the Notified Area Authority (Nagar Panchayat). After allotment the petitioner took possession in January 1986 as a tenant under a registered tenancy agreement executed on 7.2.1986 in the names of the petitioner and four others. The petitioner, a fisherman, alleges that he alone occupied and used the shed while the other co-signatories obtained and occupied different sheds. In September 1993, following a change in government, the petitioner alleges that respondent No. 4, with the Chairman of the Notified Area Authority and others, ordered and supervised his eviction on 18.9.1993 and threatened him; the petitioner then vacated the shed and respondent No. 4 (joined by respondent No. 5) occupied it. Complaints to the Notified Area Authority did not result in redress.

The State and the Vice-Chairman of the Notified Area Authority filed affidavits denying conspiracy and contending that there was no official order and hence the dispute was not amenable to adjudication under Article 226; they also raised the plea of inordinate delay. Other respondents did not appear and were proceeded against by default. The petitioner relied on a prior Single Judge judgment (Civil Rule Nos. 92/94, 499/94 and 593/94, Agartala Bench) where restoration of possession was ordered in similar factual circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged role played by the Chairperson in the ouster of the petitioner, even if performed without a formal written order, amounted to an act done for and on behalf of the Notified Area Authority such that a writ under Article 226 would lie.
  2. Whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 where there was no official order of eviction and the alleged wrong is said to be in the Chairperson's individual capacity.
  3. Whether delay (inordinate delay of about five years since alleged dispossession) and the fact that the petitioner was one of several co-allottees bars relief in the writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner took possession in January 1986 under a registered tenancy agreement and was ousted on 18.9.1993 by respondent No. 4 with the Chairman and others, under threat and force.
  • The Notified Area Authority and its Chairperson failed to act on the petitioner's complaints and did not restore possession.
  • The petitioner relied on the Single Judge judgment in Civil Rule Nos. 92/94, 499/94 and 593/94 (Agartala Bench) where petitioners similarly ousted had their possession restored; he urged parity of relief.
  • The petitioner contended that alternative remedies should not operate as a bar where there has been serious violation of natural justice (relying on AIR 2000 Gauhati 35 and a Supreme Court decision of AIR 1969 SC) and invoked S.P. Gupta (1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149) to argue that technicalities should not prevent substantial justice. He submitted that delay and formal technical bars ought to yield to justice in an appropriate case.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The State and the Vice-Chairman filed affidavits denying any conspiracy and asserting that no official order was passed; therefore the dispute could not be settled under Article 226 and the remedy, if any, was in private law.
  • They raised the plea of inordinate delay in approaching the court.
  • Counsel for respondents argued that the Chairperson's alleged actions were in his individual capacity and not in discharge of official duties, hence no writ lies against the Notified Area Authority.
  • Respondents relied on several Supreme Court authorities ((1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167; (2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573; AIR 1957 SC 529; (1999) 4 SCC 43) to submit that contract disputes and questions about breach of tenancy or agreement ordinarily belong to ordinary civil remedies, that mandamus is not to be issued against private individuals, and that the petitioner's case did not call for exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction on Article 21 grounds; they also relied on authorities concerning delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Civil Rule Nos. 92 of 94, 499 of 94 and 593 of 94 (Agartala Bench) — Single Judge judgment Held that eviction by the Authority without following statutory procedure or elementary rules of natural justice (including Section 4 of the Tripura Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act) was illegal; restoration of status quo ante ordered. The Court examined and quoted the judgment at length, treated the present petitioner as standing on equal footing with those petitioners, and considered that the relief granted in those cases could be extended in the present case.
AIR 2000 Gauhati 35 Alternative remedy will not operate as a bar where serious consequence flows from an impugned order passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that alternative remedies and technicalities should not bar the writ; the Court accepted that delay and technical objections could be overlooked in the circumstances of this case.
AIR 1969 SC (citation as referred in text) Referred to by petitioner to support the position that alternative remedies do not bar relief where natural justice is violated (exact case name not specified in the opinion). Relied upon by petitioner; considered by the Court in conjunction with other authorities in concluding that the writ jurisdiction could be exercised despite alternative remedies.
S.P. Gupta (1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149) Used to show that technicalities should not prevent substantive justice. Cited by petitioner to argue that procedural/technical objections should not defeat substantial justice; the Court treated delay and technical objections as not decisive in the present facts.
(1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167 Invoked by respondents to show that disputes about contractual terms should be adjudicated by ordinary principles of law rather than writ jurisdiction. Considered by the Court as part of respondents' submissions but the Court found the facts (eviction under supervision of the Chairperson without lawful authority) distinguishable and insufficient to deny writ relief.
(2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573 Invoked by respondents for the proposition that contractual disputes belong to ordinary civil process and to oppose writ relief. The Court noted the authority but concluded that it did not justify the extraordinary act of eviction by the Chairperson without lawful procedure; it did not bar grant of relief.
AIR 1957 SC 529 Referenced to support the proposition that a writ of mandamus is not to be issued against a private individual. Considered by the Court but the Court concluded that the Chairperson's actions, by virtue of his official status and role in the eviction, amounted to action for and on behalf of the Authority, bringing the matter within writ jurisdiction.
(1999) 4 SCC 43 Relied upon by respondents to argue that the petitioner's case did not call for exercise of discretionary power on Article 21 grounds (right to livelihood) and that writ relief was inappropriate. The Court assessed the factual matrix and held that the unauthorised eviction carried out under the Chairperson's supervision warranted intervention despite respondents' reliance on this authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the pleadings, documents and affidavits and applied the following reasoning, in the sequence apparent from the opinion:

  1. Fact-finding: The Court found that the petitioner's possession as tenant was not disputed and that ouster occurred in September 1993. The petitioner had lodged complaints with the Notified Area Authority (Annexures 5–7) which were not acted upon.
  2. On the question of denial by respondents: The co-tenants (respondent Nos. 6–8), though signatories to the tenancy agreement, did not file affidavits contradicting the petitioner's possession. The affidavit filed by the Notified Area Authority was sworn by the Vice-Chairperson and did not deny allegations against the Chairperson, which the Court said gave rise to a presumption that the petitioner was ousted at the Chairperson's behest.
  3. Legal character of the Chairperson's acts: The Court engaged the central legal question—whether the Chairperson's presence and active role in the eviction, even without a written order, constituted action for and on behalf of the Notified Area Authority. The Court emphasized that the Chairperson, by virtue of his office, carries official status and that his active participation in eviction connected with the affairs of the Authority indicated an exercise of authority on behalf of the Authority.
  4. Procedural and fairness considerations: Relying on administrative fairness and principles of natural justice, and referencing the earlier Single Judge judgment which emphasized the need for notice and fair procedure (including reference to Section 4 of the Tripura Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act), the Court held that eviction taken without statutory procedure or elementary rules of natural justice could not be sustained.
  5. Consideration of precedent and procedural objections: The Court considered authorities cited by both parties. It accepted the petitioner's position—supported by prior decisions—that serious violation of natural justice and unfair administrative action may justify writ intervention and that technical objections or delay may be overlooked in appropriate cases. The Court found respondents' submissions about the individual capacity of the Chairperson, the availability of alternative remedies, and delay to be unpersuasive given the circumstances.
  6. Conclusion on maintainability and remedy: Because the Chairperson's role related to the affairs of the Authority and because complaints to the Authority had not been meaningfully addressed, the Court concluded that the eviction was effectively an act of the Authority (or done on its behalf) and thus amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Court found the eviction unlawful and ordered restoration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The Court ordered restoration of possession of Shed No. 23 to the petitioner within one month and directed that the possession "shall not be interfered with except in due course of law." The Court also directed respondent No. 1 to pay costs of Rs. 10,000 to the petitioner within one month.

Core Ruling: The Court held that the eviction of the petitioner, undertaken under the presence and supervision of the Chairperson of the Notified Area Authority without lawful authority or adherence to procedural safeguards, was unlawful and justified exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Implications: The immediate consequence is restoration of possession to the petitioner and an award of costs against respondent No. 1. The opinion does not advert explicitly to broader doctrinal innovation or purport to lay down a new, general precedent; it addresses the direct effect on the parties under the facts and authorities before the Court and applies established principles of administrative fairness and natural justice to set aside an unlawful eviction.


End of summary — based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion.

    Gopal Chandra Das v. The Notified Area Authority, Khowai & Ors.

    1. This petition is for issuance of a writ directing the respondents to deliver back the possession of the Shed No. 23 at Subhash Part Market, Khowai which was allotted to the petitioner by the Notified Area Authority (Nagar Panchayat).

    2. I have heard Mr. K.N Bhattacharya, learned sr. counsel assisted by Mr. R. Debnath, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Deb, learned sr. counsel assisted by Mr. A. De, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. U.B Saha, learned Government Advocate assisted by Mr. D.C Nath, learned counsel for the respondent-State.

    3. Petitioner's case is that after the allotment, he took possession of the aforesaid shed in January, 1986 as a tenant and an agreement of tenancy was executed between him and 4 others on the one side and the Notified Area Authority on the other. The names of other 4 persons (respondent Nos. 6 to 8) were included as insisted upon by the aforesaid authority. The said agreement was executed and registered on 7.2.1986 The petitioner continued with the possession all alone paying monthly rent to the authority. The petitioner is a fisherman and he was selling fishes from the aforesaid shed. The proforma-respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 got allotment of separate sheds in their names in the same market and they never occupied the disputed shed where the petitioner was dealing in fish. After the general election to the Tripura Legislative Assembly in 1993, Government was formed by the Left Front and rapid changes were brought about at different levels. Respondent No. 4 created pressure upon the petitioner through the leaders of the political party in power to evict him from the aforesaid shed No. 23. On 18.9.1993, the Chairman of the Notified Area Authority being in company of respondent No. 4 and others ordered the petitioner to vacate the shed. The Chairman accompanied by respondent No. 4 and other persons also threatened the petitioner. Being apprehensive of danger to his life and property, the petitioner had to leave the shed on 18.9.1993 whereupon the respondent No. 4 occupied the same and since then in possession thereof. It is further alleged that the respondents were armed with different weapons of various kinds. After ouster of the petitioner, respondent No. 5 also joined hands with respondent No. 4 and occupied the shed along with respondent No. 4.

    4. The State as well as the Vice-Chairman of the Notified Area Authority filed separate affidavit controverting the allegations of conspiracy amongst the respondents for his ouster by threat. They also challenged the writ petition on the ground that no official order has been passed by the Notified Authority in the instant case and, as such, the dispute cannot be settled under Article 226. According to them, the allegation is primarily directed against the Chairman in his private capacity and the remedy, if any, is in private law and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Besides, they also took the plea of inordinate delay.

    5. Other respondents did not appear although served and hence they go by default.

    6. At the very first instance, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned sr. counsel for the petitioner relied upon a common judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 92 of 94. Civil Rule No. 499 of 94 and Civil Rule No. 593 of 94 (Agartala Bench). Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that the petitioners in the aforesaid Civil Rules were ousted from their allotted sheds in the same manner as has been done in the instant case and restoration of possession to the ousted allottees were ordered in the aforesaid cases.

    7. The judgment relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharjee has been appended with the writ petition as Annexure-4. I have carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment. The only difference in the factual matrix is that in the instant case, the agreement (Annexure-1) was executed by the petitioner and 4 other persons while in the cases under reference, the agreement was executed by the petitioners alone. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 6 of the judgment recorded the reasons for giving the reliefs sought for by the petitioner. It would be of immense assistance to quote herein below the relevant observation:—

    “6… What is legal justification for such an action? Assuming that there was breach of conditions of agreement, as alleged by the respondents. The moot question is whether the Notified Area Authority has any right, without taking recourse to the ordinary course of law, for eviction, either under the special laws of the State, or under general law of Transfer of Property Act, can the authority take upon itself the role of an accuser as well as a Judge in its own cause? It is this question which is common to all these petitions. Even if this question of the Bond/Agreement executed by the petitioners entitle the respondent authority, to seek eviction of the allottees, or take possession of the allotted premises, who will decide the question of breach of conditions? Should it be left to the authority itself to decide the question of alleged breach of any condition and allow it to put its own lock? These are the questions of administrative fairness. The action taken by any administrative authority must be informed with reasons and fairness it cannot be an arbitrary and capricious action. There are laws governing eviction of allottees/licensees from public premises. These are drastic laws. The Tripura Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1982 defines ‘public premises’. Section 4 thereof contemplates issuance of a Notice to show cause against order of eviction. The bare minimal that should have been done in the circumstances of the case, even in the absence of any statute as dictated by elementary rules of natural justice, has been omitted to be done by the respondents. Their action, either of putting of lock over and above the petitioners' thus interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the allotted premises, cannot stand the test of fairness. Apart from the blatant violation of Section 4 of the Tripura Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1983, it must be struck down as illegal. It is accordingly held to be illegal. Status quo ante as it obtained prior to the putting of lock of dispossession, must be restored.”

    8. Mr. Bhattacharjee further submitted that the petitioner stands in equal footing with the petitioners in the aforesaid cases and, therefore, the relief granted to the petitioners in that case may also be extended in the instant case. Mr. S. Deb and Mr. U.B Saha, learned counsel for the respondents raised vehement objection on the ground that the alleged role of the Chairperson if true, was in his individual capacity and not in discharge of his official capacity as the Chairperson and, therefore, no writ would lie against the Notified Authority.

    9. The prime question to be answered in this petition is whether the alleged role played by the Chairperson in ousting the writ petitioner from the shed shorn of official colour would tantamount to an act for and on behalf of the Notified Area Authority.

    10. It would appear from the pleadings as well as documents annexed that the petitioner's possession as tenant is not disputed. There is also no dispute that the petitioner was ousted in the month of September, 1993. Annexures-5, 6 and 7 show that the complaints lodged by the petitioner before the Notified Area Authority was not given any importance and no attempt was made either to enquire into the matter or to restore possession of the shed. It is important to note here that the respondent Nos. 6 to 8, though signatories to the agreement, have not filed any affidavit controverting the possession of the petitioner. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Notified Area Authority and the Chairperson it is contended that the ouster of the petitioner cannot be adjudicated in this petition since there are other co-tenants who have not joined the petition. Besides the plea of limitation, the affidavit however does not contain any statement denying the allegations made against the Chairperson. This affidavit has been sworn in by the Vice-Chairperson and, therefore, omission on their part to deny the allegations made against the Chairperson would naturally lead to a presumption that the petitioner was ousted from the disputed shed at the behest of the Chairperson.

    11. Apparently there is no official order or notice in the instant case for ouster of the writ petitioner. Whether presence of the Chairperson at the place of eviction and the role played by him in carrying out the threat and supervising the ouster would amount to an exercise in his individual capacity or on behalf of the Notified Area Authority. The Chairperson is not an ordinary citizen. He is first citizen and wherever he may be he carries with him the majesty and glamour of the official status as Chairperson. The ouster of the writ petitioner in his presence and under his supervision, even, though, without an order in writing, would, mean an act for and on behalf of the Notified Area Authority. Petitioner was an ordinary tenant of the Authority whom the Chairperson represents and in all fairness it was his duty to protect the interest of the petitioner in the disputed shed. The Chairperson obviously failed to do his duty. The active role played by him was in a matter pertaining to the affairs of the Notified Authority. Therefore, for all purposes his presence and the role played by him was indicative or the fact that the eviction was undertaken for and on behalf of the Notified Authority. Mr. Saha argued that there was no written order and, as such, the action taken by the Chairperson in ousting the writ petitioner was not an act for and on behalf of the Notified Authority. But this argument is bereft of logic since the action of the Chairperson was not only against law, but also against the known concept of fair play. No action shall be initiated or undertaken by a person in authority without legal sanction. Fairness and natural justice require such a person to act only in aid of justice. I think the inevitable conclusion should be that when the Chairperson himself takes part in evicting tenant from a Municipal Shed duly allotted to him without lawful authority, such act would be nothing short of an act undertaken and accomplished for and on behalf of the Notified Authority. The decision, however, would have been altogether different if the matter in controversy was not relatable to the affairs of the Notified Authority. Therefore, writ would lie.

    12. Mr. Bhattacharejee, learned counsel for the writ petitioner referred to a decision of this Court reported in AIR 2000 Gauhati 35 in order to show that the court decided that alternative remedy would not operate as a bar where serious consequence flows from the impugned order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Bhattacharjee also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court report in AIR 1969 SC to drive home the above point. In addition, he has also referred to S.P Gupta's case (1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149) in order to show that the technolities would not be a bar in rendering substantial justice. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, law of maintainability of a writ petition has marched ahead of traditional concept, and neither delay nor any technical bar for that matter would stand on the way of justice in an appropriate case.

    13. Mr. Deb, learned counsel for the respondents referred to the decisions in (1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167 and (2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573 and argued that in the domain of contract dispute about the terms of the contract have to be settled by the ordinary principles of the law of contract. It has also been argued relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1957 SC 529 that a Writ of Mandamus is not to be issued against a private individual. Further reference has been made to the decision in (1999) 4 SCC 43 in order to show that the case of the writ petitioner cannot be treated as one of those cases which call for exercise of discretionary power for violation of the right to livelihood under Article 21. Besides, reliance has also been placed on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court on the question of delay since the petitioner came late to Court, that is, after five years from the date of alleged dispossession.

    14. After due consideration of the submission of the learned counsel and the decisions referred to, this court cannot reconcile, with the idea of eviction of a petty shop-keep from an allotted shed at the behest of the Chairperson without authority of law. The State in its affidavit has not taken any exception to the unlawful act of the Chairperson in ousting this poor fisherman. Rather serious and determined attempts have been made by the State to justify the dismissal of the writ petition. The stand taken by the State is not in harmony with concept of “Rule of law”. Rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. A person in authority has to conduct himself with utmost care. He must behave both in official or individual capacity only in accordance with the principles of law. Fairness shall be apparently visible in all his actions. Here is a case where the Chairperson by his unauthorised role in an affair connected with the authority has not only dishonored the status and position held by him, but also derogated the authority of the Institution which he headed. Under no circumstances this court can endorse such unlawful act done in blatant violation of the law and the principles of natural justice. If we go through the Judgment of my Learned Brother Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.D Gyani in Civil Rules No. 593/1994, 449/1994, 92/1994, it would be evident that the action under review calls for serious condemnation.

    15. In a situation like this, the delay in filing a writ petition will have to be ignored. Besides, the plea that the writ petitioner was not the only allottee but was one of the allottees will also not stand on the way as the dispute, if any, between the writ petitioner and the proforma respondents is a matter to be thrashed out by them. Silence maintained by respondents No. 6 to 8 in this petition indicate that they are not in a mood to meddle with. Therefore, I am unable to decipher any reason to refuse status quo ante which prevailed prior to the ouster of the writ petitioner.

    16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. It is ordered that the possession of the shed be restored to the petitioner within a month and the same shall not be interfered with except in due course of law.

    17. Considering the background of the case, the respondent No. 1 is also directed to pay cost of Rs. 10,000 to the petitioner within a month.

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    Gopal Chandra Das v. The Notified Area Authority, Khowai & Ors.
    (Apr 19, 2001)