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  • provision of section 92-A of the M.V Act, 1939.6.
  • section 110-D of the M.V Act of 1939.
  • section 173 of the M.V Act of 1988.
  • Order 41 Rule 27 CPC
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • provision of section 92-A of the M.V Act, 1939.6.
  • section 110-D of the M.V Act of 1939.
  • section 173 of the M.V Act of 1988.
  • Order 41 Rule 27 CPC
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — S.K. Homchaudhuri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 12 February 1984 S.L. Mehta (the deceased) was killed in a motor accident on G.S. Road at Police Bazar, Shillong. Police investigations identified a city bus bearing registration No. MLK 654 (allegedly belonging to respondent No. 5, Smti Asha Rana Das Choudhury) and registered criminal proceedings under Sections 279/337/304A IPC against the driver. On 18 October 1988 the widow (respondent No. 1) filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Shillong) on behalf of herself and minor children seeking compensation from the appellant Oriental Insurance Company and the vehicle owner for the death.

The claim application stated the deceased's monthly income as Rs. 1,129.64. The Tribunal condoned delay in filing and registered the matter as MAC Case No. 19/89. The owner and insurer filed objections. The insurer did not produce the insurance policy despite being granted time.

The Tribunal, after evidence (claimant examined nine witnesses; owner examined three; insurer adduced no evidence), held that vehicle MLK 654 caused the death due to rash and negligent driving and awarded Rs. 3,31,000/-, directing the amount to be paid by the appellant insurer alone. The insurer's review application, which relied on a subsequently produced policy copy showing a different policy number and a limited liability of Rs. 50,000/-, was admitted on condition of deposit of half the award; that deposit did not occur and the review application was treated as rejected. The appellant pursued an appeal to this Court.

On admission of the appeal (15 February 1991), the operation of the award was suspended subject to the appellant paying Rs. 50,000/- to the claimant within one month; that payment was made. The appellant had earlier paid Rs. 15,000/- under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal erred in computing the deceased's monthly income at Rs. 2,013/- (rather than Rs. 1,129.64/- as stated in the claim) and thereby awarded an excessive compensation.
  2. Whether the Tribunal erred in failing to make deductions (up to 30%) from the calculated compensation for contingencies/uncertainty of life and lump-sum payment.
  3. Whether the appellant Insurance Company, which later produced a policy showing a limited liability (claimed to be Rs. 50,000/-), can be saddled with liability for the entire awarded amount and whether the policy or related documents may be admitted at the appellate stage (Order 41 Rule 27 CPC).
  4. Whether an Insurance Company is entitled to challenge the quantum of compensation (preliminary objection raised by the claimant/respondents).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. B. Das)

  • The Tribunal arbitrarily accepted a monthly income of Rs. 2,013/- for the deceased based on a late (1989) statement of a claimant's witness, instead of using the deceased's income on the date of the accident (Rs. 1,129.64), which is the proper basis for calculation.
  • The Tribunal failed to make the legally required deduction (up to 30%) from the calculated compensation on account of uncertainty of life and lump-sum payment.
  • The insurer's liability under the policy is limited to a maximum of Rs. 50,000/-, and therefore the appellant cannot be made liable to pay the full award; the appellant sought to file and prove the insurance policy under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to establish its limited liability.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. V.K. Jindal)

  • A preliminary objection that the Insurance Company is not entitled to challenge the quantum of compensation in an appeal under the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (section 110D of the 1939 Act, now section 173 of the 1988 Act) — i.e., insurer cannot challenge the quantum.
  • The Tribunal was correct to accept the higher income (Rs. 2,013/-) because the deceased's pay scale had been revised; thus present pay justified the figure used by the Tribunal.
  • Opposed reception of the insurance policy at appellate stage since the appellant failed to produce the policy at trial despite opportunity; invoked principle that insurer must produce policy to do justice (relying on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hemendra Dutta Choudhury v. Arun Kumar Bordoloi, 1987 (2) GLR 450 Holds that an Insurance Company can challenge quantum of award and findings on negligence in an appeal under section 110-D (M.V. Act, 1939). The Court relied on this authority to reject the respondents' preliminary objection and held that the insurer is entitled to challenge the quantum in the appeal.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, (1988) 1 SCC 626 : AIR 1988 SC 719 Duty of an insurer (or party in possession of a document) to file the insurance policy or copy thereof so as to assist the Tribunal/Court in doing justice; not to hide behind burden of proof. The Court cited this decision to criticise the insurer's failure to produce the policy earlier and to support the proposition that insurers should file the policy when claiming limited liability.
K. Venkataramiah v. Sulharan Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC appellate court may allow additional evidence if required to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any substantial cause. The Court invoked this principle in considering the appellant's application to adduce the insurance policy as additional evidence at the appellate stage.
Bhagwan Sweroon v. Moot Chand, (1983) 2 SCC 132 : AIR 1983 SC 355 Support for principles permitting additional evidence in limited circumstances at appellate stage. The Court relied on this authority among others to outline the tests and conditions for reception of additional evidence.
State of U.P. v. Manbodhanlal, AIR 1957 SC 912 Additional evidence should not be permitted at appellate stage merely to fill lacunae or to enable a party to remove deficiencies in presentation at the trial. The Court applied this cautionary principle, noting that additional evidence is not normally permitted simply to rectify earlier omissions, but recognized exceptions.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Panchan, AIR 1965 SC 1998 Appellate court's power to allow additional evidence is limited to cases where such evidence is necessary to enable pronouncement of judgment; not to allow fresh evidence merely to achieve a particular outcome. The Court used this authority to frame the limited scope in which additional evidence can be admitted and to justify allowing evidence only insofar as required to resolve policy-related obscurity.
Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit, AIR 1968 SC 933 When documents were not produced or proved at trial, an appellate court may refuse reception of such evidence where no ground for a new trial exists. The Court relied on this decision when assessing whether to admit the policy at appellate stage and the circumstances under which fresh evidence may properly be rejected.
Shivaji Nitangekar Patel v. Mahesh Madav Gosavi, (1987) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1987 SC 294 Sets out basic principles for admitting additional evidence: (1) party must show best efforts were made to produce it earlier; (2) opposing party must be given a chance to rebut; (3) evidence must be relevant to the issue. The Court applied these principles to conclude that, notwithstanding the insurer's laches, additional evidence limited to the insurance policy and related papers should be permitted so that the Tribunal can determine the insurer's actual liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two interconnected strands: (A) quantum of compensation and (B) admissibility of the insurance policy at the appellate stage.

A. Quantum of Compensation — income, evidence and deductions

  • The Court emphasized the settled principle that compensation must be calculated on the basis of the deceased's income on the date of the accident. The claim application expressly stated monthly income as Rs. 1,129.64 on the date of the accident (12.2.84).
  • The Tribunal, however, had used a figure of Rs. 2,013/- per month derived from a claimant's witness (witness No.4) who deposed on 10.7.89 that the deceased's "present pay" would have been Rs. 1,513 plus Rs. 500 local allowance. The Court found that this 1989 statement relates to a hypothetical present pay and is not evidence of the actual income on the 1984 accident date.
  • Because the Tribunal relied on a "solitary vague statement" made five years after the accident, the Court held that the Tribunal erred in taking Rs. 2,013/- as the deceased's income and thereby miscalculated compensation.
  • The Court further held that the Tribunal failed to make deductions (up to 30%) from the calculated amount to account for uncertainty of life and the lump-sum nature of the award — a recognized principle for reducing calculated compensation. This omission was a further legal error rendering the award unsustainable.
  • For these reasons (wrong income base and lack of contingency deduction), the Court concluded that the award must be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal to determine compensation in accordance with law.

B. Admissibility of the Insurance Policy and related papers

  • The appellant sought to file, under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, a copy of the insurance policy (allegedly showing limited liability of Rs. 50,000/-) which it claimed was not produced earlier because of confusion over the policy/certificate number and due to misplacement during an office shift. A copy was located only later and annexed to the review application.
  • The respondents opposed reception of this evidence, arguing the insurer had opportunities at trial to produce the policy and failed to do so; they relied on precedent (National Insurance v. Jugal Kishore) holding that insurers should file policies to assist tribunals and courts.
  • The Court analysed the competing authorities on additional evidence (including Manbodhanlal, Venkataramiah, Municipal Corporation, Associated Hotels, Shivaji Nilangekar) and summarized the governing principles: additional evidence at appellate stage is permitted when required to enable pronouncement of judgment or for substantial cause; not to fill gaps created by a party's own failure, unless justice requires it; and subject to requirements that the applicant made best efforts previously, the evidence is relevant, and the other side can rebut.
  • The Court noted the following facts bearing on these principles: both claimant and owner had quoted the same policy/certificate number (obtained by the claimant from documents seized by the police), the owner in her written statement had taken the position that the vehicle was insured with the appellant, and the insurer did not produce the policy despite being granted time by the Tribunal. The insurer's perfunctory defence and failure to seek relief from the Tribunal earlier were criticized as laches.
  • The Court also observed the owner's independent duty to produce the policy or relevant papers to show that the vehicle was insured and to establish the extent of indemnity; the Tribunal could and should have called upon the owner to produce the documents or sought seized documents from police records to resolve the conflict of policy numbers.
  • Balancing these considerations, the Court concluded that, rather than receiving additional evidence in the appeal itself, the appropriate course was to remit the matter: the Tribunal should be directed to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence only to the limited extent of filing and proving the insurance policy or papers connected therewith, and the Tribunal may call for relevant documents seized in the police case.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed; the impugned award dated 26.6.90 is set aside and the case is remitted to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong, for fresh determination in accordance with law.

The Court directed that:

  • The Tribunal shall permit the parties to adduce additional evidence limited to filing and proving the insurance policy and/or papers connected therewith (and may call for documents seized in connection with Shillong P.S. Case No. 33(2)84).
  • The Tribunal should determine the amount of compensation afresh using the deceased's income on the date of the accident and after applying appropriate deductions (including deduction for uncertainty of life/lump-sum payment as required by law).
  • The Tribunal is to proceed with notice to the parties and dispose of the case expeditiously, preferably within three months of receipt of the records.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Implications: The direct effect is that the earlier award of Rs. 3,31,000/- payable by the appellant insurer is set aside and the Tribunal will reconsider both the quantum and the question of insurer's liability after limited additional evidence on the policy is allowed. The Court applied established principles on quantum calculation and the controlled reception of additional evidence; it did not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities.

    M/S. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smti. Kailash Mehta And Ors.

    S.K Homchaudhuri, J.:— This appeal is directed against the award dated 26.6.9.0 made by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Shillong in M.A.C Case No. 19/88.

    2. Facts of the case in brief are that on 12.2.84 one Sardanilal Mahta husband of the respondents No. 1 and father of respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 was killed in a Motor accident on the G.S Road at Police Bazar Shillong police found that the City Bus bearing registration No. MLK 654 belonging to the respondents No. 5 Srimati Asha Rana Das Choudhury was involved in the accident and the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle. Police registered shillong P.S Case No. 33(2)84 under section 279/337/304A IPC against the driver of the said vehicle. The respondent No. 1 Smti Kialash Mehta, the widow of the deceased S.L Mehta on her behalf as well on behalf of her minor children made an application before the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong on 18.10.88 claiming compensation against the appellant Insurance Company as well against the owner namely, the respondent No. 5 for the death of her husband S.L Mehta on 12.2.84 in the accident.

    3. Late S.L Mehta had been an employee of the Indian Air Force and in the claim application his income has been stated as Rs. 1129.64 per month. The claim application was obviously time barred. However the learned Tribunal being satisfied that the claimants are prevented by sufficient reasons in preferring the claim application in time condoned the delay and the application was registered as MAC Case No. 19/89. After receipt of notice the applicant Oriental Insurance Company as well as the respondent No. 5 the owner, contested the claim by filing written objection. In the claim application the claimant has stated that the vehicles namely MLK 654 was insured against the party risk with the appellant Oriental Insurance Company Shillong and Policy certificate No. was 31413/17/500.T/15/84 and the same was valid upto 19.7.84 In sub para 4 of Para 24 of the application, the claimant who stated that vehicle was used under the comprehensive policy issued by the appellant. The respondent No. 5 owner of the vehicle in the written objection while denying and disputing the allegations made in the claim application involving her vehicle, has stated in para & that the vehicle was insured against third party risk with Oreintal Insurance Company, Shillong Police Bazar and the policy certificate number was 31413/17/403.T/15/84 and the policy was valid upto 19.7.84 The appellant in the written objection did not specifically deny that the vehicle was insured with it against third party risk. However, taken a vague plea that whatever liability the Insurance Company and would be limited as per the agreement in the policy.

    4. In the bearing, the claimant examined 9 witnesses including herself in support of her claim. The owner examined 3 witnesses to establish that the city Bus bearing registration No. MLS 654, might have been involved in the accident, but not the vehicle No. MLK. 654 belonging to her. The appellant adduced no evidence. Although the learned Tribunal granted time to the appellant to produce copy of the insurance policy. The appellant failed to do so. The learned Tribunal thereafter by award dated 26.6.90 held that the vehicle of the respondent No. 5 bearing registration No. MLK. 654 was involved in the accident and that due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle the deceased was knocked down by it and was killed and determined the amount of compensation at Rs. 3,31,000/- to be payable by the appellant Oriental Insurance Company alone. After the award was made, the appellant filed an application for review of the award passed by the learned Tribunal contending that by order dated 11.12.89, the appellant was given opportunity to produce the policy No. 31413/17/400.T/15/84 which was valid upto 19.7.84 But the Shillong Bench of the appellant having code number 31418 and not 31413 appellant have to make correspondence with other concerned offices to locate the policy and to submit within the date fixed. But no reply was received, for which the appellant was unable to produce the same till 20.4.90 During 1986–1987 office of the appellant at Shillong was shifted to the present building and old record were dumped in store room during the shifting. However, ⅔ days before filing of the review petition an officer of the appellant while searching other documents, accidentally got the concerned papers relating to insurance of vehicle No. MLK 654 (Bus) bearing policy No. 31418/0/201.MV/72/84 and certificate no. 31418.IZ/400.T/15/84 for the period from 20.1.85 to 19.1.85 with limited liability to cover a maximum amount of Rs. 50,000/-. The appellant also annexed copy of the certificate of the policy to the application. The learned Tribunal by order dated 21.9.90 admitted the application for review of the award on the condition that the appellant insurance company would deposit half of the awarded sum in the court within 30 days for causing payment to the claimant and failing which the application for review would automatically stand rejected. The appellant could not deposit 50% of the amount of compensation within 30 days and, as such the review application stood automatically rejected. The appellant has thereafter, approached this court in this appeal.

    5. By order dated 15.2.91 the appeal was admitted and it was further ordered that the operation of the impugned award would remain suspended on condition that the appellant would pay Rs. 50,000/- to the claimant within one month from that date. It has been submitted at the bar that the amount of Rs. 50,000/- has been paid within one month. The appellant had also paid Rs. 15,000/- earlier on the principle of no fault liability as per provision of section 92-A of the M.V Act, 1939.

    6. We have heard Mr. B. Das, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. V.K Jindal, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 4. None appeared for the respondent No. 5. Mr. Das has assailed the impugned award mainly on the following grounds (i) the learned Tribunal has arbitrarily determined the amount of compensation to a highly excessive amount ignoring the settled principles of laws inasmuch as, although the monthly income of the deceased as per statement made in the claim application was Rs. 1129.64 the learned Tribunal arbitrarily took the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 2013/- for calculiting the amount of compensation and that the Tribunal has not made any deduction on account of uncertainity of life of the deceased, and Jump sum payment and (ii) the appellant's liability as per insurance policy being limited to a maximum amount of Rs. 50,000/- the appellant could not be saddled with the liability to fay the entire amount of compensation.

    7. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that it is well settled that income on the date of accident should form basis for calculating the amount of compensation payable to the claimant. The applicant in her application has stated that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 112964/- However on the basis of solidary statement of the claimant's witness No. 4 (who was examined on 10.7.89) “Present salary of the deceased would have been Rs. 1513/- plus Rs. 500/- local allowances” the monthly income of the deceased has been taken at Rs. 2013/- The monthly income salary or the deceased on 10.7.89 tan not form basis for calculating the amount of compensation payable to the claimant inasmuch as, the accident took place on 12.2.84 Mr. Das has further submitted that it is well settled that after working out the amount of compensation deduction upto the extent of 30% therefrom has to be made on account of uncertainity of life of the deceased and lump sum payment, while awarding the compensation. But the learned tribunal had made no such deduction while awarding compensation.

    8. Mr. V.K Jindal learned counsel for the claimant respondent on the other hand, has raised a preliminary objection and has submitted that the Insurance Company is not entitled to challenge the question of compensation awarded by learned Tribunal. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that due to revision of pay scale the monthly income of the deceased had increased and as such, the learned Tribunal was right in accepting the income at Rs. 2013/-. per month. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Insurance company can not challenge the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal in an appeal under section 110D of the M.V Act of 1939 and now under section 173 of the M.V Act of 1988. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hemendra Dutta Choudhury v. Arun Kumar Bordoloi, reported in 1987 (2) GLR 450, has held that an Insurance Company can challenge the quantum of award and also can question the finding regarding negligence of driver in an appeal filed by it under section 110-D of the M.V Act of 1939. There is no evidence on record that although the monthly income of the deceased on the date of accident was stated in the claim application at Rs. 1129.64/- due to revision of pay scale with retrospective effect monthly income of deceased increased from 1129.64 to Rs. 2013/- The monthly income of the deceased increased due to revision of pay scale as contended by the learned counsel for the claimant respondents is not supported by any evidence. On the question of monthly income of the deceased higher than what has been stated in the claim application, there is nothing on record except the solidary vague statement of the claimants witness No. 4 namely— “his present pay would have been Rs. 1,513/- plus Rs. 500/- local allowance”. The claimant's witness No. 4 was examined on 10.7.89 whereas the accident took place on 12.2.84 On a plain reading of the deposition of the claimant's witness No. 4 it becomes apparant that the monthly income of the deceased on 10.7.89 would have been 1,513/- plus Rs. 500/- as local allowance. What would have been the income of the deceased subsequent to his death is not relevant for the purpose of determining the compensation. The actual income of the deceased on the date of accident has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the amount of compensation. In the instant case, the monthly income of the deceased on the date of accident was Rs. 1,129.64/- and on the basis of which the compensation has to be calculated. It appears that the learned Tribunal on the basis of the aforesaid solidary vague statement of the claimant witness No. 4 on more conjecture and surmises, has taken the income of the deceased at Rs. 2013.00 per month and has thus erred in calculating the amount of compensation on the basis thereof.

    9. We also find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Tribunal erred in awarding the compensation without making deduction on account of uncertainity of life of the deceased and for lump sump payment from the calculated amount of compensation. It is well settled that deduction from the calculated amount of compensation to the maximum extent of 30% thereof, is to be made because of uncertainity of life and lumpsum payment of compensation. For the above reasons award cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside and the case should be remanded back to the learned Tribunal for determining the amount of compensation in accordance with law.

    10. The appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for allowing to adduce additional evidence to file and prove documents in connection with insurance policy No. 31418/0/201.MV-72/84 on the ground that the appellant was refule with the number of policy quated in the application claiming compensation, inasmuch as the code number of the Shillong Branch of the appellant was 31418 and not 31413 and also that the policy was misplaced due to the shifting of office at Shillong from one building to another in the year 1986–1987. The appellant's case is that as per the policy is it apparent that the appellant's liability is limited to the maximum amount of Rs. 50,000/- and under no circumstances the appellant can be saddled with the liability to pay compensation to the amount exceeding Rs. 50,000/-.

    11. Mr. Jindal learned counsel for the respondents has vehimently opposed the payer for reception of the insurance policy or paper connected therewith at this belated stage in this appeal. Mr. Jindal has submitted that the appellant ought to have produced the insurance or the documents before the learned Tribunal but the appellant has failed to do so although the Tribunal had given opportunity to produce the same. The learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the claimant gathered the particulars of policy from the document seized by the police and beyond that she could not have any acknowledge about the terms of the policy and that in sub-para 4 of paragraph 24 of the claim application the claimant has specifically stated that the policy was a comprehensive one and that statement has neither been denied by the appellant nor rubutted by adducing evidence. It is also too late for the appellant to approach this court for reception of the insurance policy or any paper connected therewith in evidence and to take shelter under it Mr. Jindal has also submitted that it is well, settled that an insurance Company must produce the insurance policy for doing the justice in a case. In support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore ((1988) 1 SCC 626 : AIR 1988 SC 719). In para 10 of said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:—

    “10. Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to refer to the attitude often adopted by the Insurance Companies, as was adopted even in this case, of not filing a copy of the policy before the Tribunal and even before the High Court in appeal. In this connection what is of significance is that the claimants for compensation under the Act are invariably not possessed of either the policy or a copy thereof. This court has consistently emphasised that it is the duty of the party which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof. This duty to greater in the case of instrumentalities of the state such as the appellant who are under an obligation to set fairly. In many cases even the owner of the vehicle for reasons know to him does not choose to produce the policy or a copy thereof. We accordingly wish to emphasise that in all such cases where the Insurance Company concerned wished to take a defence in claim petition that its liability is not in excess of the statutory liability it should file a copy of the insurance policy along with its defence. Even in the instant case had it been done so at the appropriate stage necessity of approaching this court in Civil Appeal would in all probability have been avoided. Fling a copy of the policy therefore, not only cuts short avoidable litigation but also help the Court in doing justice between the parties. The obligation on the part of the State or its instrumentalities to act fairly can never be overemphasised.”

    12. In support of the contention that a case for reception of additional evidence in the appellate stage the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of (1) K. Venkataramiah v. Sulharan Reddy (AIR 1963 SC 1526) and (2) Bhagwan Sweroon v. Moot Chand ((1983) 2 SCC 132 : AIR 1983 SC 355). Learned counsel has also placed reliance in the decisions of other High Courts.

    13. The learned counsel for the respondents in support of his contention has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other High Courts. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court on which the learned counsel has placed reliance are in the cases of (1) State of UP v. Manbodhanlal (AIR 1957 SC 912), (2) The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Panchan (AIR 1965 SC 1998) (3) Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B Sardar Ranjit (AIR 1968 SC 933) and (4) Shivaji Nitangekar Patel v. Mahesh Madav Gosavi ((1987) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1987 SC 294).

    14. In the case of Manbhodan Lal Supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lacuna in presenting its case at the proper stage, and to fill in gaps. Of course, the position is different, where the appellate court itself requires certain evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties. In the case of Venkataramiah supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence ‘to enable it to pronounce judgment’ but also for ‘any other substantial cause’. There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of record as it is, and it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still consider that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. In the case Municipal Corporation (supra), Hon'ble Supreme court: has held that the appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined but the requirement of the said court must be limited to those cases whom it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence, at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In the case of Associated Hotel supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 8 of the said decision held as follows:—

    “8. At the hearing of this appeal, the appellant moved an application for reception of the document as additional evidence. The genuineness of the documents was disputed by the respondent. In the Court below, the appellant made no attempt to prove these documents. We found no ground for directing a new trial. Having regard to all these facts, we dismissed the application.”

    15. In the case of Shivajirao Nilangekar supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the basic principle for admission of additional evidence is that the person seeking admission of additional evidence should be able to establish that the bast efforts such additional evidence could not have been adduced at the first instant. Secondly the party affected by the admission of additional evidence should have an opportunity to rebut such additional evidence and Thirdly, that additional evidence was relevant for the determination of the issue.

    16. From the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to by learned counsel for both parties, it is apparent that an appellate court may allow additional evidence if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment and or for any substantial cause. In the instant case according to the claimant as well as the owner, respondent, has the policy number or certificate cumber of the policy issued against third party risk in respect of the vehicle No. MLK. 654 (Bus) 31413/17/400.T/15184 and same was valid upto 19.1.85 Mr. Jindal has submitted to at the claimant respondent invariably was not aware either of the insurance policy or of any paper in connection therewith. The claimant's statement regarding the policy number and nature of the policy was based on the information gathered from the document seized by the police in connection with Shillong P.S Case No. 33(2)84 under Section 279/337/304A IPC against the driver of the Bus No. MLK-654. There cannot be any dispute that ordinarily, the claimant could not have knowledge about the insurance policy or any matter connected therewith. However, in the instant case, the respondent No. 5 the owner has also quoted identical certificate number of the insurance policy. No doubt, Insurance Company being a public undertaking has the obligation to act fairly and to the copy of the insurance policy or papers connected therewith to assist the Tribunal to see whether the policy was subsisting on the date of accident and if so, what was the extent of liability of the insurer. In the instant case, the appellant did not file the policy or any paper connected therewith inspite of giving time by the learned Tribunal. The perfunctory manner in which the appellant insurance company, contested the case is reprehensible. If the appellant was confused due to quoting of wrong number of policy or certificate of the policy and/or could not find out the policy issued to it, minimum thing expected of it was to file an application before the learned Tribunal, stating that the code number of policy of Shillong Branch of the Insurance company was not 31413 but 31418 and no such policy would be issued by the appellant from its Shillong Office or that the paper connected there with was misplaced.

    17. We are of the view that for the above laches on the part of the appellant the learned Tribunal would have been justified in penalising the Insurance Company to pay the entire amount of compensation if the learned Tribunal had no alternative source to lay hand on any paper in connection with the policy. In the instant case the owner of the vehicle in her written statement stated that the vehicle was insured with the appellant namely, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Shillong and the Insurance policy Certificate No. was 31413/17/400.T/15/84 and that the policy was valid upto 19.7.84 That apart, the claimant got the same number of policy certificate from the documents seized by police in connection with shillong P.S Case No. 33(2)84. The responsibility of the owner is not discharged only by quoting the Insurance Policy or number of certificate thereof. But for insuring against third party risk, the owner would have been solely liable to pay compensation. As such, the owner was also in duty bound to produce the paper connected with the Insurance Policy to satisfy the learned Tribunal that the vehicle was insured against third party risk and the policy was subsisting on the date of accident as well as the extent to which his liability has been indemnified by the insurer under the term of the policy. The learned Tribunal ought to have called upon the respondent No. 5, the owner, to produce the relevant paper in connection with the insurance policy with a view to finding out the extent of liability undertaken by the Insurance Company as per terms of the policy. The learned Tribunal could have also called for the documents of the insurance policy seized by the police in connection with Shillong P.S Case No. 33(2) 84. To steer clear of the confusion and/or obscurity created due to referring one-insurance policy by the claimant and the owner in one hand and another policy No. by the appellant Insurance Company, on the other hand we hold that the parties should be allowed to lead additional evidence to file and prove the insurance policy or papers connected therewith in their possession.

    18. We have already held that the impugned award cannot be sustained and the case should be remanded to the learned Tribunal for making award in accordance with law. As such instead of receiving, additional evidence in appeal, we directed the learned Tribunal to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence to the limited extent of filing add proving the insurance policy or papers connected therewith. The learned Tribunal may also call for the realvant papers seized in connection with Shillong P.S Case No. 33(2) 84 from the appropriate authority.

    19. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned award is set aside. The case is remitted back to the court of the learned Tribunal for deciding the case in accordance with law in the light of decision in this appeal after allowing the parties to adduce additional evidence to the limited extent of filing and proving the insurance policy and/or papers connected therewith. The learned Tribunal shall dispose of the case expeditiously preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of the records. The learned Tribunal shall proceed to dispose of the case with notice to the parties. We make no order as to costs.

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    M/S. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smti. Kailash Mehta And Ors.
    (May 5, 1992)