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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act,
  • Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the DRC Act
  • clauses of Section 22 of the DRC Act
  • provision of Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act
  • provisions of Section 25-B DRC Act
  • Section 25-B(1) of the DRC Act.
  • Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act,
  • Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
  • Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Section 25-B(1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act,
  • Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the DRC Act
  • clauses of Section 22 of the DRC Act
  • provision of Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act
  • provisions of Section 25-B DRC Act
  • Section 25-B(1) of the DRC Act.
  • Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act,
  • Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
  • Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Section 25-B(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenges the order dated 7 November 2013 which dismissed the petitioner's leave to defend application in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed period. The respondent (a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956) filed the eviction petition before the learned ARC asserting that Shop No. 29 had been let to the petitioner for commercial purposes and that the respondent company required the shop bona fide for its own use and for its employees as part of business expansion (including hiring over 40 employees). Summons were served on the petitioner's authorised representative on 16 July 2013; the petitioner filed the leave to defend application on 30 August 2013, a delay of 27 days. This petition was brought before this Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act challenging the non-condonation of the delay and related issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned ARC (Controller) had power to condone the 27-day delay in filing the leave to defend application in proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, having regard to the procedure prescribed by Section 25-B of the DRC Act and relevant Supreme Court authority.
  2. Whether the eviction petition as pleaded by the respondent (a company requiring the premises to expand its commercial office and for employees to sit) falls under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act or is governed instead by Section 22 of the DRC Act (which addresses recovery of possession where the landlord is a company and premises are required for use of its employees or for public institutions).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petition challenged the dismissal of the leave to defend application as time-barred and contended (through learned counsel) that this Court in inherent jurisdiction could condone the delay. (The opinion addresses and rejects this claim.)
  • Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that even if the leave to defend application were not allowed, the eviction petition's averments did not attract Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and that an eviction petition under Section 22 of the DRC Act should have been filed instead.
  • The petitioner relied on a decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Lal v. P. Tandon (21 (1982) DLT 16) to support the submission that where a company requires premises for use of its employees, Section 22 alone applies and not Section 14(1)(e).

Respondent's Contentions / Pleadings

  • The respondent (a company) pleaded that it required the tenanted shop bona fide for its own use and for use of its employees to build a new and bigger office, to accommodate additional staff as part of business revamp and expansion. The respondent stated it had no alternative or suitable non-residential premises and was incurring losses prompting the revamp.
  • The respondent initiated similar eviction processes against other tenants in the same complex (as stated in its eviction petition).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
<a href="/judgement/in/5609aeb6e4b0149711414828" id="jud1">Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) Through Its Lrs..</a>, (2010) 2 SCC 15 The requirement under Section 25-B (and Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act as quoted) that a tenant must obtain leave to contest eviction within the prescribed time and that in default of such leave or appearance the landlord's statements are deemed admitted; and that the special provision (Section 25-B) must be followed and does not permit condonation of delay by the Controller. The court applied Prithipal Singh to hold that the Controller had no power to condone the delay in filing the leave to defend application and that this Court, exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8), likewise had no power to condone that delay.
<a href="/judgement/in/5609ae96e4b0149711414397" id="jud2">Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs v. Union of India</a>, (2008) 5 SCC 287 Identified as a Supreme Court decision after which Section 14(1)(e) was considered applicable to residential premises; used to contextualise earlier decisions. The court relied on the change in law post-Satyawati Sharma to distinguish earlier local decisions (such as Madan Mohan Lal) rendered before Satyawati Sharma altered the scope of Section 14(1)(e).
<a href="/judgement/in/56090999e4b0149711170206" id="jud3">Madan Mohan Lal v. P. Tandon</a>, 21 (1982) DLT 16 Held that if a company or body corporate requires premises for use of its employees, Section 22 alone would apply and not Section 14(1)(e) (decision rendered before Satyawati Sharma). The petitioner relied on this decision, but the court found it inapplicable because the eviction petition showed the premises were required for commercial office use of the company (not for residential accommodation of employees) and because Madan Mohan Lal was decided before Satyawati Sharma.
<a href="/judgement/in/56090e84e4b014971117c7be" id="jud0">Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. v. Sitar Ram Goel</a>, RC Rev. No. 401/2012 decided on 14 August, 2012 Applied in a context where the landlord pleaded requirement of premises for fulfilling the residential accommodation needs of employees. The court held this decision inapplicable to the present facts because in Superior Exim the landlord had pleaded residential accommodation need for employees, whereas in the present case the respondent pleaded requirement for commercial office expansion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two connected strands of analysis.

  1. On the procedural point regarding the 27-day delay in filing the leave to defend application, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Prithipal Singh. That decision emphasises that the special procedure prescribed under Section 25-B (and its sub-sections) is mandatory for applications on the ground of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, and that the Controller has no power to condone delay beyond the timeline prescribed by that provision. Applying this principle, the court held that the learned ARC committed no illegality in refusing to condone the delay and that this Court, in supervisory jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8), likewise has no power to condone the delay.
  2. On the substantive classification of the eviction petition, the court examined the pleadings in the eviction petition and the statutory text of Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22. The respondent had pleaded the requirement of the shop for commercial expansion and office accommodation for employees (to seat new hires), not residential accommodation for employees. The court analysed the four clauses of Section 22 and found none applicable: (a) the petitioner was not an employee who had ceased to be in service; (b) there was no allegation of contravention of terms of occupancy; (c) there was no claim of unauthorized occupation; and (d) the respondent was not a public institution as defined in the Act. Therefore Section 22 did not apply. The court also considered earlier local decisions relied upon by the petitioner (such as Madan Mohan Lal and Superior Exim) and explained they were inapplicable on the facts (and in Madan Mohan Lal's case, pre-dated Satyawati Sharma which altered the scope of Section 14(1)(e)). The court concluded the eviction petition sought possession for the company's own commercial use and that the procedural bar under Section 25-B could not be bypassed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition and the application are dismissed.

Implications:

  • The refusal by the learned ARC to condone the 27-day delay in filing the leave to defend application is upheld: the Controller had no power to condone the delay in view of the requirement of Section 25-B and the Supreme Court's decision in Prithipal Singh.
  • This Court, exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, does not have the power to condone such delay where the statutory procedure does not permit it.
  • The court found that, on the facts pleaded, Section 22 of the DRC Act did not apply because the premises were pleaded as required for commercial office expansion of the company (not as residential accommodation for employees), and therefore the eviction petition as framed under Section 14(1)(e) was appropriate on the pleadings; the petitioner's attempt to recharacterise it under Section 22 failed on the facts.
  • The decision applies existing precedent and statutory interpretation to the facts; the court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying the cited authorities.
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    Shri Bhim Sen Batra Petitioner v. M/S. Shreyans Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.

    MUKTA GUPTA, J. (ORAL)

    1. Aggrieved by the order dated 7th November, 2013 whereby the leave to defend application of the petitioner in an eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act by the respondent was dismissed being beyond the period prescribed, the petitioner prefers the present petition.

    2. The Respondent filed the eviction petition before the learned ARC under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act stating that the Respondent was a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, Shri Vinod Nair is the Principal Officer and Attorney of the Respondent Company and is duly authorized to sign, verify and institute the eviction petition. It is further stated that Shop No. 29, 9062, Ram Bagh, Azad Market, Delhi-110006 had been let out to the Petitioner for commercial purposes from where the Petitioner was carrying his business activity. It was stated that the Respondent Company was incurring losses for a long time and thus to revamp its business, the Respondent Company requires place for building proper infrastructure and office to be used by its employees as per the plan finalized. The Respondent Company is in the process of hiring more than 40 new employees and therefore it has to build up a new and bigger office. The Respondent Company requires the said shop bona fidely for its own use and for the use of its employees and Respondent Company does not have any alterative or suitable non-residential premises. The Respondent Company is presently accommodating in shop No. 21 of the said complex. It is further stated that the Respondent Company has initiated similar process of eviction against the other ten tenants in various shops in the complex.

    3. Summons in the present eviction petition were served upon the authorized representative of the petitioner on 16 July, 2013 and the leave to defend application was filed by the petitioner before the learned ARC only on 30 August, 2013. Thus admittedly there was a delay of 27 days in filing the leave to defend application.

    4. In Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) Through Its Lrs.., (2010) 2 SCC 15 the Supreme Court held:

    “16. From a careful perusal of Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act, it would be clearly evident that the tenant shall not be permitted to contest the prayer for eviction unless he files an affidavit before the Controller stating the ground on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller. This Section also clearly indicates that in default of his appearance in compliance with the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the eviction proceeding shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground mentioned in the eviction petition. At this stage, we may also note that in Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act read with Third Schedule, it has been made clear by the Legislature that if the summons of the proceeding is received by the tenant, he has to appear and ask for leave to contest the eviction proceeding within 15 days from the date of service of notice upon the tenant and if he fails to do so, automatically, an order of eviction in favour of the landlord on the ground of bona fide requirement shall be made.”

    5. Thus noting the dominant object of the amending Act so as to provide a speedy, expeditious and effective remedy for a class of landlords contemplated by sections 14(1)(e) of the drc act and for avoiding unusual dilatory process, it was held that Section 25-B(1) being a special provision and every application on the ground of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act is required to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified under Section 25-B(1) of the DRC Act. Since no power has been conferred on the Controller apart from Rule 23 which is a general rule, the Controller is required to be guided with the provisions of Section 25-B DRC Act and thus there was no power with the Controller to condone the delay in filing the leave to defend application.

    6. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh (supra) it cannot be said that this Court in its inherent jurisdiction has power to condone the delay. This Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, acts in a supervisory capacity to see whether any illegality has been committed by the learned ARC. Thus the learned ARC committed no illegality in not condoning the delay nor this Court has the power to condone the delay in filing the leave to defend application.

    7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further stated that even if the leave to defend application of the Petitioner was not to be allowed and the averments in the eviction petition are to be taken on their face value the same do not attract provision of Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act and an eviction petition under section 22 of the drc act only could have been filed. Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the DRC Act provide as:

    14(1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

    …..

    ……

    …..

    22. Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases.- Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in his behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Controller is satisfied-

    (a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or

    (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises; or

    (c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises; or

    (d) that the premises are required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities.

    8. A perusal of the eviction petition as noted above would show that the premises was required for commercial purposes for the Respondent Company to extend its office where it can arrange for the sitting of the employees as it was going to recruit 40 more employees to expand its business and was not required for the residential purposes of the employees. The first three clauses of Section 22 of the DRC Act have no application to the facts of the present case. The Petitioner is not in service of the Respondent, nor it is alleged that the Petitioner has contravened the terms of occupancy of the premises nor is an unauthorized occupant. Even Clause (d) is not applicable as the Respondent is not a public institution. ‘Public Institution’ has been defined in the explanation to Section 22 which includes Educational Institutions, Library, Hospital and Charitable Dispensary but does not include any such institution set up by any private trust.

    9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Lal v. P. Tandon, 21 (1982) DLT 16 wherein this Court held that if the company or a body corporate requires the premises for the use of its employees Section 22 DRC Act alone would apply and not Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The said decision was rendered by this Court before the decision of the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287 when Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act was applicable to the residential premises only and thus this Court held that if the premises was required for the residence of the employees then section 22 of the drc act would be applicable. As noted from the contents of the eviction petition, the Respondent clearly stated that the tenanted premises was required to expand its business and for this reason it requires the premises for its own use and the use of its employees. The tenanted premises was required as a commercial premises and not as a residential premises for the employees. Even if the employees sit in the office, the same cannot be said that the premises are required for the use of the employees. There is no gainsaying that it is for the use of the company itself. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel in Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. v. Sitar Ram Goel, RC Rev. No. 401/2012 decided on 14 August, 2012 is also not applicable because in the eviction petition therein the landlord had stated that he required the premises to fulfill the need of residential accommodation of the employees.

    10. Consequently, I find no force in the present petition. The petition and the application are dismissed.

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    Shri Bhim Sen Batra Petitioner v. M/S. Shreyans Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.
    (May 19, 2015)