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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC
  • Order 39 Rules 1&2 CPC.19.
  • Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC
  • Order 39 Rule 4
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC
  • Order 39 Rules 1&2 CPC.19.
  • Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC
  • Order 39 Rule 4
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the appellant/defendant from using the trade mark “KARIM'S” or any deceptively similar mark. The suit was accompanied by an application for interim relief, resulting in an ex parte ad interim order dated 7 September 2012 restraining the appellant/defendant from using the name “KARIM MUGHLAI CUISINE” or any similar name. The appellant/defendant contested the interim relief and applied under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC for vacation of the ex parte order. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 2 July 2013, confirmed the interim order and dismissed the appellant/defendant’s application. The appellant/defendant filed an appeal challenging the said order and also the dismissal of an application for modification of the order dated 2 July 2013. The appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation of 220 days delay in filing the appeal. The court heard the merits of the appeal despite the delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Single Judge erred in confirming the ex parte interim injunction restraining the appellant/defendant from using the trade mark “KARIM'S” or any deceptively similar mark.
  2. Whether the appellant/defendant was entitled to vacation of the ex parte interim order under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC.
  3. Whether the appellant/defendant’s plea of suppression of material facts by the respondent/plaintiff disentitled the latter from interim relief.
  4. Whether the appeal challenging the interim order is barred by delay and whether condonation of delay should be granted.
  5. Whether the application for modification of the interim order on the ground of other users of the name “KARIM” was rightly dismissed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent/plaintiff suppressed material facts, including the existence of a Trust Deed and a Franchise Agreement, and was not the rightful owner of the trade mark “KARIM” or “KARIM'S”.
  • The trade mark registration obtained by the respondent/plaintiff was fraudulent due to suppression of material facts.
  • The appellant/defendant claimed inheritance rights to the trade mark and goodwill through a Will and Trust Deed, entitling them to use the trade mark subject to payment of royalty.
  • The respondent/plaintiff was not entitled to interim relief as it did not approach the court with clean hands, relying on the principle that courts frown upon litigants who conceal facts to mislead the court (citing Amar Singh v. Union of India).
  • The respondent/plaintiff misrepresented in the plaint by claiming ownership of the trade mark since 1913 without disclosing the Trust.
  • The appellant/defendant sought modification of the interim order on the ground that others were also using the name “KARIM” in the food business.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent/plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trade mark “KARIM” and “KARIM'S”.
  • The Will relied upon by the appellant/defendant is disputed and alleged to be a forgery.
  • There are inconsistencies between the Will and the Trust Deed.
  • The non-production of the Trust Deed or Franchise Agreement at the suit stage did not prejudice the respondent/plaintiff’s case and in fact strengthened it.
  • The payment of royalty by the respondent/plaintiff to the Trust was a voluntary charitable contribution and did not affect ownership.
  • The appellant/defendant had obtained a license through a Franchise Agreement to use the trade mark, which was valid until March 2014.
  • The restaurants using the name “KARIM” or variants thereof were operating with the respondent/plaintiff’s permission and by paying royalty, negating the appellant/defendant’s modification application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Glaxo Smith Kline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Union of India, 185 (2011) DLT 540 (Para 8) Discretionary orders granting interim relief will not be interfered with on appeal unless the original order is perverse or without cogent reasoning. The court applied this principle to uphold the learned Single Judge’s order granting interim relief, finding no perversity in the reasoning.
Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69 (Para 53) Litigants who initiate proceedings without full disclosure of material facts and with intent to mislead the court are not entitled to be heard on the merits. The court considered the appellant’s reliance on this principle but held that the respondent/plaintiff’s suppression at the registration stage was irrelevant to interim relief under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court noted that the respondent/plaintiff was the registered proprietor of the trade marks “KARIM” and “KARIM'S”. The appellant/defendant admitted this registration and that any alleged misrepresentation occurred before the Registrar of Trademarks, not before the court. The court observed that the appropriate forum to challenge such registration was through revocation proceedings, not at the interim relief stage under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

The court analyzed the pleadings and found that the respondent/plaintiff only claimed “association” with the trade mark since 1913 and relied on its registered ownership for the suit. The court held that any suppression by the respondent/plaintiff at the registration stage was irrelevant to the grant of interim relief before it.

The appellant/defendant’s claim of inheritance and reliance on a Will and Trust Deed was examined. The learned Single Judge had found the Will unreliable and noted inconsistencies between the Will and Trust Deed. The court agreed that these issues required merits-based examination by appropriate forums and did not justify vacating the interim order.

The court also gave weight to the fact that the appellant/defendant had obtained a license via a Franchise Agreement from the respondent/plaintiff to use the trade mark and had paid royalties accordingly. This supported the grant of interim relief.

Regarding the application for modification of the interim order based on alleged use of the name “KARIM” by others, the court found no error in the learned Single Judge’s dismissal of the application, especially since the respondent/plaintiff stated that the Trust was not allowing such use by others.

Overall, the court found no perversity or error in the impugned orders and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The court upheld the learned Single Judge’s order granting interim injunction restraining the appellant/defendant from using the trade mark “KARIM'S” or similar marks. The appellant/defendant’s contention of suppression of material facts by the respondent/plaintiff was held to be irrelevant at the interim relief stage, and the proper remedy lay in revocation proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks. The dismissal of the application for modification of the interim order was also affirmed. This decision directly affects the parties by maintaining the status quo in favor of the respondent/plaintiff but does not set any new precedent.

    Md. Iftekhar v. M/S. Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd.

    CM No. 7295/2014 (for exemption).

    1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

    2. The CM stands disposed of.

    FAO(OS) 201/2014, CM No. 7294/2014 (for stay) & CM No. 7296/2014 (for condonation of 220 days delay in filing the appeal).

    3. The appeal impugns, (a) the order dated 2nd July, 2013 of the learned Single Judge in CS(OS) No. 2708/2012 filed by the respondent, of allowing the application of the respondent/plaintiff under order 39 rule 1&2 cpc by confirming the ex parte ad interim order dated 7th September, 2012 and dismissing the application filed by the appellant/defendant under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC; and, (b) the order dated 27 March, 2014 of dismissal of IA No. 15660/2013 filed by the appellant/defendant for modification of the order dated 2 July, 2013.

    4. The appeal, in so far as challenges the order dated 2 July, 2013, is barred by time and is accompanied with an application for condonation of 220 days delay in filing the same.

    5. However the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff being on caveat appears and we have without considering whether there are sufficient grounds for condonation of delay or not, heard the counsels on merits.

    6. The respondent/plaintiff has filed the suit from which this appeal arises for permanent injunction restraining the appellant/defendant from using in any manner whatsoever the trade mark “KARIM'S” or any other mark identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's registered trade mark “KARIM”&“KARIM'S” and for ancillary reliefs. The suit was accompanied with an application for interim relief and vide ex parte ad interim order dated 7 September, 2012 the appellant/defendant was restrained from using the name of “KARIM MUGHLAI CUISINE” or any other name identical or deceptively similar to the name KARIM/KARIM'S. The appellant/defendant besides contesting the said application for interim relief, as aforesaid also applied under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC for vacation of the ex parte order dated 7 September, 2012.

    7. The learned Single Judge has vide impugned order dated 2 July, 2013 inter alia found/observed/held:-

    (i) that on 5 February, 2013 an undertaking was given by the appellant/defendant to the Court that they would not run their restaurant in the name of KARIM MUGHLAI CUISINE or in the name of KARIM;

    (ii) that it was the plea of the appellant/defendant,

    (a) that the respondent/plaintiff was/is guilty of suppression of material facts; that the respondent/plaintiff is not the owner of the trademark KARIM or KARIM'S despite having obtained registration thereof; the said registration was obtained fraudulently by suppressing the material facts;

    (b) the appellant/defendant produced before the learned Single Judge copy of the Trust Deed dated 13 June, 1996 which notes that late Mr. Haji Zahiruddin had by a will bequeathed to the Karim's Moghlai Trust the right to receive royalty for the use of the trade name KARIM as well as the goodwill;

    (c) the appellant/defendant also relied on a Will dated 20 June 1996 purportedly executed by late Mr. Haji Zahiruddin in terms of which the right to receive royalty for use of the trade name and goodwill was bequeathed by him as owner of the Trust; under the said Will the right to use the trade name KARIM/KARIM'S was given to all family members for running any similar business or restaurants, subject to their paying a royalty of 1% on the gross sale turn over to the Trust;

    (d) the appellant/defendant also claimed to be a inheritor of the name and goodwill of KARIM'S;

    (e) the appellant/defendant also relied on documents to show that the respondent/plaintiff itself had been paying royalty to the Trust from 1994 to 2004 and which was claimed to be a clear admission by the respondent/plaintiff that it was not the owner or proprietor of the trade marks in question;

    (f) that the Director of the respondent/plaintiff had tricked the appellant/defendant to enter into a Franchise Agreement dated 1st June, 2009 and which Franchise Agreement was valid till 12 March, 2014 and under which Agreement the respondent/plaintiff had given a right to the appellant/defendant to use the name KARIM MUGHLAI CUISINE;

    (iii) that the respondent/plaintiff had disputed the Will contending it to be a forgery;

    (iv) it was further the plea of the respondent/plaintiff,

    (a) that there were mutual inconsistencies in the Will on the one hand and the Trust Deed dated 20 June, 1996 on the other;

    (b) that the respondent/plaintiff did not have access to the relevant papers and thus the Trust Deed could not be filed along with the plaint;

    (c) that non-production of the Trust Deed or the Franchise Agreement made no difference to the case of the respondent/plaintiff and rather the same strengthened the case of the respondent/plaintiff; that the Franchise Agreement was a clear acknowledgement by the appellant/defendant of the fact that the respondent/plaintiff was the owner and proprietor of the marks in question;

    (d) that the payment by the respondent/plaintiff of the royalty to the Trust was in the nature of a voluntary contribution for charity;

    (v) the learned Single Judge prima facie found,

    (a) the copy of the Will produced by the appellant/defendant to be unreliable for the reason of the inherent inconsistencies therein;

    (b) that there were indeed inconsistencies between the Trust Deed and the alleged Will;

    (c) that the appellant/defendant had challenged the validity of the registration of the marks in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and that challenge was to be examined on merits by the fora concerned; and,

    (d) that nothing in the Trust Deed contradicted the case of the respondent/plaintiff.

    8. The learned Single Judge having given cogent reasoning in the impugned order on the application for interim relief and it being a settled principle of law that such discretionary orders would not be interfered in appeal unless the reasoning given is perverse and merely for the reason that the Appellate Court on an independent assessment may have arrived at a different finding, (see Glaxo Smith Kline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Union of India185 (2011) DLT 540 (Para 8)) we have at the outset enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant as to what is the ground of challenge.

    9. The counsel for the appellant/defendant has raised only one argument. It is contended that it having been abundantly borne out that the respondent/plaintiff did not approach the Court with clean hands, making a clean breast of all the concerned documents and the respondent/plaintiff having been found to be in suppression of the Trust Deed and the Franchise Agreement, was not entitled to any interim relief and the learned Single Judge has not considered the said aspect of the matter. Reliance is placed on para 53 of Amar singh v. Union of India(2011) 7 SCC 69 laying down that the Courts frown upon litigants who, with the intent to deceive and mislead the Courts initiate proceedings without full disclosure of facts and that such litigants are not entitled to be heard on the merits of their case.

    10. We have enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant whether not the registration of the trademarks, to restrain infringement of which the suit from which this appeal arises has been filed, stands in the name of the respondent/plaintiff.

    11. The counsel for the appellant/defendant agrees.

    12. We have further enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant whether not the misrepresentation if any was before the Registrar of Trademarks in obtaining registration in the name of the respondent/plaintiff rather than in the name of the Trust.

    13. The counsel for the appellant/defendant again replies in the affirmative.

    14. We have then enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant as to how the respondent/plaintiff could be denied interim relief for the reason of having practiced a concealment at the time of registration of the trade mark and not before this Court and whether not the remedy for such concealment is in the proceedings for revocation of the registration in favour of the respondent/plaintiff.

    15. Though the counsel for the appellant/defendant agrees but further contends that the respondent/plaintiff misrepresented in the plaint that it was the owner of the said trade mark since the year 1913. It is argued that while stating so, it was incumbent upon the respondent/plaintiff to disclose about the Trust and which has not been done.

    16. To appreciate the aforesaid contention we have combed the plaint.

    17. The respondent/plaintiff, in the plaint, has claimed “association” since the year 1913 and has disclosed that the founder of the respondent/plaintiff namely Haji Karim Zahiruddin had used the initial letters of his name to start the brand name KARIM'S and the respondent/plaintiff was the owner of the trade mark.

    18. We are of the view that the respondent/plaintiff having obtained the registration of the trade mark in its name, the case of the respondent/plaintiff in the suit/plaint was on the basis of the said registration. Further, the respondent/plaintiff did not claim to be the “owner/proprietor” of the trade mark from the year 1913 and rather claimed “association” with trade mark. Owing to the supervening circumstance of the respondent/plaintiff being the registered proprietor of the trade mark, we are of the view that the suppression if any practiced by the respondent/plaintiff in obtaining such registration was/is of no relevance and cannot be said to be a factor which the respondent/plaintiff was bound to disclose to this Court, at least at the stage of Order 39 Rules 1&2 CPC.

    19. We are further of the view that in the face of the registration of the trade marks in the name of the respondent/plaintiff, the manner of such registration pales into insignificance.

    20. Besides the factum of the appellant/defendant having obtained license/rights from the respondent/plaintiff to use the said trade mark and the factum of the appellant/defendant having paid royalty/charges to the respondent/plaintiff for such user of the trade mark was/is a relevant factor and which rightly prevailed with the learned Single Judge in granting the interim relief.

    21. We do not find any perversity in the order.

    22. The counsel for the appellant/defendant has then invited attention to the application filed by the appellant/defendant for modification of the order dated 2 July, 2013 on the ground that others were also using the name KARIM in relation to foods business.

    23. The learned Single Judge has vide order dated 27 March, 2014 held that it was the stand of the respondent/plaintiff in response thereto that the Trust was not receiving any royalty from any individual/stores/business entity/traders and that the Trust was not allowing the trade name KARIM/KARIM'S/KAREEM or any other variants thereof upon payment of any royalty or otherwise and accordingly dismissed the application.

    24. No error is found in the said part of the order also.

    25. We may notice that it was/is the plea of the respondent/plaintiff that the restaurants/eating places with the trade name KARIM/KARIM'S were being run with the permission of the respondent/plaintiff and by paying royalty to the respondent/plaintiff. In view of the said statement which we have no reason to doubt, the said ground is also not available.

    26. There is thus no merit in the appeal.

    Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Md. Iftekhar v. M/S. Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd.
    (May 5, 2014)