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  • Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special) Provisions Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act)
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • provisions of Section 22(1)
  • Indian Companies Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special) Provisions Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act)
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • provisions of Section 22(1)
  • Indian Companies Act
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Indermeet Kaur, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

(Narrative derived solely from the provided opinion)

The respondent (plaintiff in the suit) filed CS(OS) No. 2249/2008 seeking recovery of Rs. 44,05,803.47 (principal Rs. 24,83,409.27; interest Rs. 15,39,714.20; sales tax Rs. 3,82,680/-) for crates and packaging materials supplied to the appellant (a scooter-manufacturing company). The appellant had been declared a sick company by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and raised a preliminary objection under Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special) Provisions Act, 1985 (SICA) that the suit could not proceed without the BIFR's permission. The appellant filed a separate application under Section 22(1) (I.A. No. 7089/2009) which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 17.01.2011. The appellant challenged that dismissal by way of this appeal.

Key factual points recorded in the opinion include: (a) the appellant's registration as a sick company before the BIFR is not disputed; (b) the appellant admitted, in its audited accounts and in the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) circulated by the BIFR, a liability of Rs. 21,74,490.88 to the respondent; and (c) there remained a disputed component of approximately Rs. 3,00,000/- relating to alleged sales tax/C-forms. The Single Judge dismissed the Section 22 application on the basis that the appellant did not place on record documents showing the current status of revival/rehabilitation and because of alleged confusion over the exact admitted amount.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the appellant company having been declared a sick company, the respondent's suit for recovery of money can proceed in the absence of the consent of the BIFR under Section 22(1) of the SICA?
  2. Whether Section 22(1) applies where part (but not necessarily the entire claimed amount) of the liability is included in the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) pending before the BIFR?
  3. Whether the precedent in Dy. Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandel Pharmaceuticals (2007/1997 SCC/AIR citation cited in the opinion) is applicable to the facts of this case?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The suit is not maintainable because the appellant-company is a sick industrial company and, under Section 22(1) of the SICA, proceedings (including suits for recovery of money) cannot proceed without the consent of the BIFR.
  • The appellant placed on record the BIFR reference (case No. 180/2006), and relied on audited accounts and an affidavit (through company officers) showing that the admitted liability in the books and in the DRS was Rs. 21,74,490.88 (a figure different from the principal sum sued for).
  • The discrepancy between the suit's principal figure (Rs. 24,83,409.27) and the audited/DRS figure (Rs. 21,74,490.88) was explained by differences in opening balances, a disputed bill for material allegedly not received (Bill No. 126 dated 23.10.2005), and freight charges that the respondent had not adjusted; the appellant asserted that once adjustments were made the figures would reconcile to Rs. 21,74,490.88.
  • Regarding C-Forms and sales-tax points: the appellant explained inability to provide C-Forms in 2006 due to a lock-out/strike but stated a willingness to provide C-Forms and allow adjustments; it further undertook to seek modification of the DRS before the BIFR if required.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent instituted the recovery suit for the larger sum claimed (Rs. 44,05,803.47) including interest and sales tax.
  • In reply/affidavit the respondent acknowledged that, as per their auditor's report, it may not be possible to claim adjustment against the C-Forms because the amounts might already have been paid to the concerned authorities in 2006; otherwise, the respondent did not dispute the remaining averments in the appellant's affidavit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raheja Universal Ltd. v. NRC Limited, AIR 2012 SC 1440 Clarifies that Section 22(1) creates a statutory injunction: where an inquiry under Section 16 is pending, a scheme under Section 17 is under preparation/consideration, a sanctioned scheme is under implementation, or an appeal under Section 25 is pending, no suit for recovery of money or similar proceedings shall lie or proceed except with the consent of the Board/Appellate Authority. The court relied on this Supreme Court enunciation to reaffirm that Section 22(1) operates to suspend proceedings where the relevant amount or liability is reflected in a scheme under consideration/implementation; because the appellant's admitted liability (Rs. 21,74,490.88) appears in the DRS, Section 22(1) applies and the suit cannot proceed without BIFR consent.
Dy. Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, (1997) 10 SCC 649 : AIR 1997 SC 2007 Held that certain amounts like sales tax, which a sick company is able to collect after the date of sanction of a scheme, legitimately belong to the revenue and may not be covered by Section 22 of SICA — hence, such sums may not attract the statutory bar in Section 22. The court held that the Corromandal ratio is inapplicable to the present factual scenario. Corromandal concerned sales-tax dues of the revenue department (amounts collected on behalf of government) and was not about a company’s liability properly reflected as part of the scheme; therefore, its principle could not be applied to defeat the statutory injunction in Section 22 where the liability is part of the DRS.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a fact-specific application of Section 22(1) of the SICA to the recorded background. Its analytical steps, as expressed in the opinion, are as follows:

  1. Establishing factual premises: it is undisputed that the appellant company is a sick company before the BIFR and that the appellant admits a liability of Rs. 21,74,490.88 in its audited accounts and in the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) before the BIFR. A residual dispute of around Rs. 3,00,000/- relating to sales tax/C-forms remained.
  2. Identifying the legal rule: the court relied on the Supreme Court's exposition in Raheja Universal that Section 22(1) mandates suspension of proceedings (including suits for recovery of money) where an inquiry/scheme/appeal is pending or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation, and when the amount/award/liability finds mention in the sanctioned/considered scheme.
  3. Applying rule to facts: because the admitted liability of Rs. 21,74,490.88 is included in the DRS pending before the BIFR, that amount is covered by the statutory injunction in Section 22(1). The court emphasized the wide sweep of Section 22's language and explained that, given the parties maintained a running account with payments over time, it would not be practicable to segregate precisely which elements of debt were recoverable outside the scheme—thus even if the full suit amount is not identical to the DRS figure, Section 22(1) still precludes continuation of the suit.
  4. Addressing the single judge's approach and Corromandal: the court found that the learned Single Judge erred in applying the Corromandal principle; Corromandal related to sales tax amounts belonging to revenue and not to a company's admitted liabilities in a rehabilitation scheme. Therefore Corromandal was inapplicable to the facts here.
  5. Providing procedural guidance: the court explained that, in the circumstances, the respondent has alternative recourse — it may approach the BIFR to seek leave to continue the suit for the balance amount, or seek enhancement of the amount included in the scheme if permissible by law.

The court thus concluded that the statutory injunction under Section 22(1) applies where the liability (or a substantial part of it) is reflected in the DRS, and continuation of the recovery suit without BIFR consent would be barred.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed. The court held that Section 22(1) of the SICA applies because the appellant's admitted liability of Rs. 21,74,490.88 is included in the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme pending before the BIFR; accordingly, the suit for recovery cannot proceed without the consent of the BIFR.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The suit proceedings for recovery of money cannot continue in the ordinary courts in the absence of BIFR consent in respect of the liability that is included in the DRS.
  • The respondent may approach the BIFR to seek leave for continuation of the suit in respect of any balance amount not covered, or may seek enhancement of the amount included in the scheme if so permitted by law.
  • Parties were directed to bear their own costs by the court's final order.

Broader implications and precedent: The court applied and followed the Supreme Court's exposition in Raheja Universal regarding the operation of Section 22(1). The opinion expressly found the Corromandal rule inapplicable to these facts. The decision is an application of established principles governing SICA and BIFR jurisdiction rather than a statement that establishes a new legal principle.

    Lml Ltd. v. Sunil Mittal .

    Indermeet Kaur, J.:— This appeal is directed against the order dated 17.01.2011 wherein an application filed by the petitioner (defendant in the suit) (I.A No. 7089/2009) under Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special) Provisions Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) had been dismissed.

    2. Record shows that the respondent (plaintiff in the suit) had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 44,05,803.47 of which the principal amount was Rs. 24,83,409.27; there was an interest figure of Rs. 15,39,714.20 and sales tax was claimed in the sum of Rs. 3,82,680/-. The suit was numbered as CS(OS) No. 2249/2008. The plaintiff claiming himself to the proprietor of M/s Shree Shyam Packaging Industries, Gulshan Park, Opposite Rajdhani Dal Mills, Main Rohtak Road, Nangloi, Delhi was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of packaging material. The appellant was a company engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of two wheeler scooter in the domestic as also in the foreign market. The appellant had sent a requirement to the respondent for packaging of its scooters which were meant for export; these crates were supplied by the respondent. The bills of the respondent remained unpaid which had culminated in the principal figure of Rs. 24,83,409.87. Suit was accordingly filed for the recovery of the principal amount. Interest was claimed at 24% per annum; the suit amount also included the alleged sales tax dues claimed by respondent.

    3. Written statement was filed by the appellant. The claim of the respondent was disputed. The preliminary objection raised was that the suit of the respondent was not maintainable as the petitioner was a sick company and in view of the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA without the permission of the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) suit could not proceed. A separate application under Section 22(1) of the said Act was also filed; order passed by the BIFR (case No. 180/2006) on a reference by the appellant company was placed on record. An affidavit of the appellant company through its Director D.R Dogra was also placed before the learned Single Judge to substantiate the argument of the appellant that the claim made by the respondent was for a sum of Rs. 21,74,490.88 which was clear from the audited statement of account of the respondent company itself; it was not Rs. 24,83,409.27.

    4. The fact that the company was registered as a sick company before the BIFR is not in dispute. The fact that a sum of Rs. 21,74,490.88 has been admitted by the appellant as due and payable to the respondent is also not in dispute. The principal amount claimed in the suit is, however, a different figure; it is Rs. 24,83,409.27 which figure is noted supra has been disputed by the appellant; submission of the appellant on affidavit being that figure is not in conformity with the statement of account of the respondent itself.

    5. The short question which had arisen before the learned single Judge was whether in view of the aforenoted factual scenario i.e the appellant company having been declared as a sick company by the BIFR; could the suit filed by the respondent seeking recovery of money be proceeded with in the absence of permission from the BIFR.

    6. Both the parties had addressed their legal submissions before the learned single Judge as is evident from the impugned order. The learned single Judge was of the view that although admittedly the appellant company is a sick company but the appellant not having placed on record any document to show the current status of the company i.e the stage of its revival/rehabilitation prayer under Section 22 of the said Act could not be granted. He was of the view that the appellant company had in fact created a confusion with regard to the actual amount which was claimed by the respondent; since the entire amount did not stand admitted by the respondent, the application filed by the petitioner was misconceived; it was accordingly dismissed. Learned single Judge had relied upon the ratio laid by the Supreme Court in Dy. Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, (1997) 10 SCC 649 : AIR 1997 SC 2007 to return a finding that a suit simplicter for recovery of money need not be stayed unless the amount is fully covered in the scheme. The legal enunciation was deduced correctly but the learned single Judge has faulted in the application of the legal proposition to the facts in the correct perspective.

    7. Appellant is aggrieved by the a forenoted finding.

    8. On 22.9.2011 a Bench of this Court had noted the admission made by the appellant in the affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that a sum of Rs. 21,74,490.88 was payable to the respondent in the books of account of the appellant and this amount also stood reflected in the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) which had been circulated by the BIFR. The dispute of Rs. 3,00,000/- arose out of certain C-forms not having been issued by the appellant.

    9. On 18.3.2013 it was reiterated by the appellant that the liability to the respondent of Rs. 21,74,490.88 was unequivocal; a further submission made was that if the C-Forms had not been supplied the liability towards the same would also be that of the appellant. The appellant was directed to file an affidavit in the aforesaid terms i.e whether the C-Forms had been supplied and if no, what would be the effect on the liability qua the said C-Forms. Counsel for the appellant on that date also assured the court that if any modification is necessitated qua the amount required to be shown under the DRS an appropriate application would be filed before the BIFR.

    10. The affidavit of the appellant has since been placed on record. This is the affidavit of Ravinder Kumar Chadha, Division Manager (Account) of the appellant company. It is reiterated that as per the duly audited account of the appellant company maintained under the Indian Companies Act as on 31.3.2006 a sum of Rs. 21,74,490.88 is due and payable to the respondent. It has been clarified that in the suit the respondent had made a claim of Rs. 24,83,409.27 and the difference in the two figures is on account of the difference in the opening balance as on 01.5.2005 as also qua bill No. 126 dated 23.10.2005 for which material was not received by the appellant company. The freight charges have also not been adjusted by the respondent and if the same are adjusted the figure would reconcile to the same amount of Rs. 21,74,490.88. Qua the C-Forms it has been deposed that the appellant could not provide the C-Forms in 2006 because of lock out proceeded by strike but he is ready and willing to provide the C-Forms and the respondent may take adjustment from the Sale Tax/concerned authorities. The affidavit further deposes that there is no contractual rate of interest between the parties. Adjustment of the freight charges had been detailed in Annexure C. The reconciled statement has also been filed along with the affidavit.

    11. Reply/affidavit has been filed by the respondent. It is pointed out that as per their Auditor's report it may not be possible for the respondent to claim adjustment against the C-Forms as the amount already stand paid to the concerned authorities in 2006. The rest of the averments made in the affidavit are not disputed.

    12. It is in this background that the question of applicability of Section 22 of the said Act arises.

    13. The said Act had in fact been promulgated by the Legislature in 1985 to provide for a timely determination, by a body of experts, as a preventive and remedial measure for the revived and rehabilitation with respect to sick industrial units. The ill-effects of sickness in industrial companies, such as cessation of production, loss of employment, loss of revenue to the Central and State Governments and blocking up of investible funds of the banks and financial institutions, were of a serious concern to the Government as well as to the society at large; it had repercussions on the industrial growth of the country With the passage of time the number of sick industrial units had also increased rapidly. Therefore, in order to salvage the productive assets, to the extent possible, of such sick companies the said Act was enacted.

    14. Under Section 22 of the said Act no proceedings for execution, distress or the like proceedings against any of the properties of the company shall lie or be proceeded further except with the consent of the Board. Relevant would it be to extract provisions of Section 22(1) of the said Act. It reads as under.

    “22. SUSPENSION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, CONTRACTS, ETC.

    (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending, or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding-up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with farther, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.

    15. The law with regard to Section 22 of the said Act is no longer re-integra the Apex Court in AIR 2012 SC 1440 Raheja Universal Ltd. v. NRC Limited had the occasion to examine the aforenoted provision. The relevant extract reads herein as under:

    “The said provision, thus, mandates that no proceeding inter alia for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company and no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security, shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. The said statutory injunction will operate when an inquiry had been initiated under Section 16 or a scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation and/or inter alia a sanctioned scheme is under implementation. It is not disputed before us that the amount awarded in favour of the Respondent by the Council finds specific mention in the sanctioned scheme which is under implementation.”

    16. The principle of law is thus unambiguous. Where the amount claimed or the liability sought to be set up is covered under the scheme, Section 22(1) will be attracted and there would be an automatic suspension of all legal proceedings including a suit for recovery of money. In the present case, the amount Rs. 21,74,490.88 is admittedly a part of the DRS pending before the BIFR. The debt of Rs. 3,00,000/- on account of sales tax dues, the petitioner admits as his liability. Even if this amount is not permitted to be adjusted at this stage as has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, keeping in view the wide import of the language of Section 22 of the said Act there can be no question of continuing with the suit proceedings. It also cannot be lost sight of the fact that the parties were maintaining a running account; payments were being made from time to time; it would thus not be possible to segregate the element of debt since the question would be whether the debt due to the plaintiff is correctly reflected or a lesser amount is in fact due to him. The language of Section 22 would take into its sweep a situation even where if the full amount is not a part of the DRS. The question of continuation of the suit would not arise.

    17. In such a situation it would be open to the respondent to approach the BIFR seeking leave for continuation of the suit qua the balance amount or in the alternate it may approach the BIFR seeking enhancement of the amount as included in the scheme if so permitted by law.

    18. The judgment of Corromandal Pharmaceuticals (supra) is inapplicable in this factual scenario. That judgment related to sales tax dues of the department; the ratio being noted as under:

    “amounts like sales tax which a sick company is enable to collect after the date of sanction scheme legitimately belonged to the revenue could not and may not have been founded to be covered within Section 22 of the said Act.”

    This judgment did not relate to the liability against a sick company. Clearly those facts would be inapplicable in the present case.

    19. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

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    Comments

    Lml Ltd. v. Sunil Mittal .
    (May 3, 2013)