M.L MEHTA, J.

1. The present revision petition has been preferred under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (herein after referred to as “Act”) against the order dated 26.07.2011 passed by the learned ACJ cum ARC (North), whereby the application filed by the petitioners-tenants seeking leave to contest eviction petition no. 52/2009, was dismissed and accordingly an eviction order was passed in favour of the respondent-landlord.

2. The respondent-landlord had filed the abovementioned eviction petition in respect of shop no. 5871 (tenanted shop), forming part of suit property no. 19 A, U.A Jawahar Nagar, Delhi on the ground of bonafide requirement as provided under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. It was submitted by the respondent in the eviction petition that he is a Karta and member of HUF Mahesh Chand & Sons and had purchased the suit property in the year 1975 and after retiring as Additional District Judge from RHJS had started practicing as an advocate at Delhi High Court. It was further stated by the landlord that the tenanted shop was let out to Sohan Singh at a rent of Rs. 200/- p.m and after his death the tenanted shop was in occupation of his daughter-in-law Narender Kaur (present petitioner) who was not an authorized tenant. It was also submitted by him that he was currently sharing the office of M/s Harish Chandra (India) Ltd., a contractor and engineers company at 113.A, Kamla Nagar and the same was not suitable for his legal practice, and hence the tenanted shop was required by him for meeting his bonafide requirement of office space. A legal notice dated 26.05.2008 was served on the petitioner, terminating the tenancy. The petitioner responded to the legal notice vide reply dated 24.06.2008, but refused to vacate the tenanted shop. It was lastly submitted by the respondent-landlord that the adjacent shops are also required by him and for which separate petitions were being filed by him.

3. Upon receiving the summons, the petitioner-tenant filed an application for leave to contest the petition on 27.11.2008, along with an affidavit stating the grounds on which she sought leave to contest the eviction petition. It was stated by the petitioner-tenant that the eviction petition was not maintainable due to non-joinder of necessary parties. It was stated that the husband of the petitioner, who was the son of original tenant Sohan Singh, left behind two sons and a daughter, who have equal tenancy right after his death, but the eviction petition was filed only against the petitioner-tenant. It was further averred that no document of title have been produced by the landlord to prove that he was the owner of the suit property. It was also contended that the respondent-landlord had not come with clean hands and had concealed the fact of owning several other properties, which are sufficient to meet his requirements. It was further averred that besides owning six shops in the suit property, the landlord has four rooms available on the first floor and second floor of the suit property, which has not been disclosed by him. It was further contended that the respondent-landlord has not disclosed in the eviction petition that he has also filed petitions against other tenants in the suit property. The landlord filed reply to the application as also the affidavit filed by the petitioner. The petitioner filed yet another counter affidavit contending that there were several triable issues which merit the grant of leave to defend. Rejecting the contentions, the ld. ARC opined that the petitioner failed to raise any triable issue that would non-suit the landlord and passed the eviction order dated 26.07.2011

4. The order granting eviction order to the respondent has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant on the ground that the findings of the learned Rent Controller are not according to the law and the grounds taken before the learned Trial Court have been reiterated. Lastly, it has been submitted that eviction petition is misconceived and was filed with the ulterior motive of getting the property vacated and for letting out at higher rent by the landlord.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlord has submitted that there is no requirement of interference with the well reasoned and speaking order of the learned Rent Controller. It has been submitted that no triable issue was established by the petitioner, which would merit the grant of leave to defend application. It has been submitted that in case of ample proof of bona fide requirement by the landlord, the application for leave to defend deserves to be dismissed.

6. I have heard the rival submissions and perused the record.

7. It is settled legal principal that leave to defend is granted to the tenant in case of any triable issue raised before the trial Court which can be adjudicated by consideration of additional evidence. The whole purpose and import of summary procedure under Section 25-B of the DRCA would otherwise be defeated. In Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Devi Niranjan Deva Tayal(1982) 3 SCC 270, the Apex Court has held that the prayer for leave to contest should be granted to the tenant only where a prima facie case has been disclosed by him. In the absence of the tenant having disclosed a prima facie case i.e such facts as to what disentitles the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, the Court should not mechanically and in routine manner grant leave to defend. In Nem Chand Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 94 (2001) DLT 683, a Bench of this Court had noted as under:

“That before the leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which disentitle the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows.”

8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the eviction petition was not maintainable due to non-joinder of legal heirs of Sharnagat Singh, who was the son of original tenant, is unsustainable. It is settled legal position that it is not necessary for the landlord to implead all the legal heirs of the deceased tenant. It is sufficient if the landlord files an eviction petition against any one of the joint tenants and all the joint tenants are equally bound by the order in the eviction petition filed against one of the tenants.

9. The ownership of the respondent over the suit property has been challenged by the petitioner. In order to prove his ownership, the respondent had placed on record the registered sale deed executed in his favour in respect of the suit premises. This proves the contention of the petitioner that no document of title have been produced by the respondent, to be utterly false. Moreover, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner-tenant to question the ownership of the respondent over the suit property, when she has been paying rent to him and rent receipts issued by the respondent are a part of record. Once the petitioner had started paying rent to the respondent, she is deemed to have accepted the respondent as the owner of the suit premises and is barred from questioning the respondent's ownership over the suit premises. The object of the requirement contained in Clause (e), that the petitioner should be owner of the premises, is not to provide an additional ground to the tenant to delay the proceedings by simply denying ownership of the landlord of the premises and thereby putting him to proof by way of full fledged trial. The object is to ensure that the provision is not misused by people having no legal right or interest in the premises. The proceedings under the Act cannot be converted and utilized by a tenant to prevent eviction merely on the ground that he seeks to cast doubt on the title of the property, which has been acquired, when there is really no one else claiming right to the property. Consequently, this defence taken up by the petitioner fails.

10. In Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi 157 (2009) DLT 450, a bench of this Court while dealing with a similar objection and on the concept of ownership in proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act had noted thus:

“It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly.”

11. The next contention raised by the petitioner was that the respondent-landlord is in possession of several other properties. Without a single shred of evidence or details regarding the properties allegedly owned by the respondent, I am afraid much cannot be read into this contention and it is clearly erroneous.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner had further urged that besides owning six shops in the suit property, the respondent has four rooms available on the first floor and second floor of the suit property which has not been disclosed by him. The perusal of record points otherwise. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, the details of his family members are provided and it is submitted that the rooms on the two floors of the suit property are being utilized by his family for residential purposes. Naturally, they are not available to the respondent for setting up an office and this fact was duly noted by the learned Rent Controller. Regarding the six shops in the suit premises, the respondent has deposed that they are in occupation of tenants and he has also filed eviction petition in respect of two of the said shops, as they are also required by him for converting them into his office. It is not that by making wild allegations, without any shred of evidence, refuted by the landlord in his affidavit, the tenant becomes entitled to a leave to defend. These contentions taken up by the petitioners are nothing, but bald statements, which are liable to be rejected.

13. Moving on to the issue of non-disclosure of the fact of eviction petitions filed by the respondent-landlord against the other tenants of the suit property, it would be pertinent to look into the contents of para 18(a) of the eviction petition. The bare perusal of para 18(a) of the eviction petition shows that this fact was unequivocally stated by the respondent-landlord. The tenant is no doubt entitled to raise all the defences available to him in his application seeking leave to defend, but it should not be an attempt of shooting in the dark and raising frivolous pleas in an irresponsible manner, with the sole objective of gaining leave to defend, which seems to be the present case scenario.

14. In the instant case, the petitioner has miserably failed to raise any important triable issues that could merit grant of leave to defend, whereas the respondent has succeeded in proving his prima facie bonafide requirement of the tenanted shop for setting up an office and has proved beyond doubt that he has no other suitable property in his possession which could be utilized by him. In Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy(2001) 8 SCC 431, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement of landlord, held that the question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord, is, whether in the given facts proved by the material on record, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide.

15. In view of my above discussion I could not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order of the learned ACJ cum ARC warranting any interference by this Court. The petition is devoid of any merit, and is hereby dismissed.