AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. (Oral)

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals challenge a common judgment of a Single Judge in Writ Petitions WP(C) 1426/1999 and WP(C) 1439/1999 dated 14.07.2011. The underlying facts as set out in the opinion are:

  • On 14.07.1998 the competent authority under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA) passed an order under section 7 forfeiting several properties.
  • A common appeal against that order was filed before the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Properties on 20.10.1998.
  • The appellants themselves admitted in their appeal and in the accompanying condonation application that the order dated 14.07.1998 was served on them around 29/30 July 1998.
  • Because the appeal was filed after the period permitted by SAFEMA, a condonation of delay application was filed with the appeal. The condonation application referred to personal hardships (illiteracy, being pardanashini widows, family responsibilities) as reasons for delay.
  • The Tribunal dismissed the condonation application and held the appeal to be barred by limitation by order dated 26.10.1998, relying on a prior Tribunal decision.
  • The appellants filed a review application against the Tribunal's order; that review was dismissed by the Tribunal on 10.02.1999. The High Court bench observed that SAFEMA contains no provision for review and concluded the Tribunal should not have entertained the review petition.
  • The present appeals before the High Court raise the question of whether the Tribunal committed an error of law in dismissing the appellants' appeal as time‑barred under section 12(4) of SAFEMA.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Properties erred in law in dismissing the appellants' appeal under section 12(4) of SAFEMA on the ground that it was filed beyond the time prescribed by that provision.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants filed a condonation of delay application citing personal circumstances: they described themselves as illiterate and pardanashini widows, and one appellant had care responsibilities for minor children and an ailing mother.
  • The appellants' pleadings also included an admission that service of the order occurred about 29/30 July 1998 (this admission formed the basis for calculation of limitation in the record).
  • Learned counsel for the appellants sought to distinguish between service as provided by Section 22 of SAFEMA and the requirement of service for the purposes of limitation under section 12(4), arguing a distinction between “service of notice and order” (Section 22) and “service of an order” under section 12(4).

Tribunal's Position (as reported in the opinion)

  • The Tribunal treated the appeal as having been presented on the 81st day after service of the order dated 14.07.1998 and, relying on the statutory timeline in section 12(4) and on a prior Tribunal decision (Smt. Pallavi Haribhai Tandel v. Competent Authority, Ahmedabad, ITR 226 (1997) p.1), held it had no power to condone delay beyond 60 days and therefore dismissed the condonation application and the appeal.
  • The Tribunal also entertained and disposed of a review application by the appellants, dismissing it on 10.02.1999 on the basis that proper service had been effected and there were no grounds for review (a point later addressed by the High Court as being beyond the Tribunal's jurisdiction under SAFEMA).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Pallavi Haribhai Tandel v. Competent Authority, Ahmadabad, ITR 226 (1997) p. 1 That the Appellate Tribunal has no power to entertain any application for condonation of delay if the appeal is preferred beyond 60 days from the date of receipt of the order under appeal. The Tribunal had relied on this decision to hold that it could not condone delay beyond 60 days and therefore the appeal filed on the 81st day was barred by limitation. The High Court accepted the Tribunal's reliance on this precedent for the limitation point.
Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.), (1987) 4 SCC 525 The principle that the power of review is a creature of statute; an authority without statutory power of review cannot exercise such jurisdiction, and any order purportedly passed in exercise of such non-existent review jurisdiction is a nullity. The High Court applied this Supreme Court principle to conclude that SAFEMA contains no provision for review; thus the Tribunal should not have entertained the review petition, and the Tribunal's review order dated 10.02.1999 was a nullity and of no consequence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in a stepwise, statutory and fact-bound manner:

  1. Starting point — service date: The appellants had expressly admitted in their appeal that the competent authority's order dated 14.07.1998 was received by them around 29/30 July 1998. The court treated that admission as the starting point for calculating limitation under section 12(4) of SAFEMA.
  2. Statutory timeline — section 12(4): The court set out section 12(4), noting that an appeal must be preferred within 45 days from the date on which the order is served, and that the Tribunal may entertain an appeal after 45 days but not after 60 days if satisfied there was sufficient cause. The court emphasized that the proviso only allows a maximum extension up to the 60th day; the Tribunal has no power to condone delay beyond 60 days.
  3. Application to facts: Given the admitted service date (29/30 July 1998) and the appeal filing date (20.10.1998), the appeal was beyond 60 days (the court records it as the 81st day). Consequently, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or to condone delay beyond 60 days.
  4. Condonation application and Tribunal order: The Tribunal's order dated 26.10.1998 correctly characterized the appeal as filed after 60 days and dismissed the condonation application in reliance on the earlier Tribunal decision in Smt. Pallavi Haribhai Tandel. The High Court accepted that conclusion concerning limitation.
  5. Review jurisdiction: The appellants sought review of the Tribunal's order. The High Court observed that SAFEMA contains no provision for review; hence the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the review petition. Applying the Supreme Court's ruling in Kuntesh Gupta, the High Court held that an order purportedly passed in exercise of a non‑existent review jurisdiction is a nullity. Therefore, the review order dated 10.02.1999 was of no effect.
  6. Service and Section 22: The learned Single Judge had discussed whether service on the appellants' advocate constituted sufficient service under section 22. The High Court considered this discussion unnecessary because the appellants themselves admitted personal receipt of the order on 29/30 July 1998. The court also rejected the appellants' counsel's submission seeking to distinguish between service under Section 22 and the requirement in section 12(4), holding that section 12(4) requires the order to be served on the aggrieved person and Section 22 prescribes the manner of such service.
  7. Conclusion: Because the appeal was filed after the statutory maximum period (60 days) and the review order was not maintainable, the Tribunal had no power to entertain or revive the appeal; the High Court agreed with the conclusion that the appeals were time‑barred and dismissed them.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The appellants' appeal against the competent authority's forfeiture order is barred by limitation because it was filed beyond the 60‑day maximum period permitted under section 12(4) of SAFEMA (as measured from the admitted service date of 29/30 July 1998).
  • The Appellate Tribunal had no power to condone delay beyond 60 days and therefore correctly held it could not entertain the appeal filed on 20.10.1998.
  • The Tribunal had no statutory jurisdiction to entertain a review petition under SAFEMA; the review order dated 10.02.1999 is a nullity and cannot be relied upon.
  • No costs were awarded: "There shall be no order as to costs."

The court did not purport to lay down any new law; it applied the statutory scheme in section 12(4) and established precedents to the facts before it. The opinion does not indicate that it creates any new binding precedent beyond its application of existing statutory interpretation and settled principles concerning review jurisdiction.

    Amina Bi Kaskar Deed Thr Lrs & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors.

    Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. (Oral):— These appeals have been filed against the common judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) 1426/1999 and WP(C) 1439/1999 on 14.07.2011

    2. The only issue that arises for consideration is whether the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Properties (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) had not committed an error in law in dismissing the appellants' common appeal filed purportedly under Section 12(4) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 [hereinafter referred to as ‘SAFEMA’] on the ground that the said appeal was beyond the time prescribed under the said provision.

    3. Some facts would be necessary to decide these appeals. The competent authority under SAFEMA passed an order dated 14.07.1998 for forfeiture of several properties under section 7 of safema. The common appeal filed on behalf of the appellants herein before the said Tribunal was filed on 20.10.1998 It is obvious that the appeal was beyond the period of 60 days from the passing of the order dated 14.07.1998 by the competent authority. We may point out, at this stage, that the appellants had admitted in their said appeal before the Tribunal that the order dated 14.07.1998 was served upon them on 29/30th July, 1998. This admission has clearly been made in paragraph 3 as well as paragraph 8 of the appeal. The clear admission was to the following effect:—

    “that the said order dated 14.07.1998 was received by the appellant sometime around 29-30th of July, 1998”.

    A condonation of delay application was also filed along with the said appeal before the said Tribunal. Paragraph 4 of the said condonation of delay application reads as under:—

    “That the impugned order dated 14.7.1998, was served on the appellant on 29/30th July, 1998, and the appellant should have preferred an appeal within 45 days therefrom. The appellants are illiterate and pardanashini widows and the appellant no. 1 has the duty of bringing up four minor children and an ailing aged mother who is appellant no. 2 in addition to other social obligations.”

    4. The Tribunal took up the application for condonation of delay and disposed of the same by its order dated 26.10.1998 By an order of the same date, the said application had been dismissed in the following manner:—

    “3. The order dated 14.7.1998 was served on the appellants on 29/30th July 1998, whereas the order dated 14.10.1998 was served on the appellants on 17.10.1998 Hence the appeal so far as the order dated 14.7.1998 is concerned, was filed with delay on 20.10.1998 The appellant, therefore, filed his application for condonation of delay in presenting the appeal against the order dated 14.7.1998

    4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    5. The copy of the order dated 14.7.1998 was served on the appellants on 29/30th July, 1998 and the appeal was presented on after 20th October 1998 on the 81st day after the service of the order. Under Sec. 12(4) of SAFEMA, an appeal against an order under Sec. 7 or sub-section (1) of Sec. 9 or Sec. 10 has to be preferred within 45 days from the date on which the order is served on the appellant. As per the proviso to sub-section 4, the Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 45 days, but not after 60 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. Admittedly, the appeal was presented beyond the period of 60 days. This Tribunal had earlier held by an order dated 1st April 1997 in F.P.A No. 3 of 1997 in Smt. Pallavi Haribhai Tandel v. Competent Authority, Ahmadabad, reported in ITR 226 (1997) page 1 that the Tribunal has no power to entertain any application for condonation of delay, if the appeal preferred beyond 60 days from the date or the receipt of the order under appeals. Following the decision, we hold that the appeal having been filed beyond 60 days after receipt of the order under appeal, is barred by limitation and this Tribunal has no power to condone delay beyond the period of 60 days prescribed under the Act.”

    5. Thereafter, both the appellants filed an application for review of the said order dated 26.10.1998, whereby the condonation of delay application was rejected and the appeal was held to be barred by limitation. The said review application was disposed of by an order dated 10.02.1999 by holding that proper service had been effected, and that there were no grounds for reviewing the order dated 26.10.1998 The review petition was dismissed.

    6. At this juncture itself, we would like to point out that there is no provision for review in SAFEMA. Therefore, the Tribunal, in our view, ought not to have even entertained the review petition. It is a well settled principle that the power of review is the creature of statute and unless and until the statute provides for a review, any authority, other than a Court of plenary jurisdiction, such as a High Court, would not have any inherent power of review. If any authority is needed for this purpose, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P): (1987) 4 SCC 525 would be sufficient. An order purportedly passed in exercise of a review jurisdiction, which an authority does not have, would be a nullity. This is also clearly established in the said decision of the Supreme Court. Consequently, all arguments which were considered and raised and disposed of by the review order dated 10.02.1999, in our view, would be of no consequence. The review petition was not maintainable and the review order dated 10.02.1999 was also a nullity. We may point out that it is in this review application that arguments had been raised with regard to the service of the order on an agent of the appellants, namely, their lawyer/advocate. In our view, we need not go into all those arguments because they were raised only at the stage of the purported review application filed on behalf of the appellants which they were not entitled to do because there was no provision for review in SAFEMA.

    7. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge also went into great detail on the aspect of as to whether service on the advocate was sufficient service within the meaning of section 22 of safema. We feel that the entire discussion on that aspect of the matter was unnecessary. This was so because the appellants had clearly admitted in their appeal that the order dated 14.07.198 had been served on them on 29/30th July, 1998. It is on this basis that they had filed the appeal and it is on this basis that they had sought condonation of delay.

    8. section 12(4) of safema reads as under:—

    “12. Constitution of appellate tribunal.—

    (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    (2) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    (3) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    (4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority made under section 7, sub-section (1) of section 9 or section 10, may, within forty-five days from the date on which the order is served on him, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal:

    Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain any appeal after the said period of forty-five days, but not after sixty days, from the date aforesaid if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.”

    It is clear that an appeal under section 12(4) of safema has to be filed within 45 days from the date on which the order is served on the person aggrieved. The proviso extends that period by enabling the Tribunal to entertain an appeal even after the period of 45 days but restricts it to the period of 60 days. The stipulation is clear and categorical that the Tribunal cannot entertain any appeal after 60 days from the date on which the order is served on the aggrieved person. The question of the appellant being prevented by a sufficient cause in not filing the appeal within the initial period of 45 days can be looked into only for the balance period of 15 days after 45 days, that is, up to the 60th day.

    9. We may point out that the learned counsel for the appellants sought to bring out a distinction between the service of notice and order as provided in Section 22 and service of an order as indicated in section 12(4) of safema. We are unable to agree with the said submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. Section 12(4) simply provides that the order must be served on the aggrieved person. The manner in which the order is to be served is set out in Section 22. It not only includes the orders passed under Sections 7, 9(1) or 10 but also other orders and notices that may be made or issued under the said act. section 22 of safema reads as under:—

    “22. Service of notices and orders. — Any notice or order issued or made under this Act shall be served—

    (a) by tendering the notice or order or sending it by registered post to the person for whom it is intended or to his agent;

    (b) if the notice or order cannot be served in the manner provided in clause (a), by affixing it on a conspicuous place in the property in relation to which the notice or order is issued or made, or on some conspicuous part of the premises in which the person for whom it is intended is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain.”

    10. Anyhow, we need not go into this aspect of the matter at all inasmuch as the appellants themselves had admitted in their appeal that they had been served with the order dated 14.07.1998 passed by the competent authority on 29/30th July, 1998. That is the starting point of limitation. The appeals were filed on 20.10.1998, which is beyond 60 days from 30th July 1998. In these circumstances, the Tribunal was left with no power to entertain the appeal. We have already indicated that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the review petition and/or to pass any order thereon other than dismissal of the same for non-maintainability. The review application as also the order dated 10.02.1999 cannot be looked into for any purposes in these proceedings.

    11. Although the learned Single Judge has arrived at the conclusion that the appeals were barred by time on different set of reasons, we feel that the impugned order does not warrant any interference inasmuch as we agree with the conclusion for the reasons indicated above.

    The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Amina Bi Kaskar Deed Thr Lrs & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors.
    (Sep 27, 2012)