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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 DHC 3620
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3 of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 (DSG Act)
  • Section 10 (2) of the Income Tax Act 1922,
  • Section 2 (h) (d) (i) or (ii) of the RTI Act,
  • Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act.
  • Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.18.
  • Section 2(h)(b) of the RTI Act.
  • sub-clause (b) of Section 2(h).
  • Section 2(h) (a),(b), (c) and (d).12.
  • Sections 2(h) (a), (b), (c)
  • Section 2(h),(a), (b), (c)
  • Section 2(h)(b).14.
  • Section 2(h) (d) (i)
  • Section 2(h)(b)
  • Section 2(h)(d)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 DHC 3620
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3 of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 (DSG Act)
  • Section 10 (2) of the Income Tax Act 1922,
  • Section 2 (h) (d) (i) or (ii) of the RTI Act,
  • Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act.
  • Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.18.
  • Section 2(h)(b) of the RTI Act.
  • sub-clause (b) of Section 2(h).
  • Section 2(h) (a),(b), (c) and (d).12.
  • Sections 2(h) (a), (b), (c)
  • Section 2(h),(a), (b), (c)
  • Section 2(h)(b).14.
  • Section 2(h) (d) (i)
  • Section 2(h)(b)
  • Section 2(h)(d)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Delhi High Court (S. Muralidhar, J.) — July 22, 2010

Factual and Procedural Background

The central dispute arose from applications for information that the Respondents filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) directed to the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee (DSGMC). The Central Information Commission (CIC) on 22 July 2009 held that the DSGMC, established under Section 3 of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 (DSG Act), is a public authority under the RTI Act and directed the DSGMC to supply the requested information.

The DSGMC did not comply with CIC's directions. After non-compliance, the CIC issued notice to the Public Information Officer and then to the General Manager of the DSGMC. The General Manager failed to provide a valid explanation for non-compliance, and the CIC levied a penalty of Rs. 25,000 on him, directing recovery from his salary. The DSGMC challenged the CIC's orders in writ petitions. This Court stayed the impugned CIC orders on 4 February 2010 subject to the deposit of Rs. 5,000 as litigation expenses and heard arguments from counsel for the parties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee (DSGMC) is a "public authority" within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (DSGMC) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi

  • The RTI Act's Preamble, long title and object indicate it was intended mainly to promote transparency and accountability in government and its instrumentalities; it was not intended to apply to institutions like the DSGMC.
  • The textual reading of Section 2(h), particularly the placement of the words "and includes any" immediately after subsection (d), should be read continuously (not disjunctively). Therefore, bodies falling within clauses (a) to (d) must also satisfy the later requirement of being "directly or indirectly" substantially financed by funds from the appropriate Government.
  • On that reading, the DSGMC — though established by law — is not a public authority under the RTI Act because it does not receive substantial government financing.
  • Relied upon multiple authorities (including several High Court decisions) and principles of statutory interpretation, to support a conjunctive reading of Section 2(h) and to argue that the RTI Act should not extend to bodies such as the DSGMC.

Respondents' Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Gurbaksh Singh

  • The DSGMC was constituted by the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 — a law made by Parliament — and therefore it falls squarely within Section 2(h)(b) of the RTI Act.
  • Once an entity is established by a law made by Parliament (i.e., within clause (b)), there is no need to inquire into whether it is substantially financed by the government; the financing requirement pertains to a different part of Section 2(h).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagar Yuwak Shikshan Sanstha v. Maharashtra State Information Commission, MANU/MH/0813/2009 Relied upon by petitioner to support limited scope of RTI application to bodies. Recognized as a precedent relied upon by Mr. Tulsi; the Court noted such decisions concerned bodies not within Section 2(h)(b) and so their approach could not be adopted for the present case.
Asian Education Charitable Society v. State of Uttarakhand MANU/UC/0014/2010 Relied upon by petitioner on scope of RTI and public authority definition. Identified as one of the High Court decisions cited by Mr. Tulsi; the Court observed such decisions did not involve bodies falling within Section 2(h)(b) and therefore were not determinative here.
The Public Information Officer and Secretary v. Karnataka State Information Commission (2009 (6) KarLJ 2009) Relied upon by petitioner concerning public authority scope under RTI. Cited by Mr. Tulsi; Court treated it as not directly applicable because it did not concern an entity falling under Section 2(h)(b).
Dattaprasad Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Karnataka State Chief Information Commissioner AIR 2009 Kant 1 Relied on for the proposition that some bodies may not be public authorities under RTI. Noted as part of Mr. Tulsi's authorities; Court found such decisions concerned entities outside Section 2(h)(b) and thus not applicable to DSGMC.
Bidar District Center Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Karnataka Information Commission ILR 2008 KAR 3830 Relied upon by petitioner on public authority question. Listed among cases cited by Mr. Tulsi; Court indicated its approach could not be adopted since those cases did not involve entities constituted by parliamentary enactments (Section 2(h)(b)).
Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. The State Information Commission AIR 2009 Bom 75 Relied upon by petitioner concerning RTI applicability to certain bodies. Included in the list of authorities relied upon by Mr. Tulsi and treated by the Court as not being applicable to bodies within Section 2(h)(b).
Smt. Amba Joshi v. Army Welfare Education Society CIC/WB/A/2008/000634 Relied upon in argument on scope of RTI for non-government entities. Cited by petitioner; Court noted its limited application and that it did not concern bodies within Section 2(h)(b).
Shri Girdhari Lal Bhargava v. All India Chess Federation CIC/PB/C/2008/00947/LS Relied upon as authority on RTI applicability to non-governmental bodies. Part of Mr. Tulsi's reliance; Court observed it was not a case about an entity falling under Section 2(h)(b) and therefore not determinative here.
Group Captain M. Kapoor v. Col. S. Thapar CIC/AT/A/2006/00123 Relied upon for scope of RTI vis-à-vis certain institutions. Listed among authorities cited by Mr. Tulsi; Court concluded such precedents did not involve Section 2(h)(b) entities and so could not guide the present decision.
State (Delhi Administration) v. Puran Mal (1985) 2 SCC 589 Relied upon for general approach to statutory interpretation. Included among the precedents Mr. Tulsi cited on interpretation; Court considered general principles but did not accept petitioner’s specific application to Section 2(h).
Paras Ram v. State Of Haryana (1992) 4 SCC 662 Relied upon for principles of statutory interpretation. Referenced as authority relied upon by Mr. Tulsi; Court did not find these decisions determinative for entities covered by Section 2(h)(b).
J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India (1999) 5 SCC 138 Relied upon for interpretive approach to statutes. Cited by Mr. Tulsi; Court noted the general interpretive value but rejected the petitioner's proposed reading of Section 2(h).
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala AIR 1957 SC 699 Relied upon for statutory interpretation principles. One of the decisions relied upon by petitioner; Court did not accept the resulting construal of Section 2(h) urged by petitioner.
Pooran Singh v. State of M.P AIR 1965 SC 1583 Relied upon for general interpretive principles. Included among cases relied on; Court did not allow these authorities to change the clear textual reading of Section 2(h) in the Official Gazette version.
Rajesh Kumar v. Dy. CIT (2007) 2 SCC 181 Relied upon for interpretive approach. Cited by Mr. Tulsi; Court observed that those cases concerned different factual contexts than the present one.
Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2008) 14 SCC 151 Relied upon as part of interpretive authorities. Part of the list of authorities cited by petitioner; Court did not accept the specific statutory reading advanced relying on these cases.
Star Co. Ltd. v. CIT (Central), Calcutta (1970) 3 SCC 864 Relied upon for interpretation of statutory language. Cited by petitioner; Court found the contextual differences significant and did not adopt petitioner’s interpretation.
Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Product v. UOI (2000) 1 SCC 426 Relied upon in support of principles of interpretation. Included in citations by petitioner; Court considered but rejected the application contended for by petitioner.
M/s. Sahney Steel and Press Work Ltd. v. CIT, A.P-I, Hyderabad AIR 1997 SC 3968 Relied upon for interpretive guidance. One of the precedents relied upon by Mr. Tulsi; Court did not find these authorities decisive for a body constituted by Parliament under Section 2(h)(b).
Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd. v. Ramesh Chander Bawa 2010 (V) AD (Del) 405 Interpreted the conjunctive "and includes" and considered whether a multi-state cooperative society is a public authority under Section 2(h)(d)(i). The Court referred to this recent decision as useful and quoted its analysis explaining that "and includes" connotes that the following entities need not fall within the description that precedes those words; this supported the Court's view that "and includes" is disjunctive.
CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel (1971) 3 SCC 550 Explained the interpretive effect of the word "includes" as enlarging meaning in an interpretation clause. The Court quoted the passage to support the proposition that "includes" enlarges meaning and that items listed after "includes" need not be limited to the natural meaning of the preceding words; used to buttress textual interpretation regarding "and includes".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out a textual and contextual analysis of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. Its reasoning unfolded in successive steps:

  1. The Court first observed a textual discrepancy between versions of Section 2(h) as published in many Bare Acts and the version published in the Official Gazette. The Bare Act wording presented the words "and includes any" immediately following clause (d), whereas the Official Gazette version places "and includes any" on a new line starting from the left margin.
  2. The Court regarded the Official Gazette version as the authoritative and reliable text. The layout in the Official Gazette, with "and includes" beginning on a fresh line from the left margin, indicated that the categories under Section 2(h)(a), (b), (c) and (d) are "stand alone" categories and that the words "and includes" introduce a separate set of entities (those in subsections (i) and (ii)).
  3. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument (advanced by Mr. Tulsi) that the phrase "and includes" must be read continuously with clause (d) so as to impose an across-the-board financing requirement ("directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government") on all bodies covered by clauses (a)–(d). The Court found no scope for the conjunctive reading urged by the petitioner.
  4. On the correct textual reading, a body established or constituted by a law made by Parliament falls within Section 2(h)(b) and is therefore a public authority. The DSGMC was constituted under Section 3 of the DSG Act, which is a law made by Parliament; hence Section 2(h)(b) plainly applies.
  5. The Court explained the deliberate difference in language between sub-clause (b) ("by any other law made by Parliament") and sub-clause (a) ("by or under the Constitution"), noting that where the Parliament establishes or constitutes a body by law, it is included as a public authority under Section 2(h)(b) without the need for proof of substantial government financing.
  6. The Court further relied on prior reasoning (notably in Krishak Bharti) that the expression "and includes" connotes that entities described after those words need not fall within descriptions that precede them; the term "includes" is understood to enlarge meaning where used.
  7. The Court noted that the decisions relied upon by Mr. Tulsi were delivered in contexts concerning bodies that did not fall within Section 2(h)(b); therefore, that line of authority could not be directly imported to decide whether an entity constituted by Parliament is a public authority.
  8. On the question of penalty, the Court observed that the legal question had not earlier been examined by it; it considered the Rs. 25,000 penalty levied by the CIC on the General Manager to be perhaps overly harsh in the circumstances and reduced the penalty to Rs. 5,000. The Court directed that this reduced amount be paid by the petitioner (DSGMC) to the CIC within two weeks and ordered that it not be recovered from the General Manager's salary.

Holding and Implications

Holding: This Court held that the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee (DSGMC) is a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, specifically under Section 2(h)(b) because it was constituted by a law made by Parliament.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The Court concurred with the Central Information Commission's conclusion that the DSGMC is a public authority under Section 2(h) and therefore within the scope of the RTI Act.
  • The penalty of Rs. 25,000 previously levied by the CIC on the General Manager for non-compliance with the CIC orders was reduced to Rs. 5,000. The reduced penalty is to be paid by the petitioner (DSGMC) to the CIC within two weeks and shall not be recovered from the salary of the General Manager.
  • The writ petitions were disposed of in these terms and all pending applications were closed.

Broader Implications:

The Court's textual analysis of Section 2(h) — relying on the Official Gazette text and prior interpretive authorities — indicates that entities constituted by enactment of Parliament or State Legislatures (i.e., falling under Section 2(h)(b) or (c)) are captured as public authorities under the RTI Act without an additional requirement of substantial government financing. The financing requirement applies to the separate category introduced by "and includes" (subsections (i) and (ii)).


Judgment delivered by S. Muralidhar, J. — July 22, 2010.

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    Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee & Anr. Petitioners v. Mohinder Singh Matharu

    J U D G E M E N T

    1. The short question that arises for determination is whether the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee (‘DSGMC’) is a public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘RTI Act’)?

    2. On 22nd July 2009, the CIC held the DSGMC, which is established under Section 3 of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 (‘DSG Act’) to be a public authority under the RTI Act. The Respondents in both writ petitions were initially unsuccessful in seeking information from the DSGMC pursuant to the applications filed by them under the RTI Act. In the second appeal filed by each of them the CIC passed orders directing the DSGMC to provide them the information before 5th August, 2009. When there was continued non-compliance by the DSGMC, the CIC directed notice to the Public Information Officer (‘PIO’). Thereafter, a notice was sent to the General Manager of the DSGMC. He was unable to give any valid explanation for not complying with the CIC's orders. Accordingly, a penalty of Rs. 25,000/- was levied on the General Manager and the penalty was asked to be recovered from his salary. Aggrieved by the said orders, the DSGMC has filed these writ petitions.

    3. While directing notice to the Respondent, subject to the deposit of Rs. 5000/- as litigation expenses, this Court by an order dated 4 February 2010 directed a stay of the impugned orders.

    4. This Court has heard submissions of Mr. K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the DSGMC and Mr. Gurbaksh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Respondents.

    5. Mr. Tulsi referred to the Preamble, the long title and the various provisions of the RTI Act to impress upon the Court that the general purpose of the RTI Act was to promote transparency and accountability and contain corruption in the government and its instrumentalities. The Preamble further indicated that the expectation was that revelation of information which might lead to conflict with other public interests including “efficient operations of the Government” had to be harmonized “while preserving the paramountcy of the democratic ideal” It is accordingly submitted that the RTI Act was not intended to apply to institutions like the Petitioner.

    6. Turning to section 2(h) of the rti act, Mr. Tulsi submitted that the words “and includes any” occurring after Section 2(h)(d) had to be read continuously and, therefore, even if a body fell within the definition of a Public Authority under Section 2(h) (a) to (d), such a body would have to be substantially financed “directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government” In other words, according to Mr. Tulsi, there cannot be any disjunctive reading of the latter portion of Section 2(h) and that it had to be read as one continuous whole. He submits that if the definition is so read then certainly the Petitioner, which may have been established by a law made by the Parliament, was not a public authority, since it did not receive funds “directly or indirectly” from any appropriate Government.

    7. Mr. Tulsi placed reliance on the Judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Nagar Yuwak Shikshan Sanstha v. Maharashtra State Information Commission MANU/MH/0813/2009 in support of his submissions. Referring to the provisions of the DSG Act, Mr. Tulsi submitted that the Petitioner was intended to be an autonomous statutory body without interference by the Government. Relevant to the RTI Act, Mr. Tulsi has placed reliance upon the decisions of other High Courts including Asian Education Charitable Society v. State of Uttarakhand MANU/UC/0014/2010, The Public Information Officer and Secretary v. Karnataka State Information Commission 2009 (6) KarLJ 2009, Dattaprasad Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Karnataka State Chief Information Commissioner AIR 2009 Kant 1, The Bidar District Center Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Karnataka Information Commission ILR 2008 KAR 3830, Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. The State Information Commission AIR 2009 Bom 75, Smt. Amba Joshi v. Army Welfare Education Society CIC/WB/A/2008/000634, Shri Girdhari Lal Bhargava v. All India Chess Federation

    CIC/PB/C/2008/00947/LS, Group Captain M. Kapoor v. Col. S. Thapar CIC/AT/A/2006/00123.

    8. As regards the general approach that the Court should adopt while interpreting statutes, Mr. Tulsi relied upon the decisions in State (Delhi Administration) v. Puran Mal (1985) 2 SCC 589, Paras Ram v. State Of Haryana (1992) 4 SCC 662, J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India (1999) 5 SCC 138, The State of Bombay v. R.M.D Chamarbaugwala AIR 1957 SC 699, Pooran Singh v. State of M.P AIR 1965 SC 1583, Rajesh Kumar v. Dy. CIT (2007) 2 SCC 181, Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2008) 14 SCC 151, The Star Co. Ltd. v. Cit (Central), Calcutta (1970) 3 SCC 864, Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Product v. UOI (2000) 1 SCC 426 and M/s. Sahney Steel and Press Work Ltd. v. CIT, A.P-I, Hyderabad AIR 1997 SC 3968. Mr. Tulsi has also placed reliance upon certain passages of Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P Singh on conjunctive and disjunctive words.

    9. Mr. Gurbaksh Singh, on the other hand, referred to the fact that the DSGMC was constituted by the DSG Act. He submitted that as far as the Petitioner was concerned, it squarely fell within the definition of Section 2(h)(b) of the Act and there was no need to look further to examine if the body was substantially financed

    “directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government”

    10. This court has considered the above submissions. There is a difference in the way Section 2(h) reads as published in many of the Bare Acts and how it reads as published in the Official Gazette. Section 2(h) as published in the Bare Act reads as under:

    “2 (h) “public authority” means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted,-

    (a) by or under the Constitution;

    (b) by any other law made by Parliament;

    (c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

    (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any-

    (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

    (ii) non-Government Organisation substantially financed,

    directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;”

    Whereas Section 2(h) as published in the Official Gazette reads as under:

    “2 (h) “public authority” means any authority or institution of self-government established or constituted-

    (a) by or under the Constitution;

    (b) by any other law made by Parliament;

    (c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

    (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government,

    and includes any-

    (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

    (ii) non-Government organization substantially financed,

    directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;

    11. A comparison of the two ways of depicting Section 2(h) makes it clear that in terms of the ‘official’ version, which is therefore the reliable one, the words “and includes” is not joined to clause (d) but starts in a new line from the left extreme margin. The categories of bodies or institutions or authorities covered by Sections 2(h) (a), (b), (c) and (d) are therefore ‘stand alone’ authorities or bodies. The words “and includes” beginning in a fresh line from the left margin is intended to indicate another set of bodies which may not fall within the categories of Section 2(h) (a),

    (b), (c) and (d).

    12. This Court is unable to accept the submission made by Mr. Tulsi that the words “and includes” is not meant to be read disjunctively and, therefore, although a body may fall within the Section 2(h),

    (a), (b), (c) and (d) it would nevertheless have to satisfy the requirement of being “directly or indirectly” substantially financed by the appropriate Government. There is no scope for reading the provisions in the manner suggested by Mr. Tulsi.

    13. It is plain that Section 2(h)(b) applies in the instant case. The DSG Act is a law made by the Parliament. The DSGMC is a body constituted under section 3 of the dsg act. The DSGMC is not a body made under any law but a body made by a law. There is a distinction between the use of the words “by any law made by Parliament” and “by or under the Constitution” The Parliament has consciously not used the words “by or under” in sub-clause (b) of Section 2(h). In other words, once the body is established or constituted by the law made by Parliament, it would be a ‘public authority’ under Section 2(h)(b).

    14. As regards the words “and includes” they are disjunctive and indicative of a separate set of entities. The discussion in the recent judgment of this Court in Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd. v. Ramesh Chander Bawa 2010 (V) AD (Del) 405 may be usefully referred to. There the question was whether a multi-state cooperative society is a ‘public authority’ within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act. It is in that context that in para 13, it was observed:

    “13. Before embarking on a more detailed analysis it is necessary to recapitulate the law concerning interpretation of the conjunctive “and includes” The expression “and includes” connotes that those entities which answer the description following those words need not fall within the definition of entities that precede those words. The word “includes” is generally

    understood in statutory interpretation as enlarging the meaning of the words or phrases in the body of the statute. In CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel (1971) 3 SCC 550 the Supreme Court was considering whether the word ‘plant’ in Section 10 (2) of the Income Tax Act 1922, include sanitary pipes and fittings in a building as well? Section 10(5) had defined ‘plant’ to include “vehicles, books, scientific apparatus, surgical equipment purchased for the purpose of business.” The Court held:

    “The word “includes” is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used, those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.”

    15. This Court is, therefore, not persuaded to accept the submission made by Mr. Tulsi as regards the interpretation to be placed on the words “and includes” It is also unable to accept the submission that a body that falls within the definition of public authority under Section 2(h) (a) to (d) must be directly or indirectly substantially financed by funds provided by the appropriate Government. That requirement would only apply to the latter part of section 2(h) of the rti act, i.e the bodies falling within the meaning of Section 2

    (h) (d) (i) or (ii). Since it is nobody's case that the Petitioner falls within the ambit of the latter part of Section 2 (h) (d) (i) or (ii) of the RTI Act, that aspect need not be examined any further.

    16. The decisions referred to by Mr. Tulsi on the interpretation to be placed on the RTI Act were delivered in the context of bodies, none of which fell within the definition of Section 2(h)(b) of the RTI Act. It is not possible, therefore, to adopt the approach adopted by those High Courts in the said decisions for determining whether the bodies concerned were public authorities or not. It is also not possible to read the long title and the Preamble in the manner suggested by Mr. Tulsi so as to confine the entire RTI Act only to Government or instrumentalities of the Government. The fact that the legislature has enacted Section 2(h) in the manner it has, clearly indicates that a whole range of public authorities are sought to be brought within the ambit of RTI Act. It hardly needs mention that there are a large number of bodies that are constituted by enactments both of the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures. Once it is shown that a body has been constituted by an enactment by Parliament or State Legislature, then nothing more need be shown in order to demonstrate that such a body is a public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) (b) or (c) of the RTI Act.

    17. In that view of the matter, this Court concurs with the view expressed by the CIC that the Petitioner DSGMC is a public authority under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.

    18. However, considering that the above question of law had not earlier been examined for its correctness by this Court, this Court is of the view that the penalty of Rs. 25,000/- levied on the General Manager of the Petitioner may have been a bit too harsh. In the circumstances, the penalty amount is reduced to Rs. 5000/- in both petitions and directed to be paid by the Petitioner DSGMC itself to the CIC within a period of two weeks without recovering it from the salary of its General Manager.

    19. The writ petitions are, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms. All the pending applications stand disposed of.

    S. MURALIDHAR, J

    JULY 22, 2010 vg

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    Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee & Anr. Petitioners v. Mohinder Singh Matharu
    (Jul 22, 2010)