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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 250 or section 254 or section 263 or section 264,
  • SECTION 144 A INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • provisions of sub-sections (1), (1A), (1B)
  • provisions of sub-section (2A),
  • provisions of section 153(2A)
  • section 250, 254, 260, 262, 263
  • section 250 or section 254
  • section 263 or section 264
  • section 153(3)(ii)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 250 or section 254 or section 263 or section 264,
  • SECTION 144 A INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • provisions of sub-sections (1), (1A), (1B)
  • provisions of sub-section (2A),
  • provisions of section 153(2A)
  • section 250, 254, 260, 262, 263
  • section 250 or section 254
  • section 263 or section 264
  • section 153(3)(ii)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Revenue challenged an order dated December 22, 2006, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench “A” concerning the assessment year 1996-97. The original assessment of the assessee was completed under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on March 31, 1999. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who found procedural deficiencies in the assessment, particularly that the Assessing Officer failed to grant an additional opportunity to the assessee to present evidence. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.

Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued a fresh notice under section 143(2) on February 24, 2003. The assessee contended that this notice was barred by limitation under section 153(2A) of the Act. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment again due to the assessee’s alleged non-cooperation. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that section 153(2A) was not applicable but that section 153(3)(ii) applied, implying no time limit for assessment. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal, which ruled that section 153(2A) was applicable instead of section 153(3)(ii).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act apply to the fresh assessment made pursuant to the appellate order setting aside or cancelling the original assessment.
  2. Whether section 153(3)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, which allows assessment without time limit to give effect to appellate findings or directions, applies in this case.
  3. Whether the appellate order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) operated as a setting aside or cancellation of the original assessment order.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) did not explicitly set aside or cancel the original assessment order.
  • Therefore, the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act would not apply.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The notice issued by the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment was barred by limitation under section 153(2A) of the Act.
  • The appellate order effectively set aside the original assessment to the extent of the disputed additions.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the operative portion of the appellate order and noted that although the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) did not explicitly use the words "set aside" or "cancel," the allowance of ground No. 2 of the appeal necessarily implied that the original assessment order was set aside to that extent. The appellate order directed the Assessing Officer to grant an additional opportunity to the assessee and to pass a fresh order under section 144 after considering the assessee’s explanation. This, according to the court, amounted to setting aside or cancelling the original assessment order in part.

Given this, the court held that section 153(2A) was applicable as it governs fresh assessments made pursuant to orders setting aside or cancelling assessments. Conversely, section 153(3)(ii), which applies when the Assessing Officer is merely required to give effect to a finding or direction without disturbing the original assessment, was not applicable here because the original assessment was effectively set aside and a fresh order was mandated.

Therefore, the court found no substantial question of law arose for consideration beyond this interpretation.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal filed by the Revenue.

The direct effect of this decision is that the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act apply to the fresh assessment made pursuant to the appellate order, confirming that the fresh assessment was validly made within the prescribed time limit. No new legal precedent was established beyond the interpretation of the statutory provisions in the context of the facts of this case.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Bhan Textile P. Ltd.

    Madan B. Lokur, J.:— The Revenue is aggrieved by an order dated December 22, 2006, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench “A” in I.T.A No. 2892.D/2004 relevant for the assessment year 1996-97.

    2. The assessment in respect of the assessee was completed under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”) on March 31, 1999. Feeling aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (“the CIT(A)”) who passed an order dated May 12, 2000, the operative portion of which is important and that reads as follows:

    “It was also the case of learned counsel that the additions were made without any basis and there was no history of case which could justify such an assessment. I have considered this argument also. It is true that there is no history of case in respect of the additions made in the assessment order. At least nothing is mentioned in the order in this respect. It is also felt that the learned Assessing Officer could have specifically granted one more opportunity to the appellant to state his case in respect of the matters covered in the questionnaire. This is so because the appellant could have thought that the proceedings may be dropped after hearing the preliminary objection. Though it is mentioned in the note that the authorised representative did not agree to file any detail. Yet the Assessing Officer could have granted one more opportunity, particularly when the matter had remained pending up to March 31, 1999. It is also seen that the assessment was taken up on March 5, 1999, while the initial notice had been issued on November 27, 1997, and there was no follow up of the case in the interregnum. In view of this, I am of the view that the learned Assessing Officer should have granted one more opportunity to the appellant on proposed additions. Therefore, it is held that it will be the interest of the justice to restore the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer, so that one more opportunity may be given to the appellant to file evidence and state his case in respect of the matters covered in the show-cause notice dated March 5, 1999. Thereafter, the learned Assessing Officer may pass order under section 144 taking the explanation into account. Therefore, this matter is restored to the file the Assessing Officer. Thus, ground No. 2 of the appeal is treated as allowed.”

    3. When the matter was taken up by the Assessing Officer pursuant to the above order, he issued a notice to the assessee under section 143(2) of the Act on February 24, 2003, for making a fresh assessment. According to the assessee, the notice was barred by limitation in view of the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act.

    4. Since the assessee apparently did not co-operate with the Assessing Officer, the assessment, as originally framed, was once again made by the Assessing Officer.

    5. Against the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who concluded that the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act were not applicable but the case was covered by section 153(3)(ii) of the Act and as such there was no time limit fixed for making the assessment.

    6. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The appeal was allowed by the order under challenge and it was held by the Tribunal that the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act were applicable and not section 153(3)(ii) of the Act.

    7. For facility of appreciating the controversy involved, section 153(2A) of the Act and section 153(3)(ii) of the Act are reproduced below:

    “153. Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments.—…. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1), (1A), (1B) and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971, and any subsequent assessment year, an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 250 or section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner :….

    The provisions of sub-sections (1), (1A), (1B) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A), be completed at any time—…

    (ii) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264 or in an order of any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act.”

    8. It was contended by learned counsel for the Revenue that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) did not set aside the assessment order and, therefore, the provisions of section 153(2A) would not be applicable. We are not at all in agreement with learned counsel for the Revenue.

    9. The operative words in section 153(2A) of the Act are “an order……setting aside or cancelling an assessment”. We have reproduced the operative portion of the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and although that portion does not specifically say that the order of the Assessing Officer has been set aside or cancelled, but since ground No. 2 of the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed, by necessary implication, the assessment order was set aside to that extent.

    10. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had made it clear in his order that the Assessing Officer “should have granted one more opportunity to the appellant on proposed additions” and in view thereof, it was held that it would be in the interest of justice to restore the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer so that one more opportunity could be given to the assessee to file its evidence and state its case in respect of the show-cause notice issued to it. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) also directed the Assessing Officer to pass an order under section 144 of the Act after taking the explanation of the assessee into account. This, in our opinion, clearly means that the assessment order to the extent that it did not give an opportunity to the assessee to place its evidence on record was set aside or cancelled by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) although these specific words were not used in the appellate order.

    11. This being the position, in our opinion, section 153(2A) of the Act is clearly applicable.

    12. In so far as the applicability of section 153(3)(ii) of the Act is concerned, that relates to giving effect to a finding or direction, inter alia, by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). What this means is that the Assessing Officer must comply with the finding or direction given by the appellate authority without necessarily disturbing the assessment order. In so far as the present case is concerned, that is not the position because the Assessing Officer was directed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to pass a fresh order under section 144 of the Act meaning thereby that the assessment order to the extent that it is covered by ground No. 2 of the appeal filed by the assessee was set aside or cancelled. There was no independent finding or direction which the Assessing Officer was required to comply with on the basis that the core of the assessment order has been sustained by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Under the circumstances, we are of the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration.

    13. The appeal is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Bhan Textile P. Ltd.
    (Feb 22, 2008)