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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 6 LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
  • SCHEDULE LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956.
  • provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 CPC.4.
  • provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), CPC.
  • Article 59 alongwith Section 6 (1),
  • Order 7 Rule 11, CPC.10.
  • Order 7 Rule 11, CPC,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 6 LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
  • SCHEDULE LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956.
  • provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 CPC.4.
  • provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), CPC.
  • Article 59 alongwith Section 6 (1),
  • Order 7 Rule 11, CPC.10.
  • Order 7 Rule 11, CPC,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Order 7 Rule 11 Application (Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Order 7 Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in which defendant No. 1 sought rejection of the plaint on three grounds: (1) limitation, (2) failure to disclose a cause of action, and (3) that the suit is vexatious and frivolous.

The plaintiff seeks, inter alia, a declaratory decree that a compromise decree dated 30.01.1987 (passed in Suit No. 1970/1986) is null and void, a declaration that defendant No. 2 is not the daughter of the deceased MKR, and that defendant No. 1 was not MKR's wife. The compromise decree recorded terms under which MKR was regarded as absolute owner of property No. A-16, Niti Bagh, New Delhi, with specified occupation rights for the plaintiff's mother during MKR's lifetime and distribution of floors thereafter. The plaintiff alleges he is the son of MKR and claims a share in the property as a co-parcener; he contends the compromise decree is liable to be set aside because he was a minor when it was passed and his interest was not placed before the court, invoking Order 32 Rule 7 CPC principles.

The defendant No. 1 challenged the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 on the three grounds stated above. The application was heard, and the court confined its decision to the question of limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint is barred by limitation such that it must be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
  2. Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action (i.e., whether the plaintiff's claim of being a co-parcener is maintainable given the allegations about the mother's marital status).
  3. Whether the suit is vexatious and frivolous and therefore liable to be rejected at the threshold.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant No. 1 (Applicant) — Arguments

  • The plaint is barred by limitation: the plaintiff was born on 27.05.1970 and attained majority on 27.05.1988; by Articles 59 and 60 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 a minor has three years from attaining majority to institute such a suit, so the limitation period expired on 27.05.1991 and the suit filed in 1994 is time-barred (rejection under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC sought).
  • The plaint does not disclose a cause of action because the plaintiff's claim of being a co-parcener depends on him being the legitimate son of MKR; the mother's alleged marriage to MKR would be void under Section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (because both had living spouses), and in any event the mother's suits (Nos. 472/1986 and 599/1986) were dismissed — thus the plaintiff cannot claim a higher status.
  • The suit is vexatious and frivolous, being an indirect attempt by the plaintiff's mother to achieve by the present suit what she could not obtain directly after compromise. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in T. Arivandanam v. T.V Satyapal and Another, 1977 (4) SCC 467, to support rejection on that ground.

Plaintiff (through his mother, who appeared and argued) — Arguments

  • On Order 7 Rule 11: only the plaint and documents accompanying it are relevant; averments in the plaint must be treated as correct for the limited purposes of deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
  • On limitation: the plaintiff only became aware of the compromise decree when defendant No. 1 filed probate case No. 26/1993 and annexed the terms; therefore the three-year period would commence from 1993, making the 1994 suit within time.
  • On cause of action: the plaint discloses a clear threat to the plaintiff's right because he was not a party to the proceedings culminating in the compromise decree and was a minor at that time; the decree obstructs his present claim.
  • On vexatious/frivolous: the suit is not vexatious or frivolous because it is the first suit filed by the plaintiff claiming his rights; he was not a party to the earlier compromise.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T. Arivandanam v. T.V Satyapal and Another, 1977 (4) SCC 467 Relied upon by defendant No. 1 to support the submission that the plaint ought to be rejected as vexatious and frivolous. The court noted the reliance but did not decide on this point. Because the plaint was rejected on limitation grounds, the court expressly stated it was unnecessary to express any view on the contention based on this precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Scope of Order 7 Rule 11: The court reiterated that an application under Order 7 Rule 11 must be considered solely on the basis of the averments in the plaint and any documents annexed thereto; for this purpose, the averments in the plaint are to be treated as true.

Limitation analysis (the court's central analytical thrust):

  1. The plaintiff's date of birth is admitted in the plaint as 27.05.1970; therefore he attained majority on 27.05.1988.
  2. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a three-year limitation period for cancelling or setting aside a decree, and Article 60 prescribes three years for setting aside transfers made by a guardian; Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act provides that where the person entitled is a minor when the period begins, the period begins to run from the date the disability (minority) ceases.
  3. Construing Article 59 together with Section 6(1), if the cause of action accrued while the plaintiff was a minor, the three-year period for seeking cancellation of a decree begins on his attaining majority (27.05.1988) and would expire on 27.05.1991.
  4. The critical question then is: when did the plaintiff first become aware of the facts entitling him to have the decree set aside? The plaint's paragraph 28 was examined closely. Although the plaintiff's counsel argued that knowledge arose only in 1993 when probate case No. 26/93 was filed, paragraph 28 itself contains averments (including that MKR pleaded with Shyamlaji not to proceed with the suits because it would ruin his career) that, by the verification clause, the plaintiff swore to be true to his knowledge.
  5. From that verification, the court concluded the plaintiff had knowledge of the compromise decree in 1987 (while still a minor). Even granting the benefit of Section 6 (i.e., that limitation runs from attaining majority), the three-year period expired on 27.05.1991.
  6. The present suit was filed in 1994. Therefore, on the basis of the averments in the plaint itself and the applicable provisions of the Limitation Act (Articles 59/60 and Section 6(1)), the plaint is time-barred.

Because the court found the plaint barred by limitation on this analysis, it did not proceed to decide the separate contentions that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action or that the suit was vexatious and frivolous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 and rejected the plaint. The judgment concludes: "This application is allowed. The plaint is rejected. All the pending applications also stand disposed of."

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit seeking to declare the compromise decree of 30.01.1987 null and void (and associated reliefs) is dismissed at the threshold for being barred by limitation; all pending applications in the suit were disposed of as consequential to this order.
  • The court did not decide the other two substantive grounds (failure to disclose cause of action and vexatious/frivolous nature). Consequently, no determination was made on those issues and no new legal precedent on those points was laid down by this judgment.

    M.R. Krishnamurthi v. Chandan Ramamurthi

    Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.:— In this application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), the defendant No. 1 has prayed for the rejection of the plaint on three counts:—

    (1) Limitation;

    (2) The plaint does not disclose any cause of action; and

    (3) The suit is vexatious and frivolous.

    2. The main prayer in the suit is for declaring the compromise decree dated 30.01.1987 passed by this court in Suit No. 1970/1986 filed by the plaintiff's mother (Ms Shyamla Pappu) against Late Mr. M.K Ramamurthi (MKR) as being null and void. A declaratory decree is also sought declaring that defendant No. 2 is not the daughter of MKR and that the defendant No. 1 was not the wife of MKR. Interestingly, a declaration is also sought that the decree dated 18.12.1985 passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi dissolving the marriage between the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 is null and void. Several other prayers have also been made, but these are the main prayers.

    3. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff is the son born out of the alleged wedlock of his mother and MKR. As such, being a co-parcener, he is entitled to his share in the property bearing No. A-16, Niti Bagh, New Delhi. It is the case of the plaintiff that at the time when the compromise decree dated 30.01.1987 was passed, the plaintiff was a minor and as his interest was not placed before the court, the said decree is liable to be declared as null and void, inter alia, in view of the provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 CPC.

    4. It is contended on behalf of the defendant No. 1.applicant that the plaintiff is not the legitimate son of MKR inasmuch as there was no marriage, what to speak of a legal marriage, between the plaintiffs mother and MKR. It was submitted that the plaintiffs mother had filed a suit bearing No. 472/1986 in the District Court seeking an injunction against the defendant No. 1 and MKR in respect of the said property. Another suit bearing No. 599/1986 was filed by the plaintiffs mother again before the District Court at Delhi, inter alia, seeking a declaration that she was the legally wedded wife of MKR. Later, in the same year, MKR filed Suit No. 1970/1986 in this court seeking an injunction against the plaintiff's mother from interfering with his rights to enjoy the property bearing No. A-16, Niti Bagh, New Delhi.

    5. It is further contended that a compromise had been arrived at and the same had been recorded in MKR's suit bearing No. 1970/1986. By virtue of the compromise, MKR was regarded as the absolute owner of the said property bearing No. A-16, Niti Bagh, New Delhi. The terms of the settlement as recorded in the compromise decree were, inter alia, that the plaintiff's mother would be entitled to occupy and use the ground floor of the said premises during the lifetime of MKR, but she would have no access to the first floor. After the lifetime of MKR, the ground floor would be occupied and used by Mr. Vivek Ramamurthi (son of MKR through his earlier marriage with Smt Susan) and the present plaintiff. The first floor would then fall in the share of the defendant No. 1 and her daughter. It was specifically indicated in the compromise that the plaintiff's mother gives up all her contentions raised by her in her two suits, namely, Suit No. 472/1986 and Suit No. 599/1986. Consequently, the compromise was taken on record and a decree was passed thereon in Suit No. 1970/1986. Suit Nos. 472/1986 and 599/1986 were withdrawn by the High Court from the District Court and in terms of the compromise arrived at between the plaintiff's mother and MKR and defendant No. 1, the same were dismissed. The plaintiff, by the present suit, is seeking a declaration from this court to declare that compromise decree dated 30.01.1987 as null and void.

    6. On the point of limitation, it has been contended on behalf of the defendant No. 1 that the plaintiff, as per the averments made in the plaint, was born on 27.05.1970 This means that he attained majority on 27.05.1988 It was submitted in the backdrop of Articles 59 and 60 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 that a minor could bring an action within three years of attaining majority. The three years would have to be counted from 27.05.1988 The three years would elapse on 27.05.1991 The present suit has been filed in 1994 and, therefore, the same is barred by time and consequently the plaint is liable to be rejected in view of the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), CPC. It was further contended that, in any event, the decree dated 30.01.1987 had attained finality. Since MKR died much later, i.e, on 26.04.1993, the decree has been worked out and accepted by all, including the plaintiff who did not object to the same during the lifetime of MKR.

    7. As regards the plea that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, it was contended on behalf of the defendant No. 1 that the plaintiff claims himself to be a co-parcener. The entire suit is based on this claim. Such a claim can be asserted only if the plaintiff was a legitimate son of MKR. At the time when the plaintiff's mother claims to be married to MKR, both she and MKR had living spouses and, therefore, such a marriage would be a void marriage in view of Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. It was contended that, in fact, there was no marriage at all between the plaintiff's mother and MKR. Therefore, there is no question of the plaintiff claiming to be a co-parcener. It was also contended that since the claims of the mother were dismissed inasmuch as the suits bearing Nos. 472/1986 and 599/1986 filed by her were dismissed, the plaintiff, being her son, cannot claim a higher status.

    8. With regard to the suit being vexatious and frivolous, it was contended on behalf of the defendant No. 1 that after the compromise had been entered into by the plaintiff's mother, the plaintiff's mother could not have instituted any further proceeding directly. However, the present suit filed by the plaintiff is at her instance in an attempt to achieve indirectly what she cannot achieve directly. Such an attempt needs to be snubbed at the first instance and is nothing but a vexatious and frivolous action and, therefore, placing reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of T. Arivandanam v. T.V Satyapal and Another, 1977 (4) SCC 467, it was submitted that the plaint ought to be rejected.

    9. The plaintiff's mother who happens to be a senior advocate appeared and argued on behalf of the plaintiff. With regard to the scope of an application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, she submitted that the settled law is that only the plaint and the documents accompanying the plaint are to be taken into consideration while deciding such an application. The averments made in the plaint are to be treated as correct for the purposes of deciding as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected or not under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC.

    10. With regard to the question of limitation, she submitted that as revealed in the plaint, the suit has been filed because of the claims made by the defendant No. 1 in a probate case No. 26/1993 filed by the defendant No. 1 in respect of an alleged will of MKR of 07.05.1990 The defendant No. 1 has claimed that the decree passed on 30.01.1987 is binding on all parties. This decree comes in the way of the plaintiff who was not a party to the earlier proceedings and it is for this reason that the present suit has been filed. She submits that the plaintiff gained knowledge of the decree in 1993 and, therefore, the three-year period would start to run from 1993 and not from 1988 as suggested by the defendant No. 1. She submitted that the cause of action also arose on account of the defendant No. 1 claiming on the basis of the compromise decree, in 1993, therefore, the starting point of limitation would be in 1993 and since the suit was filed in 1994, it was within time.

    11. With regard to the question of the plaint not disclosing a cause of action, she submitted that reading the averments in the plaint, it is apparent that a threat to the right of the plaintiff has been clearly disclosed. The plaintiff was not a party to the proceedings which culminated in the compromise decree of 30.01.1987 At that point of time, he was a minor. The plaintiff now seeks to claim his rights. The said compromise decree comes in his way and this is the cause of action for the plaintiff. Consequently, she submitted, the plaint does disclose a cause of action and cannot be rejected.

    12. With regard to the allegation that the suit is vexatious and frivolous, she submitted that it is not so. The plaintiff was not a party to the earlier proceedings and this is the first suit filed by the plaintiff claiming his rights.

    13. Considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, it is correct that an application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC needs to be considered only on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and any documents accompanying the plaint. It is also clear that an application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC has to be disposed of on the basis that what is stated in the plaint is true.

    14. As regards the point of limitation raised by the learned counsel for the defendant No. 1, I am of the view that he is correct in submitting that the suit is beyond time. De hors the question of whether the plaintiff is or is not the legitimate son of MKR and de hors the question of the plaintiff's mother's marriage with MKR, it is an admitted position that the plaintiff was born on 27.05.1970 This would mean that he would be 18 years of age on 27.05.1988 From that date onwards, he would no longer be regarded as a minor. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates that the period of limitation for cancelling or setting aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract would be three years and the time from which the period would begin to run would be when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him. Plainly speaking, a person has three years time for seeking the cancellation of a decree from the date from which he became aware of the facts entitling him to have the decree set aside or cancelled. Article 60 stipulates a period of three years for setting aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward. The suit can be filed by the ward, who has attained majority, within three years of his attaining majority. Going by Article 60, the three years would expire on 27.05.1991

    15. Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and in particular sub-section (1) thereof provides that where a person entitled to institute the suit or make an application for the execution of a decree, is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the date specified, therefor, in the third column of the schedule. What this provision basically means is that the time when the period of limitation would begin to run would be on the date on which the minor attains majority. So, if a cause of action had accrued to a minor, when he was a minor, if the period of limitation for such a cause of action was three years, then the same would begin to run not from the date on which the cause of action accrued to the minor, but from the date on which he attains majority. Thus, construing Article 59 alongwith Section 6 (1), if the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff when he was a minor, the starting point of limitation would be the date on which he attains majority, i.e, on 27.05.1988 The three-year period prescribed for filing a suit seeking the setting aside of a decree would come to an end on 27.05.1991

    16. The only question that has, therefore, to be examined in the present case is — when did the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside first become known to him? Paragraph 28 of the plaint reads as under:—

    “28. Shri MKR pleaded with Shyamlaji not to proceed with the suits as that would ruin his professional career. The suits were compromised after confirming and accepting Shyamlaji's pre-existing right in respect of the ground floor of A-16, Niti Bagh and it was categorically undertaken by Shri MKR that the possession of Shyamlaji would not be disturbed under any circumstances. The plaintiff came to know of the compromise decree when defendant No. 1 filed probate case No. 26/93 and annexed the terms of the compromise decree as an annexure to the probate petition.”

    17. The last portion of the above paragraph indicates that the plaintiff came to know of the compromise decree when the defendant No. 1 filed the probate case 26/93. In other words, the suggestion is that the plaintiff attained knowledge only in 1993. If this were to be so, the starting point of limitation would be 1993 and the suit would be within time. However, unfortunately for the plaintiff, this is not so. It is clearly indicated in the earlier portion of the said paragraph 28 that Shri MKR pleaded with Shyamlaji not to proceed with the suit as that would ruin his professional career. This is not what is stated in the compromise decree. The question that arises is — how did the plaintiff come to know that MKR pleaded with his mother not to proceed with the suit as that would ruin his professional career? This question can only be ascertained at this stage from what is stated in the plaint itself. Looking at the verification at the end of the plaint, it is clear that paragraph 28 has been verified as true to the knowledge of the plaintiff which means that the plaintiff was aware, de hors the filing of the probate case, that the suit had been compromised in 1987. He was aware because he has verified the averments made in paragraph 28 as being true to his knowledge. From this discussion, it is clear that the plaintiff had knowledge of the compromise decree even when he was a minor, i.e, in 1987 itself. Obviously, because he was a minor, he would get the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the starting point of limitation would not be 1987, but would be 27.05.1988 when he attained majority. The end point for the period of limitation being, 27.05.1991 The suit has been filed in 1994. Therefore, the same is barred by limitation and, on this ground alone, the plaint is liable to rejected. Because of the view taken by me on this question, it shall not be necessary for me to express any view on the other two points raised by the defendant No. 1.

    This application is allowed. The plaint is rejected. All the pending applications also stand disposed of.

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    Comments

    M.R. Krishnamurthi v. Chandan Ramamurthi
    (Jul 3, 2008)