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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a private company engaged in sewer desilting and related renovation works, sought a writ of mandamus directing Respondent No. 1 (New Delhi Municipal Council, NDMC) and Respondent No. 2 (Delhi Jal Board, DJB) to issue a letter of award/work order for execution of rehabilitation of the upstream stretch (NDMC area) of a 66" (1650 mm) brick barrel sewer from Dayal Singh College to Kilokari Pumping Station. The alternative relief sought was reimbursement of expenses incurred by the petitioner in relation to that work.

Background chronology (as stated in the opinion): DJB invited tenders in 2001 for rehabilitation of the drain from Q point Lodhi Road to Kilokari SPS, with downstream (DJB) and upstream (NDMC) stretches. The petitioner asserts it received a work order from DJB in 2002 for the downstream portion. DJB repeatedly requested NDMC (letters dated 28-9-2004 and 9-12-2004) to assess and undertake desilting/rehabilitation in the NDMC portion. NDMC replied on 19-1-2005 approving desilting/rehabilitation of about 2 km of the trunk sewer in NDMC area and suggesting DJB could carry the work as a deposit work.

The petitioner expressed its readiness (27-1-2005) to execute the upstream work on the same rates and terms. DJB offered NDMC (28-1-2005) two options: NDMC executes the work, or NDMC deposits an estimated sum (Rs. 26,19,74,681) with DJB to have DJB complete it. NDMC communicated acceptance of the estimate (3-3-2005). DJB then suggested that the work (including maintenance) be carried out by M/s. Kaveri Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. at the same rates and terms (16-3-2005), citing time constraints in a fresh tendering process.

DJB's Technical Committee minutes (23-9-2005) recommended award to M/s. Kaveri Infrastructure (P) Ltd. NDMC prepared a draft MoU and forwarded it to DJB; NDMC informed the petitioner (7-7-2006) that NDMC had asked DJB to take up the work as a deposit work and that it was DJB's prerogative how to award and execute the work, subject to competitive process under Government Financial Rules. The petitioner repeatedly requested award and sought reimbursement for material it had allegedly procured; it also placed on record correspondence including a confidential DJB letter urging award to the petitioner because material worth Rs.16 crore had been arranged.

The matter was taken up for disposal and the court heard submissions before dismissing the writ petition and related application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus directing NDMC and/or DJB to issue a letter of award/work order for the upstream rehabilitation work.
  2. Whether the petitioner had an enforceable legitimate expectation (including an "entrenched legitimate expectation") arising from the draft MoU, DJB/NDMC correspondence, or the Technical Committee recommendation that would justify compelling the authorities to award the contract to the petitioner.
  3. Whether doctrines such as promissory estoppel, issue estoppel or conduct estoppel operate in the petitioner's favour to compel award or compensation.
  4. Whether the remedy sought via a writ petition under Article 226 was appropriate for compensation/reimbursement for expenses incurred in anticipation of an award.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The draft MoU signed by the Chief Engineer of DJB and NDMC and the correspondence between the agencies showed that a decision to award the work to the petitioner had already been taken, leaving only a ministerial act of signing the contract.
  • The DJB Technical Committee had recommended award to the petitioner; therefore the authorities could not renege on this decision.
  • The upstream work was part of a two-phase project (continuation of the downstream work already executed by the petitioner), so a single contractor should have been awarded both phases.
  • Invoked doctrines: entrenched legitimate expectation, issue estoppel, conduct estoppel, and Wednesbury reasonableness to argue denial of award was arbitrary/irrational.
  • Because the petitioner had already invested substantially in anticipation of award (including purchasing raw material), it should be compensated if award was not given.
  • Failure to award to the petitioner could cause siltation problems and potential unforeseen liabilities relating to downstream work already completed by the petitioner.

Delhi Jal Board's (DJB) Arguments

  • DJB's counsel contended the work pertaining to the NDMC area was within NDMC's domain and thus the award decision was not in DJB's hands.
  • DJB indicated concern that regular tendering would take time and that liability/performance under fresh tenders could not be fixed; this was used as a basis for DJB to suggest continuity with the agency executing downstream works.

New Delhi Municipal Council's (NDMC) Arguments

  • NDMC's counsel maintained that the petitioner had no right to demand that NDMC award the work to it.
  • NDMC emphasized that Government Financial Rules requiring competitive bidding could not be bypassed and that NDMC must follow applicable General Financial Rules for award of such works.
  • The petitioner was free to participate in any open tendering process and seek contract award on that basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re Westminster City Council [1986] AC 668 Developed the doctrine that a duty of consultation (and more broadly legitimate expectation) may arise from a promise or established practice. The court cited Lord Bridge's formulation to explain the origins of legitimate expectation and to situate the petitioner's reliance on that doctrine.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 Wednesbury principles: the standard of judicial review for irrationality/unreasonableness of administrative action. The court used Wednesbury as the yardstick for assessing whether a change in policy defeating a legitimate expectation was irrational or perverse; it concluded that choosing competitive bidding was not irrational under Wednesbury.
Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Others (1999) 4 SCC 727 Explains evolution of legitimate expectation in Indian law and its interplay with Wednesbury principles and proportionality; decision-makers can be compelled to give effect to representations unless overriding public interest intervenes. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to state that substantive legitimate expectation can be enforced but that reliance, detriment and proportionality must be examined; applied these criteria and found the petitioner's case lacking.
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO (2005) 1 SCC 625 Further exposition of the doctrine of legitimate expectation and its limits in Indian jurisprudence. The court cited this case as part of the chain of authorities refining legitimate expectation; it formed part of the doctrinal background against which the petitioner's claim was tested and rejected.
Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, JT 2006 (6) SC 199 Additional authority further explaining legitimate expectation and administrative law principles in India. Used to support the court's survey of law on legitimate expectation and to explain how those principles apply to the facts.
Bakul Cashew Corporation Limited v. STO (1986) 2 SCC 365 Principles of promissory estoppel: need for definite representation by state agency, reliance by the claimant and resulting detriment. The court invoked this case to set out the requirements of promissory estoppel and held that the petitioner had not established the necessary factual foundation to attract the doctrine.
Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P. (2002) 2 SCC 188 Promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel a government/public authority to carry out a representation which is prohibited by law or made without authority; equity yields to larger public interest. The court relied on this precedent to explain that representations requiring deviation from established procedures (such as competitive tendering under financial rules) cannot be enforced and that promissory estoppel cannot override statutory or rule-based obligations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the petition principally through the frameworks of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel, and by reference to administrative law doctrines of rationality (Wednesbury) and public-procurement compliance with Government Financial Rules.

Key analytical steps and findings:

  1. The court examined documentary and factual material and concluded there was no concluded agreement or enforceable understanding between DJB and NDMC that the work would be executed by the petitioner. The draft MoU (which did not bear a date) and protracted internal negotiations were insufficient to create an enforceable right.
  2. A recommendation by a Technical Committee in DJB in favour of the petitioner did not create a legitimate expectation enforceable against the authorities, particularly where the award of work is governed by Government Financial Rules requiring competitive process.
  3. DJB's stated urgency and preference for continuity (so as to avoid perceived risks in fresh tenders) did not render NDMC's decision to insist on competitive bidding irrational or perverse under Wednesbury principles.
  4. The court analyzed the petitioner's reliance on doctrines of issue estoppel and conduct estoppel and found the factual foundation wanting; the petitioner had not pleaded or demonstrated facts to attract those doctrines.
  5. On promissory estoppel, the court reiterated the requirement of a definite representation by a state agency, reliance and detriment (Bakul Cashew). It held that enforcement cannot compel a public authority to deviate from established procedures or statutory obligations (Sharma Transport). The petitioner had not shown a legitimate, authoritative promise that would justify compelling the respondents to award the contract.
  6. The court observed that unilateral acts or representations by the petitioner (for example a communication to its supplier claiming award) were done at its own risk and could not substitute for an authoritative communication from the respondent authorities.
  7. The court noted that if the petitioner had incurred loss in anticipation of an award, the appropriate forum for seeking compensation might be a civil suit, subject to legal limits; a writ under Article 226 was not the appropriate remedy for such a grievance.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs; the related application is also dismissed.

Implications and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court refused to issue a mandamus compelling DJB or NDMC to award the upstream rehabilitation work to the petitioner because there was no enforceable contract or entitlement established by the petitioner.
  • The petitioner's reliance on legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel failed for want of the necessary factual and legal elements; the authorities' insistence on following Government Financial Rules and competitive bidding was not irrational and could not be overridden by equitable doctrines in the circumstances.
  • The petitioner remains free to pursue appropriate civil remedies for any losses it claims to have incurred in anticipation of award, if such remedies are available in law; the court indicated a writ under Article 226 was not the proper forum for that relief.
  • No novel legal principle or new precedent was established by the court; the decision applies established doctrines of legitimate expectation, promissory estoppel and Wednesbury review to the facts and results in dismissal of the petition.
  • There is no order as to costs in favour of any party.

    Kaveri Infrastructure P. Ltd. Petitioner v. N.D.M.C & Ors. S

    Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:— Learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents appearing on advance notice agree that the matter can be taken up for disposal.

    Background facts

    2. The petitioner, a private company involved in carrying out work of desilting of sewers, renovation of water rising mains seeks a mandamus to Respondent No. 1, New Delhi Municipal Council (‘NDMC’) and Respondent No. 2 Delhi Jal Board (‘DJB’) to issue a letter of award/work order in favour of the petitioner for execution of the work of “rehabilitation” of upstream stretch (falling in NDMC area) of 66” (1650 mm) dia old Brick Barrel from Dayal Singh College to Kilokari Pumping Station.” The alternative prayer is for a direction to the respondents to reimburse the expenses incurred by the Petitioner in relation to this work.

    3. In the year 2001, DJB invited tenders for the work of rehabilitation of 66” (1650mm) dia drain sewers (Brick Barrel) from Q point Lodhi Road to Kilokari SPS. The upstream stretch was from Q-point Lodhi Road to Dayal Singh College and downstream portion was from Dayal Singh College to Kilokari SPS. According to the petitioner it was issued a work order dated 1-11-2002 by the DJB in relation to the downstream work which falls within the jurisdiction of the DJB. It is not in dispute that the upstream portion of the sewer is in the area within the jurisdiction of the NDMC.

    4. On 28-9-2004, the DJB wrote to the NDMC stating as under:—

    “DJB has taken up Rehabilitation/Renovation of 1650 mm. dia old Kilokari sewer for Dayal Singh College to Kilokri Sewage Pumping Station within DJB/MCD limits. This sewer rehabilitation work is likely to be completed by March 2005.

    The upstream side of this sewer i.e from Q point to Dayal Singh College falls in the NDMC area. As such you are requested to assess the condition of the sewer line falling in NDMC area and to take action for desilting/repair/rehabilitation in NDMC area as per requirement to achieve optimum use of the sewerage system. This will result in smooth sewage flow to Kilokri Sewage Pumping Station and will avoid siltation of the already desilted portion. An early action in this regard is requested as the rehabilitation work in DJB/MCD limits is likely to be completed by March 2005.

    The layout plan showing the alignment of the sewer line in DJB limit as well as in NDMC area is attached for reference and further action.”

    5. This was followed by another letter dated 9-12-2004 by which the DJB reiterated its request and further required the NDMC to desilt the sewer falling within its jurisdiction. In reply to these letters, the NDMC on 19-1-2005 informed the DJB:

    “I have been directed to communicate the approval of NDMC for desilting and rehabilitation of 2 Kms approx length of trunk sewer in NDMC area on the upstream of 66” dia old brick barrel from Dayal Singh College to Kilokri Pumping Station. The work of trunk sewer in NDMC area may also be carried out by you on as a deposit work in continuation of work dome by you.

    As regards, the second trunk sewer lime I wish to inform you that the old trunk sewer line had already been replaced with a new trunk sewer line. In view of this, desilting and rehabilitation as proposed by you is not required. The plan showing the new sewer line bypassing the old sewer line is also enclosed.”

    6. The petitioner wrote to the DJB on 27-1-2005 stating that as regards the upstream work from Q point Lodhi Road to Dayal Singh College which falls within the NDMC area, it was “ready to execute this work on same rates and terms & conditions without any extra levy.”

    7. On 28-1-2005 the DJB offered the NDMC two options:

    (i) The work may be executed by the NDMC itself.

    (ii) That the DJB would get the work completed provided NDMC deposits an estimated amount of Rs 26,19,74,681 with the DJB.

    It appears that NDMC on 3-3-2005 accepted the estimate suggested by the DJB. Thereafter the DJB wrote to the NDMC on 16-3-2005 stating:

    “May please refer to your letter No. 251-52.CE(C) I dated 3-3-2005 wherein the acceptance of estimate amounting to Rs 26,19,74,700 was conveyed to this department.

    In this regard, it is mentioned that since regular tender process will take appreciable time and moreover liability/performance of the system in the event of fresh tenders cannot be fixed.

    You are requested to send a request to Delhi Jal Board for getting the work including maintenance of sewer line for 10 years be carried out from M/s. Kaveri Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. on the same rates, terms and conditions, who is executing the downstream reach in DJB area otherwise like the work may please be carried out at your end.”

    8. The petitioner has placed on record the minutes of the meeting held on 23-9-2005 of the Technical Committee of DJB held in the chamber of Member (DR) which “recommended the award of work in favour of M/s. Kaveri Infrastructure (P) Ltd. at their negotiated rate at a total cost of Rs 22,70,85,000 only.”

    9. As far as the NDMC was concerned, it appears that at one stage by a letter dated 26-12-2005 they wrote to the DJB enclosing a draft MOU approved by the competent authority for acceptance and signature. The petitioner has managed to obtain and enclose with the petition a copy of the said draft MOU. On this basis, the petitioner wrote to the NDMC asking it to finalise the MOU so that work could be started at the earliest. In response to this letter the NDMC replied to the petitioner on 7-7-2006 informing it as under:

    “Proposal submitted by DJB to rehabilitate the upstream portion of the said barrel has already stand accepted by NDMC and DJB has been requested to get the barrel rehabilitated by them on behalf of NDMC as a deposit work.

    NDMC has already communicated DJB to take up the work on behalf of NDMC as a deposit work and now it is their prerogative as to how the work is to be awarded and executed.

    NDMC is not in a position to negotiate with you as it has already been decided by the NDMC and communicated to DJB that work is to be carried out by DJB on behalf of NDMC as a deposit work on competitive basis in accordance with the General Finance Rule applicable to Govt. bodies. A draft MOU approved by the competent authority already stand submitted to DJB for their acceptance and signing the same. Response of DJB is still awaited for which they are being pursued vigorously.” ….

    (emphasis supplied)

    10. This was followed by letters dated 17-7-2006, 25-10-2006, 1-12-2006 by the petitioner to the DJB asking it to award the work to the petitioner. The petitioner has placed on record a confidential letter written by the Chief Engineer DJB to the NDMC making a strong pitch for the petitioner and stating inter alia, as under:

    “After the award of work the firm has already arranged material worth Rs 16 crore which can create further litigation in the matter. Hence it shall be desirable to get the work executed from the same agency.”

    11. By a letter dated 8-2-2007 the petitioner asked the DJB to award it the contract within 7 days. It was alternatively suggested by the petitioner to the DJB “if you are too keen to award this work to some other agency, you must first reimburse us the amount incurred by us on purchasing raw material for this work. The said raw material is lying ready at our supplier's end and can be delivered to you at any time on your demand.

    Submissions of counsel

    12. Mr Chetan Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner first submits that the draft MOU signed by the Chief Engineer DJB and Chief Engineer NDMC read with the correspondence referred to reveal that the decision to award the work to the petitioner had already been taken and all that remained was the ministerial act of actually signing the contract. Secondly, he submits that the Technical Committee of the DJB had already approved the award of the contract to the petitioner and in those circumstances it was not open to either of the two agencies, the DJB and the NDMC, to renege on such decision. Thirdly, he submitted that the correspondence on record showed that the work as originally envisaged was in two phases. Therefore, there was no need to award two separate contracts for each of the phase. In other words, the upstream work was “in continuation” and the downstream work which had already been successfully completed by the petitioner. Mr Sharma relied on the principles of “entrenched legitimate expectation”, “issue estoppel”, “conduct estoppel” and the yardstick of Wednesbury principles of reasonableness to urge that the denial of the award of work to the petitioner was arbitrary and irrational. Adverting to the fact that the petitioner had already invested a lot of money in anticipation of the award of the contract, he submitted that the petitioner should be compensated for its loss. Finally, he submitted that the non-award of the work by another agency would result in heavy siltage of the sewer which might constrain the petitioner with unforeseen liability in respect of the downstream work already completed by it.

    13. On behalf of the DJB, Mr Sandeep Aggarwal pointed out that the work in question pertains to an area within the domain of the NDMC and therefore the question of award of the work was not in the hands of the DJB. Appearing on behalf of the NDMC, Ms. Anjana Gosain contends that there is no right in the petitioner to demand that the work should be awarded to it. She further submits that the NDMC could not have bye-passed the Financial Rules which require competitive bidding for the work of this kind. She further submits that it is always open to the petitioner to participate in any open tendering process and seek award of contract on that basis.

    Legitimate Expectation:

    14. The first plank of the petitioner's submission is based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, developed by the courts in England in the context of testing administrative action on the rubric of reasonableness. In Re Westminster CC,[1986] AC 668, Lord Bridge explained (at p. 692):

    “The courts have developed a relatively novel doctrine in public law that a duty of consultation may arise from a legitimate expectation of consultation aroused either by a promise or by an established practice of consultation.”

    15. The above doctrine was further developed not only in the context of consultation with different authorities as a procedural necessity but developed into a substantive doctrine as well. Prof. Wade explains in Administrative Law (8th Edition) (at page 498):

    “Procedural expectations are protected simply by requiring that the promised procedure be followed. Substantive expectations are often protected procedurally, i.e by extending to the person affected an opportunity to mark representations before the expectation is dashed.”

    16. However Prof. Wade reminds that a person “…is not entitled to rely upon his expectation of a benefit unless it is founded upon some promise or established practice. To do this is to confuse the protection of legitimate expectations with the duty of act fairly.”

    17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the evolution of the doctrine in our country by its authoritative pronouncement in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, (1999) 4 SCC 727. The court also considered the doctrine in the context of the principle of reasonableness first enunciated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, now generally known as Wednesbury principles. The court then proceeded to explain as under (SCC p. 747):

    “37. The above survey of cases shows that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation bases on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. The judgment in Raghunathan's case requires that reliance must have been placed on the said representation and the representee must have thereby suffered detriment.

    38. The more important aspect, in our opinion, is whether the decision maker can sustain the change in policy by resort to Wednesbury principles of rationality or whether the court can go into the question whether decision maker has properly balance the legitimate expectation as against the need for a change? In the latter case the court would obviously be able to go into the proportionality of the change in the policy.”

    18. Ultimately the court concluded that in the context of a change in policy (page 749 SCC):

    “The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if the change in policy, which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made.”

    The above law was further explained in the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625 and Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi., JT 2006 (6) SC 199.

    19. We now turn to the facts of the present case to examine if these principles make out a case for interference in this matter at the instance of the petitioner. The narration of facts indicate that although at one stage the DJB and NDMC had agreed on a draft MOU, there was in fact no concluded understanding or agreement between the two agencies that the work would be executed by the petitioner. Protracted behind-the-room negotiations cannot create a legitimate expectation in the petitioner much less an “entrenched legitimate expectation”.

    20. The court is unable to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the signing of the draft MOU by the Chief Engineer of DJB and NDMC, which document interestingly does not bear any date, created an enforceable right in the petitioner. There can be no manner of doubt that the said draft MOU does not signify a concluded contract at all. Likewise the similar fact that the Technical committee recommended the award of work in favour of the petitioner cannot create any legitimate expectation particularly when the award of work by said agency is governed by Government Financial Rules. In fact the letter dated 16-3-2005 written by the DJB to the NDMC indicates that the hurry to award the tender to the petitioner was actuated by the DJB's perception that the “regular tender process will take appreciable time and moreover liability/performance of the system in the event of fresh tenders can not be fixed.” If the NDMC has taken a decision that the Government Financial Rules which require award of such tender only through a competitive process, it can hardly be said that such decision is either arbitrary or irrational. The court is unable to accept the contention that the decision of going in for a competitive bidding process is irrational on the application of Wednesbury principles.

    21. As long as there is no concluded contract, it would be futile for the petitioner to seek to rely on correspondence between the two agencies, to which the petitioner is not a party, in support of its plea that any enforceable right has accrued in its favour. In these circumstances, the question of the court issuing a mandamus to award the work in question to the petitioner, does not arise.

    Promissory estoppel:

    22. As regards the plea “issue estoppel” and “conduct estoppel” this court is not prepared to entertain such a plea in the facts and circumstances of the case. If the petitioner was seeking to reply on these principles, then it should have laid a factual foundation to demonstrate how these get attracted on the facts of the present case. This, however, has not been done. If on the other hand, the petitioner is relying on the broader concept of promissory estoppel in that event the petitioner would have to demonstrate that there was a definite representation by the State agency, that the petitioner altered its position by acting on such representation and suffered detriment (see Bakul Cahsew Corporation Limited v. STO (1986) 2 SCC 365). That by itself would not suffice as explained in the Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P (2002) 2 SCC 188. A promise that would require the state agency to deviate from an established procedure cannot be sought to be enforced. It was explained (SCC p. 203):

    “24. It is equally settled law that the promissory estoppel cannot be used compelling the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make. Doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The court on satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against Government or the public authority.”

    23. If the petitioner wrote as it did on 5-10-2005, to its supplier in the United Kingdom claiming that DJB had already awarded it the contract, it was a unilateral act, entirely at the risk of the petitioner. In any event till such time there was actually a communication to the petitioner that the work in question had been awarded to it, the petitioner could not have proceeded on that footing in anticipation. In the facts of the present case, this court is of the view that there is no question of applicability of the principles of promissory estoppel that necessitates a mandamus being issued to the respondents to award the contract in favour of the petitioner.

    24. If the petitioner, as it claims, invested resources in anticipation of the award of contract to it, it is always open to the petitioner to seek a proper remedy in the civil court, if so permitted in accordance with the law. A writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy for such a grievance.

    25. For all of the above reasons, this court finds no merit in this writ petition and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Consequently, the application is dismissed.

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    Kaveri Infrastructure P. Ltd. Petitioner v. N.D.M.C & Ors. S
    (Mar 9, 2007)