Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C.R No. 1077 of 1997 with Cont. Cas (C) 83/1998 and CM (M) No. 238 of 1999 and CR No. 620 of 1999

Advocates

Mr. R.P Bansal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Manas R. Panigrahi, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr. D.R Thadani with Mr. H.N Takkar, Advocates for the Respondent.

Judges

Vikramajit Sen, J.

Acts

Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (hereinafter referred to as the H.A& M. Act)
SECTION 24 HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Sections 406 and 498A of Indian Penal Code
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT
Section 18 of the H.A & M. Act
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Vikramajit Sen, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The husband, Shri Ajit Arjani, filed a divorce petition on 1 February 1996. The opinion notes uncertainty about when the wife, Roma Arjani, was served with summons or when she became aware of that petition. In April 1996 the wife lodged an F.I.R. under Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. On 15 May 1996 the husband paid Rs. 50,000 to the wife; the husband contended this was for maintenance/settlement, while the wife said it was repayment of a loan.

On 31 May 1996 the wife filed a suit for maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (H.A. & M. Act) with an application for interim maintenance. On 3 October 1997 an Additional District Judge (ADJ) awarded interim maintenance at Rs. 3,500 per month. The Revisionist husband (in C.R.P No. 1077/1997) contested the ADJ's order on the ground that the suit valuation at Rs. 6 lakhs placed it outside the ADJ's pecuniary jurisdiction.

The wife also invoked Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the divorce proceedings; the Matrimonial Court fixed interim maintenance at Rs. 2,500 per month by order dated 21 April 1999, which was based on earlier directions by this Court (including directions in C.M. 3754/97 in C.R. 1077/1997 dated 22 October 1997).

A Review Petition was filed before the ADJ seeking adjustment of the Rs. 50,000 payment against interim maintenance. The Trial Court declined to adjust it, treating the payment as part of proceedings under Sections 406 and 498A IPC and not as maintenance. The wife filed a Contempt Petition alleging non-payment of interim maintenance.

The High Court considered multiple petitions (including C.R.P Nos. 1077/1997 and 620/1999) and several interlocutory and review applications, referred to relevant precedents, and delivered orders disposing of the matters described below.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Additional District Judge possessed pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 18 of the H.A. & M. Act to entertain the maintenance suit valued at Rs. 6 lakhs (the core grievance in C.R.P No. 1077/1997).
Whether the sum of Rs. 50,000 paid on 15 May 1996 should be adjusted against interim maintenance arrears (raised in the Review Petition before the ADJ).
Whether a Contempt Petition was an appropriate remedy for alleged non-payment of interim maintenance or whether contempt proceedings were inappropriate where alternative remedies/ambiguities existed.

Arguments of the Parties

Husband / Revisionist

Contended that because the suit was valued at Rs. 6 lakhs, the Additional District Judge lacked the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit and therefore interim orders passed by the ADJ were vulnerable (the grievance in C.R.P No. 1077/1997).
Maintained that the Rs. 50,000 payment made on 15 May 1996 was paid towards maintenance/settlement (i.e., beneficial to the wife by way of maintenance).
Through learned Senior Counsel, stated that the fixation of interim maintenance at Rs. 2,500 per month (as determined in interlocutory proceedings) was not under challenge—i.e., the husband did not dispute the interim Rs. 2,500 figure for the moment.

Wife / Respondent

Contended that the Rs. 50,000 paid in May 1996 was repayment of a loan, not maintenance.
Filed a Contempt Petition alleging that interim maintenance was not being paid as ordered.
Accepted the interim arrangement fixing maintenance at Rs. 2,500 per month as the interim position (the opinion records that the wife had no objection to Rs. 2,500 as an interim arrangement).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 291	The principle that once a governmental action is taken pursuant to court directions a fresh cause of action arises and that improper execution or perceived non-compliance typically gives rise to remedies by way of judicial review rather than contempt; contempt should not be invoked where the alleged violation can be redressed by other remedies.	The Court relied on this passage to support the proposition that contempt is not the appropriate substitute for available corrective remedies and that an aggrieved party should pursue available review/remedial forums if an implementation is allegedly incorrect rather than treat the issue as wilful contempt.
Ram Kishan v. Raj Kumar, 2003 (6) Scale 682	A reiterated view that contempt proceedings are not the proper remedy when compliance with directions is disputed and that remaining grievances should be assailed in an appropriate forum rather than by contempt.	The Court cited the decision as reinforcing the view that a contempt petition is inappropriate where the compliance/dispute can be addressed by other proceedings; used to justify dismissal of the wife's contempt petition.
Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. v. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., (2002) 5 SCC 352	Explains the purpose and limits of contempt jurisdiction: to uphold judicial authority, to be exercised sparingly, confined to deliberate disobedience of clear directions, and not to be used to decide substantive matters that were not specifically directed in the order complained of.	The Court relied on the detailed exposition to hold that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised cautiously, limited to deliberate disobedience of unambiguous orders, and that ambiguities should be resolved by seeking clarification from the court that made the order rather than by initiating contempt proceedings.
R.N. Dey & Ors. v. Bhagyabati Pramanik & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 400	Warns against using contempt jurisdiction as a method of executing a decree or an order for which other statutory execution remedies exist; also notes that contempt questions are between court and contemnor and the aggrieved party cannot insist on contempt being used.	The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that contempt cannot be used as a substitute for execution proceedings and that the aggrieved party has no right to force the Court into contempt proceedings as an execution substitute.
Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers & Others, (2003) 6 SCC 659	Interpreted (in context of amendment to Section 115 CPC) that interim orders are subject to final orders and that appellate or review intervention in interlocutory orders should be approached with caution.	The Court cited this case to explain its reluctance to interfere with interim orders and to reinforce that interim directions are subject to final adjudication; used to support refusal to disturb interim arrangements.
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Others, AIR 2003 SC 3044	Addresses the status of interim orders and the limited scope for interference, in the context of the amendment to Section 115 CPC and allied principles.	The opinion invokes this decision alongside Shiv Shakti to justify restraint in disturbing interlocutory orders and to state that interim orders remain subject to final orders that may be passed later.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in several linked steps, strictly grounded in the material and authorities before it:

Interim maintenance: The Court accepted learned Senior Counsel for the husband’s statement that the interim maintenance fixation at Rs. 2,500 per month (as determined in interlocutory proceedings) was not being challenged. On that basis, and having regard to the long pendency of proceedings and payments already being made at that rate, the Court found no ground to interfere in C.R.P No. 620/1999.
Pecuniary jurisdiction point (C.R.P No. 1077/1997): The Court acknowledged the arguable point that the ADJ might not have possessed pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 18 of the H.A. & M. Act for a suit valued at Rs. 6 lakhs, and that in that event interim orders should not have been passed. However, because interim maintenance has been fixed at Rs. 2,500 per month and the wife accepted that figure as an interim arrangement, the Court allowed C.R.P No. 1077/1997 and set aside the impugned order—effectively resolving the jurisdictional challenge in light of the present interim arrangement and lack of contest on the Rs. 2,500 figure.
Adjustment of Rs. 50,000: The Trial Court had concluded the Rs. 50,000 payment, made in the criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 498A IPC, did not relate to interim maintenance and that there was no mention in those proceedings indicating the payment was for past or future maintenance. The High Court read the sequence of orders (including the dates from which maintenance was ordered in various proceedings) and concluded that the Rs. 50,000 was not in contemplation when interim maintenance was fixed; therefore, it was not adjustable against interim maintenance. The Court clarified that the Rs. 50,000 remains payable and is not adjustable, together with litigation costs.
Contempt petition: The Court undertook a legal review of the principles governing contempt jurisdiction: an order alleged to have been disobeyed must be explicit and unambiguous; if two reasonable interpretations exist and the respondent complies with a plausible one, contempt should not be invoked. The Court relied on authorities (J.S. Parihar; Ram Kishan; Jhareswar Prasad Paul; R.N. Dey) to emphasise that contempt is not an appropriate substitute for execution or other corrective remedies and must be confined to cases of deliberate, contumacious non-compliance. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that contempt jurisdiction should not be exercised here and dismissed the Contempt Petition.
Consequential determinations: On the admitted accounts of the parties, the Court quantified that Rs. 60,000 was due and payable towards arrears of maintenance and litigation expenses. The Court directed that the suit under Section 18 of the H.A. & M. Act shall now proceed, and that the divorce proceedings filed on 1 February 1996 shall proceed as and when the arrears are cleared, subject to further orders of the Matrimonial Court. The Court also stated a general reluctance to interfere with interim orders in view of the amendment to Section 115 CPC and the authorities cited, observing that interim orders remain subject to final adjudication.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

C.R.P No. 1077/1997 was allowed and the impugned order was set aside.
The Review Court's conclusion stands that the Rs. 50,000 paid on 15 May 1996 is not adjustable against interim maintenance and is payable (together with litigation costs).
The Contempt Petition alleging non-payment of interim maintenance is dismissed.
On the parties' admitted accounts, Rs. 60,000 is due and payable towards arrears of maintenance and litigation expenses.
The maintenance suit under Section 18 of the H.A. & M. Act shall proceed; the divorce proceedings shall proceed once arrears are cleared, subject to further orders.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The husband remains liable to pay the Rs. 50,000 (not adjustable) and Rs. 60,000 in total arrears and litigation expenses as calculated on the admitted accounts; the maintenance suit may proceed and the divorce proceedings are put on the calendar subject to clearance of arrears.
Procedural guidance: The opinion emphasises established principles limiting the use of contempt jurisdiction — contempt is not to be used as a substitute for execution or other corrective remedies and should be invoked only where there is clear, deliberate, contumacious disobedience of an unambiguous order.
On precedent and law-making: The opinion applies existing Supreme Court authorities and the amendment to Section 115 CPC as guidance for restraint in interfering with interlocutory orders. The Court did not purport to lay down new legal precedent beyond application of existing authorities.

Disposition

All petitions and applications before the Court were disposed of in the terms described above.

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Ajit Arjani Petitioner v. Roma Arjani

Vikramajit Sen, J.:— The legal quarrel between the spouses had started on 1st February, 1996 with the filing of a divorce petition by the Husband, namely Shri Ajit Arjani. It is not clear when the wife, namely, Roma Arjani, was served with the summons of the divorce petition, or the date on which she gained knowledge of that petition. In April 1996 an F.I.R was lodged by the wife under Sections 406/498A of the I.P.C In those proceedings, on 15.5.1996, a sum of Rs. 50, 000/- was paid by the husband to the wife. It is the contention of the husband that this sum was paid towards maintains/settlement, but the wife contends that this was towards repayment of a loan. On 31st May, 1996, a Suit for maintenance was filed under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the H.A& M. Act’) which was accompanied by an application for grant of interim maintenance. On 3rd October, 1997, interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 3500/- per month was awarded by the Additional District Judge (ADJI). The Revisionist husband has inter alia contended in C.R.P No. 1077/1997 that since the valuation of the suit was made at Rs. 6 lacs, the Additional District Judge did not possess pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit at that relevant time. This is the grievance of the Revisionist against the order dated 3.10.1997 An application was filed by the Wife in the Divorce Petition invoking Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HM Act) which came to be decided by the Matrimonial Court on 21.4.1999, fixing interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per month. This interim Order was predicated on Orders passed by this Court on 22.10.1997 in C.M 3754/97 in C.R 1077/1997 directing payment of Rs. 2,500/- per month with effect from the date of the application as interim maintenance.

2. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel for the husband states that the fixation of interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per month, which had been determined in interlocutory proceedings in C.R.P No. 1077/1997, is not under challenge. The effect is that, without prejudice to the final order that may be passed, interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per month is presently not in dispute. It is also well settled that if maintenance is granted under various provisions and sundry proceedings, the highest amount is the maximum liability towards maintenance. Keeping in view the pendency of the proceedings since 1997, and payment of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2500 per month, and the statement of learned Senior Counsel for the husband, I am of the view that no interference is called for in C.R.P No. 620/1999.

3. It is certainly arguable that if the Court did not possess any pecuniary jurisdiction under section 18 of the h.a & m. act the suit having been valued at Rs. 6 lacs, interim orders ought not to have been passed by the Additional District Judge. This question does not, however, fall for further consideration or determination since interim maintenance has now been fixed at Rs. 2500/- per month to which the Wife has no objection as an interim arrangement. C.R.P No. 1077/1997 is allowed and the impugned Order is set aside.

4. A Review Petition has been filed before the Additional District Judge contending that the sum of Rs. 50,000/- paid in May, 1996 should be adjusted in the calculation of interim maintenance. The Trial Court has taken the view that since that payment had been made in the proceedings under Sections 406 and 498A of Indian Penal Code it does not relate to interim maintenance, and also for the reason that no mention has been made in those proceedings that this sum was being paid towards past and future maintenance. It has, however, been observed in the impugned Order that payment of maintenance was made effective from 31.5.1996 In the proceedings under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court has also ordered payment of maintenance with effect from 14.5.1996 A cumulative and concatenate reading of these Orders reaches to the conclusion that the said sum of Rs. 50,000/- was not in contemplation while fixing the interim maintenance. It is clarified that this sum of Rs. 50,000/-is not adjustable and is, therefore, payable together with litigation costs.

5. The wife has filed a Contempt Petition on the grounds that the interim maintenance has not been paid. It is trite to state that for a person to be held punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act the Order of which disobedience is alleged should be explicit and unambiguous. If two opinions are possible, and the one preferred or adhered to and compiled with by the Respondents is a plausible one, the Court should eschew the exercise of its powers of committing for its contempt. It is well established that the powers to commit for Contempt cannot be involved as a substitute for execution proceedings. In J.S Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 291, it had been ordered that a seniority list be prepared which was so done. However, a contempt petition was preferred on the ground that it was not correctly prepared and therefore violated the concerned Order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following pronouncement.

“It is seen that once there is any order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate Forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. That cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge cannot be given to re-drew the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the Division Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment or order of the Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the mistake committed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in this Court against the judgment of the learned Single Judge when the matter was already seized of the Division Bench.

The appeals are accordingly dismissed. It may be open to the aggrieved party to assail the correctness of the seniority list prepared by the State Government, if it is not in conformity with the directions issued by the High Court, if they are so advised, in an appropriate Forum. No costs.”

Similar views have been reiterated in Ram Kishan v. Raj Kumar, 2003 (6) Scale 682 as is evident from a perusal of the following Order by which the Petition came to be dismissed.

“1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

2. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the respondent-State states that the respondents have complied with the directions issued by this Court. Accordingly, they have prepared the seniority list and intimated to the petitioner his position in the seniority and have also prepared the Register as directed by this Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, disputes the said submission.

3. Considering the dispute, in our view, the contempt proceedings is not the proper remedy. If respondents have not allowed the directions, it would be open to the petitioner to file fresh petition for the remaining grievance.

4. Hence, this petition for initiation contempt proceedings is dismissed. Contempt Notice discharged.”

In Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another v. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others, (2002) 5 Supreme Court Cases 352 : 2002 (4) Scale 546 the Apex Court has opined as extracted below:

“The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the Courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of Court is a special power vested under the Constitution in the. Courts of record and also under the stature. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the Courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the Court exercising the appellate Court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been nay deliberate disobedience of the order of the Court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The Court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter of if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the Court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the Courts exercising contempt of Court jurisdiction ‘that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute’ in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of Courts”.

In R.N Dey and Others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Others, (2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 400, the Apex Court has specifically deprecated the use of Contempt of Court jurisdiction as a method of executing a decree or implementing an Order for which the law provides appropriate remedy. It had also noted that the question of contempt is a matter between the Court and the Contemnor and the aggrieved person has no right to insist that the Court should exercise such jurisdiction.

6. The Contempt Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

7. The effect is that on the admitted accounts of both sides, a sum of Rs. 60,000/- is due and payable towards arrears of maintenance and litigation expenses.

8. The suit filed under section 18 of the h.a & m. act shall now proceed. The Divorce proceedings filed on 1.2.1996 shall proceed as and when arrears are cleared subject to further orders of the Matrimonial Court. The matter has been pending for several years and the Matrimonial Court may endeavour to bring it to an early conclusion.

9. All the orders which have come before me are essentially interim in nature which this Court is reluctant to interfere with especially after the amendment carried out to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure are exposition of law in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers & Others, (2003) 6 SCC 659 and Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Others, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3044 Therefore there can be no gain saying in observing that interim orders are subject to final orders that may be passed.

10. All the Petitions are disposed of in the above terms.

Ajit Arjani Petitioner v. Roma Arjani

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Vikramajit Sen, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Husband / Revisionist

Wife / Respondent

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Disposition

Ajit Arjani Petitioner v. Roma Arjani

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