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  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act).3.
  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.21.
  • sub-section (6) of Section 158
  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
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  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act).3.
  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.21.
  • sub-section (6) of Section 158
  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Madan B. Lokur, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellants appealed an Award dated 12 September 1988 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) in Suit No. 97/1982. The claim arose from an accident on 26 July 1982 caused by the rash and negligent driving of Respondent No. 1, in which Smt. Shakuntala Devi, a housewife aged about 36 years, was fatally injured and died the next day. Her husband and children filed a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The MACT held Respondent No. 1 liable and awarded compensation by adopting an annual notional value of services of Rs. 2,500 (following Bhagwan Dass Bhatia), applying a multiplier of 16 and awarding Rs. 40,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. The Appellants challenged the adequacy of the pecuniary valuation of the deceased's contribution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What amount of compensation is due and payable for the death of a housewife who has no apparent source of income?
  2. Whether the valuation principle in Lata Wadhwa (supreme court decision fixing Rs. 36,000 per annum for certain housewives) is applicable to claims for statutory compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
  3. Whether a tribunal/court can award an amount exceeding the sum claimed in the claim petition and, if so, what procedure should be followed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The contribution of the deceased housewife to the household was materially more than Rs. 2,500 per annum as taken by the MACT; the MACT's pecuniary assessment was therefore too low.
  • Learned counsel orally requested that the claim petition be treated as amended (or otherwise that a higher amount than claimed be awarded) if necessary to do justice, on the ground that the appropriate compensation would exceed the amount originally claimed before the MACT.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwan Dass Bhatia v. Anand Pal (1986 ACJ 879) Held that the pecuniary value of services of a deceased housewife (aged about 53-54 in that case, death in 1976) could be taken at not less than Rs. 2,500 per annum. The MACT relied on this decision to fix Rs. 2,500 p.a.; the Court considered Bhagwan Dass Bhatia but held that, given inflation between 1976 and 1982, a higher valuation was appropriate in the present case.
Berry v. Humm & Co. ([1915] 1 K.B. 627) Constructive interpretation that pecuniary loss can include the monetary loss of replacing gratuitous services of a relative when there was reasonable prospect of such services being rendered in the future. Referred to as early authority recognizing non-monetary household services can be monetized for pecuniary loss purposes; used to show historical basis for assessing housewives' services.
Regan v. Williamson ([1976] 2 All ER 241) Stated the then existing law that dependants are to be compensated only for value of services lost; companionship, grief and mother's affection are to be ignored; but judge observed 'services' may be too narrowly construed. Referred to for the point that English law had evolved to recognize services beyond narrow housekeeping and for judicial observations expanding the notion of 'services'.
Mehmet v. Perry ([1977] 2 All ER 529) Assessed pecuniary value of a wife's services under three heads: housekeeping services; personal attention to children; personal care and attention to husband. Referred to as authority showing English courts recognize multifaceted value of a housewife's contribution beyond mere housekeeping.
Sunny Chugh v. Darshan Lal (1987 ACJ 812) and Shakuntala Devi v. Delhi Transport Corporation (1990 ACJ 459) Hold that gratuitous services of a deceased housewife have monetary value; additional expenses for substitute help and loss of security should be considered; no retirement age for housewife. Cited to support the proposition that housewives' services have a monetary value and to illustrate Indian High Court practice awarding substantial compensation (e.g., Rs. 50,000 in those cases).
A. Rajam v. M. Manikya Reddy (1989 ACJ 542) Loss computed by estimating services that would have been rendered; consider cost of substitutes and expenses; interpret 'services' broadly to include love, affection and personal care. Used to show Andhra Pradesh High Court's broad approach and the factors to be considered when valuing housewife services.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shamsher Singh (2003 ACJ 742) Accepted that something more than mere pecuniary value could be attached to a housewife's services; proceeded on basis that annual value could be Rs. 36,000 (following Lata Wadhwa). Noted as an instance where a High Court relied on Lata Wadhwa's figure of Rs. 36,000 p.a.; referenced by this Court in its survey of authority.
Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar ((2001) 8 SCC 197) Supreme Court (on facts of mass disaster and after a report) quantified services of certain housewives at Rs. 3,000 per month (Rs. 36,000 p.a.) for ages 34–59 and Rs. 20,000 p.a. for ages 62–72; did not award interest and stratified values without considering increase over time. The Court analyzed Lata Wadhwa in detail and distinguished it, holding it not applicable to statutory compensation under the M.V. Act because Lata Wadhwa arose in different factual and legal circumstances.
Mali Devi v. Sukhbir Singh (1997 II AD (Delhi) 175) Valued a housewife's contribution in 1979 as Rs. 1,800 p.a. (Rs. 300 per month) and awarded compensation which this Court later upheld. Used as a benchmark showing judicial practice and for comparison in determining an appropriate figure for 1982.
Jaimal Singh v. Paramjit Singh & Ors. (1998 VI AD (Delhi) 469) The court assessed a housewife's household contribution at Rs. 700 per month (Rs. 8,400 p.a.) where evidence did not support claimed earnings. Cited as an instance of Delhi courts taking higher notional monthly figures for housewives in later years.
Chandra Singh & Ors. v. Gurmej Singh & Ors. (2003 VII AD (Delhi) 222) Rejected automatic application of Lata Wadhwa; applied Second Schedule notional income of Rs. 15,000 p.a. and the Sarla Dixit formula, concluding a different amount appropriate. Cited as authority for not mechanically applying Lata Wadhwa and for considering the Second Schedule and Dixit approach in motor accident claims.
Captan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (2004 I AD (Delhi) 543) Rejected Lata Wadhwa's Rs. 36,000 p.a. as universally applicable; valued housewife's contribution at Rs. 10,000 p.a. plus other earnings where applicable. Used to support the proposition that Lata Wadhwa is fact-specific and not a universal yardstick in M.V. Act cases.
Krishna Gupta & Ors. v. Madan Lal & Ors. (2002 VIII AD (Delhi) 333) Held Lata Wadhwa not applicable to motor accident cases because the Motor Vehicles Act is a complete code providing statutory compensation and forum; Lata Wadhwa arose in a different factual situation. Cited by the Court in concluding that Lata Wadhwa is distinguishable/inapplicable to statutory M.V. Act claims.
Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav ((1996) 3 SCC 179) Provides the method (referred to in the opinion as the 'Dixit formula') used in calculating dependency by applying multiplier and deduction for personal expenses. The Court applied the Dixit approach (averaging notional incomes, applying multiplier, deducting one-third for personal expenses) in its calculation for the present case.
M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood ((2001) 8 SCC 151) Approved use of multiplier method; referred to Lata Wadhwa in the context of awarding compensation when children die. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential context regarding the multiplier and to show that Lata Wadhwa had limited application.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer (2003 8 SCC 731) Referred to Lata Wadhwa and M.S. Grewal regarding awards for death of children and reiterated multiplier use. Referred to as another Supreme Court decision in the broader jurisprudence on compensation calculation (multiplier confirmation).
Rattan Lal Mehta v. Rajinder Kapoor (1996 ACJ 372) Treatment of whether awards can exceed amounts claimed; the Division Bench did not accept the contention that courts cannot award more than claimed and relied on various authorities limiting such technical objections. Cited in the debate over whether a tribunal can award sums exceeding the claimed amount; ultimately placed in the context of Nagappa (below).
Bai Nanda v. Shivabhai Shankerbhai Patel (1966 ACJ 290) and Babu Mansa v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (1978 ACJ 485) Discuss procedural/pleading aspects about claims and awards exceeding claimed sums under relevant rules (as relied upon in Rattan Lal Mehta). Referred to as part of the authorities considered on the question of awarding amounts higher than claimed.
Jyoti Gupta v. Ashok Kumar & Ors. (2002 ACJ 1056) Expressed the view that awards may exceed the amount claimed and courts should not be too technical about this aspect. Cited to show judicial opinions permissive of exceeding claimed amounts in appropriate circumstances.
Ramu Tolaram & Ors. v. Amichand Hansraj Gupta & Ors. (1988 ACJ 24) Held that fixed court fees (not ad valorem) mean there is no reason why award cannot exceed claimed amount, particularly where claim pleadings are broad. Referred to in the discussion of procedural permissibility of awarding amounts above those claimed.
Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Ors. (JT 2002 (10) SC 144) Supreme Court held there is no restriction under the M.V. Act preventing tribunal/court from awarding compensation exceeding the claimed amount; courts should award 'just' compensation based on evidence and may permit amendment when required. Relied upon by this Court to hold there is no bar to awarding more than the claimed amount; the Court treated the claim petition as amended and awarded a higher amount in view of the long delay and evidence on record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a layered analysis:

  1. Survey of jurisprudence: The judgment surveys English authorities (Berry; Regan; Mehmet) to show the historical acceptance that monetary compensation may include replacement value of gratuitous household services and that the concept of 'services' has broadened beyond narrow housekeeping tasks.
  2. Review of Indian decisions: The Court reviewed decisions from Indian High Courts and this Court (Punjab & Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi) showing divergent approaches — some courts awarding fixed lump sums (e.g., Rs. 50,000 in similar-era cases), others applying Second Schedule notional incomes or rejecting wholesale application of Lata Wadhwa. The Court noted some decisions had adopted Lata Wadhwa's Rs. 36,000 p.a., while several Delhi decisions had distinguished it.
  3. On the applicability of Lata Wadhwa: The Court examined the facts and procedure in Lata Wadhwa, noting that it arose from a mass disaster and relied upon a report classifying housewives and fixing amounts in a context devoid of statutory compensation provisions. The Court concluded Lata Wadhwa is distinguishable and not applicable as a general yardstick for statutory M.V. Act compensation, because the M.V. Act provides a complete code and the basic principles used in motor accident claims (award of interest, consideration of future prospects) remain applicable.
  4. Choice of method for valuation: Recognizing no scientific method exists for assessing a housewife's contribution, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach: use the Minimum Rates of Wages in Delhi for a skilled worker as a proxy for the least value of a housewife's contribution. The Court considered prior decided figures (Bhagwan Dass Bhatia, Mali Devi, Jaimal Singh) and minimum wage data.
  5. Numerical application (Dixit-style calculation): The Court used the following data and steps (all drawn from the opinion):
    • Minimum wage for a skilled worker in Delhi as of 1 March 1982: Rs. 400 per month.
    • Minimum wage for a skilled worker in Delhi in February 1998: Rs. 2,361 per month, rounded to Rs. 2,400 per month.
    • Average of these two monthly figures = (400 + 2400) / 2 = Rs. 1,400 per month, i.e., Rs. 17,100 per annum.
    • Applying the agreed multiplier of 16 gives Rs. 2,24,000.
    • Deducting one-third for the deceased's personal expenses yields Rs. 1,50,000 as the net contribution to the household.
  6. Additional heads and interest: The Court awarded funeral expenses of Rs. 1,000 (choosing a lesser amount than the Second Schedule figure of Rs. 2,000 because the death occurred in 1982) and Rs. 3,000 for loss of consortium to Appellant No. 1. Amounts awarded over and above what the MACT had given were to carry interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition.
  7. On awarding amounts exceeding the claim: The Court analyzed the procedural controversy and concluded, following Nagappa (Supreme Court), that there is no bar under the Motor Vehicles Act to awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed; while formal amendment is the proper procedure, where evidence on record justifies a higher award and considering the delay in this appeal, the Court treated the claim petition as amended and awarded the higher amount.
  8. Final disposition: On these bases, the Court allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation in the terms set out above; no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED.

The Court held:

  • The services rendered by a housewife to her household should be given a broad interpretation and an expansive meaning.
  • The decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa is not applicable to claims for statutory compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and is distinguishable on its facts.
  • In the absence of scientific or statutory guidance, the wages of a skilled worker as per the Minimum Rates of Wages in Delhi can be resorted to as a reasonable proxy for valuing a housewife's contribution.
  • There is no bar under the Motor Vehicles Act to awarding an amount in excess of that claimed; though the appropriate procedure is formal amendment, a tribunal/court may, in a given case supported by evidence, award a higher amount even without a formal amendment.

Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered by the Court):

  • The contribution of the deceased housewife was quantified (after applying the multiplier and deduction) so that her beneficiaries were awarded an enhanced amount: net contribution Rs. 1,50,000.
  • Funeral expenses awarded: Rs. 1,000.
  • Loss of consortium to Appellant No. 1: Rs. 3,000.
  • Amounts awarded in excess of the MACT award shall carry interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition.
  • The appeal was allowed and there will be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The Court reaffirmed that the established principles for awarding compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act (use of multiplier, allowance for future prospects, and awarding interest) remain intact; it discouraged the mechanical transplantation of Lata Wadhwa's fixed figures into statutory motor accident claims and endorsed a pragmatic use of minimum skilled wages as a proxy in the absence of statutory guidance.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Amar Singh Thukral And Others Petitioners v. Sandeep Chhatwal And Others S

    Madan B. Lokur, J.:—The Appellants are aggrieved by an Award dated 12th September, 1988 passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) in Suit No. 97/1982.

    2. Smt. Shakuntala Devi died in an accident caused by the rash and negligent driving of a vehicle by Respondent No. 1. The accident took place on 26th July, 1982 and she died the next day. At the time of her death, she was a housewife aged about 36 years. Her husband and children filed a claim petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act).

    3. The learned MACT held Respondent No. 1 guilty of rash and negligent driving and thereby causing the death of Smt. Shakuntala Devi. As regards the compensation to be awarded, the learned MACT relied upon Bhagwan Dass Bhatia v. Anand Pal, 1986 ACJ 879 wherein a housewife aged about 53-54 years died in an accident in September 1976. A learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court estimated that her contribution to the household could not be less than Rs. 2,5007-per annum. On this basis, the High Court awarded a sum of Rs. 30,000/-as compensation taking into consideration the ever-increasing cost of incidental services. Following this reasoning, the learned MACT took the pecuniary value of the services rendered by the deceased housewife to her household at Rs. 2,500/- per annum. Adopting a multiplier of 16, the learned MACT awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/- as compensation with interest at 12% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till payment.

    4. There is no grievance with regard to the choice of the multiplier, but according to the Appellants, the contribution taken is far too low. It is submitted that her contribution is much more than Rs. 2,500/- per annum determined by the learned MACT.

    5. The question that, therefore, arises in a case such as the present is what is the amount of compensation that is due and payable in respect of the death of a housewife who has no apparent source of income.

    March of the law

    6. Long ago, in Berry v. Humm & Co., [1915] 1 K.B 627 the plain tiff claimed damages for the death of his wife by the negligence of the defendant's servants. According to the plaintiff, he had to employ a housekeeper to look after all the work in the house and also to look after his child. Damages, at that time, were based solely on compensation for pecuniary loss, either on the loss of such contribution in the past or on the loss of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit in the future. But, while giving a constructive interpretation to the existing law, it was said,

    “I can see no reason in principle why such pecuniary loss should be limited to the value of money lost, or the money value of things lost, as contributions of food or clothing, and why I should be bound to exclude the monetary loss incurred by replacing services rendered gratuitously by a relative, if there was a reasonable prospect of their being rendered freely in the future but for the death.”

    7. Much later, in Regan v. Williamson, [1976] 2 All ER 241 it was noted that the present law is that “dependants are to be compensated only for the value of the services lost to them by the death of a wife and mother. A wife's companionship is to be ignored, likewise the grief and misery caused by her departure and, so too, a mother's love, guidance and influence in bringing up children.” Reference was made to cases in which there was strict disregard to those features of the life of a woman beyond her so-called services, to keep house, cook food, buy clothes, wash them etc. Though the learned Judge found himself bound by the law, yet he expressed the view that the word 'services’ has been too narrowly construed. It was said,

    “It should, at least, include an acknowledgement that a wife and mother does not work to set hours and, still less, to rule. She is in constant attendance, save for those hours when she is, if that is the fact, at work. During some of those hours she may well give the children instruction on essential matters to do with their upbringing and, possibly, with such things as their home-work. This sort of attention seems to be as much of a service, and probably more valuable to them, than the other kinds of service conventionally so regarded.”

    8. In Mehmet v. Perry, [1977] 2 All ER 529 the pecuniary value of a wife's services were assessed and granted under three heads:

    (a) Loss to the family of the wife's housekeeping services.

    (b) Loss suffered by the children of the personal attention of their mother, apart from housekeeping services rendered by her.

    (c) Loss of the wife's personal care and attention, which the husband had suffered, in addition to the loss of her housekeeping services.

    9. Over a period of time, therefore, the march of the law in England has recognized the contribution of a housewife to the home and hearth as something over and above housekeeping services.

    Views of some Courts in India.

    10. In Sunny Chugh v. Darshan Lal, 1987 ACJ 812 (P&H) and Shakuntala Devi v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 1990 ACJ 459 a learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that gratuitous services provided by a deceased housewife do indeed have a monetary value in respect of which compensation is payable to her beneficiaries, including her husband and children. It was noted that additional expenses would have to be incurred for having the household run by a servant or other domestic help instead of the wife. Apart from this, there would also be a loss of an element of security to the family. Moreover, there is no retirement age for a housewife, who is required to do housework for as long as she is physically able.

    11. In Sunny Chugh the deceased housewife died in an accident in November 1974. She was about 29 years of age and her beneficiaries were awarded Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. Similarly, in Shakuntala Devi the deceased housewife died in an accident in March 1983. She was about 30 years and her beneficiaries were awarded Rs. 50,000/- as compensation, even though the accidental death took place about 9 years later.

    12. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, speaking through M. Jagannad-ha Rao, J in A. Rajam v. M. Manikya Reddy, 1989 ACJ 542 held, inter alia,as follows:—

    “The loss to the husband and children consequent upon the death of the housewife or mother has to be computed by estimating the loss of 'services’ to the family, if there was reasonable prospect of such services being rendered freely in the future but for the death. It must be remembered that any substitute to be so employed is not likely to be as economical as the housewife. Apart from the value of obtaining substituted services, the expense of giving accommodation or food to the substitute must also be computed. From this total must be deducted the expense the family would have otherwise been spending for the deceased housewife.

    While estimating the 'services’ of the housewife, a narrow meaning should not be given to the meaning of the word 'services’ but should be construed broadly and one has to take into account the loss of constant ‘love and affection’ as also of ‘personal care and attention’ by the deceased to her children, as a mother and to her husband, as a wife. The award is not diminished merely because some close relation like a grandmother is prepared to render voluntary services.”

    13. That something more than a mere pecuniary value can be at tached to the services of a housewife, a view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court, was readily ac cepted by the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shamsher Singh, 2003 ACJ 742. The last mentioned decision, however, noted the view of the August Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 and proceeded on the basis that the annual value of services rendered by a housewife is Rs. 36,000/-. Compen sation was awarded to the claimants on this basis. I propose to discuss Lata Wadhwa a little later.

    View of Delhi High Court

    14. In Mali Devi v. Sukhbir Singh, 1997 II AD (Delhi) 175, the deceased housewife met with a fatal accident in December 1979. At that time, she was about 35 years of age. It was said that apart from looking after her family consisting of six children, she used to assist her husband in carrying out agricultural operations. Her earning capacity was taken as Rs. 300/- per month out of which it was estimated that she would spend about Rs. 150/- per month on her family. On this basis, the monetary value of her services to the household was quantified at Rs. 1,800/- per annum and her beneficiaries were awarded compensation of Rs. 37,000/-by the learned MACT. This Court upheld the award.

    15. Jaimal Singh v. Paramjit Singh & Ors., 1998 VI AD (Delhi) 469, was a case in which a housewife died in an accident in April, 1991. She was about 40 years of age at that time. She was said to be self-employed and undertaking stitching work apart from managing the household. The contention that she was earning by stitching clothes was rejected by the learned MACT. This Court accepted this finding but assessed her contribution to the family for purposes of cooking, cleaning, washing clothes etc. at Rs. 700/- per month or Rs. 8,400/- per annum. On this basis, her beneficiaries were awarded compensation of Rs. 1,26,000/-after applying the appropriate multiplier.

    16. In Chandra Singh & Ors. v. Gurmej Singh & Ors., 2003 VII AD (Delhi) 222, the deceased housewife was 31 years of age. The date of her death is not mentioned in the judgement. The contention raised on behalf of the claimants was that in view of Lata Wadhwa, the contribution of the deceased housewife for the purposes of managing the entire family should be taken at Rs. 36,000/- per annum. This contention was rejected in paragraph 5 of the Report and it was held that the judgement in Lata Wadhwa was given in the peculiar facts of that case taking into consideration not only the status of the families but also the concession given by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the employer. It was held that the estimated income of a housewife taken in Lata Wadhwa couldn’t be taken to be the income of a housewife in every case. The Court then adverted to the Second Schedule of the Act wherein it is provided that in the case of a person who has no income, notional income can be taken at Rs. 15,000/-per annum. It was held that in the case of a housewife as well, this amount could be taken as her contribution to the household. It was noted that the Second Schedule was inserted in the Act in 1994 and at that time the minimum wages of a skilled worker were Rs. 1,784/- per month while in the year 2003 when judgement was delivered, the minimum wages were Rs. 2,783/- per month, an increase of about 60%. I am not sure about the correctness of these figures, since they are not borne out from the Minimum Rates of Wages in Delhi; but that hardly matters.

    17. It was noted that as per the Second Schedule of the Act, the ap-plicable multiplier in the case of the deceased was 17. It was then held that over a period of 17 years, the minimum wages would have more or less doubled. Consequently, it was concluded that over this period of time, the average notional annual income of the deceased would come to Rs. 22,500/- per annum. From the figure, 1/3rd was required to be deducted towards her personal expenses leading to a calculation of Rs. 15,000/- per annum. Effectively, therefore, the formula laid down in Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 179 was applied. On this calculation, the Court awarded an amount of Rs. 2,55,000/-.

    18. In Captan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., 2004 I AD (Delhi) 543, the deceased housewife was 27 years of age. The date of her death is not available from the judgement. The claimants relied upon Lata Wadhwa to contend that her contribution to the family should be es timated at Rs. 36,000/- per annum. Rejecting this contention in paragraph 3 of the Report, it was held that judgement in Lata Wadhwa was delivered in the facts of that case. The deceased in Lata Wadhwa belonged to higher stratum of society and it was in those circumstances that the august Supreme Court had taken an amount of Rs. 3,000/- per month as the value of the multifarious services rendered by a housewife in the absence of any other evidence. It was held that the observations of the august Supreme Court couldn't be applied to the facts of the present case.

    19. Since the deceased was gainfully employed for six months in a year, the Court estimated her contribution to the household, as a housewife, at Rs. 10,000/- per annum for rendering multifarious services to the family. To this amount, the Court added her income of Rs. 12,000/-per annum form gainful employment for six months in a year, and after applying the Dixit formula, it was held that the beneficiaries of the deceased suffered a loss of dependency of Rs. 33,000/-per annum.

    20. In Krishna Gupta & Ors. v. Madan Lal & Ors., 2002 VIII AD (Delhi) 333, one of the arguments raised on behalf of the claimants related to the applicability of Lata Wadhwa. A Division Bench of this Court held in paragraph 24 of the Report that Lata Wadhwa cannot have any application in cases pertaining to motor accidents because the Act is a complete code by itself. It was also held that the question of compensation in Lata Wadhwa arose in an absolutely different fact situation where there was no provision for a statutory compensation, which is not the case under the Act. The Division Bench held as follows:—

    “The decision of the Apex Court in Lata Wadhwa (Supra), in our considered opinion, cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was the complete Code by itself. It not only provides for the right of a victim and/or his legal heirs to obtain compensation in case of bodily injury or death arising out of use of motor vehicle, but the forum therefor has been provided, as also the mode and manner in which the compensation to be awarded therefor. In such a situation, it would be inappropriate to rely upon a decision of the Apex Court, which had been rendered in an absolutely different fact situation and in relation whereto there did not exist any statutory compensation. Lata Wadhwa (supra) was decided in a matter where a fire occurred during a celebration. The liability of the Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. was not disputed. Compensation was awarded having regard to the peculiar feature obtaining in that case which has got nothing to do with the statutory compensation payable under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.”

    21. Given the view expressed by this Court on more than one oc casion, how relevant would Lata Wadhwa be in the scheme of things?

    Applicability of Lata Wadhwa

    22. In Lata Wadhwa a devastating fire had broken out in Jamshedpur in March 1989. At least 60 persons, including women and children died and about 113 were injured.

    23. In December 1993, the august Supreme Court referred the question of grant of compensation to Justice Y.V Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India. In his report submitted some time in November 2000, Justice Chandrachud classified the deceased housewives in two categories: one whose husband was an employee of the company and whose income was known, and the other whose husband was an outsider and his income was not known. The deceased housewives were then grouped into four on the basis of their age and thereafter Justice Chandrachud adopted an appropriate multiplier for granting compensation.

    24. The august Supreme Court noted in paragraph 10 of the Report that there was an absence of data. Nevertheless, the august Supreme Court concluded that since the deceased ladies were housewives who were not earning any income, the figure arrived at by Justice Chandrachud quantifying the value of their services at Rs. 10,000/- per annum for some and Rs. 12,000/- per annum for others was grossly low. In spite of the absence of any data but considering the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family, the august Supreme Court was of the view that their services should be quantified at Rs. 3,000/- per month or Rs. 36,000/- per annum. This was made applicable to all housewives between the age group of 34-59 years. For the deceased housewives in the age group of 62-72 years, the value of their services was estimated at Rs. 20,000/- per annum. The multiplier adopted by Justice Chandrachud was not disturbed.

    25. Two significant facts emerge from the decision in Lata Wadhwa:—

    Interest was not awarded on the amount of compensation, as is usually done in claims arising out of motor accident cases.

    The august Supreme Court stratified the pecuniary value of services rendered by housewives. In other words, increase in value of services with the passage of time, was ignored, a factor that is always taken into account while awarding compensation in motor accident claim cases.

    26. Lata Wadhwa was referred to in M.S Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, (2001) 8 SCC 151 but only to approve the use of the multiplier method and also because Lata Wadhwa was definitely a guiding factor in the matter of awarding compensation when children die due to an unfor tunate accident.

    27. Recently, in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer (2003) 8 SCC 731, the august Supreme Court referred to Lata Wadhwa and M.S Grewal. The context was award of compensation for the death of children and for reiterating the need for using the multiplier method for calculating compensation.

    28. It is significant to note that in Lata Wadhwa and in M.S Grewal, the applicable principles for awarding compensation in motor accident cases were adopted. But this does not mean that the reverse is also true, namely, that the principles laid down in Lata Wadhwa and M.S Grewal have to be applied for awarding compensation in motor accident claim cases. If that were so, then the award of interest and consideration of future prospects and future income, which are always taken into account in motor accident claim cases will have to be given a go by. Surely, this was not the intention of the august Supreme Court nor was it, I think, the purport of the argument of learned counsel for the Appellants. The basic principles for award of compensation in motor accident claim cases have been left untouched nor have they been modified either in Lata Wadhwa or in M.S Grewal or even in Laxman Iyer. The basic principles continue to remain the same and it is those principles that should govern the award of compensation in the present case also. Otherwise, the entire jurisprudence of awarding compensation in motor accident claim cases will have to be re-written. For these reasons, and because of the consistent view taken by this Court (including a Division Bench), I think Lata Wadhwa is distinguishable, if not inapplicable.

    Award of compensation

    29. The judgements from Punjab & Haryana High Court and from Andhra Pradesh High Court show that an award of Rs. 50,000/- in the year 1982-83 was quite adequate. The amount awarded by this Court, during more or less the same period, is quite comparable. As against this, the learned MACT awarded Rs. 40,000/- in the present case. To this extent, no fault can be found with the compensation awarded by the learned MACT. However, as mentioned above, the learned MACT based its conclusion on Bhagwan Dass Bhatia in which the accidental death took place in September 1976 and the value of the services was held to be not less than Rs. 2,500/- per annum. Taking inflationary trends into account, the pecuniary value of the services of the deceased in the present case who died in 1982 (almost six years later) would be more than the Rs. 2,500/-per annum estimate of Punjab & Haryana High Court. The question is: how much more?

    30. A few parameters are available for calculating the amount of compensation due to the beneficiaries of the deceased housewife. They are:

    a) The decision in Bhagwan Dass Bhatia wherein it has been held that the contribution of a housewife would be, in 1976, not less than Rs. 2,500/- per annum. This works out to roughly Rs. 200/- per month.

    b) The decision in Mali Devi wherein the contribution of the deceased housewife was taken, in 1979, at Rs. 300/- per month.

    c) The decision in Jaimal Singh wherein the contribution of the deceased housewife in 1991 was taken as Rs. 700/- per month.

    d) The decision in Chandra Singh wherein minimum wages due to a skilled worker at the appropriate time was taken as a relevant factor for consideration.

    31. The Minimum Rates of Wages in Delhi for 1982 show that the minimum wages for a skilled worker (which is the least that can be said for a housewife) with effect from 1st March, 1982 were Rs. 400/- per month. This is in consonance with the increase apparent between the period covered by Bhagwan Das Bhatia and Mali Devi.

    32. As mentioned above, there is no dispute about the multiplier, that is, 16. In February 1998, which is about 16 years later, the minimum rate for wages for a skilled worker was Rs. 2361/- per month (which I round off to Rs. 2400/-). Proceeding on this basis, the loss caused to the family, applying the Dixit formula would be Rs. 1400/- per month or Rs. 17,100/- per annum (400+2400 = 2800/2 = 1400). Applying the multiplier of 16, the compensation due the Appellants would work out to Rs. 2,24,000/-. Out of this amount, 1/3rd is required to be deducted towards personal expenses. Consequently, the contribution of the deceased housewife to her household would work out to Rs. 1,50,000/-.

    33. In addition to the above, the Appellants will also be entitled to funeral expenses. As per the Second Schedule to the Act, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- is required to be granted towards funeral expenses. But this was in 1994. Since the death of the housewife took place in July, 1982, I think it will be appropriate to award the Appellants a lesser amount towards funeral expenses. In the absence of any discernible parameters, I would award a sum of Rs. 1,000/- towards funeral expenses. Similarly, Appellant No. 1 will be entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,000/- towards loss of consortium.

    34. To the extent that the aforesaid amounts are over and above what has been awarded to the Appellants by the learned MACT, they will carry interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition.

    35. To conclude on this aspect, therefore, I would hold that:

    The 'services’ rendered by a housewife to her household should be given a broad interpretation and an expansive meaning.

    The decision of the august Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa does not apply to claims for statutory compensation.

    Since there is no scientific method of assessing the contribution of a housewife to her household, in cases such as the present, resort should be had to the wages of a skilled worker as per the Minimum Rates of Wages in Delhi. Although this may sound uncharitable, if not demeaning to a housewife, there is hardly any other option available in the absence of any statutory guidelines.

    Whether an amount in excess of what is claimed can be awarded?

    36. Learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that if his submissions were accepted, the amount due and payable would be much more than the amount claimed before the learned MACT. He submits that there is no bar in awarding an amount higher than what is claimed.

    37. A Division Bench of this Court did not accept such a contention in Rattan Lal Mehta. v. Rajinder Kapoor., 1996 AC J 372. In that case, the Court relied upon Bai Nanda v. Shivabhai Shankerbhai Patel, 1966 ACJ 290 (Gujarat) and Babu Mansa v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1978 ACJ 485 (Gujarat) and held in paragraph 24 of the Report that “though claimants might have estimated in the pleadings different sums under different subheads, it is still open to the court to award higher under one subhead or lower under another, than claimed so long as the award does not exceed the total amount claimed.”

    38. Without referring to the aforesaid decision, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Jyoti Gupta v. Ashok Kumar & Ors., 2002 ACJ 1056 expressed the view that the Award may exceed what is claimed in the claim petition and one cannot be too technical in this aspect.

    39. In Ramu Tolaram & Ors. v. Amichand Hansraj Gupta & Ors., 1988 ACJ 24, the Bombay High Court took the view that since court fees payable on the claim petition are not ad valorem but fixed, there is no reason why an amount higher than what is claimed cannot be awarded. Moreover, in that case, the claim itself was nebulous inasmuch as though Rs. 15,000/- was claimed, it was further stated in the prayer clause that such other amount as the Court might find just, proper and reasonable, should be paid.

    40. Be that as it may, the controversy is now settled by a decision of the august Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Ors., JT 2002 (10) SC 144.

    41. In Nagappa, learned counsel for the Appellant had made an application before the august Supreme Court seeking permission to amend the claim petition and enhance the claim from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 5,00,000/-. The august Supreme Court referred to the provisions of Section 158(4) of the Act wherein it is mentioned “the claims tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” In other words, even if no claim has been made or no specified amount is claimed, a report made under Section 158(6) of the Act can be treated as a petition for compensation.

    42. The august Supreme Court also drew attention to the provisions of Section 168 of the Act, which empowers the learned MACT to make an Award determining the amount of compensation that appears to it to be just. As pointed out by the august Supreme Court, there is no restriction in the Act that compensation can be awarded only upto the amount claimed by the claimants. In the absence of any such embargo, the learned MACT is entitled to award an amount which appears to it to be just and which may, in a given case, exceed the amount claimed.

    43. After discussing the case law on the subject, the august Supreme Court held in paragraph 21 of the Report as follows:—

    “For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the M.V Act, there is no restriction that tribunal/court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the tribunal/court is to award ‘just’ compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in such cases there is no question of claim becoming time barred or it cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that as provided under subsection (4) to section 166, even report submitted to the claims tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for compensation under the M.V Act. If required, in appropriate cases, court may permit amendment to the claim petition.”

    44. In so far as the present case is concerned, it would have been appropriate if learned counsel had moved an application for amendment of the claim petition; but since the accident took place more than 20 years ago, and this appeal has been pending in this Court for almost 15 years, I think it would only be appropriate to accede to the oral prayer of learned counsel that the claim petition may be treated as amended and a just and fair amount be awarded even if it exceeds the amount claimed.

    45. To conclude on this issue, therefore:

    There is no bar in awarding an amount higher than what is claimed.

    The appropriate procedure to follow while awarding an amount higher than what is claimed would be to insist on a formal amendment of the claim petition.

    However, in a given case, if there is evidence on record to justify it, a higher amount may be awarded even without a formal amendment to the claim petition.

    46. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

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