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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs, legal heirs of the deceased Niranjan Dass Rikhy, filed a suit seeking possession and partition of certain property. The Defendants include Smt. Harbans Kaur and others. The suit was initiated in 2001, long after the death of the family patriarch in 1974. Probate proceedings have been pending since 1982, with Defendant No. 1 claiming exclusive rights under an alleged Will of the deceased. The Plaintiffs allege that they have been ousted from possession and assert a continuing cause of action, demanding partition by metes and bounds or sale of the property if partition is not feasible. The present applications concern the payment of Court fees and the status of possession.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to possession and partition of the property as co-sharers despite not being in actual possession.
  2. Whether the suit can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 for lack of cause of action or possession.
  3. The applicability of the principle of deemed possession of co-sharers and its exceptions, particularly in cases of ouster.
  4. The requirement and quantum of Court fees payable by Plaintiffs when ousted from possession of joint property.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The Plaintiffs are legal heirs entitled to possession and partition by virtue of descent.
  • Possession held by one co-sharer may be deemed possession of all co-sharers, citing Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh.
  • The cause of action is continuing as Defendants are in actual occupation, and Plaintiffs have no right to be excluded from possession.
  • They rely on Raman Chandra Dey v. Gour @ Gharbaran Gur to support the concept of constructive possession among co-sharers.
  • They submitted an undertaking to pay Court fees as directed.

Court's Observations on Arguments

  • The Court noted a clear distinction between actual and constructive possession.
  • It observed that Plaintiffs have been ousted from actual possession, which negates the principle of deemed possession.
  • The Court referenced the exception to deemed possession rule established in Darshan Singh where clear ouster is found.
  • It highlighted that in cases where third parties attorn only to one co-sharer, ouster occurs but differs in rigor from ouster by a co-sharer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh, 2002 (1) Supreme 36 Possession of property by one co-sharer may be deemed possession of all co-sharers; exception where clear ouster is established. Applied to determine that Plaintiffs’ ouster from possession negates deemed possession; creates a triable issue preventing rejection under Order VII Rule 11.
Raman Chandra Dey v. Gour @ Gharbaran Gur, AIR 1962 ASSAM 137 Constructive possession of co-sharers in joint property. Referenced to contrast actual possession and constructive possession; Court found Plaintiffs lacked constructive possession.
Prakasha Wati v. Dayawanti & Ors., AIR 1991 DELHI 48 Requirement of ad valorem Court fees when a co-sharer is ousted from possession. Supported the Court’s direction for Plaintiffs to pay Court fees based on their share after ouster.
S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 245 Ad valorem Court fees payable where co-sharer has been ousted from possession. Cited but not elaborated on, as the Court was not concerned with suit valuation at this stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the Plaint and noted that the Plaintiffs claim legal heirship and entitlement to possession and partition but have been ousted from actual possession. It distinguished between actual possession and constructive possession, emphasizing that the Plaintiffs do not hold either. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Darshan Singh to highlight that possession by one co-sharer is generally deemed possession of all, except where there is clear ouster. The pending probate proceedings and the delay in filing suit were noted as relevant to the question of possession and ouster, though limitation was not presently addressed. The Court accepted the Plaintiffs’ undertaking to pay Court fees and directed payment of ad valorem Court fees within two months, indicating that the suit cannot be dismissed summarily under Order VII Rule 11 due to the triable issue of possession and partition. The Court also maintained the Defendant’s undertaking for nine weeks and scheduled further consideration of the matter.

Holding and Implications

The Court disposed of I.A. 133/2002 by accepting the Plaintiffs’ undertaking to pay Court fees ad valorem on their share of the suit property within two months.

The Court held that the Plaintiffs are neither in actual nor constructive possession, and the suit raises triable issues preventing its rejection under Order VII Rule 11. The decision directs compliance with Court fee payment but does not resolve substantive rights. No new precedent was established; the ruling applies established principles regarding possession, ouster, and Court fees in partition suits. The matter is listed for further consideration, indicating ongoing proceedings.

    Harjit Kaur v. Jagdeep Singh Rikhy

    Vikramajit Sen, J.— For the purpose of these applications I shall only read the Plaint. In paragraph 17 thereof it has been pleaded that the Plaintiffs are legal heirs of the deceased Niranjan Dass Rikhy and Smt. Harbans Kaur are also the Defendants. In the same sentences, it is stated that by virtue of their descendance they “are entitled to the possession and partition of the property by metes and bounds.” Thus for the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh (dead) by LRs, 2002 (1) Supreme 36, would apply in favour of the Plaintiffs since the possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers of one co-sharer may be deemed to be the possession of all co-sharers. Therefore, a triable issue would arise making it questionable as to whether this suit can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, however, the averments in the Plaint do not stop here. In paragraph 22 it has been pleaded that “the cause of action is a continuing one and since the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are in actual occupation of the same, it is the submission of the Plaintiffs that they have no right to continue in possession exclusively to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs and every heirs and the only course open to the parties as to partition the property by metes and bounds and if not possible by sale of property”. In addition to Darshan Singh's case (supra), Counsel for the Plaintiff has also relied on Raman Chandra Dey v. Gour @ Gharbaran Gur, AIR 1962 ASSAM 137, which proceeds on the basis/assumption that the co-sharers were in constructive possession of the property. There is a clear distinction between actual and constructive possession. A reading of the Plaint in the present case leaves no manner of doubt that the Plaintiff has actually been ousted from the possession of the property. Therefore, it brings into play the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh's case (supra), where the Court had pointedly drawn the exception to the rule of deemed possession of co-sharers viz. if it is found that there is a clear ouster from possession. In a suit for partition there can be disputes about the share in property as also a dispute pertaining to its possession. Where the property is in the possession of the third party normally actual possession of any of the co-sharers is not possible. It is in these circumstances that constructive possession becomes relevant. There may also be cases where the third party attorns to only one co-sharer from the very inception of the relationship, and pays all the dues to that one co-sharer alone. This, in my opinion, would also amount to ‘ouster from possession’ but would not have the same rigour as an ouster by another alleged co-sharer. Since I am presently not concerned with the valuation of the suit for purposes of Court fees viz-a-viz suit valuation, I need not advert to the decision in S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar, v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 245. If authority is required for the proposition that where a co-sharer has been ousted from the possession of alleged joint property ad valorem Court fees must be paid, it can be found inter alia in the decision in Prakasha Wati…Plaintiff; v. Dayawanti & Ors.…Defendant., AIR 1991 DELHI 48.

    2. In view of the pleadings, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs are neither in actual nor constructive possession of the property in suit. It cannot also be overlooked that the patriarch of the family who is the recorded titular owner thereof died in 1974 but the present suit has been filed as late as in 2001, i.e a quarter of century later. It also appears that probate proceedings are pending since 1982 in which Defendant No. 1 has set up exclusive claims thereto, based on the alleged Will of his Grandfather late Niranjan Dass Rikhy. Even this event has not galvanized the Plaintiff to file a suit forthwith. I am not presently concerned with the question of limitation but the conduct of the parties would be relevant in so far as ouster of possession and/or failure to be in joint possession of the suit property is concerned.

    3. In these circumstances, the Plaintiffs' undertaking in the Plaint to pay Court-fee as and when directed, is accepted by the Court. The Plaintiff shall pay ad volerm Court-fees on the share of the suit property as per law within two months from today. I.A 133/2002 is disposed of in these terms.

    4. Undertaking of the Defendant shall continue for a period of nine weeks from today.

    5. List the matter for further consideration on 14.12.2004

    I.A disposed of.
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    Comments

    Harjit Kaur v. Jagdeep Singh Rikhy
    (Oct 4, 2004)