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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letter Patent Appeals arising from CWP 1950/2000)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are a registered association whose members entered into agreements with the fourth respondent to purchase freehold plots at Okhla Enclave, State of Haryana. It was alleged that the fourth respondent booked thousands of plots without obtaining the licence required by Section 7 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (the Act), and did not disclose that approval for development/colony formation had not been obtained. Official respondents published advertisements stating that the fourth respondent had been acting illegally in receiving applications and monies without the licence.

The factual matrix includes contested disclosures about development charges, initial payments demanded at Rs. 50 per sq. yard with the balance to follow, later claims of higher final charges, and an asserted Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and agreement fixing development charges at Rs. 550 per sq. yard. The fourth respondent allegedly breached agreements and failed to deliver possession, leading to claims of cheating by plot purchasers.

Several writ petitions were earlier filed before the Supreme Court (some in which these petitioners were not parties). The Supreme Court issued directions (quoted in the opinion) directing payment of Rs. 50 per sq. yard to the Government of Haryana and directing colonizer to put allottees in possession. Consequent to Supreme Court directions, licences were renewed, and notices under Section 8 of the Act were served on the fourth respondent (served at Delhi). By an order dated 2 December 1999 the Supreme Court directed allottees be put in possession upon payment; other writs were dismissed on 14 March 2000.

The present writ petitions (before the High Court) sought multiple forms of relief including: registration of allotted plots and possession free from encumbrances; penal interest (24%) on amounts paid; initiation of inquiries and penal action against officers; directions to expedite development work and civic amenities; costs; and other reliefs. Earlier writ petitions in the Punjab High Court were dismissed as withdrawn on 2 June 2000 with liberty to approach the Directorate of Town and Country Planning, Haryana.

Before the learned Single Judge the maintainability of these writ petitions was challenged on territorial jurisdiction grounds. The Single Judge held that substantial reliefs were sought against respondents 1 to 3, for causes of action arising in Haryana, and therefore the High Court (Delhi) had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions. The present Letter Patent Appeals challenge that conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this High Court (Delhi) has territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India to entertain the writ petitions where the lands are situated in Haryana and the principal official respondents (1–3) have their offices in Chandigarh.
  2. Whether the parts of the cause of action alleged to have occurred in Delhi (payments made in Delhi, agreements or MoU signed in Delhi, notices served in Delhi, clause conferring jurisdiction on Delhi courts in allotment letters) are sufficient to render the High Court's jurisdiction exercisable.
  3. Whether particular reliefs sought by the petitioners (for example, penal interest at 24% and directions to expedite development work) are maintainable by writ in this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Dholakia)

  • Clause (2) of Article 226 permits exercise of jurisdiction even if part of the cause of action arose within the Court's territorial limits; therefore this Court could entertain the petitions.
  • Material acts and transactions occurred in Delhi: plots were allotted in favour of appellants in Delhi; all payments were made at Delhi; demand notices were raised in Delhi and directed to Delhi residents; show cause notices were issued to the fourth respondent at his Delhi address and replies were sent from Delhi.
  • The letter of allotment contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on Delhi courts; the MoU dated 27 February 1995 was signed in Delhi; agreements and correspondence were sent and received at Delhi.

Respondents' Arguments

  • No part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court; principal actions and the lands are situate in Haryana and the offices of respondents 1–3 are in Chandigarh (outside Delhi jurisdiction).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640 Principle on territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases: the principal factor is the place where the alleged offence was committed; registration of FIR in a State is not the sole criterion; Section 177 CrPC is relevant. The Court held this precedent was not apposite because it concerned criminal offences; it was distinguished on that basis and not applied to the civil/territorial jurisdiction facts of the present case.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr., AIR 1985 SC 1289 Definition and treatment of "cause of action" as a bundle of facts; service of notice is not an integral part of the cause of action unless nature of impugned order makes it so. The Court relied on this authority to explain that only those facts that form an integral part of the cause of action can confer territorial jurisdiction; mere communications or notices in Delhi would not by themselves confer jurisdiction.
Mussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh (15 IA 156) Cause of action refers to the grounds set forth in the plaint and is independent of the defendant's defence. Cited to support the formulation that cause of action depends on the grounds pleaded and not on defences or other subsequent matters.
Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711 Territorial jurisdiction must be determined on the basis of averments in the petition; not every fact pleaded constitutes a cause of action unless integral to the lis. The Court applied this principle to require that facts pleaded must have a nexus with the relief sought; communications from or to Delhi that were not integral were held insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd & Anr. v. UP State Industrial Development Corporation & Anr., 79 (1999) DLT 193 Followed Swaika: communications received at a party's registered office outside situs of dispute do not necessarily create cause of action in that forum. Cited as a supporting local precedent that communications received at the registered office do not automatically form an integral part of cause of action to establish jurisdiction.
M/s. New Horizons Limited and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1994 Del 126 Even where jurisdiction exists, a High Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 in appropriate cases. Relied upon to note the discretionary power of the court to refuse exercise of jurisdiction where the main reliefs relate to fora outside its territory, even if a small part of cause of action arose within the Court's limits.
Modern Malleable Casting Works Ltd. v. M/s Star Iron Works Ltd. & Ors., 1995 (II) CHN 483 (and related discussion) Interpretation of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 and the situs theory; reaffirmation of the "bundle of facts" meaning of cause of action. Used to reinforce the position that Article 226 confers jurisdiction where seat of authority is within the High Court's territorial limits or part/whole of cause arose there, but does not eliminate discretion or the requirement of a substantive nexus.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. M/s Jharia Talkies, 1992 (2) Cal LT 357 Consideration of territorial jurisdiction and related principles (cited in the context of discretion). Referenced in support of the proposition that jurisdictional and discretionary considerations may bar exercise of jurisdiction in certain factual contexts.
Union of India & Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 126 High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded that those facts constitute a cause of action that has at least in part arisen within its jurisdiction; facts irrelevant to the lis do not confer jurisdiction. Applied to conclude that the facts pleaded by petitioners did not constitute a bundle of facts with the necessary nexus to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court.
Suresh Desai & Associates v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1998) 230 ITR 912 Procedural note about referral of questions arising from Bench's own order to the High Court of the originating State (contextual procedural precedent). Mentioned in the opinion as an example of procedural practice; not central to the decision on territorial jurisdiction in this case.
Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharlal Parshottamdas & Co. & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 543 Authority on formation of contract and situs-related questions (cited in discussion in Modern Malleable). Referred to in the judgment quoted from Modern Malleable to illustrate that mere receipt of some communications outside the situs of dispute does not necessarily confer jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the primary question: whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions under Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The analysis unfolded as follows:

  1. Cause of action was defined and treated as a "bundle of facts" necessary to obtain the relief sought; the Court relied on the principle from State of Rajasthan (Swaika) and related authorities to explain that only facts integral to the lis can confer jurisdiction.
  2. The Court noted the geographic and institutional realities: the lands are situated in Haryana; offices of respondents 1–3 are in Chandigarh; only the fourth respondent had an office in Delhi. Licences and steps regarding licences were issued and pursued from Chandigarh.
  3. The transactions between petitioners and the fourth respondent (agreements, payments, some communications in Delhi) were acknowledged, but the Court found they were predominantly matters between the petitioners and the fourth respondent and not integral to the complaints against respondents 1–3.
  4. The Court examined the reliefs sought and observed that substantial reliefs were directed against respondents 1–3 (registration in Haryana, possession of Haryana land, grant of No Objection Certificates and development permissions in Haryana, actions by authorities based in Chandigarh). Because those respondents and the lands are outside Delhi territory, the essential nexus was missing.
  5. The Court applied principles from ONGC and Adani Exports to require a direct nexus between pleaded facts and the lis; communications in Delhi which did not form an integral part of the cause of action were insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
  6. The Court distinguished Navinchandra (criminal-law context) and treated it as inapposite to the civil/territorial jurisdiction issues before it.
  7. Concerning particular reliefs: the Court held that relief (b) (penal interest at 24%) was not maintainable by writ and that recovery must be pursued by separate suit against the fourth respondent. Relief (d) (directions to expedite development/internal and external works) could only be granted against respondents 1–3, whose residences/offices are outside the Court's territorial jurisdiction.
  8. The Single Judge's finding that disputed questions of fact between the petitioners and the fourth respondent made writ relief inappropriate was noted and relied upon: where disputed factual issues exist, a writ petition is not the suitable forum.
  9. The Court also observed that even if a small part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the Court may nonetheless refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in cases where the main reliefs concern fora outside its territory (citing New Horizons and other authorities).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEALS DISMISSED — the Court dismissed the Letter Patent Appeals and found no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Single Judge. The appeals were dismissed without any orders as to costs.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The High Court (Delhi) held that the writ petitions before it were not maintainable on territorial jurisdiction grounds and/or because the principal reliefs related to respondents and lands in Haryana (outside Delhi jurisdiction).
  • The prayer for penal interest at 24% (relief (b)) cannot be granted by way of writ in this forum; recovery must be sought by a separate suit against the fourth respondent (as explicitly stated in the opinion).
  • Relief relating to internal and external development work (relief (d)) is envisageable only against respondents 1–3, who are situated outside the territorial limits of this Court; therefore such reliefs could not be granted in this petition in this Court.

Broader Implications Noted by the Court

The opinion does not purport to set any new precedent; it applies established principles on territorial jurisdiction, cause of action and the discretionary exercise of writ jurisdiction. No broader or novel legal principle was declared beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.

    Okhla Enclave Plot Holders Welfare Association (Regd.). v. State Of Haryana & Ors

    S.B Sinha, C.J— These Letter Patent Appeals having arisen out of a common judgment and involving similar questions of law were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

    2. However, we may consider the fact of the matter from the file of LPA 66/2001 arising out of CWP 1950/2000.

    3. The petitioner is a registered association. Its members allegedly have entered into agreements with the fourth respondent for purchase of freehold plots at Okhla Enclave in the State of Haryana. The respondent No. 4 allegedly had booked thousands of plots without obtaining requisite licence as is mandatorily required in terms of Section 7 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as “the Act”). Allegedly, the respondent No. 4 kept the purchasers at dark to the effect that although specific plots were being booked, approval for development and setting up of colony itself had not been obtained in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Allegedly, the official respondents had issued advertisements in the newspapers stating that the said respondents had been acting illegally in receiving applications and monies for allotment of the land without the requisite licence. It had been contended that although the respondent No. 4 gave out the impression that Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana had provisionally fixed the development charges at Rs. 329/- per sq. yard, petitioners and other members were called upon to pay Rs. 50/- per sq. yard on or before 15th of February 1992 and the balance amount of Rs. 279/- per sq. yard within two years. It is further alleged that the respondent No. 4 in August 1994 claimed that the Director, Town and Country Planning, had fixed the final development charges for plots up to 161 sq. yards @ Rs. 878 per sq. yard and for plots up to 263 sq. yards at Rs. 975/- per sq. yard without disclosing that the said rates included land costs.

    4. The fourth respondent entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the purchasers fixing the development charges at Rs. 550/- per sq. yards but in breach of the said agreement, failed to deliver possession and thus cheated a number of plot holders. Several writ petitions were filed in the Apex Court such as 113/96, 477/96, 792/96 and 876/96 wherein the petitioners were not parties and therein the Apex Court issued the following directions:

    “All the same, we direct each allottee to pay a sum of Rs. 50/- per square yard within 4 weeks from today to the Government of Haryana in the account of the colonizer. We direct the colonizer to put each allottee in possession of the respective plot within 2 weeks therefrom. The balance amount, if any, payable by each allottees will be worked out and fixed up later.

    If the amount specified above is not paid within the period of 4 weeks the colonizer is not obliged to put the defaulting allottee in possession of the plot concerned. To avoid further complications regarding payment and acceptance, we make it clear that it is sufficient that the amount is sent by draft by registered post to the Director, Town & Country Planning, Chandigarh (Haryana), if personal delivery is not found feasible. The remittance of the amount shall immediately be communicated to the colonizer in writing by registered post by the remitter.”

    5. Upon directions of the Supreme Court, the Government renewed the licences granted to the fourth respondent with effect from 1993-1994 as the licence had expired.

    6. However, notices had been issued upon the fourth respondent in terms of Section 8 of the said Act which was served upon him at Delhi. Two further show cause notices were issued.

    7. By a judgment dated 2nd December 1999, the Supreme Court directed that the allottees be put in possession on payment of Rs. 50 per sq. yard whereupon they were put in possession.

    8. However, when some other allottees filed writ petitions before the Supreme Court, the same were dismissed by an order dated 14th March 2000 directing them to take recourse to the other remedies available to them in law.

    9. Thereafter, these writ petitions have been filed claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs:

    “(a) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to register the allotted plots in the names of all the petitioners, give physical possession of the same to them free from all encumbrances, and give all necessary permissions including “No Objection Certificates” to enable construction of houses thereon.

    (b) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to pay interest at a penal rate of 24% to the petitioners on the amount paid by them to the respondent No. 4 over the last 14 years;

    (c) direct respondents 1 to 3 to initiate appropriate enquiries and take penal actions against the officers responsible for permitting respondent No. 4 to defraud the petitioners; (d) direct the respondents to expedite and complete internal and external development work including providing civic amenities and facilities within a specified time frame;

    (e) award costs;

    (f) pass such other or further order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

    10. The allottees who had moved the Supreme Court, however, filed writ petitions in the Punjab High Court which were also dismissed as withdrawn on 2nd June 2000 giving liberty to them to approach the Directorate of Town and Country Planning, Haryana.

    11. Before the learned Single Judge, a question as regard the maintainability of these applications was raised on the ground that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction in relation to the lands in question. The learned Single Judge, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, inter alia, held that substantial reliefs have been sought for against respondents No. 1 to 3 wherefor cause of action had also arisen in the State of Haryana and as such, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions.

    12. Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, however, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if a part of cause of action had arisen within jurisdiction of this Court, the impugned judgment could not have been passed. The learned counsel would submit that plots have been allotted in favour of the appellants in Delhi in respect whereof all payments had been made at Delhi. Even the respondent No. 4 raised demand notices for payments had been sent to the persons, were residents of Delhi. Director, Town and Country Planning issued show cause notice to the fourth respondent at his address in Delhi and in reply whereto the show causes were also sent from Delhi by Respondent No. 4. The letter of allotment issued by the Respondent No. 4 contained a clause that Delhi Courts alone would have jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 27th February 1995 had also been signed at Delhi. The learned counsel would further contend that all agreements as also the correspondences between the parties were sent and received at Delhi.

    13. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    14. The primary question which arises for consideration in these writ petitions is as to whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions.

    15. Cause of action constitutes a bundle of facts which are necessary to be stated for the purpose of obtaining a relief. What would be a ‘cause of action’ is no longer res integra having regard to a recent decision in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640.

    16. However, such cause of action must have a direct nexus with the reliefs sought for in the petition. Out of the four respondents, the offices of the three respondents are in Chandigarh. Only the office of the fourth respondent is in Delhi.

    17. The transactions have been made by the petitioners with the fourth respondent. The petitioners have nothing to do with the show cause notice issued upon the fourth respondent by the third respondent herein in terms of Section 8 of the said Act.

    18. It is not in dispute that the lands in question are situate in the State of Haryana. It is also not in dispute that the fourth respondent had been granted a licence by the first respondent. Such licence was issued from Chandigarh, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Steps for its cancellation are also being taken from Chandigarh which are again outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

    19. A bare perusal of the reliefs sought for by the petitioners would clearly indicate that the same are directed against the 1st to 3rd respondents.

    20. The petitioners might have been cheated by the fourth respondent. The petitioners' right has also centered into the agreements entered into by the members of the Association and the fourth respondent pursuant whereto payments might have been made at Delhi. The transactions by and between the petitioners and the fourth respondent have nothing to do with the action of the respondents No. 1 to 3 vis-a-vis the fourth respondent.

    21. Having regard to the transactions between the petitioners and the fourth respondent, a suit for specific performance of contract might have been maintainable within the jurisdiction of Delhi Courts but we are of the opinion on the facts pleaded, these writ petitions are not maintainable, as a bare perusal of the reliefs sought for herein would clearly go to show that the other respondents had got nothing to do therewith. The lands being situate in the State of Haryana, registration thereof in question are also required to be done in Haryana. Possession of such plots are also required to be given all Haryana. No objection certificate to enable the petitioners to raise constructions are also required to be issued by the first respondent from the State of Haryana. The land uses in terms of the provisions of the Act are also required to be done within the State of Haryana.

    22. So far as relief (b) is concerned, such a prayer is not maintainable. No writ can be issued in relation thereto as recovery must be made from the fourth respondent by way of a separate suit.

    23. So far as relief (d) is concerned, the fourth respondent has no concern therewith. The same can be granted only against the Respondents No. 1 to 3 whose residences are outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

    24. Can it, in the afore-mentioned situation, be said that this Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition having regard to the clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India? The answer to the said question must be rendered in negative.

    25. The learned Single Judge noticed that so far as the dispute by and between the petitioner and the fourth respondent is concerned, the same involved disputed questions of fact and on that ground also, the writ petition would not be maintainable.

    26. It is now trite that the residence or location of the petitioners is not relevant. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr., AIR 1985 SC 1289, the Apex Court held:

    “8. The expression ‘cause of action’ is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure:

    “The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.”

    27. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under S. 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under S. 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Art. 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under S. 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under S. 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under S. 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under S. 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.”

    28. In Mussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh (15 IA 156), it was held:—

    “… the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”

    29. The Supreme Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711 held that the question as to whether the court has a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial.

    30. The Supreme Court in ONGC's case (1994 (4) SCC 711) (Supra) held that all necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. It observed:

    “So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereof at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15.1.1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27.1.1993”

    31. The judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr., AIR 1985 SC 1289 was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd & Anr. v. UP State Industrial Development Corporation & Anr., 79 (1999) DLT 193 wherein in was observed:

    10. In the instant case also the question arising for determination's of right of the respondents to recover arrears, which have accumulated to the tune of Rs. 84,81,022.83. The question whether or not the respondents are within their rights to enforce its demand in terms of the agreement, which was executed within the State of Uttar Pradesh or whether under the terms thereof due to non payment of dues the respondents have or have not a power of re-entry are such for which neither it is nor it was necessary for the appellant to plead service of notice on them by the respondents. The mere fact that the registered office of the appellant is in Delhi where the two communications dated 27.2.1996 and 22.7.1996 were received, will not be an integral part of cause of action for such a petition. In case the appellant has felt aggrieved by the demand raised or that the same is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement or that the respondents do not have any right of re-entry, it will be for the appellant to approach that High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the land is situated or agreement was executed and not this Court. Learned Single Judge not on the same reasonings but on different reasonings on the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that cause of action substantially and materially had arisen within the State of Uttar Pradesh.”

    32. The decision of the Apex Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640 whereupon Mr. Dholakia has placed strong reliance, is not apposite. The court therein was concerned with a criminal offence. In that situation, it was held that so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned, the main factor to be considered is a place where the alleged offence was committed. Having regard to the provision of Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Apex Court held mere fact that the First Information Report was registered in a particular State, is not the sole criterion to decide that any cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. The Apex Court held that the Bombay High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition on the premise that a major part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the said court. It was further stated in para 27 that:

    27. Tested in the light of the principles laid down in the cases noted above the judgment of the High Court under challenge is unsustainable. The High Court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a proper decision on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole consideration that the complainant had filed the complaint at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the said complaint. The High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complainant at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complaint to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.”

    33. In para 29, it was further observed:

    “29. Considering the peculiar fact-situation of the case we are of the view that setting aside the impugned judgment and remitting the case to the High Court for fresh disposal will cause further delay in investigation of the matter and may create other complications. Instead, it will be apt and proper to direct that further investigation relating to complaint filed by J.B Holdings Ltd. should be made by the Mumbai Police.”

    34. We may, however, note that Thomas, J. in his concurring but separate opinion, referred to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Mis. Swaika Properties & Anr. (supra) and Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (supra) and stated that the same has provided sufficient guidelines for the High Court.

    35. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, where the main reliefs have been sought for against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the offices of the said respondents are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court even if it be held that a small part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. In M/s. New Horizons Limited and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1994 Del 126, Wadhwa, J. as the learned Judge then was, observed in para 33 as under:

    “….We could certainly have directed the petitioners to approach the Andhra Pradesh High Court which also has jurisdiction in the matter since the telephone directories were required for Hyderabad Telecom District and the contract was to be entered there and the records were also maintained there in Hyderabad. We could decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such a matter in spite of the fact of our having jurisdiction in the matter. However, since the arguments were addressed at length we do not think any useful purpose will be served by sending the petitioners to Hyderabad.”

    36. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. M/s Jharia Talkies, 1992 (2) Cal LT 357. In Modern Malleable Casting Works Ltd. v. M/s Star Iron Works Ltd. & Ors., 1995 (II) CHN 483, U.C Banerjee, as his Lordship then was, observed as under:

    —On a plain reading of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution it appears that a Writ can be issued against a Government Authority if its seat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The introduction of the situs theory and the part of cause of action in the main body of the Article cannot in any way be stated to be a restriction on to the use of jurisdiction. As regard the situs theory, no difficulty is experienced in the matter of interpretation by reason of the express language of the Article, viz., “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.”: in so far as the meaning to be attributed to the expression “cause of action”, a long catena of judicial pronouncements set forth such a meaning to the effect that the expression means “the bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court.”

    37. It was further held:

    “12. Turning attention on to the main thrust of challenge against the order of the learned Trial Judge on the basis of Situs Theory in our view, there is sufficient justification in the strong criticism of Mr. Sarkar in regard to the assumption of jurisdiction by this Court in the factual backdrop as noted above. If we analyse the factual aspect in slightly more greater detail here at this juncture it is apparent that the NTPC has formulated a policy for Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and tender notice was published in Delhi Formulation of Policy was at Delhi: The rejection of offer and acceptance of the offer did take place at Delhi itself. Merely because of the fact that some communication was received at Calcutta, in my view, will not confer jurisdiction on this Court. This letter, in any event, was posted at Delhi and if an analogy is drawn as regards the formation of contract. Mr. Chatterjee's contention cannot be accepted, that the same would give rise to a cause-of-action authorizing him to initiate proceedings in this Court. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharlal Parshottamdas & Co. & Ors., (AIR 1966 SC 543) in this context, lends assistance to the view expressed above.

    13. The main thrust of challenge in the writ petition is alleged arbitrary exercise of power in so far as Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and NTPC are concerned but that exercise of power also did take place at Delhi. Would this factual backdrop entitle a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta - In my view, the answer cannot but be in the negative.”

    38. Recently in Union of India & Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 126, referring to its earlier decision in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711, the Apex Court held:

    “17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has, at least-in-part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the Courts at Ahmedabad.”

    39. In Suresh Desai & Associates v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1998) 230 ITR 912, a Division Bench of this Court has held, in a matter arising out of the Income-tax Act, that the Bench would refer the question arising out of its own order in appeal to the High Court of the State from which the appeal had come.

    40. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case is made out for interfering with the impugned judgment. These appeals are, therefore, dismissed without any orders as to costs.

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