Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was allotted an industrial plot in 1991 on a leasehold basis with conditions restricting sale, transfer, subletting, or change of trade without the lessor's written permission. The petitioner completed construction and obtained a licence to run a ready-made garments factory, with electricity sanctioned for commercial use. The Commissioner of Industries alleged illegal subletting and change of trade, leading to termination of the lease by order dated 4.2.1999 and a direction to hand over possession. The petitioner challenged the termination through an appeal and a civil suit, both pending. Despite the pending suit, the respondent disconnected the electricity supply to the petitioner’s premises on 12.4.2000 following a notice dated 8.4.2000. The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash the disconnection orders and restore electricity supply.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent was justified in disconnecting electricity supply to the petitioner’s premises solely on the ground of termination of the lease by the lessor.
  2. Whether the disconnection of electricity without a proper show cause notice violated principles of natural justice.
  3. Whether the petitioner’s possession and rights continue during pendency of challenge to lease termination, preventing extra-judicial dispossession.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The disconnection of electricity without a show cause notice was arbitrary, illegal, and violated natural justice.
  • The petitioner was still in possession and had a pending civil suit challenging the termination of the lease.
  • The premises were being used for commercial purposes and electricity disconnection was unjustified.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The disconnection was based on directions from the Department of Industries following termination of the lease by the lessor.
  • Once the lease was terminated, the petitioner had no right to remain in the premises or receive electricity supply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P and Others v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh & Others, 1989 (2) SCC 505 The lessor cannot resume possession extra-judicially by force after lease expiry or termination; possession of lessee remains juridical; State as lessor must act in accordance with law and cannot take possession otherwise than by due course of law. The Court applied this principle to hold that the termination of lease did not justify disconnection of electricity or forcible dispossession, especially when legal challenge was pending, condemning the use of electricity disconnection as an oppressive, extra-judicial tactic.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed whether the respondent was justified in disconnecting electricity supply solely on the basis of lease termination. It noted that while the lessor can terminate the lease as per its terms, termination does not automatically extinguish the lessee’s rights if challenged legally. The Court emphasized that possession remains juridical until lawfully recovered and the lessee cannot be forced out by extra-judicial measures. The Court relied on the precedent from State of U.P v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh, which prohibits forcible re-entry by the State without due legal process.

Further, the Court distinguished the lease termination process from electricity supply regulation under the Electricity Act, 1910, which sets separate conditions for supply and withdrawal. The Court found that disconnection without a valid legal basis and pending civil suit was unjustified. It also held that the notice given by the respondent was insufficient as it was not a proper show cause notice and violated natural justice principles by denying the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

Therefore, the Court concluded that disconnection was illegal, arbitrary, and a misuse of power aimed at pressuring the petitioner to vacate without lawful eviction. The Court underscored that electricity supply should continue so long as the petitioner remains in possession and complies with supply terms and payment obligations.

Holding and Implications

The Court quashed the orders dated 8.4.2000 and 12.4.2000 directing disconnection of electricity supply and directed the respondent to continue supplying electricity to the petitioner’s premises subject to compliance with terms and payment.

The decision directly restores electricity supply to the petitioner pending final resolution of the lease termination dispute, preventing extra-judicial dispossession through utility disconnection. No new precedent was established; the ruling reinforced existing principles protecting lessees from unlawful eviction and underscored the separation of lease rights from electricity supply regulations.

    Satish Verma v. D.V.B.

    R.C Chopra, J.— This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks quashing of the orders dated 8.4.2000 and 12.4.2000 issued by the respondent directing disconnection of the electricity to the petitioner's Premises No. 175, Functional Industrial Estate, Patparganj, Delhi. The petitioner also seeks directions to the respondent to restore the electricity which was ordered to be disconnected on the ground that the Commissioner of Industries, Government of NCT of Delhi, the lessor, vide orders dated 4.2.1999 had terminated the lease of the plot in favour of the petitioner and had directed the petitioner to hand over the possession of the plot in question to it on the ground that there was a change in the trade and the plot had been sold/sublet.

    2. The petitioner alleged that the aforesaid industrial plot was allotted to him in the year 1991 on lease hold basis subject to the condition that the petitioner lessee could not sell, transfer, assign, sublet or part with the possession of the plot or any part thereof except with the permission in writing of the lessor nor he could use the said plot for residence or for carrying on any trade or business other than that of manufacturing ready-made garments. The proviso however stipulated that the lessor could allow change of user on such terms and conditions, including payment of additional premium and additional rent, as the lessor may in his absolute discretion determine.

    3. The petitioner averred that the ground floor, first floor and barsati floor were completed in the year 1995 and thereafter the petitioner obtained a licence for running a factory of ready-made garments. The said licence was valid upto 31.3.2000 The respondent/DVB sanctioned 14 kw of electricity to the petitioner's premises for commercial use. The petitioner had been paying all the bills and there were no arrears. However on 11.6.1998 the Commissioner of Industries, NCT of Delhi issued a notice to the petitioner alleging that the plot was under the occupation of one Shri V.K Aggarwal and was being used as godown and thus the plot was sold/sublet. It was also alleged that there was a change in the trade also. The petitioner replied to the said notice denying that any part of the plot had been sold, sublet or parted with. Regarding change of trade, he pleaded that the trade of readymade garments could not be successfully run on account of lack of water and as such the petitioner was interested in commissioning of a project for assembling and repair of electrical goods on job work basis. The Commissioner of Industries, however, vide order dated 4.2.1999 terminated the lease and directed the petitioner to hand over possession of plot to him. A copy of the cancellation order was endorsed to the DVB/respondent also with a direction to cut off the electricity supply. The petitioner filed an appeal before Lt. Governor against the termination of his lease which was forwarded by him for consideration to the Commissioner of Industries. The petitioner made one more representation dated 22.4.1999 to the Commissioner of Industries against the cancellation of lease but vide orders dated 24.6.1999 the Commissioner of Industries directed him to hand over the possession of the plot stating that the Lt. Governor had rejected his appeal. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order by filing a Civil Suit which was still pending.

    4. On 8.4.2000 the respondent issued a notice to the petitioner that the supply would be disconnected after the expiry of 48 hours. The petitioner made a representation dated 10.4.2000 stating therein that a Civil Suit against the cancellation of lease deed was pending in the Civil Court. However, on 12.4.2000 the respondent disconnected the supply of electricity to the petitioner's premises. The petitioner assailed the action of the respondent in regard to disconnection of electricity without any show cause notice pleading that it was arbitrary, illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice for the reason that the suit against termination of lease was still pending, premises were being used for commercial purposes and no proper show cause notice was given to him before dfsconnecting the electricity supply.

    5. The respondent in its counter affidavit pleaded that the disconnection was on the ground that the lease in favour of the petitioner had been cancelled by the lessor and order for re-entry had been passed and as such the petitioner had no right to remain in the premises in question or get the electricity supply. It was stated that the electricity was disconnected in terms of the directions received from the Department of Industries and once the lease in favour of the petitioner was determined, the petitioner had no right to have supply of electricity.

    6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. I have gone through the records.

    7. The main question which requires consideration by this Court is as to whether the respondent was justified or not in withstanding the supply of electricity to the petitioner's premises merely on the ground that the lease in his favour had been determined by the lessor. The lessor may, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease, terminate the lease but the mere termination of the lease does not ipso facto extinguish the rights and title of a lessee who may wish to challenge the termination on the ground that the termination was not in accordance with law or that it was in violation of the terms of the lease or in case of an instrumentality of the State it was mala fide, arbitrary or unjust. Till the time such a challenge remains pending and the possession of the premises continues with the lessee, he cannot be termed as unauthorised occupant and subjected to arm twisting tactics so as to force him to vacate the premises and submit to the order of termination.

    8. In State of U.P and Others v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh & Others, 1989 (2) SCC P 505, the Apex Court in no uncertain terms held that a lessor, with best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or termination of the lease. It was held that the use of expression re-entry in the lease deed does not authorise use of extra-judicial methods to resume possession and the possession of a lessee even after the expiry of lease or termination of lease is juridical possession and his forcible dispossession is prohibited. In a case where State is a lessor, it was held that it is under an additional duty to act in accordance with law. The State is prohibited. from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, it appears that the lessor, Director of Industries, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, after terminating petitioner's lease was indulging in arm twisting and oppressive tactics to oust the petitioner from the premises in question by way of stopping supply of electricity to him so that the premises become unusable and he stands browbeaten to surrender the same inspite of the pendency of his challenge to the termination order by way of filing a Civil Suit. This short cut to re-entry as adopted by the Govt. of NCT of Delhi with the help of respondent, cannot be approved. It is also to be added that the impugned action initiated by the respondent at the instance of Director of Industries, Govt. of NCT of Delhi tantamounts to validating the action of termination of lease and resumption of possession by adopting extra-judicial means. In para 31 of the judgment in State of U.P and Others v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh & Others (supra), the Apex Court made following observations:

    “Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law.”

    9. After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the grant as well as termination of lease by a lessor are governed by the terms and conditions of the lease whereas the supply of electricity to a consumer is controlled by the Electricity Act, 1910 which prescribes different parameters for the supply and withdrawal of the electricity to a consumer. The mere fact that the lease in favour of a lessee has been determined by a lessor is not a valid ground for withdrawal of electricity to a consumer especially when the action of the lessor in regard to the termination of the lease is under challenge before a Court and is sub-judice. Therefore, the withdrawal of electricity supply to the petitioner by the respondent on mere receipt of directions from the lessor was unjustified and unwarranted firstly on the ground that a civil suit challenging the termination of lease was pending in a Civil Court and secondly the lessor had not so far recovered the possession of the premises from the lessee by following due process of law. The lease deed, in favour of the petitioner, speaks of powers to condone the default made by a lessee and as such till the time the controversy regarding termination of lease is decided by Court or the lessor recovers the possession of premises from the lessee the withholding of electric supply cannot be justified. Possibility cannot be ruled out that the lessor itself may condone the alleged violations and regularise the breaches. In that eventuality the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss on account of non-availability of electricity supply to him during the interregnum. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned action on the part of the respondent in disconnecting the electricity supply to the petitioner merely on account of termination of lease by the lessor was illegal, unjust and unwarranted in as much as mere determination of lease by the lessor does not render the lessee an unauthorised occupant and his possession continues to be juridical.

    10. This Court is further of the view that withdrawal of electricity supply to the petitioner by merely giving him a notice dated 8.4.2000 intimating him that the supply would be disconnected after the expiry of 48 hours was in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Neither this intimation was a show cause notice nor any opportunity was given to the petitioner to present his case before the respondent so as to satisfy it that there were no good grounds for disconnection of electric supply. The impugned action, therefore, initiated vide orders dated 12.4.2000 by way of disconnecting the electricity supply to the petitioner's premises was in violation of the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained.

    11. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that so long the petitioner is in possession of the premises in question, the respondent has no right to refuse the supply of electricity to him subject to the condition that the petitioner abides by the terms and conditions of the supply of the electricity and continues to pay for the electricity as per tariff rules. Therefore, the orders dated 8.4.2000 and 12.4.2000 passed by the respondent are quashed and the respondent is directed to continue to supply the electricity to the petitioner in accordance with the terms and conditions of the supply of electricity.

    12. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Satish Verma v. D.V.B.
    (Jul 11, 2002)