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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 93, 91 and 104 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Madhya Pradesh and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, CPC
  • Section 62 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.
  • Section 62 of the Indian Copyright Act.
  • SECTION 62 COPYRIGHT ACT 1957
  • Order 7 Rule 10, CPC.7.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 93, 91 and 104 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Madhya Pradesh and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, CPC
  • Section 62 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.
  • Section 62 of the Indian Copyright Act.
  • SECTION 62 COPYRIGHT ACT 1957
  • Order 7 Rule 10, CPC.7.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking injunction against the defendants. Plaintiff No. 1 is engaged in manufacturing and marketing food products, including soya flour, under the trademark "RUCHI" along with "NUTRELA" since 1978. Plaintiff No. 2 is a licensee under a license agreement dated 8.8.1991. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, engaged in a similar business, have been using a deceptively similar mark "SAHARA RUCHI" since 1999, which infringes the plaintiffs' trademark and copyright rights, causing confusion and passing off of goods. The suit concerns claims of trademark infringement, passing off, copyright violation, and territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit based on the allegations of sale and business solicitation within its jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the defendants' mark "SAHARA RUCHI" is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' trademark "RUCHI NUTRELA" and amounts to infringement and passing off.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs have acquired proprietary rights and goodwill in the trademark and label "RUCHI NUTRELA" sufficient to grant injunction.
  4. Whether the defendants’ use of the mark constitutes violation of plaintiffs’ registered copyright in the artistic label.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Plaintiff No. 1 has used the trademark "RUCHI" with "NUTRELA" since 1978 continuously and commercially, establishing proprietary rights and goodwill.
  • The trademark label has distinctive artistic features protected under registered copyright.
  • The defendants' use of "SAHARA RUCHI" with similar artistic features and color scheme is likely to cause deception, confusion, and passing off.
  • The plaintiff has invested substantially in advertising and built valuable trade under the trademark.
  • The Court has territorial jurisdiction as the defendants are soliciting business and selling goods bearing the impugned mark within the Court’s territorial limits, including Delhi.
  • Reliance on precedents supports the grant of injunction and territorial jurisdiction.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The suit was not filed or verified by a competent person and the trademark "RUCHI" is not registered, only an application is pending.
  • The Court lacks territorial jurisdiction as the defendants and plaintiffs reside and operate mainly outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
  • "NUTRELA" is the registered trademark of the plaintiffs, not "RUCHI," which is a common name usable by others.
  • The defendants’ mark "SAHARA RUCHI" is distinct and not deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ marks.
  • The plaintiffs are attempting to stifle competition and harass the defendants, who are a small company.
  • The defendants do not use the mark in the Court’s jurisdiction (Delhi) and several other companies have pending registrations for "RUCHI."
  • Reliance on case law supports the absence of confusion and the defendants’ right to use their mark.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. Middlessex (England) v. Samrat Pharmaceuticals, AIR 1984 Delhi 265 Territorial jurisdiction based on presence of licensee and business activities. Supported the Court’s territorial jurisdiction as plaintiff’s licensee was located in Delhi.
P.M Diesels Ltd. v. Patel Field Marshal Industries, 1998 PTC (18) 260 Territorial jurisdiction depends on allegations in plaint, not on defendant’s defense. Applied to hold that Court’s jurisdiction is based on plaintiff’s claims of sales and infringement in Delhi.
Jawahar Engineering Company v. Jawahar Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 1983 PTC 207 Injunctions aim to prevent likely future infringement; jurisdiction exists if threatened sales occur in Court’s territory. Supported injunction and jurisdiction even if actual sales in Delhi were not yet established.
Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Mahavir Steels, 1992 (1) Arbitration Law Reporter 417 Territorial jurisdiction can be assumed if goods are sold within jurisdiction; imitation of marks is not legitimized by multiple infringers. Supported injunction despite defendants’ claim of no established presence in jurisdiction.
Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P and Co. Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618 Marks are remembered by general impression; minor differences do not preclude deception. Applied to find defendants’ mark deceptively similar despite differences.
B.K Engineering Company, Delhi v. U.B.H.I Enterprises (Regd.), AIR 1985 Delhi 210 and others Deceptive resemblance and passing off can exist despite addition of words or differences in detail. Supported finding of infringement despite defendants’ addition of "SAHARA" to "RUCHI."
Coolways India v. Princo Air Conditioning and Refrigeration, 1993 (1) Arbitration Law Reporter 401 Reputation and goodwill in a mark are key to passing off claims. Supported plaintiffs’ claim of acquired goodwill and likelihood of passing off.
Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Balaji Tea (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1990 IPLR 266 Territorial jurisdiction considerations and inconvenience to parties. Distinguished on facts; Court held jurisdiction was proper in present case.
Peshawar Soap and Chemicals Ltd. v. Godrej Soap Ltd., 2001 PTC 1 Test for deceptive similarity based on ordinary purchaser’s perception and overall impression. Applied to find defendants’ mark likely to cause confusion among average purchasers.
S.M Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., 2000 PTC 39 Leading character of a mark and overall comparison for passing off. Rejected defendants’ reliance; Court emphasized overall similarity and likelihood of deception.
Uniply Industries Ltd. v. Unicorn Plywood Pvt. Ltd., 2001 PTC 417 Assessment of trademark similarity and likelihood of confusion. Defendants’ reliance rejected in light of overall impression and deception test.
Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2001 PTC 300 Factors for deciding deceptive similarity including nature of marks, goods, purchasers, and surrounding circumstances. Applied these factors to hold defendants’ mark deceptively similar to plaintiffs’ mark.
Ruston and Hornby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., 1969 SCC 727 Passing off arises when mark use is calculated to cause purchasers to believe goods come from plaintiff. Supported finding of infringement despite addition of "INDIA" to defendants’ mark.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the question of territorial jurisdiction, relying on established precedents that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the plaint rather than defenses raised by the defendants. The plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants were soliciting business and selling goods bearing the impugned mark in Delhi, and that the defendants had applied for trademark registration covering Delhi. The Court found these allegations sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction under Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

On the issue of similarity, the Court applied the legal principles that trademarks are remembered by their general impression rather than minute details, and that the overall structural and visual similarity must be considered from the perspective of an ordinary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. The Court referred to authoritative precedents emphasizing that minor differences or addition of words (such as "SAHARA") do not negate deceptive similarity if the essential features and overall impression are confusingly similar.

The Court found that the defendants’ use of the mark "SAHARA RUCHI" with a similar color scheme and artistic label was likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers, including illiterate purchasers who rely on visual cues. The defendants’ mark was held to be a colorable imitation designed to take advantage of the plaintiffs’ goodwill and reputation. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting established trade names and styles against dishonest competitors seeking to pass off their goods.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case for injunction, balancing the convenience in favor of the plaintiffs to restrain the defendants from using the impugned mark until the suit’s disposal.

Holding and Implications

The Court restrained the defendants, their agents, servants, representatives, dealers, and distributors from using, manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or displaying directly or indirectly any food products made from soya under the mark or label bearing the word "RUCHI" with the same or deceptively similar color scheme to the plaintiffs’ trademark "RUCHI NUTRELA" until the disposal of the suit.

This injunction protects the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights and goodwill in their trademark and artistic label, preventing the defendants from passing off their goods as those of the plaintiffs. The Court’s decision is interlocutory, with no expression on the merit of the case, and does not establish new precedent beyond application of existing principles. The matter is to proceed further for admission/denial of documents and framing of issues.

    Ruchi Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Flame Enterprises

    Vijender Jain, J.— Plaintiffs have filed this application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, CPC inter alia, praying that plaintiff No. 1 is in the business of manufacturing and marketing of wide range of food preparations for human consumption including soya flour and other food articles made of soya since 1978 and has been selling and marking the said goods under the trade name RUCK, which it has used along with trade mark NUTRELA in an artistic label. Plaintiff No. 1 adopted the said trademark in the year 1978 and continuously, commercially and in the course of trade used the said trade mark since then till date as its proprietor and through its licensee being plaintiff No. 2 under licence agreement dated 8.8.1991

    2. It was contended before me by Mr. Bansal, learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff/applicant has been using the said mark in a distinctive label having distinctive artistic features including artistic getup, makeup, colour scheme and lettering style. For that plaintiff also holds copyrights under Registration No. A-26732/80. It has been contended by Mr. Bansal that RUCHI forms an essential key, distinguished and material part of the said mark RUCHI NUTRELA as also of the copyright. It was further contended that RUCHI is also forming an essential and distinguishing feature of the trading style of plaintiffs 1 and 2. It was further contended that plaintiff No. 1 has filed application for registration of the trade mark RUCHI under application No. 556001 in Class 30 dated 7.8.1991 and there is likelihood of the registration certificate being issued in favour of the plaintiff. It was contended before me that plaintiffs' goods and business are dependent on the said trade mark and label and plaintiffs have already built a valuable trade under the said trademark/label and the figure of sale run over for 1996-1997 was Rs. 8,70,67,160.00. It was further contended that the applicant/plaintiff had been advertising the aforesaid goods bearing its mark/label through different media and substantial money has been spent on such advertisements.

    3. It was further contended before me by Mr. Bansal that the plaintiff has acquired proprietary rights in the aforesaid trademark/label and the said mark/label has become sufficiently distinctive in the trade to be capable of protection. The applicant has been using the same without any interruption or interference from any corner whatsoever.

    4. It was further contended that defendant No. 1 is engaged in the same business as that of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2 manages the business of defendant No. 1 and also sells and markets the impugned goods of the defendant No. 1. It is contended that since 1999, the defendants are using and selling their impugned goods in a mark/label consisting of the mark RUCHI having artistic feature which are similar to that of the plaintiffs. It has been contended by Mr. Bansal that by using identical and deceptively similar trade name RUCHI, which is an essential part of trademark/label of the plaintiff, but also the lettering style, artistic work, manner of writing, the placement and the impugned label of the defendant is also similar to that of the plaintiffs, which is violation of the plaintiffs' rights. It was contended before me that use of the impugned trademark/label by the defendant is violation of the plaintiffs' trademark/label and rights in the mark RUCHI amounting to passing off. It was also contended that it is also in violation of the plaintiffs' copyright in the artistic work which is registered. Therefore, the same infringes the right of the plaintiffs. It was further contended that defendants by the impugned adoption of the deceptively similar trademark/label which is deliberate, dishonest, fraudulent and improper and by doing so, defendants want to take advantage of the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs. Said action of the defendant is to cause deception and confusion in the markets and to pass off his spurious and impugned goods as that of the plaintiff. It was contended by Mr. Bansal that the defendant by using the word SAHARA along with RUCHI on their impugned trade mark cannot claim that the ordinary consumer will not purchase the goods of the defendant thinking it to be of the plaintiffs and the same would not amount to passing off. On the aforesaid submissions, plaintiff has prayed for grant of injunction.

    5. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, while repelling the contention of learned Counsel for the defendant that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, has cited Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. Middlessex (England) v. Samrat Pharmaceuticals, Kanpur, AIR 1984 Delhi 265, on the proposition that the licensee of the plaintiff is also at Delhi as plaintiff No. 2. He further cited P.M Diesels Ltd. v. Patel Field Marsltal Industries, 1998 PTC (18) 260, where it was held:

    “Reverting now to the main question in respect of territorial jurisdiction, it may be noticed that the plaintiff has claimed that Delhi High Court has jurisdiction on three counts. Firstly, in view of Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Secondly, in view of the fact that the defendants had sought registration of trade mark for sale at Delhi as well and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to restrain the threatened sale by defendants at Delhi. Thirdly, it has been claimed that the goods under the impugned mark have been sold at Delhi and the plaintiff's rights violated at Delhi. On the other hand, the defendants claim that Delhi Court has no jurisdiction as plaintiff and defendants have been residing at Rajkot and both the parties have also been ordinarily working for gain at Rajkot and that no sale has been effected by defendants within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.”

    6. It was held that the jurisdiction of the Court does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendant and it is the allegations made in the plaint which decide the Forum. In Jawahar Engineering Company v. Jawahar Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Sri Rampur, Distt. Ahmedabad, Maharashtra, 1983 PTC 207, the High Court held as follows:

    “Held that an injunction being prohibitive in nature is intended to prevent something that is likely to happen and once the plaintiffs have learnt that the defendants have applied for registration of trade mark in Delhi, they can claim an injunction to prevent any sale of the infringing product in Delhi and in this sense the Court will have jurisdiction whether any sale in Delhi has taken place or not. In any case the decision as to the jurisdiction being of a preliminary nature is not open to appeal at the preliminary stage being not a final decision and accordingly the appeal is dismissed with the observations that it will be open to the plaintiffs or the defendants to agitate the question of jurisdiction along with any other claim that they may have after the suit is decided and it will also open to the Court trying the suit to return the plaintiff it is subsequently found that this Court has no jurisdiction as provided in Order 7 Rule 10, CPC.”

    7. In The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Mahavir Steels, 1992 (1) Arbitration Law Reporter 417, it was held:

    “The question of territorial jurisdiction should not deter the Court from considering the application for temporary injuction and the question that the defendants are not established within the jurisdiction of this Court is not such which wholly takes away the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the application. A mere averment that their goods were being sold by the defendants in Delhi is enough at this stage to assume territorial jurisdiction. Even if some others are using trade marks with prefix ‘ISCO’, an imitation remains an imitation and whether it is down by one or many, it acquires no legitimacy. The trade mark ‘FISCO’ is deceptively similar to ‘TISCO’ and there is every likelihood of ‘F’ being made to appear as ‘T’. Injunction was granted.”

    8. It was further contended by Mr. Bansal that the arguments of the learned Counsel for the defendant that the mark/label of the defendant was not similar to that of the plaintiffs if the same is compared as a whole, has no force as the essential and other features of mark if are taken as whole would make the mark deceptively similar to that of the plaintiffs. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the plaintiff has cited Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P and Co. Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618, where Supreme Court observed as follows:

    “According to Karly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (9th edition, Paragraph 838)—

    ‘Two marks, when placed side by side, may exhibit many and various differences, yet the main idea left on the mind by both may be the same. A person acquainted with one mark, and not having the two side by side comparisons, might well be deceived, if the goods were allowed to be impressed with the second mark, into a belief that he was acquainted. Thus, for example, a mark may represent a game of football; another mark may show players in a different dress, and in very different position, and yet the idea conveyed by each might be simply a game of football. It would be too much to expect that persons dealing with trade marked goods, and relying, as they frequently do, upon marks, should be able to remember the exact details of the marks upon the goods with which they are in the habit of dealing. Marks are remembered rather by general impressions or by some significant detail than by any photographic recollection of the whole. Moreover, variations in detail might well be supposed by customers to have been made by the owners of the trade mark they are already acquainted with for reasons of their own’.”

    9. For the similar proposition of law Counsel for the plaintiff also cited B.K Engineering Company, Delhi v. U.B.H.I Enterprises (Regd.), Ludhiana, AIR 1985 Delhi 210; Hiralal Parbhudas v. Ganesh Trading Company, AIR 1984 Bombay 218; K.R Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Sri Ambal & Co., (1969) 2 SCC 131 : AIR 1970 SC 146; Ruston and Hornby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727 : AIR 1970 SC 1649, where Supreme Court held as under:

    “In the present case the High Court has found that there is a deceptive resemblance between the word ‘RUSTON’ and the word ‘RUSTAM’ and therefore the use of the bare word ‘RUSTAM’ constituted infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark ‘RUSTON’. The respondent has not brought an appeal against the judgment of the High Court on this point and it is, therefore, not open to him to challenge that finding. If the respondent's trade mark is deceptively similar to that of the appellant the fact that the word ‘INDIA’ is added to the respondent's trade mark is of no consequence and the appellant is entitled to succeed in its action for infringement of its trade mark.”

    10. He further cited Coolways India v. Princo Air Conditioning and Refrigeration, 1993 (1) Arbitration Law Reporter 401, and on the basis of the Coolways India's case (supra), Mr. Bansal has contended that at this stage what is to be seen is whether the plaintiff has acquired a reputation, goodwill in the mark which he is using in trade of its goods interruptedly for quite some time and the defendants are attempting to pass off their goods under that mark.

    11. Mr. H.P Singh, learned Counsel for the defendants has contended that the suit has neither been filed nor verified by a competent person. It was also contended by Mr. Singh that the trademark RUCHI is not registered and only an application for registration has been given and the same is pending before Registrar of Trade Marks. Therefore, no injunction can be granted in relation to the trade name RUCHI.

    12. It was contended by Mr. Singh that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction. It was further contended that it is NUTRELA which is the trade mark of the plaintiff and not RUCHI. RUCHI is a common name and can be used by all and sundry. Mr. Singh has contended that as the registration of the plaintiff pertains to NUTRELA and not RUCHI, the use by the defendant of mark SAHARA RUCHI is neither improper nor illegal. However, it was admitted by Mr. Singh that they are using the said mark SAHARA RUCHI since April, 1999. It was contended that defendant No. 1 is a small company and is being prosecated by plaintiffs to stifle competition and entire effort of the plaintiff was to harass defendant No. 1 company. It was contended by Mr. Singh that the plaintiff have filed an application before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore under Sections 93, 91 and 104 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Having miserably failed to get any order in their favour, the plaintiffs in order to circumvent the law have filed the present suit in this Court. If was further contended that defendant No. 1 is not using the trade mark SAHARA RUCHI in Delhi. It was further contended that list of documents filed by the defendants would demonstrate that so many other companies have asked for registration under the same RUCHI and the same are pending: Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim that they can exclusively use the word RUCHI. In support of his contention, Mr. Singh has cited Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Balaji Tea (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1990 IPLR 266; Lalli Enterprises v. Dharam Chand and Sons, 2000 PTC 443, a Single Judge decision, in support of his contention that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction. He has further cited Prabartak Commercial Corporation Ltd. v. The Chief Administrator Dandakaranya Project, 1991 (1) Arbitration Law Reporter 283, to somewhat similar effect.

    13. Learned Counsel for the defend ant has contended that two trade names are totally different and are not similar. In support of his contention, he has cited Peshawar Soap and Chemicals Ltd. v. Godrej Soap Ltd., 2001 PTC 1, where the following was observed:

    “(a) The true and appropriate test is whether an ordinary purchaser of normal memory, purchasing with common caution, who could not be expected to make a close and careful examination of the products in juxtaposition, was likely to be induced or confused into buying the wrong product. The commercial reality is that new-comers most often arrange incentives of myriad natures to get the retailer to promote its product. The customers/purchasers choice is undermined by stratagems such as the purveyor implying that the products are the same; it would be sanguine to expect that the shopkeeper will explain the differences in the source of the two products and/or put both products before the confused or unaware client in order to help him to take his decision. (b) Even though a disclaimer may have been recorded, this would not disentitle such a party to complain of imitation in a passing off action, (c) Acquiescence, or laches or failure to object would disentitle a challenge to a similar mark since the rival would have built-up a reputation and clientele and that then apple-cart of balance of convenience ought not to be upset, (d) Acquiescence would also lend legal legitimacy to exclusive user of a descriptive word, which if contemporaneously challenged would call for cancellation, (e) Use of a prefix to the same mark is no justification for permission to use two identical or similar marks, (f) User of the mark is of pre-eminent importance and would override the rights of the owner of a registered mark who had not entered the market till the time its competitor did.”

    14. Lastly relying on S.M Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., 2000 PTC 39; Mr. Singh has contended that the leading character of the mark is not RUCHI and on critical comparison of the two marks numerous points of differences emerge. It was further contended that on the basis of the aforesaid authorities of the Supreme Court it was contended that once SAHARA has been used along with RUCHI there is no cause for passing off made out by the plaintiff for grant of injunction and there is no question of confusion and deception. To the similar effect the learned Counsel for the defendant cited Uniply Industries Ltd. v. Unicorn Plywood Pvt. Ltd., 2001 PTC 417.

    15. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned Counsels appearing for both the parties. I am bound by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court with regard to the territorial jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of the Court does not depend upon the defence of the defendant and it is the allegations made in the plaint which decide the Forum. In P.M Diesel's case (supra) the plaintiff claimed the jurisdiction of this Court on three counts. Firstly, in view of Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Secondly, in view of the fact that the defendants had sought registration of trade mark for sale at Delhi as well and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to restrain the threatened sale by defendants at Delhi. Thirdly, it has been claimed that the goods under the impugned mark have been sold at Delhi and the plaintiff's rights violated at Delhi. In the circumstances, the Court held that the jurisdiction of Court does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendant and it is the allegations made in the plaint which decide the Forum. In the present case, the plaintiff in paragraph 20 of the plaint has stated:

    “This Hoh'ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the instant suit. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants work for gain in Delhi. The defendants are soliciting business and selling its impugned goods bearing the impugned trade mark/labels in Delhi and are also causing them to be sold in Delhi. The plaintiffs are also selling, marketing and work for gain in their said goods under its said trade mark/labels in Delhi as also from its aforementioned Zonal Office in Delhi. This Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit under Section 62 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957. Defendants have also filed a trade mark registration application under trade mark application No. 818823 dated 11.9.1998 (as per the documents placed by them the aforesaid criminal proceedings). It appears that the said application has been filed for registration on an All India basis which obviously includes registration for Delhi and the defendant No. 1 has sought registration in Delhi as well. The defendants are also selling their impugned goods bearing the impugned trade mark/label in Delhi in a clandestine manner and without issuing formal sale bills and invoices.”

    16. For the aforesaid it would be clear that it is the averment of the plaintiff that the plaintiff and the defendant work for gain in Delhi. The defendants are soliciting business and selling its impugned goods bearing the impugned trade mark/labels in Delhi. The plaintiff is also selling and marketing its goods under the said trademark/labels in Delhi and the jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under Section 62 of the Indian Copyright Act. It has also been contended by Counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff has also filed a trade mark registration application under trade mark application No. 818823 dated 11.9.1998 for the registration of its trade mark on All India basis, which includes registration for Delhi. Therefore, the authorities cited by learned Counsel for the defendant is of no help in view of the a division Bench of this Court in PM. Diesel's case that for the purposes of considering an application for grant of temporary injunction and forming a prima facie opinion, the Court is required to look into the allegations made in the plaint and the jurisdiction of the Court does not depend upon the defence of the opposite party.

    17. Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Balaji Tea (India) Pvt. Ltd.'s case (supra) is a decision of Madras High Court, in which it was held that the Madras High Court did not have jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant was comparatively weak party to litigation and it was very inconvenient for it to defend the suit effectively by coming every time to Madras all the way from Madhya Pradesh and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act was enacted in the interest of authors, painters and others who being economically weak, were not ordinarily able to litigate at various places where their infringers may be residing or operating. Said decision does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.

    18. Therefore, I hold that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

    19. Let me now deal with the second limb of the arguments of the learned Counsel for the defendant with regard to the question of similarity. In Hiralal Parbhudas's case (supra) the question of similarity came up for consideration or the Bombay High Court where it was held:

    “In deciding the question of similarity of two marks, the following well established principles are to be observed—(i) marks are remembered by general impressions or by some significant detail rather than by a photographic recollection of the whole, (ii) overall similarity is the touchstone, (iii) marks must be looked at from the first impression of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, (iv) overall structure, phonetic similarity and similarity of ideas are important and both visual and phonetic tests must be applied, (v) marks must be compared as a whole, microscopic examination being impermissible, and (vi) the broad and salient features must be considered for which the marks must not be placed side by side to find out differences in design. In addition, the nature of the commodity, the class of purchasers, the mode of purchase and other surrounding circumstances must also be taken into consideration.

    …………………………

    …………………………

    In the present case, all the features and various placements in the respondents' label were the same as those in the plaintiffs' label except on the respondents' label the words ‘Himatlal Special Bidi’ were written, whereas in the plaintiffs' label the words ‘Hiralal Chhap Bidi’ appeared.

    Applying the test that the marks must be looked at from the first impression of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, it was held that the respondents' label was deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' labels and was likely to deceive or cause confusion. ‘Hiralal’ and ‘Himatlal’ are both common Indian names. The great deal of phonetic similarity in these two words taken in conjunction with the otherwise similarity in the get-up of the offending label with the plaintiffs' labels would undoubtedly confuse an ordinary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection and who may even be illiterate.”

    20. Reliance placed by Counsel for the defendant on S.M Dyechem Ltd.'s case (supra) and Uniply Industries Ltd. v. Unicorn Plywood Pvt. Ltd.'s case (supra), will also not help the case of the defendant. In Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.., 2001 PTC 300, a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court laid down the following factors for deciding the question of deceptive similarity:

    (a) The nature of the marks i.e whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks, i.e both words and label marks.

    (b) The degree of resemblance between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.

    (c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.

    (d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.

    (e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.

    (f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods, and

    (g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.

    21. For deceptive resemblance two important questions have to be borne in mind—(1) who are the persons whom the resemblance must be likely to deceive or confuse, and (2) what rules of comparison are to be adopted in judging where such resemblance exists. Let us apply these facts to the facts of the case under consideration. It is not disputed before me that the two names ‘RUCHI'S NUTRELA’ and ‘SAHARA’ RUCHI’ are in use in respect of same description of goods namely food prepared for human consumption from soya flour. Such packets are purchased by common people in the towns as well as in villages, literate and illiterate. To such a man, the overall structural depiction and use of RUCK'S which, in the case of the plaintiff has been put in green colour on the top of NUTRELA and which in the case of defendant has been in green colour by putting SAHARA and in place of NUTRELA, the defendant has used RUCHI in a manner so as to, in my opinion, would likely to deceive or cause confusion. Unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection is bound to be deceived. As unintending purchaser go more by overall structural and colour similarity in the nature of the food product which has been purchased previously or which has been sold. The colourable imitation would also bring an action for passing off. In Cadila Health Care Ltd.'s case (supra) the Court held that as follows:

    “It is important that the marks must be compared as wholes. It is not right to take a portion of the word and say that because that portion of the word differs from the corresponding portion of the word in the other case there is no sufficient similarity to cause confusion.”

    22. While considering the effect of S.M Dyechem's case, the Court further held:

    “We are unable to agree with the aforesaid observations in Dyechem's case (supra). As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last four decades have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing confusion.”

    23. In Ruston and Hornby Ltd.'s case (supra) it was held that in a passing off action, the question is whether the defendant is selling its goods so marked as to be designed or calculated to lead purchasers to believe that they are the plaintiff's goods. In the said case the High Court found that there was deceptive resemblance between the word ‘RUSTON’ and ‘RUSTAM’ and, therefore, held that the use of the bare word ‘RUSTAM’ constituted an infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark ‘RUSTON’. The Supreme Court held that if the respondent's trade mark was deceptively similar to that of the appellant's, the fact that the word ‘INDIA’ was added to the respondent's trade mark was of no consequence. That was the case where the Court held that it was an infringement of the trade mark of the plaintiff.

    24. On perusal of the documents filed on record, it appears that the defendant has not only copied the colour scheme but the manner in which RUCHI has been written on the bags containing NUTRELA and the colour scheme of the defendant's plastic bags is deceptively similar. The products of the plaintiff may be purchased by both the villagers and persons living in towns as well as literate and illiterate. Man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection can definitely be misled.

    25. In a country like India where large percentage of the population is illiterate and small factions of the people know English, one thing which has to be kept in mind is that the purchaser of such goods who may be led to a garden path by merely showing the colour scheme and the name of RUCHI on the defendant's goods so as to allow the defendant to pass off the goods manufactured by the defendant as that of the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff is using the trade mark NUTRELA which is registered in conjunction with RUCHI, the use of the word RUCHI along with SAHARA in relation to cognate goods would cause deception. More so in view of the fact that the nature of the goods and the business of the parties are the same. The label of the defendant is identical and deceptively similar to the label of the plaintiff visually, structurally and in basic idea.

    26. Therefore, the true test would be whether an ordinary purchaser purchases with common caution, not expected to make a close and careful examination of the products, was likely to be induced or confused into buying a wrong product. The use of word RUCHI along with SAHARA, RUCHI being an essential part of the trade mark/label of the plaintiff used in conjunction with NUTRELA and the manner of using the colour scheme and manner of placement of impugned label clearly show that the defendants want to take advantage of the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff. If that is so, the Court should not be reluctant in safeguarding the reputation and goodwill which are attached to trade name or trade style in comparison to a person who has come recently in the market and wants to pass off its goods as that of the plaintiff's which has acquired reputation and goodwill. Balance of convenience would also be in restraining such a user of impugned trademark/trade name.

    27. In view of the above discussion, I restrain the defendants, its agents, servants, representatives, dealers and distributors from using, manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or displaying directly or indirectly or dealing in any manner in food made out of soya chunks and soya based products of similar nature as has been manufactured by the plaintiff under its trade mark NUTRELA and label bearing the word RUCHI with the same colour scheme or any other colour scheme which is identical or deceptively similar to the trade mark of plaintiff's trade mark RUCHI till the disposal of the suit.

    28. Nothing said earlier would be an expression on the merit of the case.

    29. Application stands disposed of.

    Suit No. 1775/2000

    30. List this matter before Joint Registrar for admission/denial of documents on 28.11.2001

    31. Thereafter matter be listed in Court for framing of issues.

    Application disposed of.
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