Citation Codes

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Case Number

SAO No. 47 of 1991

Advocates

Mr. Ishwar Sahai, Sr. Adv. with Mr. B. K. Sood, Advocate for Appellant.
Mr. V. K. Makhija, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Vandana Khurana, Advocate for Respondents.

Judges

Vijender Jain, J.

Acts

provisions of clause (h) of proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 14
Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1959 of 1958.
Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT
(h) of Section 14 (1) of Delhi Rent Control Act,
(h) of Section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control
Section 14 (1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control
Clause (h) of Section 14 (1).
Section 14 (1)(h)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Vijender Jain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (landlord) appealed against an order of dismissal of an eviction petition by the Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal. The dismissal had been grounded on Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act: the authorities held that the petitioner (landlord) had failed to make out a case under the proviso to clause (h) of Section 14(1).

The respondent is a tenant occupying premises at No. 81, Pashchmi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi (a large house on an 800 sq. yard plot). The premises were originally let by a registered lease-deed dated 1.4.1970 for three years (with an option for two more) and the lease expired by efflux of time at the end of March 1975. The eviction petition under review was filed in 1985.

The landlord's ground for eviction was that the tenant's wife, Smt. Sudesh Ramana, had acquired a separate, commodious residential house (S-248, Panchsheel Park) and another house (B-11, Swami Nagar) under a will, and thus the tenant had acquired alternate vacant residential accommodation within the meaning of Section 14(1)(h). The tenant and his wife both testified that they were living together with a common kitchen and common mess in the suit premises.

At first instance the Additional Rent Controller and thereafter the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant had not acquired a suitable alternative residence within the mischief of proviso (h) to Section 14(1) because the wife was the exclusive owner and the tenant had no legal right in the properties she acquired; the authorities relied on the decision in B.R. Mehta v. Smt. Atma Devi & Ors., and concluded there was no evidence of tenant's control or management of the wife's acquired house.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether acquisition of a suitable residential accommodation by the tenant's wife can amount to acquisition by the tenant within the meaning of proviso (h) to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act when the husband and wife live together as a family unit sharing a common kitchen and mess.
Whether the Addl. Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal misapplied or misinterpreted the Supreme Court decisions in Prem Chand Anr. v. Sher Singh and B.R. Mehta v. Smt. Atma Devi & Ors. when determining whether the tenant had acquired alternate residential accommodation.
Whether the question raised in this appeal is one of fact (precluding second appeal) or a pure question of law involving interpretation of Supreme Court authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Landlord's) Arguments

The appellant contended that the tenant and his family had acquired alternate accommodation (through the wife) and therefore Section 14(1)(h) applied to permit eviction.
Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Ishwar Sahai) argued that where there is conflict between precedents of different bench strengths, the High Court should follow the view of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court (citing State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi).
The appellant relied on the three-Judge Bench decision in Prem Chand Anr. v. Sher Singh (1981 DRJ 287) as the controlling authority on the interpretation of clause (h) of the proviso to Section 14(1).

Respondent's (Tenant's) Arguments

The respondent (through counsel Mr. Makhija) argued that the wife was the absolute and exclusive owner of the Panchsheel Park property acquired before marriage and constructed from her own funds; therefore the husband/tenant had no legal right to occupy that property and could not be said to have acquired alternative accommodation for the purposes of Section 14(1)(h).
It was contended that the decisions of the Additional Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal (relying on B.R. Mehta) correctly rejected the landlord's case because there was no evidence of the tenant exercising control or management over the wife's property.
The respondent also raised a contention invoking the Hindu Succession Act (cited authority Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai) to the effect that a Hindu female is a full owner of property acquired by her, but the respondent argued that this legal position precluded treating the wife's acquisition as the tenant's acquisition under Section 14(1)(h).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Prem Chand Anr. v. Sher Singh, 1981 DRJ 287 (three-Judge Bench)	Interpreted clause (h) of the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 14: where a tenant and his family live as one unit and an alternate residence is acquired by the wife and is available to the respondent, that acquisition can be treated as acquisition by the tenant for Section 14(1)(h).	The court relied on Prem Chand as the controlling authority: where the husband, wife and family lived together with a common kitchen and no evidence of separation or discord, acquisition of alternate accommodation by the wife is to be treated as acquisition by the tenant.
B.R. Mehta v. Smt. Atma Devi & Ors. (33) 1987 DLT 154 (two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court referenced)	Held that, on its facts, acquisition by the wife did not amount to acquisition by the husband where (inter alia) the flat was allotted on account of the wife's official duties and the premises was not the matrimonial home; the word "domain" was used in view of those specific facts.	The court distinguished B.R. Mehta on its facts and held that the Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal had misinterpreted or over-applied B.R. Mehta. The court held that B.R. Mehta did not lay down a general proposition that every acquisition by a wife is not an acquisition by the tenant.
State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976 SC 2547	Principle that where there is a conflict between views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of the Supreme Court, the opinion of the larger Bench should be followed by the High Court.	The court accepted this principle in the context of choosing between the three-Judge decision in Prem Chand and the two-Judge decision in B.R. Mehta, preferring to follow the larger Bench where appropriate for the legal question involved.
V.K. Malhotra & Anr. v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur, 1985 (1) RCJ 250	Referenced as a decision relied upon in Prem Chand (specific rule not separately detailed in the opinion).	The opinion notes that V.K. Malhotra was relied upon in Prem Chand; the court references this lineage in preferring the Prem Chand approach to interpretation.
Laxman Dass Aggarwal v. A.K. Bahal, 1986 (1) RCJ 190 (Punjab & Haryana High Court)	Held that in the ordinary family unit the husband would have domain over wife's property, an approach similar to Prem Chand (as described in the opinion).	The court cited this case as an example of a High Court taking a similar view to Prem Chand regarding family unit and domain; used as supporting authority for the court's analysis.
Hamukhlal Raichand Shah v. Arvindbhai Mohanlal Kapadia, 1988 (2) RCJ 573 (Gujarat High Court)	Similar view taken by the Gujarat High Court (parallel to Laxman Dass) regarding family/domestic unity and the husband's domain.	Cited as supporting authority showing that other High Courts reached similar conclusions to Prem Chand in appropriate facts.
Shri N. K. Rastogi v. Shri Karori Lal, 1993 RLR 358	Summarised that B.R. Mehta did not whittle down Prem Chand and emphasised that whether a wife's acquisition amounts to the tenant's acquisition depends on facts, particularly whether the tenant has domain over the acquired residence.	The court relied on the passage to support its view that factual circumstances determine applicability of Section 14(1)(h) and that Prem Chand's ratio remains authoritative where its facts are present.
Satya Gupta (Smt) Alias Madhu Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423	Cited by respondent's counsel to argue that a second appeal may be barred by findings of fact by the Tribunal; the opinion states the authority relied upon by respondent but found it inapplicable to the present facts.	The court considered this authority but held it was not applicable because the present appeal raised a pure question of law (interpretation of Supreme Court authorities) rather than a pure factual review.
Shiv Nandan Prasad Jain v. Dr. Sushil Gupta & Ors., 7 (1998) DLT 287	Referenced by respondent's counsel; the opinion records that the decision is "of no help" to respondent and in fact goes against him on the facts recounted in that authority (including that strained relations would normally manifest in separate residence).	The court noted that even this authority did not assist the respondent and was not contrary to the court's conclusion that harmonious co-residence points to family domain.
Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai and others, (1987) 2 SCC 572	Authority for the proposition under the Hindu Succession Act that property acquired by a Hindu female may be held by the female as full owner.	The court acknowledged the legal proposition but observed that its relevance to proceedings under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was limited; the court did not treat this principle as decisive in the rent-control context.
Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian (Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975)	Cited in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi to illustrate the appropriate approach where High Courts face conflicting Supreme Court Benches.	Used in the opinion's discussion (through the Ram Chandra Trivedi passage) to support the approach of following larger Bench decisions on conflicting precedents.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps (as reflected in the opinion):

Identification of the central interpretive question: whether acquisition by the wife of a suitable residential accommodation brings the tenant within the mischief of proviso (h) to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Examination of the facts on record: the tenant and his wife lived together in the tenanted premises as a unit, shared a common kitchen and mess, and there was no evidence of discord, separation or that they were not living as one family. The wife had let out the Panchsheel Park house and had also received another house under a will; but crucially, the couple's evidence established harmonious co-residence.
Consideration of Supreme Court authorities, particularly the three-Judge Bench decision in Prem Chand and the two-Judge Bench decision in B.R. Mehta. The court emphasised that Prem Chand was a larger Bench decision and that, under the established principle cited from State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, the view of the larger Bench should be followed where relevant.
Distinguishing B.R. Mehta on its facts: B.R. Mehta concerned allotment/acquisition to a wife arising from official position and the wife having occupied that accommodation independently (it was not the matrimonial home), and the Supreme Court there used the concept of "domain" in light of those special facts. The present case, by contrast, involved harmonious co-residence and shared domestic arrangements, and therefore the "domain" concept in B.R. Mehta did not negate application of Prem Chand's reasoning.
Drawing the legal conclusion from the factual matrix plus the Prem Chand ratio: where the family unit is living together and treating needs as those of the unit, acquisition of suitable residential accommodation by the wife in which the family participate or which is available to the family may be considered an acquisition of alternate residence by the tenant for the purposes of Section 14(1)(h). The court expressly rejected the respondent's argument that the wife's independent title or financing alone precluded such a finding in every case.
Determination that the Addl. Rent Controller and the Tribunal had misinterpreted B.R. Mehta and erred in law in denying the landlord relief. The court characterized the appeal as raising a pure question of law (interpretation of Supreme Court judgments) rather than being barred as an impermissible second appeal based on findings of fact.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; Orders of the Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal set aside; decree of eviction under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act passed against the respondent/tenant.

Consequences and implications:

Direct effect: The court set aside the prior orders dismissing the eviction petition and issued a decree for eviction of the respondent under Section 14(1)(h). The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.
On precedent and broader law: The court concluded that the decision does not rest on creating a new general rule but on applying and interpreting existing Supreme Court authorities (notably Prem Chand and distinguishing B.R. Mehta) to the facts. The opinion emphasises that whether a wife's acquisition brings a tenant within Section 14(1)(h) depends on facts — in particular, whether the family lives together as a unit and whether the tenant has "domain" in the sense discussed in the authorities. The court therefore did not purport to announce a novel, sweeping legal principle beyond that factual application.

If any section above omits particular detail, it is because the provided opinion did not contain discrete additional information on that point.

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Hari Sharma v. Amarjit Singh Ramana.

Vijender Jain, J.— Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the petition on the ground of Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act by the Addl. Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal on the ground that the petitioner has failed to made out a case under proviso (h) of Section 14 (1) of Delhi Rent Control Act, the appellant/landlord has filed this second appeal.

Respondent is a tenant in respect of premises bearing No. 81, Pashchmi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi having five bed rooms, drawing room and dining room on a plot of land admeasuring 800 sq. yards. Premises were let out to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month by a registered lease-deed dated 1.4.1970 for a period of three years for residential purposes with option for another two years. Lease was finally expired in the end of March, 1975 by efflux of time.

Present eviction petition was filed in the year 1985. The ground taken was that the wife of the tenant Smt. Sudesh Ramana has built a very commodious residential house bearing No. S-248, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi, which was then let out at a monthly rent of about Rs. 10,000/-. per month. It was further contended that the respondent and his wife were on very good terms and were living together in the property in question throughout. It was further averred in the petition that the wife of the respondent has also received another residential house (No. B-11, Swami Nagar, New Delhi) under a will executed by her mother. The stand of the wife of tenant, Smt. Sudesh Ramana was that she was the absolute and exclusive owner of house No. S-248, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi, plot of the said house was acquired by her even prior to her marriage, she was independently assessed to income-tax and she raised the construction by her own funds on the said plot of land and her husband has no legal right to live in the house. She stated that she will not allow her husband or anybody else from his family to reside in it. It was the testimony of RW 9-Smt. Sudesh Ramana before the Addl. Rent Controller that RW 9, her husband and husband's parents have a common kitchen/mess. They were living together in the suit premises as one unit. There was one kitchen and common mess. This is how the trial court has dealt:—

“To my mind there is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. Unity of the family may require that a husband would always live with the wife. But it does not mean in law that the property of wife belongs equally to the husband. Admittedly the fact of cordial relations between the tenant and his wife of common and one mess and residence in the suit premises as a single family unit does not in law mean that the tenant would have equal right in property acquired by wife.”

The Addl. Rent Controller on the basis of the testimony of respondent that property at Swami Nagar exclusively belongs to his son Ravinder Singh after the death of his mother-in-law on the basis of a Will left by her also held that tenant had no right in the property at Swami Nagar, New Delhi. It was also on record that said Ravinder Singh was a minor at the time of execution of the will and the wife of the tenant was the sole executrix of that Will. It was further mentioned in the said Will that Smt. Sudesh Ramana shall let out the said property for the benefit of Ravinder Singh only. Therefore, the Addl. Rent Controller held that acquisition of house No. B-11, Swami Nagar, New Delhi by the said Ravinder Singh does not bring the tenant within the mischief of proviso (h) of Section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

It was held by Addl. Rent Controller that acquisition by the wife of S-248,. Panchsheel Park, the respondent/tenant had no legal right to occupy the said house, Addl. Rent Controller relied his judgment on account of B.R Mehta v. Smt. Atma Devi & Ors. (33) 1987 DLT 154. Rent Control Tribunal also fell in the same error applying wrongly the ratio of B.R Mehta's case (supra). The Rent Control Tribunal held that there was no evidence to show that the respondent/tenant is exercising any control in the matter of management or use of house No. S-248, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi.

Mr. Ishwar Sahai,. learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Prem Chand's case (supra) was a decision rendered by three Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court and the latter judgment in B.R Mehta's case was a judgment delivered by two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and he has contended that the proper course for the High Court is to find out and follow the opinion expressed by the larger bench of the Supreme Court in preference to those preferred by the smaller Benches of the Supreme Court. In support of his submission has cited The State of U.P v. Ram Chandra Trivedi AIR 1976 SC 2547. In this case, the Supreme Court held as under:

“Thus on a conspectus of the decisions of this Court referred to above, it is obvious that there is no real conflict in their ratio decided and it is no longer open to any one to urge with any show of force that the constitutional position emerging from the decisions of this court in regard to cases of the present nature is not clear. It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the view expressed by larger and smaller benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court in such a case, as observed by this Court in Union of India v. K.S Subramanian (Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975, decided on July 20, 1976) to which one of us was a party, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself.”

In support of his contention Mr. Sahai has also cited another judgment of this Court V.K Malhotra & Anr. v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur reported in 1985 (1) RCJ 250, which has been relied upon in Prem Chand's case.

This matter only requires the interpretation of the case of Prem Chand Anr. v. Sher Singh 1981 DRJ 287 and B.R Mehta's case (supra). Former was a decision of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and the latter was the judgment of two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. In Prem Chand's case (supra), the Supreme Court was very much conscious of the provisions of clause (h) of proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Act.

It is a short judgment. I would like to quote it. Y.V Chandrachud, C.J spoke for the Bench:

“The respondent-tenant is out of possession since October 9, 1976. He was dispossessed during the pendency of the appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal.

The respondent's son is a business executive, who was, at one time, allotted a flat by his employers. On December 12, 1980 the respondent's wife purchased a flat at Saket from the Delhi Development Authority, at a cost of about Rs. 1,20,000/-. The flat is available to the respondent though his explanation is that it has been let out by his wife to their son. The respondent has now no case to be put back in possession of the flat in dispute.

“We had allowed the appellants to amend their application for possession by pleading that the respondent has acquired possession of a vacant residence within the meaning of Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1959 of 1958. The respondent has filed his reply to the amended application. Having considered the averments of the parties on the point at issue we are satisfied that the respondent has through his wife acquired vacant possession of a residence in Delhi. The application of the appellants of possession for the flat is therefore allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs throughout.”

The learned counsel for the respondent has argued at length to bring home the point that there is no domain of the tenant over the property of his wife. Mr. Makhija has taken great pains in explaining that the evidence which was brought before the Addl. Rent Controller overwhelmingly suggested that the total money on construction was spent by the wife of the tenant. The plot at Panchsheel Park was acquired by the wife of the tenant prior to the marriage and, therefore, there was no legal right on the basis of which it could be said that there was any acquisition of a vacant residential accommodation by the tenant and, therefore, tenant could not be brought within the mischief of Section 14(1)(h) of the Act.

I am afraid that would not be proper course to decide as to whether any acquisition of a vacant residential house by wife would amount to acquisition by tenant. There was nothing on record suggesting that there was a dispute between the wife and the husband either in terms of their living together or otherwise. There was nothing on record to show that they were not sharing the common mess, rather, the evidence on record was to the contrary. It was brought on the record that wife of the tenant and other children were living together under the same roof, they had a common kitchen. In such a case the ratio of B.R Mehta's case (supra) regarding domain has to be construed. Whether, that domain which B.R Mehta's case spoke of, would be in the nature of domain in terms of contribution of finances towards acquisition of alternative accommodation? Let us go to the ethos of our society in the realm of marriage, according to which the husband will have domain over wife not only in respect of physical terms but also to what she is possessed of including property. But we may not adopt that definition. What has to be seen in such a context to determine whether the family as a unit is living together, sharing a common kitchen and mess we have to see ground realities.

In a broader conspectus of universe family is the smallest unit and when husband, wife, parents and children hole the property jointly, they would be considered ordinarily as members of one unit and the requirement of one would be the requirement of the other. In view of the evidence on record that the tenant and his wife were living together one has acquired suitable residential accommodation and there is no evidence to the effect that they had not been looking upon themselves as one unit the acquisition of suitable residential accommodation by wife would be considered to be the acquisition of a suitable residential accommodation by the tenant. As has been stated earlier, there is nothing on record which has been brought to show that the husband and wife were not having cordial relations or there was inter se dispute between both of them or they were not living as one unit. Look at the testimony of respondent-RW 4. He has stated that his wife and son and his parents were living with him. In cross-examination he has further admitted that his wife and his son are living with him permanently in the suit premises since the time they took the premises on rent in 1975. He further stated in the cross-examination that they had a common kitchen. In this case the wife of the tenant Smt. Sudesh Ramana also appeared in the witness box as RW. 9. Specifically in the cross-examination she deposed:—

“It is correct that relation between myself and my husband and our son has always been cordial.”

That being the situation can it be said that the acquisition of residence at Panchsheel Park by wife wherein she is realising rent at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per month, whereas the husband tenant before me is paying rent at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month, be permitted to do business on account of protection provided under the Act? The answer is in the negative.

There is no dispute between husband and wife. They constitute normal Hindu family where husband would have domain over his wife's property until disharmony, distrust or separation is pleaded. This view was taken by Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Laxman Dass Aggarwal v. A.K Bahal 1986 (1) RCJ 190. Similar view was taken by Gujarat High Court in Hamukhlal Raichand Shah v. Arvindbhai Mohanlal Kapadia 1988 (2) RCJ 573.

As a matter of fact, the law has been succinctly reflected in the judgment of Shri N. K. Rastogi… v. Shri Karori Lal… 1993 RLR 358:

“The close analysis of this judgment given in case of B.R Mehta (supra), which was a judgment given by two Hon'ble Judge, would show that ratio of which can be culled from the judgment given in the case of Prem Chand's case (Supra) a judgment given by three Hon'ble Judges, had not been in any manner whittled down. The legal position of now very clear that it is not that every acquisition of a residential accommodation by the wife would mean acquisition of a residence by the tenant, but it will depend upon the facts of each case in order to decide whether alternate residential accommodation has become available to the tenant over which has tenant and his family members have a domain.”

I am of the considered view that in B.R Mehta's case (supra) the Supreme Court has not whittled down the decision of Prem Chand's case (supra). In B.R Mehta's case, Supreme Court held:—

“The said decision rested on the facts of the case. There in that case, this Court found that the respondent's wife had purchased a flat in Saket and further found that the flat was available to the respondent. In those circumstances it was held that there was acquisition of vacant possession of a residence and as such Section 14 (1) (h) of the Act would be attracted. It cannot however be laid down as a general proposition of law that acquisition of flat by the wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of flat by the tenant.”

“What is necessary is that unless there is a positive evidence and here there is none, of acquisition of property prima facie in the name of the tenant or allotment of flat to the tenant, it cannot be said to have been acquired by or allotted to some members of the tenant's family other than the wife in her name. That cannot defeat the tenant's right under Clause (h) of Section 14 (1). If there is such an acquisition by or on behalf of the tenant then the tenant and members of the tenant's family would have dominion over the acquired residence. Such acquisition would bring to the tenant the mischief of Section 14(1) (h) of the Act.

In B.R Mehta's case, the Supreme Court was considering allotment of a house to a wife who was a Government employee and was allotted a residential flat by Government due to her being in employment as a teacher in a Government School. The fact of that case was that the wife had started living in the said flat alone. In that case, the plea was taken that the relations between the husband and wife were not amicable as there was difference of opinion. Therefore, the Supreme Court in that case held that it cannot be laid down as general proposition of law that acquisition of a flat by the wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of flat by the tenant. To my mind the word “domain” occurring in B.R Mehta's case (supra) was in view of the special facts and circumstances of that case. That is how the Supreme Court has summed up in paragraph six of the judgment:

“………….The premises in question which the wife occupied was indisputably not the matrimonial home. It is nobody's case. The husband would not, therefore, have any statutory or legal right against the Government to use and enjoy the allotted premises to the wife of the tenant because of her job. Looked at any point of view, the tenant cannot be made to lose his tenancy because of wife acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation.”

Therefore, the word ‘domain’ is not with regard to acquisition of flat or allotment of a flat but on allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which husband cannot have any domain. Whereas in this case in view of the clear and unambiguous stand of the tenant as well as his wife RW 9 that they are living together there is no dispute between them can it be said that in spite of harmonious relationship between the wife and the husband, the husband will not have domain over his wife or the property of his wife. Wife is earning fifty thousand rupees on account of letting out to of the accommodation and the husband is paying Rs. 1,500/- as rent of a property in Vasant Vihar constructed on 800 sq. yds. of plot. Wife is living in the tenanted property along with her husband.

I do not find any force in the argument of learned counsel for the respondent that this second appeal is not maintainable as there is a finding of fact by the Rent Controller as well as the Rent Control Tribunal. This appeal only involves the interpretation of the judgments of Supreme Court in Prem Chand and B.R Mehta's cases. Therefore it is a pure and simple question of law and nothing more. Therefore, I do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent and the authority cited by the learned counsel in this regard of Satya Gupta (Smt) Alias Madhu Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar. (1998) 6 SCC 423 is not applicable to the facts of this case. Even the authority cited by learned counsel for the respondent Shiv Nandan Prasad Jain v. Dr. Sushil Gupta & Ors. 7 (1998) DLT 287 is of no help to him. As a matter of fact, it goes against him. In this case the Court held:

“…….The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner and his wife were not expected to make a public display of their strained relations and, as such, there was no pleading to that effect, does not inspire confidence or appear credible. The strained relationship, even if it is assumed, was not pleaded, would have manifested by separate residence or separate establishments.”

Another contention was raised by Mr. Makhija before me that in view of the Hindu Succession Act particular Section 14 (1) property acquired by a Hindu female and after the codification of Hindu Succession Act is held by the female as full owner and in his support has cited Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai and others (1987) 2 SCC 572. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition of law but how that is relevant in the proceedings under Section 14 (1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

In view of the above discussion, Addl.. Rent Controller as well as Rent Control Tribunal fell in error in misinterpreting the case of B.R Mehta (supra). The respondent cannot be permitted to do business on account of protection of Section 14 (1)(h) when admittedly, his wife has acquired suitable residential accommodation at S-248, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi. The property being constructed by her own independent funds would not be material insofar as the evidence on record was that they were living as a unit in complete harmony, sharing common roof as well as mess.

I, therefore, set aside the orders of the Addl. Rent Controller as well as the Rent Control Tribunal and pass a decree of eviction under Section 14 (1)(h) against the respondent/tenant.

Appeal is allowed with cost throughout.

Hari Sharma v. Amarjit Singh Ramana.

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Vijender Jain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Landlord's) Arguments

Respondent's (Tenant's) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Hari Sharma v. Amarjit Singh Ramana.

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