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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Foreign Awards Recognition & Enforcement Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as FARE Act) or the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the A&C Act)
  • Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act or Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act.
  • SECTION 10 DELHI HIGH COURT ACT
  • Section 49 of the A&C Act, 1996
  • Section 47 of the A&C Act, 1996,
  • Section 7 of the FARE Act, 1961
  • Section 48 of the A&C Act.
  • Section 47 of the A&C Act
  • Section 50 of the A&C Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Foreign Awards Recognition & Enforcement Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as FARE Act) or the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the A&C Act)
  • Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act or Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act.
  • SECTION 10 DELHI HIGH COURT ACT
  • Section 49 of the A&C Act, 1996
  • Section 47 of the A&C Act, 1996,
  • Section 7 of the FARE Act, 1961
  • Section 48 of the A&C Act.
  • Section 47 of the A&C Act
  • Section 50 of the A&C Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Devinder Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties entered into an agreement on 1.8.1994 under which the appellant agreed to supply 108 Metric Tonnes of menthol crystals to the respondent for the period January 1995 to June 1996. The appellant did not supply the full quantity in time and sought an extension; the respondent treated the failure as repudiatory and issued notices. The respondent referred shortfall claims to the International General Produce Association (IGPA), London. IGPA passed Award No. 1030 on 13.8.1996 (relating to shortfall for July–December 1995) and Award No. 1034 on 16.10.1996 (relating to remaining supplies for January–June 1996).

The respondent filed two execution petitions in this Court (No. 168/98 and No. 169/98) to execute the foreign awards. On 4.8.1998 a Single Judge ordered attachment of the appellant's properties to secure execution. The appellant filed EA.347/98 and EA.346/98 challenging maintainability and validity of the execution proceedings. On 9.9.1998 the Single Judge recalled the attachment in both cases subject to securities totalling Rs. 4.24 crores. By order dated 19.2.1999, the Single Judge (i) dismissed Execution Petition No. 168/98 as not maintainable and released security to the extent of Rs. 1.74 crores, and (ii) in Execution Petition No. 169/98 (EA No. 346/98) held that execution proceedings were not maintainable prior to enforcement proceedings but proceeded to convert the execution petition into proceedings under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (treating the petition as compliant with section 47) and retained security of Rs. 2.5 crores. The second order (in EA No. 346/98 in Ex. Petition No. 169/98) is the subject of the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether execution proceedings could be instituted directly in respect of the foreign awards or whether enforcement proceedings under the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act, 1961 (FARE Act) or the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) must be first instituted.
  2. Whether the Single Judge's order converting an execution petition into enforcement proceedings (and retaining security) is an order against which an appeal lies under section 50 of the A&C Act.
  3. Whether an appeal against the impugned order is maintainable to a Division Bench under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act (Letters Patent), or under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (i.e., whether Clause 10 provides a right of appeal in this situation).
  4. Whether the impugned order, being passed de hors the A&C Act in exercise of inherent jurisdiction, is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and therefore appealable to a Division Bench.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appeal is not maintainable: Part II of the A&C Act (Chapter I in Part II) governs enforcement of foreign awards and section 50 of the A&C Act enumerates orders against which an appeal is provided; the impugned order is not covered by section 50 and hence no appeal lies under section 50.
  • Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act does not confer a right of appeal — it only supplies a forum of appeal; an appeal is a creature of statute. Reliance was placed on East India Hotels Ltd. v. Jyoti Pvt. Ltd., 1996 III AD (Delhi) 242.
  • No appeal lies under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent from an order not covered by the clauses of section 50 (relying on State of West Bengal v. M/s Gourangalal Chatterjee, (1993) 3 SCC 1).

Appellant's Arguments

  • Neither under the FARE Act, 1961 nor under the A&C Act, 1996 is an execution application directly maintainable; the Single Judge correctly found the execution petition not maintainable. Because the Single Judge's order was made in proceedings de hors the A&C Act and in exercise of inherent jurisdiction on the Original Side, the order must be treated as an order passed outside the Act.
  • The impugned order is therefore a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and appealable to a Division Bench under Clause 10; Clause 10 should apply to permit the present appeal (argument advanced by Mr. K.K. Venugopal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
East India Hotels Ltd. v. Jyoti Pvt. Ltd., 1996 III AD (Delhi) 242 Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act does not confer a right of appeal but provides only a forum of appeal; appeal is a creature of statute. The respondent relied on this decision to argue that Section 10 cannot be relied upon to sustain the present appeal. The Court acknowledged the decision as correctly laying down that Section 10 alone does not create an appeal right.
State of West Bengal v. M/s Gourangalal Chatterjee, (1993) 3 S.C.C. 1 No appeal lies from an order not covered by clauses of section 50 of the A&C Act even under Clause 10 of Letters Patent. The respondent relied on this Supreme Court decision. The Court in the present opinion held that reliance on this case was misconceived because the impugned order was passed de hors the A&C Act (inherent jurisdiction) and thus the case did not apply in the same way.
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania & Anr., AIR 1981 S.C. 1786 Sets tests to determine when an interlocutory order can be regarded as a "judgment" for purposes of appeal under Letters Patent — only those orders deciding matters of moment or affecting vital and valuable rights qualify. The Court applied these tests to conclude that the impugned order could be regarded as a "judgment" because upholding the appellant's objection could terminate the main proceedings and thus affects vital rights; this supported maintainability of the appeal under Clause 10.
T.V. Tulzaram Row v. M.K.R.V. Allagappachettiar, (1912) I.L.R. 35 Madras 1 (Sir Arnold White, C.J.) Illustrative test: if there is a possibility that the defendant may succeed thereby terminating proceedings, the order may be appealable as an adverse adjudication affecting a valuable right. The Court adopted and approved these illustrative tests (as approved in Shah Babulal Khimji) and applied the rationale to determine that the impugned order involves an adverse determination that could terminate proceedings, thus rendering it appealable under Clause 10.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first noted the statutory framework governing foreign awards under the A&C Act. Section 49 (as explained in the opinion) provides that a foreign award governed by the New York Convention shall be deemed a decree of the Court only where the Court is satisfied that the award is enforceable under Chapter I of Part II. From this the Court reasoned that an execution application cannot be filed straightaway to enforce a foreign award; the person seeking enforcement must first approach the Court for adjudication under section 48 (and related provisions). In the present case, no such adjudication was sought before filing execution; the Single Judge therefore held the execution petition not maintainable and — observing substantial compliance with section 47 — treated the petition as one under section 47.

The Court addressed the respondent's preliminary contention that no appeal lies because the impugned order is not covered by section 50 of the A&C Act and because Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act does not confer any right of appeal. The Court accepted that Section 10 alone does not create an appeal right (relying on East India Hotels Ltd.), so an appeal would not lie under Section 10 unless another provision supported it.

The Court then examined whether Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (the appellate jurisdiction provision) permits an appeal. The Court observed that the impugned order was passed in proceedings initiated de hors the A&C Act (i.e., not under the statutory Act) and that the Single Judge exercised inherent jurisdiction on the Original Side, converting the proceedings into ones under the A&C Act. Because the order was made outside the statutory scheme, the Court treated it as an order passed de hors the Act and therefore considered whether it was a "judgment" for purposes of Clause 10.

Applying the tests from Shah Babulal Khimji (and the illustrative tests of Sir Arnold White in T.V. Tulzaram Row), the Court asked whether the order decided a matter of moment or affected vital and valuable rights and whether upholding the appellant's objection could terminate the proceedings. The Court found that upholding the appellant's objection would likely terminate the respondent's proceedings (as had occurred in the other execution petition). Because the impugned order thus involved an adverse adjudication of a valuable right and could terminate proceedings, it satisfied the tests for being a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 10.

The Court also noted the Supreme Court's order in SLP (Civil) No. 7674/99, where the Supreme Court observed the preliminary objection concerning maintainability and permitted the petitioner to file the requisite appeal in the High Court within 15 days; this was treated as a relevant aspect of the procedural posture.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the appeal against the impugned order is maintainable under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Court directed that the appeal be treated as one filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and ordered the appeal to be de-registered as F.A.O. (OS) and registered as L.P.A.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's present appeal is maintainable and will proceed to be heard by a Division Bench under Clause 10 (registered as L.P.A.). The procedural classification of the appeal has been changed by the Court (de-register F.A.O. (OS); register as L.P.A.).
  • Scope for further adjudication: The Court's order allows the substantive challenge to the Single Judge's decision (conversion of execution proceedings and retention of security) to be adjudicated by a Division Bench under the Letters Patent route.
  • Precedential scope: The opinion applies established tests from Supreme Court and earlier decisions to determine when interlocutory or non-statutory orders amount to a "judgment" under Clause 10. The opinion does not state that it is setting a novel legal precedent beyond applying those tests; no broader precedent-creating statement is made in the text.

Administrative direction from the opinion: "To be de-registered as F.A.O (OS) and be registered as L.P.A." (as recorded in the original text).

    Jindal Exports Ltd. v. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd

    Devinder Gupta, J.— The preliminary objection raised by the respondent is about maintainability of this appeal, which has been filed against the order passed on 19.2.1999 by learned Single Judge. Appeal has been preferred under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act with a prayer to set aside the execution proceedings instituted by the respondent.

    Facts in brief are that on 1.8.1994 parties entered into an agreement by which the appellant agreed to supply 108 Metric Tonnes of Menthol Crystals to the respondent during the period January, 1995 to June, 1996. The appellant could not supply the stipulated quantity of goods within time, therefore, sought extension of time from the respondent. A notice was issued by the respondent to the appellant in repudiatory breach on the appellant's obligation under the contract for supply of remaining quantity of good. On 18.12.1995 claim was filed by the respondent before the International General Produce Association, London, U.K (hereinafter referred to as “the IGPA”), the Arbitral body nominated by the respondent, The claim was for short fall in supply of goods in respect of the period July to December, 1995. Protest was raised by the appellant before the IGPA that there did not exist any Arbitral disputes and as such the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference. On 13.8.1996 Award No. 1030 was passed by the IGPA against the appellant. Two notices were issued by the respondent holding the appellant in repudiatory breach of contractual obligation in respect of the remaining supplies for the period January to June, 1996. Claim was lodged by the respondent with IGPA on which also Award No. 1034 was passed by the IGPA on 16.10.1996 The respondent straightaway filed two execution petitions No. 168 and 169 of 1998 in this Court in respect of the two aforementioned Awards dated 13.8.1996 and 16.10.1996 respectively. On 4.8.1998 learned Single Judge directed issuance of order of attachment in respect of the properties of the appellant company to secure execution of the foreign awards. On coming to know of filing of the execution petitions and of the order of attachment, two separate applications, namely, EA. 347/98 and EA. 346/98 were filed in the two execution proceedings No. 168 and 169 of 1998 respectively. In those applications, the appellant challenged the maintainability of the execution proceedings arid validity of the orders passed therein. By order dated 9.9.1998 learned Single Judge recalled the order of attachment in both the execution proceedings subject to the appellant's furnishing security to the extent of Rs. 4.24 Crores.

    The main objection raised by the appellant about the maintainability of the execution proceedings has been that the Awards are covered by the New York Convention and whether the Foreign Awards Recognition & Enforcement Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “FARE Act”) or the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the A&C Act”) applied, the awards being foreign awards are not liable to be executed proprio vigore. The awards under the two Acts had to be sued upon, when the objection, set out in Section 7 of the FARE Act, 1961 or under section 48 of the a&c act could be raised by the party against whom awards have been made. On such questions being raised, issues would then have to be framed, which would have to be tried before a judgment is delivered. Only then a decree capable of execution would come into existence.

    Learned Single Judge by order dated 19.2.1999 disposed of E.A 374/98 and proceeded to dismiss Execution Petition No. 168/98 holding that the same was not maintainable. It was held that arbitral proceedings having commenced prior to the coming into force of A&C Act, 1996, the enforcement of the award would have to be sought under FARE Act, 1961 and consequently ordered release of security to the extent 1.74 Crores. By a separate order passed on the same day in EA No. 346/98 filed in Execution Petition No. 16/98, it was held that execution proceedings were not maintainable prior to enforcement proceedings in respect of the second Award and then learned Single Judge proceeded to convert the execution proceedings instituted by the respondent into proceedings seeking enforcement of the foreign award on the ground that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 47 of the a&c act and also directed for retaining security to the extent of Rs. 2.5 Crores furnished by the appellant.

    The order passed in EA No. 346/98 in Ex. Petition No. 169/98 is under challenge in this appeal.

    Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that Part II of the A&C Act deals with enforcement of certain foreign awards. Chapter I in Part II would apply to the award in question. section 50 of the a&c act enumerates the orders against which appeal is provided. The impugned order is not covered by Section 50, therefore, no appeal is maintainable against the said order under section 50 of the a&c act. Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act does not confer any right of appeal. It provides only for a forum of appeal. Appeal is a creature of statute and there is no inherent right of appeal. As such the appeal is not maintainable. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in East India Hotels Ltd. v. Jyoti Pvt. Ltd., 1996 III AD (Delhi) 242 in support of this proposition. It has further been contended by him that no appeal lies from an order, which is not covered by any of the clauses of section 50. As the order does not fall in any of the clauses of Section 50, no appeal would lie to a Division Bench even under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, for which reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State Of West Bengal v. M/S Gourangalal Chatterjee., (1993) 3 S.C.C 1.

    Mr. Venugopal has vehemently contended that neither under FARE Act, 1961, nor under A&C Act, 1996 execution application is maintainable. Learned Single Judge has also held that execution petition is not maintainable. Therefore, execution petition not being a proceeding either wider FARE Act, 1961 or under A&C Act, 1996, an order passed in such proceedings cannot be taken to be an order passed under the Act. The order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court has thus to be taken as an order passed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction on Original Side to which Clause 10 of the Letters Patent would apply. Nature of order is such that it would be covered by the expression “judgment” under in clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appeal would lie to this Court.

    We have given due consideration to the submissions made at the Bar. One important aspect to which we may make reference at this stage is that against the order passed by learned Single Judge in EA No. 374/98 in Execution Petition No. 168/98, the respondent had preferred SLP (Civil) No. 7674/99 in which on 13.7.1999 the following order was passed by the Supreme Court:—

    “Mr. K.K Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents on caveat raises a preliminary objection and states that the impugned order can be validly made a subject matter of appeal in the High Court under section 50(1)(b) of the arbitration & conciliation act or Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. We find substance in this preliminary objection and Mr. Venugopal further states that he will not object to the maintainability of the appeal if it is so filed. As the petitioner has moved this Court in Special Leave Petition directly against the order of learned Single Judge he may file the requisite appeal against the aforesaid judgment, if so advised, within 15 days from today and the same if so filed will be decided on its own merit as the learned senior counsel for the respondents fairly concedes that no objection on ground of limitation will be raised by the respondents in that eventuality. The Special Leaye Petition is disposed of accordingly. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly without going into the merits of the controversy between the parties.” [Emphasis supplied]

    Only for the purpose of deciding the preliminary objection, which has been raised by learned counsel for the respondent, it may be observed that section 49 of the a&c act, 1996 provides that only where Court is satisfied that foreign award is enforceable under Chapter I of Part II, being New York Convention Awards that the said award shall be deemed to be a decree of that Court. Therefore, it would not be permissible to straight away file execution application in Court and in order to enforce the award, it would be necessary, for a person seeking enforcement, to first approach the Court and seek appropriate adjudication, as envisaged under section 48 of the a&c act. Such an adjudication was not sought and only execution application was filed, which by the impugned order has been held to be not maintainable. Learned Single Judge observing that since the petition substantially complies with the requirement of an application under section 47 of the a&c act, 1996, ordered that it be treated as an application under Section 47 of the said Act. Admittedly, the impugned order is such against which an appeal would not lie under Section 50 of the Act. The question, which was raised by the appellant before learned Single Judge in EA. 346/98 was about the very maintainability of execution petition. The objection is such, which if allowed, would have the effect of terminating the main proceedings. Learned counsel for the respondent is perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in East India Hotels Ltd. case (supra) that Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act does not confer any right of appeal but provides only for a forum of appeal. As such appeal would not lie under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act unless there is any other provision under which it will be permissible for the appellant to file appeal against the impugned order to a Division Bench of this Court.

    Now the question is whether the appeal would be maintainable under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent or not? Reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent in M/s. Gourangalal Chatterjee's case (supra) is misconceived in as much as the impugned order is not such, which learned Single Judge has passed in any of the proceedings taken out under the A&C Act. The order on the face of it and as has rightly been observed, in the impugned order by learned Single Judge is in proceedings, which were initiated by respondent not under the Act but de hors the Act. For that reason alone by the impugned order proceedings have been ordered to be converted into proceedings under the A&C Act. Therefore, the impugned order has to be treated as one having been passed by learned Single Judge not under any of the provisions of A&C Act, but in exercise of his inherent jurisdiction on original side of this Court. Thus, the impugned order is such, which would be deemed to have been passed de hors the provisions of the Act.

    The next question to be considered is whether the impugned order would be covered by the expression “judgment” so as to enable the appellant to challenge the same before a Division Bench of this Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 S.C 1786, tests were culled out to determine as to when an order passed by a learned Single Judge can be said to be judgment. It was held that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be “judgments”, which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. While laying down the guide lines to determine whether or not an order passed by the trial Judge would be ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Letters Patent, instances have been given therein, which are illustrative and not exhaustive. Tests laid down by Sir Arnol White, C.J in T.V Tulzaram Row v. M.K.R.V Allagappachettiar (1912) I.L.R 35 Madras 1, were adopted and approved, which inter alia also laid down that if there is a possibility of the defendant succeeding and thereby bringing about termination of the proceedings by an order being passed the other way, the order would be an appealable because the order involves an adverse determination or adjudication to a valuable right of the defendant.

    There is no manner of doubt that upholding of the objection of the appellant ultimately is likely to have an effect of terminating the proceedings initiated by the respondent as was ordered by learned Single Judge in the other execution case against which the respondent has preferred an appeal. For that reason, we are of the view that applying the tests laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), the appeal would be maintainable under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. We direct that the appeal be treated as one having been filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

    To be de-registered as F.A.O (OS) and be registered as L.P.A

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    Jindal Exports Ltd. v. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd
    (Sep 1, 1999)