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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are real brothers. The agricultural lands measuring 11 bighas and 7 biswas situated in Village Aya Nagar, New Delhi, were owned and possessed by the plaintiff. On 8.6.1981, defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,02,000 and placed the plaintiff in possession on the same day, also executing a General Power of Attorney in the plaintiff's favor. Despite cultivation by the plaintiff from 1983 to 1986, the Revenue Authorities did not mutate the plaintiff's name in the records. On 31.1.1986, defendant No. 1 allegedly sold the suit land to defendant No. 3, who subsequently sold it to defendant No. 4, and then to defendant No. 5. The plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction against the defendants' interference.

Defendant No. 1 did not contest. Defendants No. 4 and 5 contested, claiming that the land was sold to defendant No. 3 by registered deed with possession delivered and mutated in revenue records. They argued the plaintiff never possessed the land and that the suit is barred under Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit as framed is maintainable.
  2. Whether Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration of title in respect of agricultural land.
  3. Whether the plaintiff’s suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction is barred as it is in substance a claim for Bhumidhari rights.
  4. Whether an agreement to sell without registered sale deed confers any legal interest or right in the immovable property.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act does not bar a civil suit founded on title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The suit is for declaration of title based on purchase from the owner, not for Bhumidhari rights.
  • The plaintiff was placed in possession by defendant No. 1 after payment and execution of Power of Attorney.
  • The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with possession.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The suit is barred under Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act as it essentially claims Bhumidhari rights.
  • The plaintiff never possessed the suit land, so the suit for mere declaration without consequential relief is not maintainable.
  • The suit land was sold by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 3 by registered sale deed, possession was delivered, and mutation was effected in revenue records.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hathi v. Sunder Singh, (1970) 2 SCC 841 : AIR 1971 SC 2320 Bar on civil court jurisdiction for claims of Bhumidhari rights under Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. Defendants relied on this precedent to argue the suit was barred; court distinguished the present suit as one for title, not Bhumidhari rights.
Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 Statutes ousting civil court jurisdiction must be strictly construed; party claiming bar must prove it. The court applied this principle to hold that Section 185(1) must be strictly construed and does not bar suits for title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mehbood Ali Khan, AIR 1949 PC 78 Cause of action determines jurisdiction based on plaint allegations. Supported the court's analysis that jurisdiction depends on plaint allegations, not written statements.
Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, AIR 1967 SC 744 Mere agreement to sell does not create legal interest or right in immovable property. Applied to hold that plaintiff’s agreement to sell did not confer legal interest, so suit for title was not maintainable.
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., AIR 1954 SC 44 Same principle that agreement to sell does not convey title without registered sale deed. Reinforced the court’s view that plaintiff had no legal interest without registered sale deed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified the preliminary issue of whether the suit as framed is maintainable. It analyzed the facts and the legal provisions governing jurisdiction and title in agricultural land disputes. Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act bars civil court jurisdiction over suits concerning Bhumidhari rights, but the court found that the plaintiff’s suit is founded on title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, not on Bhumidhari rights. The court emphasized that jurisdiction depends on the cause of action as alleged in the plaint, which here is a claim based on purchase and title, not Bhumidhari rights.

Applying the principle from Abdul Waheed Khan that statutes ousting civil court jurisdiction must be strictly construed, the court held that Section 185(1) does not bar the present suit. However, the court then examined the plaintiff’s actual legal interest. Since the plaintiff’s claim rests on an agreement to sell dated 8.6.1981 and not on a registered sale deed, the court noted that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, title cannot pass without a registered sale deed. The plaintiff had not filed for specific performance of the agreement and thus had no legal interest in the land.

Consequently, the plaintiff lacked a legal right to maintain the suit for declaration of title and injunction. The court further rejected the plaintiff’s application to amend the plaint to add relief for recovery of possession as unnecessary to decide the real controversy.

Holding and Implications

The suit as framed is not maintainable and is dismissed with costs.

The court held that the plaintiff, having only an agreement to sell without a registered sale deed, had no legal interest in the suit land and thus could not maintain a suit for declaration of title and injunction. The decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the plaintiff’s claim and confirming the defendants’ title under registered sale deeds. No broader precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding jurisdiction and title transfer in agricultural land disputes.

    Cdr. Bhupinder Singh Rekhi v. C.S. Rekhi

    M.S.A Siddiqui, J.— By this order, I propose to decide the following preliminary issue framed on 25.1.1990:

    “Whether the suit as framed is maintainable?”

    2. To appreciate the merits of the controversy, it will be necessary to give brief narrative of the material facts. Plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 are real brothers. Defendant No. 2 is the brother-in-law of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 is the wife of the defendant No. 2. The agricultural lands measuring 11 bighas and 7 biswas, bearing Kh. Nos. 555(4-16), 556/2(2-14), 556/1(0-9-1-14), 557(1-14) situated in Village Aya Nagar, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) were owned and possessed by the plaintiff. On 8.6.1981, the defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1,02,000/- vide deed of agreement dated 8.6.1981 On that date, defendant No. 1, after receiving sale consideration from the plaintiff, placed him in possession of the suit land. On the same day, the defendant No. 1 also executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff, in respect of the suit land. Although the plaintiff cultivated the suit land for the period from 1983 to 1986, but despite repeated request the Revenue Authorities did not mutate his name in the Revenue records in respect of the said land. According to the plaintiff, on 31.1.1986, the defendant No. 1 wrongfully sold the suit land to the defendant No. 3 vide registered sale deed dated 31.1.1986 Thereafter, the defendant No. 3 sold the suit land to Smt. Kaushalya Devi (defendant No. 4), who in turn sold the same to the defendant No. 5 vide registered sale deed dated 14th January, 1987. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit for declaration of his title in respect of the suit land and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants' from interfering with his possession thereon.

    3. The defendant No. 1 did not contest the suit. The defendants No. 4 and 5 resisted the suit on various grounds. According to the defendants, on 31.1.1986, the defendant No. 1 sold the land to the defendant No. 3 under the registered sale deed followed by delivery of possession. On 10.3.1986, the suit land was mutated in the Revenue record in the name of the defendant No. 3. On 10.10.1986 the defendant No. 3 sold the suit land to the defendant No. 4, who in turn sold the same to the defendant No. 5 vide registered sale deed dated 14.1.1987 and placed the defendant No. 5 in possession thereof. It was stated that the plaintiff never remained in possession of the suit land and so the plaintiff's suit for mere declaration without consequential relief is barred. It was further stated that the suit is also barred under Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (for short the Act’).

    4. The question for determination in this case is whether Section 185(1) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration of title in respect of an agricultural land. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff contended that Section 185(1) does not stand in the way of the institution of a civil suit founded on title and what is excluded from the cognizance of a Civil Court under Section 185(1) is a suit for declaration of Bhumidhari rights in respect of an agricultural land. Learned Counsel for the defendants, on the other hand, contended that the present suit in substance is for declaration of Bhumidhari rights in respect of the suit land and so it is barred under Section 185(1) of the Act. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hathi v. Sunder Singh, (1970) 2 SCC 841 : AIR 1971 S.C 2320, in which it was held by the Supreme Court that a person claiming Bhumidhari rights in respect of an agricultural land is not entitled to approach the Civil Court, but should make an application to the Revenue Assistant and the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain such a suit is barred under Section 185(1) of the Act.

    5. Section 9, C.P.C provides that Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except those of which its cognizance is barred under any local law. In the case of Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 S.C 1718, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while considering the bar of certain provisions of Bhopal State Land Revenue Act to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, observed as under:

    “Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Civil Court can entertain a suit of a civil nature except a suit of which its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is settled principle that it is for the party who seeks to bust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to establish its contention. It is also equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be strictly construed.”

    6. The bar of the jurisdiction of Civil Court with regard to certain class of cases relating to agricultural land is provided under Section 185(1) of the Act, which reads as under:

    “Except as provided by or under this Act no Court other than a Court mentioned in Column 7 of Schedule. I shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof.”

    7. A bare perusal of Section 185(1) makes it clear that this saves only those cases which are mentioned in Col. 7 of Schedule 1 of the Act. Thus, the scope of Section 185(1) is confined to the specific matters enumerated in the said schedule. It is well settled that jurisdiction of a Court primarily depends upon the allegations made in the plaint and not upon allegations in the written statement, and it is the cause of the action which determines the jurisdiction of a Court. The expression “cause of action” means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment. (Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mehbood Ali Khan, AIR 1949 p.c 78). Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act provides that any person entitled to a legal character, or to any right as to any property may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make such declaration. The plain tiff has not filed the present suit for declaration of Bhumidhari rights in respect of the land. The tenor of the plaint shows that the plaintiff has filed this suit for declaration of his title to the suit on the ground that he had purchased it from its owner. It is well established that a Revenue Court is not competent to decide title in respect to an agricultural land. Thus, the present suit of the plaintiff for declaration of title and permanent injunction is not covered under specific matters enumerated in Schedule I of the Act and, therefore, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. Next, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the defendants that the present suit for mere declaration without consequential relief is not maintainable. It is worth mentioning that the plaintiff has filed this suit for declaration of his title and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the suit land. It is beyond the pale of controversy that the defendant No. 1 was the owner of the suit land. It was stated in the plaint that on 8.6,81, the defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1,02,000/- vide agreement dated 8.6.81 and on that day, the defendant No. 1, after receiving the sale consideration from the plaintiff, placed him in possession thereof. On 28.9.1998, the plaintiff's application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C was dismissed by this Court on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land on the date of institution of the suit. On 27.11.1996, the plaintiff filed an application (IA No. 12138/96) under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC seeking leave to add the relief for recovery of possession of the suit land. This application has been opposed by the defendants.

    8. It is also beyond the pale of controversy that on 31.1.1986, the defendant No. 1 sold the suit land to the defendant No. 3 vide registered sale deed dated 31.1.86 and on 10.10.86, the defendant No. 3 sold the suit land to the defendant No. 4, who in turn, sold it to the defendant No. 5 vide registered sale deed dated 14.1.1987 Present suit has been filed on 20.9.1986 When equities are to be balanced between the two rival claimants, namely, the prospective purchaser of the suit land under an agreement to sell on the one hand and the person who had purchased the said land by a registered sale deed on the other, it has to be seen whether the plaintiff could claim any legal interest and even a preferential interest in the land which would entitle him to recover possession thereof. As noticed earlier, the agreement to sell dated 8.6.1981 is the foundation of the present suit. As per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an immovable property gets conveyed only by registered sale deed. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of the proposed transferee agreement holder, the title of the land would not get divested from the vendor and would remain in his ownership. Thus, despite the alleged agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff, that had taken place on 8.6.1981, tine suit land which continued to remain in the ownership of the defendant No. 1 could be legally conveyed to any other person by a registered document. Admittedly, the plaintiff has not filed any suit against the defendant No. 1 for specific performance of the agreement dated 8.6.1981 It is axiomatic that mere agreement to sell creates no legal interest or right in the property which is the subject matter of the agreement. (Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, AIR 1967 SC 744; Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., AIR 1954 SC 44). Therefore, it must be held that by mere agreement to sell, the plaintiff got no interest in the suit land. Consequently, he could not be said to be having any legal interest to entitle him to file the present suit.

    9. In this view of the matter, the proposed amendment in the plaint is not necessary to decide the real controversy between the parties. Consequently, the application (IA No. 12138/96) is disallowed.

    10. For the foregoing reasons, I find and hold that the present suit is not maintainable. Accordingly, the suit is dismissed with costs. Plaintiff shall pay the costs to the defendants and bear his own. A decree be drawn up accordingly.

    Suit dismissed.
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    Comments

    Cdr. Bhupinder Singh Rekhi v. C.S. Rekhi
    (Oct 1, 1998)