Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter SICA, for short)
  • Sections 29 and/or 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951
  • sub section (1) of S. 22. By Section 12(a) of the Amendment Act,
  • amount.3. Section 22(1) of SICA
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • sub-section (1) of S. 22
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter SICA, for short)
  • Sections 29 and/or 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951
  • sub section (1) of S. 22. By Section 12(a) of the Amendment Act,
  • amount.3. Section 22(1) of SICA
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • sub-section (1) of S. 22
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (a company) challenged the trial Court's order dated 8.11.1996 refusing to grant a stay of a suit under Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 ("SICA"). The petitioner had taken premises from the plaintiff-respondent under a lease dated 16.4.1992 for three years. The petitioner company was declared a "sick company" on 2.8.1993 and proceedings under Sections 16 and 17 of SICA were pending.

On 22.12.1995 the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit seeking (a) recovery of possession (eviction) of the premises, (b) arrears of rent totalling Rs. 1,77,840 for November 1994 to November 1995 (calculated at Rs. 13,680 per month), (c) mesne profits and damages at a specified rate amounting to Rs. 38,475 for the period 1.12.1995 to 15.12.1995, and (d) further damages/mesne profits and interest.

Relevant statutory background: SICA was amended by Act No. 12 of 1994 (effective 1.2.1994). The amendment added to sub-section (1) of Section 22 the words: "and no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company."

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 22(1) of SICA (as amended) applies to the eviction proceedings instituted by the landlord against the petitioner (a sick industrial company).
  2. Whether a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, damages and mesne profits filed by the plaintiff-respondent is a "suit for recovery of money" within the meaning of the words inserted into Section 22(1) by the 1994 Amendment.
  3. What the defendant-objector must demonstrate to obtain a stay under Section 22(1) — specifically, whether mere pendency of an inquiry suffices or whether the dues must be reckoned/included in a sanctioned scheme (and whether dues incurred after the date of a sanctioned scheme are covered).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner's counsel relied heavily on the decision in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd and another (1993 (2) SCC 144), arguing that the term "proceedings" in Section 22(1) should be given a broad or liberal construction to effectuate the object of SICA.
  • Counsel submitted that, after the 1993 (1994 Act No. 12 of 1994) Amendment, a "suit for recovery of money" is clearly covered by Section 22(1); since the plaintiff seeks recovery of arrears of rent and damages/mesne profits (i.e., recovery of money), the suit should be stayed under Section 22(1).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiff-respondent's specific legal arguments in opposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras — AIR 1992 SC 1439 The unamended Section 22(1) suspends: (1) winding up proceedings; (2) execution/distress or the like against properties of the sick company; and (3) proceedings for appointment of a receiver. The Supreme Court held that eviction proceedings by a landlord against a tenant sick company do not fall within these categories and thus are not suspended by Section 22(1). The High Court relied on this authority to hold that the eviction relief sought by the plaintiff is not liable to be stayed under Section 22(1); the Court observed that Section 22(1) was not intended to protect a tenant company from eviction when it has defaulted in rent and ceased to enjoy protection of rent law.
Pearey Lal and Sons (P) Ltd v. Modi Spg & Wvg Co — 1994 (2) Co LJ. 261 (Delhi High Court) Applied the Shree Chamundi Mopeds principle to a suit for recovery of possession and damages: proceedings for eviction/recovery of possession were held not liable to be suspended under Section 22(1). The decision was cited by the Court to reinforce that eviction proceedings are not covered by Section 22(1), supporting maintenance of the trial Court's refusal to stay the ejectment relief.
Maharashtra Tubes Ltd v. State Industrial & Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd & Anr — 1993 (2) SCC 144 The Supreme Court interpreted the word "proceedings" in Section 22(1) broadly (not confined to "legal proceedings") and construed "or the like" following "execution, distress" as an omnibus expression intended to capture other coercive measures of similar quality against the properties of a sick undertaking. The petitioner relied on this authority to argue for a broad construction that would include suits for recovery of money; the High Court considered this submission but distinguished eviction proceedings in light of Shree Chamundi Mopeds and applied the broad rule to examine whether recovery-of-money claims fall within the amended Section 22(1).
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals — 1997 III AD SC 713 The Supreme Court held that Section 22(1)'s bar on execution, distress or the like is intended to protect implementation of a sanctioned scheme; consequently, Section 22(1) applies only to liabilities or amounts that are reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme, and does not cover dues incurred after the date of the sanctioned scheme. The High Court applied this principle to conclude that mere pendency of an inquiry is insufficient for a stay; to obtain a stay under Section 22(1) the dues must be included in the sanctioned scheme. The Court remitted the question of stay of the recovery-of-money relief to the trial Court for reconsideration consistent with this principle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, relying on prior authorities and the statutory amendment:

  1. The Court first examined the effect of the unamended Section 22(1) as interpreted in M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd (supra) and followed in Pearey Lal & Sons (P) Ltd (supra). Those authorities concluded that eviction proceedings by a landlord against a sick company are not proceedings for winding up, execution/distress or for appointment of a receiver and therefore do not fall within the suspension created by Section 22(1). Applying that reasoning, the Court held that the eviction relief claimed by the plaintiff is not liable to be stayed.
  2. The Court then considered the 1994 amendment which added the words "and no suit for recovery of money..." to Section 22(1). It framed the narrower question whether a suit seeking arrears of rent, damages and mesne profits is a "suit for recovery of money" within the amended provision. The Court observed that a decree for arrears, damages and mesne profits imposes a financial liability on the defendant and thus constitutes a suit for recovery of money within the meaning of the amendment.
  3. The Court addressed what must be shown by a defendant-objector to successfully obtain a stay under Section 22(1). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, the Court explained that mere pendency of an inquiry under Section 16 is insufficient; Section 22(1) protects only those liabilities that are reckoned or included in a sanctioned scheme and does not apply to liabilities incurred after the date of a sanctioned scheme. The protective bar is directed at preventing coercive steps that would impede implementation of a sanctioned scheme.
  4. Applying those principles, the Court concluded: (a) the trial Court was right to refuse a stay insofar as the suit sought ejectment (eviction) — that part is not covered by Section 22(1); and (b) as to the recovery-of-money claims (arrears, damages, mesne profits), the Court could not finally decide on the stay at the revision stage without examination whether the dues were included in any sanctioned scheme. Accordingly, the Court allowed revision in part and remitted the question of stay of the recovery claims to the trial Court for fresh consideration consistent with the Corromandal principle.

The Court therefore balanced the textual amendment (bringing suits for recovery of money potentially within Section 22(1)) with prior authority limiting eviction proceedings from the scope of the bar, and with the Corromandal requirement that the bar applies only to amounts included in a sanctioned scheme.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Revision allowed in part.

  • The impugned order is maintained in so far as it refuses to stay the suit for the relief of ejectment (eviction): that relief may proceed.
  • The question of stay of the suit insofar as it seeks recovery of money (arrears of rent, damages, mesne profits) is remitted to the trial Court for fresh consideration in light of the Court's observations, specifically the requirement that for Section 22(1) to apply the dues must be reckoned or included in a sanctioned scheme. The trial Court must consider whether the amounts claimed fall within any sanctioned scheme or were incurred after the date of a sanctioned scheme.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the landlord's claim for eviction is not stayed and may continue; the recovery-of-money component is not finally decided at the revision stage and requires trial Court determination on whether the claimed dues are protected by Section 22(1) (i.e., included in a sanctioned scheme).
  • Statutory interpretation implications (as applied by the Court): the amendment adding "suit for recovery of money" can bring recovery claims within Section 22(1), but the Supreme Court's Corromandal decision limits the practical scope of the bar to amounts included in a sanctioned scheme — dues incurred after sanction are not protected by Section 22(1).
  • The decision does not purport to create a new departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent on eviction proceedings; it applies and reconciles existing authorities (Shree Chamundi, Corromandal) to the facts at hand.

The parties and their counsel were directed to appear before the trial Court on 14 July 1997 for further proceedings consistent with this order.

    Sirmor Sudburg Auto Ltd v. Kuldip Singh Lamba.

    R.C Lahoti, J.— The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order dated 8.11.96 passed by the trial Court rejecting his application under Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter SICA, for short) paying for stay of the suit.

    2. The petitioner company took the premises belonging to the plaintiff-respondent for three years under a lease agreement dated 16-4-1992. On 2-8-1993, the petitioner company has been declared a sick company and proceedings under sections 16 and 17 of sica are going on against it. On 22-12-1995, the plaintiff-respondent has filed a suit seeking a decree for recovery of possession over the premises held by the petitioner Company and a decree for arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 1,77,840/- on account of arrears of rent for the period November, 1994 to November, 1995 calculated at the rate of Rs. 13680/- per month, the tenancy of the petitioner company as terminated with the end of November, 1995. Mesne profits and damages at the rate of Rs. 90/- per sq ft have been asked for from 1-12-1995 to 15-12-1995 amounting to Rs. 38475/- alongwith a relief for further damages/mesne profits and interest on the said amount.

    3. section 22(1) of sica provides as under:

    ‘22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc:—(1) Where in respect of an industrial company an inquiry under Section 16 is pending of any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding any hing contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.’ (emphasis supplied)

    4. SICA was amended by Act No. 12 of 1994 which came into force on 1.2.94 Several provisions of SICA have been amended. For the purpose of the case at hand, what is relevant is the amendment made in sub section (1) of S. 22. By Section 12(a) of the Amendment Act, the following words have been added after the words “appointment of a receiver in respect thereof in the text of the principal Act—

    “and no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company.”

    5. The question arising for decision is whether the suit of the nature filed by the plaintiff attracts the applicability of S. 22(1) of SICA (as amended).

    6. In M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd v. Church of South India Trust Association Madras AIR 1992 SC 1439, unamended section 22(1) of sica came up for consideration of their Lordships. The appellant company had taken premises of the respondent No. 1 on a monthly rent of Rs. 21159/-. The appellant company committed a default in payment of rent and as on March 31, 1987 a sum of Rs. 2,45,534 was payable as rent to the respondents. Legal notice dated 1.4.87 was served. On 26.2.88, the respondents filed a petition seeking eviction of the Company on the ground of arrears of rent. Prayer by the company for stay under S. 22 of SICA was refused. The question posed before their Lordships was - “Are the proceedings instituted by landlord for eviction of a tenant who is a sick company from the premises at out to it required to be suspended under S. 22(1) of the Act.” Their Lordships have held “The following proceedings are automatically suspended under S. 22(1) of the Act:

    1) Proceedings for winding up of the industrial company;

    2) Proceedings for execution, distress of the like against the properties of the sick industrial company: and

    3) Proceedings for the appointment of received.”

    “Eviction proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant company would not fall in categories (1) and (3) referred to above. The question is whether they fall in category (2). It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant company that such proceedings fall in category (2) since they are proceedings against the property of the sick industrial company. The submission is that the leasehold right of the appellant company in the premises leased out to it is property and since the eviction proceedings would result in the appellant company being deprived of the said property the said proceedings would be covered by category (2). We are unable to agree. The second category contemplates proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any other properties of the industrial company. The words or the like have to be construed with reference to the preceding words, namely, for execution, distress which means that the proceedings which are contemplated in this category are proceedings whereby recovery of dues is sought to be made by way of execution distress or similar process against the property of the company. Proceedings for eviction instituted by a landlord against a tenant who happens to be a sick industrial company, cannot in our opinion, be regarded as falling in the category. We may, in this context, point out that, as indicated in the Preamble, the Act has been enacted to make special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined. The provisions regarding suspension of legal proceedings contained in Section 22(1) seeks to advance the object of the Act by ensuring that a proceedings having an effect on the working or the finances of a sick industrial company shall not be instituted on continued during the period the matter is under consideration before the board of the Appellate Authority or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation without the consent of the Board of the Appellate Authority. It could not be the intention of Parliament in enacting the said provision to aggravate the financial difficulties of a sick industrial company while the said matters were pending before the Board of the Appellate Authority by enabling a sick industrial company to continue to incur further liabilities during this period.

    This would be the consequence if sub-section (1) of S. 22 is construed to bring about suspension of proceedings for eviction instituted by landlord against a sick industrial company which has ceased to enjoy the protection of the relevant rent law on account of default in payment of rent. It would also mean that the landlord of such a company must continue to suffer a loss by permitting the tenant (a sick industrial company) to occupancy the premises even through it is not in a position to pay the rent. Such an intention cannot be imputed to Parliament. We are, therefore, of the view that Section 22(1) does not cover a proceeding instituted by a landlord of a sick industrial company for the eviction of the company premises let to it.” (11-12)

    7 In Pearey Lal and Sons (P) Ltd v. Modi Spg & Wvg Co 1994 (2) Co LJ. 261, the High Court of Delhi was seized of a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed by the plaintiff against the defendant. The defendant was in arrears of rent for the period 1.8.88 to 28.2.89 It was declared a sick company under S. 16 of SICA on 15.6.90 The Court directed the defendant to deposit arrears of rent and on failure to comply with the order in spite of opportunities having been allowed, directed the defence to be struck off. This Court ruled relying on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M/Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd (supra), the proceedings were not liable to be suspended under Section 22(1) of the Act.

    8. Faced with the two decisions abovesaid, the learned counsel, for the petitioner heavily relied on Maharastra Tubes Ltd v. State Industrial and Investment Corpn. of Maharastra Ltd and another, 1993 (2) SCC 144. The question arising for decision before their Lordships was whether the proceedings under Sections 29 and/or 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 where liable to be stayed in view of the bar created by section 22 of sica. One of the contentions raised was that S. 22(1) uses the expression “proceedings” and not legal proceedings though the expression used in the marginal note is legal proceedings and hence S. 22(1) was not applicable to the impugned proceedings as they were mere proceedings and not legal proceedings. Their Lordships held thai word ‘proceedings’ in S. 22(1) cannot be given narrow or limited meaning so as to confine it to ‘legal proceedings’ as such a narrow meaning would run contrary to law and would frustrate the purpose of S. 22(1) of SICA Interpreting the expression ‘to the like’, their Lordships held:

    ‘The words ‘or the like’ which follow the words ‘execution’ and ‘distress’ are clearly intended to convey that the properties of the sick industrial company shall not be made the subject-matter of coercive action of similar quality and characteristic till the BIFR finally dispose of the reference made under Section 15 of the said enactment. The legislature has advisedly used an omnibus, expression ‘or like’ as it could not have conceived of all possible coercive measures that may be taken against a sick undertaking.” [PARA 10]

    9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court the word proceedings has to be liberally construed so as to advance the object and purpose sought to be achieved by S. 22(1) of SICA. He further submitted that in view of 1993 Amendment a suit for recovery of money is clearly covered by S. 22(1) of SICA and inasmuch as the plaintiff-respondent is seeking recovery of arrears of rent - and damages/mesne profits, it is a suit for recovery of money and hence liable to be stayed.

    10. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd and the view taken by this Court in the case of Pearey Lal & Sons (P) Ltd I have no hesitation in mind in holding that so far as the relief of eviction is concerned the suit is not liable to be stayed. In spite of the word ‘proceedings’ being given a liberal meaning, it would not cover proceedings for eviction of the tenant, though it may be a sick company for it is neither a proceeding for winding up of the company nor for execution, distress or the like.

    11. The only question which remains to be examined is whether a suit for recovery of arrears of rent damages and mesne profits is a suit for the recovery of money within the meaning of the expression as inserted by the 1993 Amendment Act. In as much as a decree for recovery of arrears of rent damages and mesne profits would result in financial liability caste on the defendant, a suit for recovery thereof is a suit for recovery of money attracting applicability of Section 22(1) of the Act.

    12. Still question would arise what the defendant-objector has to show in order to successfully make out a case under Section 22(1) of the Act. The question was examined very recently by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, 1997 III AD SC 713. The petitioner company was an assessee to sales tax assessed for the years 1992-1993 and 1993-1994 by orders dated 3.1.94 and in 1995 respectively. A scheme under SICA was sanctioned by the BIFA on 19.11.90 Recovery proceeding for the sales tax were assailed and stay was sought under Section 22 of the Act. The revenue contended that as the arrears of sales tax in question were related to the period after sanctioned scheme was brought under implementation, Section 22 of the Act was inapplicable and could apply only in respect of sales tax dues included in the sanctioned scheme. Their Lordships upheld the contention of the revenue and formed an opinion that Section 22(1) should be read down. Their Lordships held:—

    “Any step for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company other of similar as steps should not be pursued which will cause delay or impediment in the implementation of the sanctioned scheme. In order to safeguard such state of affairs, an embargo, or bar is placed under Section 22 of the Act against any step for execution, distress or the like or other similar proceedings against the company without the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority. The language of Section 22 of the Act is certainly wide. But, in the totality of the circumstance, the safeguard is only against the impediment, that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme. If that be so, only the liability or amounts covered by the scheme will be taken in, by Section 22 of the Act, So, we are of the view that though the language of Section 22 of the Act is of wide import regarding suspension of legal proceedings from the moment an inquiry is started, till after the implementation of the scheme or the disposal of an appeal under Section 25 of the Act, it will be reasonable to hold that the bar or embargo envisaged in Section 22(1) of the Act can apply only to such of those dues reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme.”

    “Any other construction will be unreasonable and unfair and will lead to a state of affairs enabling the sick industrial unit to collect amounts due to the Revenue and withhold it indefinitely and unreasonably. Such a construction which is unfair, unreasonable and against spirit of the statute in a business sense, should be avoided.” [emphasis supplied]

    13. It follows from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Corromandal Pharmaceuticals case (supra) that to be entitled to stay of the legal proceedings under Section 22 of the Act a mere pendency of the enquiry would not suffice; the dues must be reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme. Section 22(1) is also not attracted to the dues incurred after the date of the sanctioned scheme.

    14. For the foregoing reasons, the revision is allowed in part. The impugned order in so far as it refuses to stay the suit for the relief of ejectment is maintained. The matter as to stay of the suit for the relief of recovery of money is sent back for consideration afresh, by the trial Court consistently with the observations made hereinabove. No order as to the costs.

    15. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the trial Court on 14th July, 1997.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sirmor Sudburg Auto Ltd v. Kuldip Singh Lamba.
    (May 29, 1997)