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citation codes
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  • Rule 6 of the Indian Air Travel Tax Rules, 1989:6.
  • 25.9.19953. Sub-section (3) of Section 46,
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 42
  • sub-sec(3) of Section 46
  • Orissa Sales Tax Act.
  • FINANCE ACT 1989
  • Sales Tax Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 6 of the Indian Air Travel Tax Rules, 1989:6.
  • 25.9.19953. Sub-section (3) of Section 46,
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 42
  • sub-sec(3) of Section 46
  • Orissa Sales Tax Act.
  • FINANCE ACT 1989
  • Sales Tax Act
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — R.C. Lahoti, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a scheduled airline operating domestic flights. Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1989 imposes an Inland Air Travel Tax (IATT) to be collected by carriers and deposited with the Central Government. Section 46 prescribes penalties for failure to pay IATT; the Central Government framed the IATT Rules, 1989. Rule 6 required carriers to pay collected tax within sixty days of the end of the month, with a proviso allowing the Collector of Customs to grant an extension not exceeding ninety additional days on sufficient cause.

For January 1995, the petitioners had collected IATT totaling Rs. 80,32,990/-, due for deposit on or before 2.3.1995. The petitioners deposited Rs. 50,000 by cheque dated 20.4.1995 (realised 26.4.1995) and Rs. 30,32,990 by cheque dated 10.7.1995 (realised 12.7.1995). Interest for delay of Rs. 3,65,650/- was paid on 25.9.1995.

On 28.3.1995 the petitioners were served a show-cause notice seeking imposition of penalty for non-deposit. The petitioners explained that they used centralized accounting across ten stations, that documents from one station for January 1995 were lost in transit, and sought permission to file returns and relief. The Assistant Collector of Customs (ACC) issued a letter on 29.6.1995 directing filing of returns and deposit of balance within seven days.

The ACC, after a hearing, by order dated 22.8.1995 imposed a penalty of Rs. 18 lakhs under Section 46(3) for contravention of Section 42(2) read with Rule 6; other lesser penalties and interest were also imposed but were not challenged. The petitioners' appeal to the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) succeeded: the Commissioner set aside the Rs. 18 lakh penalty and reduced other penalties, relying in part on M/s Hindustan Steels Ltd. The Central Government, on revision, allowed the revision and restored the ACC's penalty of Rs. 18 lakhs by order dated 31.3.1997. The petitioners filed the present petition challenging the reinstatement of the Rs. 18 lakh penalty.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "fails to pay" in sub-section (3) of Section 46 requires mens rea (a deliberate or willful default) for liability to arise, or whether liability and jurisdiction to impose penalty arise immediately upon statutory non-compliance.
  2. If jurisdiction to impose penalty is attracted, whether the adjudicating authority has discretion to impose no penalty or a penalty below the statutory minimum (one-fifth of the tax) when a minimum and maximum are statutorily prescribed.
  3. Whether the Assistant Collector of Customs' letter dated 29.6.1995, which gave seven days to file returns and deposit the balance, operated to extend the statutory period for deposit and thereby deprived the ACC (and other authorities) of jurisdiction to impose penalty.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The phrase "fails to pay" in Section 46(3) implies a deliberate or willful failure; since the petitioners' delay was not deliberate but caused by loss of documents in transit and centralized accounting issues, mens rea is absent and penalty cannot be imposed.
  • Even if jurisdiction to impose penalty exists, the authority retains discretion (despite statutory minimum) to refrain from imposing any penalty or to impose less than the statutory minimum where circumstances warrant leniency; the ACC and the Central Government failed to exercise such discretion.
  • The ACC's letter of 29.6.1995 effectively extended the time for filing returns and depositing the balance to 13.7.1995 (letter received on 6.7.1995), and since the petitioners filed their return and paid the balance on 10.7.1995, the ACC had no jurisdiction to impose penalty thereafter.

Respondent (Union of India) Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent supported the impugned ACC order and the Central Government revision order, asserting the findings recorded by the ACC and the Central Government that the delay was not bona fide and that penalty was properly imposed under Section 46(3) and the Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/S Hindustan Steels Ltd v. State of Orissa, AIR 1990 S.C. 253 The principle (as quoted in the opinion) that penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party acted deliberately, contumaciously or dishonestly; imposition of penalty is discretionary and may be refused in cases of bona fide or venial breach. The petitioners relied upon this case and the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) followed it to set aside the Rs. 18 lakh penalty. The Central Government and this Court distinguished the case as inapplicable to the statutory scheme under Section 46(3) where mens rea is not an ingredient; the Court held the case distinguishable and not applicable.
Cement Marketing Co v. Asstt Commissioner Sales Tax (1980) ELT 295 Described in the opinion as holding that liability for penalty is not attracted if the assessee is labouring under a bona fide contention, though wrongly. Relied on by the petitioners; the Central Government distinguished it and the Court found it distinguishable and not applicable to the present case.
Bharat Barrell & Drums Mfg Co v. Commissioner of Customs, AIR 1971 SC 704 The opinion records the case was relied upon by the petitioners; the text does not extract a detailed principle from it. The Central Government distinguished the case. The Court treated it as one of the cases relied upon but found the petitioner’s authorities distinguishable and not applicable to the statutory provision before the Court.
Akbar Badurdin Jiwani of Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, AIR 1990 SC 1579 The opinion (when referring to an Akbar/ Akbar Badruddin case) notes that under the Customs Act their Lordships found import was made on a bona fide belief and imposition of heavy fine was not warranted. The Court observed the Akbar-related authorities concerned bona fide belief under different statutory regimes and held them distinguishable from the facts and statutory scheme in the present case.
Akbar Badruddin v. Commissioner of Customs, AIR 1980 SC 1579 Referenced among authorities relied upon by the petitioners; the opinion associates it with the proposition that bona fide belief may negate heavy penalty. Included among cases distinguished by the Central Government and this Court as inapplicable to Section 46(3)'s statutory scheme where mens rea is not required.
State of Gujrat v. D. Pandey, AIR 1971 SC 866 Listed among authorities relied on by the petitioners; the opinion does not state the specific principle in detail. The Central Government distinguished the case; the Court regarded it as not applicable to the present statutory provision.
M/s. Pioneer Traders v. The Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, Pondicherry & Ors, 1963 SC 734 Noted in the opinion as stating the jurisdiction to impose penalty is quasi-judicial in nature. The Court acknowledged the case's proposition but treated it as not altering the Court's conclusion that Section 46(3) imposes strict liability on failure to pay and does not permit reduction below the statutory minimum when jurisdiction is properly exercised.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory text and scheme. It emphasised that Section 46(3) prescribes penalty for every carrier who "fails to pay" IATT and that the expression is not qualified by words requiring deliberate, intentional or dishonest conduct. Consequently, mens rea is not an ingredient of the offence created by Section 46(3); liability and jurisdiction to impose penalty arise on expiry of the appointed date for payment if tax collected by the carrier is not deposited.

Rule 6 of the IATT Rules prescribes the time frame (sixty days from end of the month) and contains a proviso allowing the Collector of Customs to grant a further extension of up to ninety days on sufficient cause. The Court noted that the petitioners had not invoked the proviso to seek an extension from the Collector.

The Court reviewed the authorities relied upon by the petitioners (e.g., Hindustan Steels, Cement Marketing Co., Akbar-related authorities and Pioneer Traders) and concluded they were distinguishable. The Court formulated the governing test: where jurisdiction to impose penalty is attracted, and the authority exercises that jurisdiction, the statutory boundaries (a minimum of one-fifth and maximum of three times the unpaid tax) cannot be circumvented under the guise of discretion. Thus, if the statutory provision prescribes a minimum penalty, an adjudicating authority cannot lawfully impose a penalty below that minimum.

The Court also examined the ACC's 29.6.1995 letter and rejected the petitioners' contention that it extended the statutory time for filing returns and depositing tax. Two reasons were given: (i) the statute does not confer jurisdiction on the ACC to extend the prescribed time (the power to extend is vested in the Collector under Rule 6's proviso), and (ii) the ACC's letter did not in terms grant an extension but merely reminded the petitioners of their obligation and insisted on compliance within seven days; it could not be construed as condoning prior default or absolving penal consequences.

The Court further observed documentary material (Annexure-B) suggesting a pattern of belated deposits by the petitioners for multiple months, supporting the Central Government's conclusion that the January 1995 delay was not a one-time aberration. In light of these findings and the statutory text, the Court concluded that the ACC and Central Government were justified in finding that jurisdiction to impose penalty was attracted and that the penalty imposed—near the statutory minimum—was within the permissible boundaries.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court upheld the Central Government's restoration of the Assistant Collector of Customs' penalty of Rs. 18,00,000/-. The Court rejected the petitioners' contentions that mens rea was required, that an authority could lawfully impose no penalty or a penalty below the statutory minimum once jurisdiction was attracted, and that the ACC letter operated to extend the statutory period.

DISMISSED

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Rs. 18 lakh penalty imposed by the ACC (and restored by the Central Government) stands; the petition seeking to set it aside is dismissed. Other penalties and interest mentioned in the record were not challenged in this petition and remain outside this decision.
  • Legal consequence: The Court emphasised that where a statutory provision prescribes a minimum penalty and the jurisdiction to impose penalty is properly attracted and exercised, the adjudicating authority cannot prescribe a lesser penalty than the statutory minimum; the expression "fails to pay" in the relevant statutory provision does not import a requirement of mens rea.
  • Broader precedent: The Court treated the authorities relied upon by the petitioners as distinguishable and did not extend or modify existing precedent in favour of the petitioners; the decision enforces a strict textual reading of Section 46(3) and the statutory limits on discretion. The opinion did not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond the textual interpretation stated.

No order as to costs (as recorded in the opinion).

    Sahara India Airlines. v. Union Of India.

    R.C Lahoti, J.— The petitioner company is a scheduled airlines operating its flights on various domestic sectors within the country. Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1989 provides for levy of tax on all passengers embarking on inland journey by air, called the Inland Air Traffic Tax (IATT for short) The said tax is to be collected by the airlines from the passengers and paid to the credit of the Central Government. Section 46 of the Act provides for the imposition of penalty on carrier or other person who fails to pay IATT to the credit of the Central Govt. The Central Govt has in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act, framed the IATT Rules, 1989 (hereinafter, the Rules, for short). The Rules provide for depositing with the Central Govt by the carrier the amount of tax collected by it within 30 days from the last date of the previous month.

    2. For the month of January, 1995, the amount of tax collected by the petitioners and payable to the credit of the Central Govt was to the tune of Rs. 80,32,990/-. This amount should have been deposited on or before 2.3.1995 However, the amount was deposited in two instalments. An amount of Rs. 50,000/- was deposited by means of a cheque dated 20.4.95 (realised on 26.4.1995). An amount of Rs. 30,32,990/- was deposited by means of a cheque dt 10-7-1995 (realised on 12-7-95). An amount of Rs. 3,65,650/- by way of interest for the period of delay in making the deposit was paid to the credit of the Central Government on 25.9.1995

    3. Sub-section (3) of Section 46, around which centres the controversy, reads as under:

    46. Penalties

    xxxx xxxx xxxx

    (3) Every Carrier or other person who fails to pay the Inland Air Travel Tax to the credit of the Central Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 42 shall, in addition to the payment of such Tax and the interest leviable thereon, be liable to pay penalty which shall not be less than one-fifth but which may extend to three times of the amount of the Tax not so paid to the credit of the Central Government.” [emphasis supplied]

    4. Here itself we may reproduce Rule 6 of the Indian Air Travel Tax Rules, 1989:

    “6. Tax to be paid into the Treasury:—The tax collected in any month by any carrier shall be paid by such carrier before the expiry of sixty days from the end of that month into the treasury:

    Provided that the Collector of Customs may on sufficient cause being shown and having regard to the system of accounting adopted by any carrier allow such carrier to pay the tax within a further period not exceeding ninety days.”

    5. On 28.3.1995, the petitioners were served with a notice, (Annexure-C) to show cause why penalty be not imposed for non-deposit of tax for the month of January, 1995. The petitioners pointed out that they were operating their flights from ten stations within the country. They were following a centralised accounting procedure regarding the deposit of tax in the treasury through its headquarters at Delhi. The documents sent from one of the ten stations for the month January, 1995 were lost in transit and that is why there was a delay in making the deposit. It was prayed that the petitioners be permitted to file return for the month of January since they were in a position to re-construct a duplicate set of documents lost in transit and a lenient view be taken for the lapse of the petitioners which was attributable to the circumstances beyond the control of the petitioners.

    6. On 29th June, 1995, the petitioners were informed by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs IATT (vide letter, Annexure-G) as under:

    “Sub: Outstanding dues of IATT-JAN 95

    Pl.refer your letter dt 25 April, 95 and subsequent assurance of Sh S.K Trehan, who appeared for personal hearing on 18/5/95 and assured to deposit the pending amounts.

    For the month of Jan 95 you did not file the Returns in Part A and B required to be filed under IATT Rules (as amended). You deposited Rs. 50 lakhs on the average basis.

    You are directed to file the required return within seven days of the receipt of this letter and deposit the rest of the amount within this period, failing which action under IATT Rules, 1989 (as amended) will be initiated against you, without any further notice on this subject.”

    7. The abovesaid letter has been reproduced in its entirety inasmuch as one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners was based on the contents of the above said letter.

    8. After affording an opportunity of hearing the ACC (IATT) vide his order dated 22.8.1995 (Annexure-L) held, that there was a delay of 137 days in submitting the return for the month of January, 1995 as the same was submitted on 17.7.1995 while it was due on 2.3.1995; the delay in depositing the amount of tax was also not satisfactorily explained; and hence a penalty of Rs. 18 lakhs under Section 46(3) of the Act for contravention of clause 42(2) of the Act read with Rule 6 of IATT Rules was imposed on the petitioner. A penalty of Rs. 2 lakhs under Rule 8A for contravention of Rule 7, a further penalty of Rs. 68,500/- under Rule 8A for delay in submission of IATT returns were also imposed over and above raising a demand on account of interest to the tune of Rs. 3,65,650/- under Section 43A(1) of the Act. However, these are not under challenge. As already noticed the dispute in the present petition relates to imposition of penalty of Rs. 18 lakhs only.

    9. The petitioners went in appeal to the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals). The appeal was allowed. The penalty of Rs. 18 lakhs was set aside and penalty of Rs. 68,500/ under rule 8A was reduced to Rs. 10,000/- only. During the course of the order dated 31.1.1996/1.12.96 (Annexure-O), the learned Commissioner observed that the petitioners were regularly depositing the amount of tax and the delay in deposit in the month of January, 1995, appears to be an aberation rather than a rule and hence a case for imposition of penalty was not made out at all. During the course of hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners had relied on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M/S Hindustan Steels Ltd v. State of Orissa, AIR 1990 S.C 253, which was followed by the learned commissioner.

    10. The Commissioner of Customs filed a revision before the Govt of India which has been allowed vide order dated 31.3.1997, (Annexure-P). The Central Government has held that the delay in depositing the amount of tax cannot be held to be bonafide but appears to be deliberate for at least three reasons: firstly, the petitioners were well aware of their liability to deposit the IATT collected by them in time; secondly, the petitioners had not bothered to inform the department well in time about the loss of documents in transit; and thirdly, the petitioners did not voluntarily deposit the amount of tax on 26.4.1995 itself on ad hoc basis but did so only on the receipt of the show cause notice dated 28.3.1995 which had appointed the date 18.4.1995 for personal hearing on which date an adjournment was taken for 21.4.1995 The Central Govt has also distingushed the case of M/S Hindustan Steels Ltd (supra), as also the cases of Cement Marketing Co v. Asstt Commissioner Sales Tax, (1980) ELT 295, Bharat Barrell & Drums Mfg Co v. Commissioner of Customs, AIR 1971 SC 704, Akbar Badruddin v. Commissioner of Customs AIR 1980 SC 1579, the State of Gujrat v. D. Pandey AIR 1971 SC 866 which were relied on by the petitioner. The order of the Commissioner of Customs has been set aside and order of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs restored to the extent of the impugned penalty of Rs. 18 lakhs.

    11. Mr Rajiv Nayyar, learned Senior advocate for the petitioners has raised three contentions: (i) firstly, that the jurisdiction to impose penalty arises only when one “fails to pay” the tax which expression implies a deliberate or willful delay in payment of tax which there was none on the part of the petitioners; secondly, that assuming the jurisdiction to impose the penalty was attracted it is not obligatory to impose a penalty though the law provides for a minimum of penalty to be imposed and the adjudicating authority is not debarred from imposing ‘no penalty’ or a penalty less than the minimum if it be satisfied of the availability of circumstances warranting such exercise which the assistant Collector of Customs and the Central Govt have both failed to do; and lastly, the Assistant Collector of Customs having himself (vide his letter dated 29.6.95 Annexure-G) noticed the factum of part payment of Rs. 50 lakhs by the petitioner, allowed seven days time from the date of receipt of the letter for filing the return and depositing the balance amount within this much period the time for filing the return and making the balance deposit stood extended upto 13.7.95 (letter having been received by the petitioner on 6.7.95) and inasmuch as the return was filed and the balance amount of tax deposited on 10.7.95, the jurisdiction to impose the penalty could not be exercised.

    12. Mr A.K Vali, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent- Union of India has supported the impugned orders passed by the ACC and the Govt of India respectively on all counts on the pleas as set out in the counter.

    13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the petition must fail on all the counts. We proceed to deal with each of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and assign our reasons for repelling the same.

    14. It is not disputed that the Rules provide for a time limit by which the tax collected by the airlines has to be deposited with the Central Government. The failure to pay tax occurs soon on the expiry of the date appointed for payment. Mens rea is not an ingredient of sub-sec(3) of Section 46 quoted in para 3 above. The expression ‘fails to pay’ is not accompanied by any qualification such as ‘deliberately’ ‘without reasonable cause’ ‘intentionally” or the like. Thus the liability to pay the penalty is attracted and jurisdiction to impose the penalty arises immediately on failure of the airlines to pay the amount to the credit of the Central Government by the appointed dale, the tax having been already collected by the airlines.

    15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Akbar Badurdin Jiwani of Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, AIR 1990 SC 1579, Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd., 1980 ELT 295, Hindustan Steels Ltd. (supra) and M/s. Pioneer Traders v. The Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, Pondicherry & Ors. 1963 SC 734. Heavy reliance was placed on the case of Hindustan Steels Ltd. (supra) wherein their Lordships have held:—

    “ The liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof of default in registering as a dealer. An order imposing penalty for failure to cary out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a munimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from the bona fide belief that the offender is not libale to act in the manner prescribed by the statute.”

    16. It is not necessary to deal with each of the cases individually. Suffice it to observe that each of the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable and has no applicability to the facts of the case at hand. The test for the applicability of the principle propounded by the learned counsel for the petitioner may be so stated. The facts and circumstances of a given case may attract the applicability of a provision to impose penalty may and yet not impell the exercise of that power if the provision itself vests descretion in the authority to impose or not to impose a penalty. Penalty may not be imposed when the alleged fault or default is trivial or technical merely. Where the jurisdiction to impose the penalty itself is not attracted or when the authority concernd is not inclined to invoke the penal provision at all then the question of imposing a minimum penalty looses all its significance. However, if the jurisdiction to impose the penalty is attracted and also exercised then the authority exercising the jurisdiction cannot in the name of discretion afford to by-pass and ignore the provision for minimum penalty statutorily prescribed.

    17. The case of Akbar Badrudin Zibani (supra) was under the Customs Act and their Lordships had formed an opinion (vide para 61) that the import was on a bonafide belief that the stone slabs were not marble and hence the imposition of a heavy fine was not at all warranted and justified.

    18. The case of Hindustan Steels Ltd. (supra) was under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The assessee was acting honestly and under a genuine belief and hence in the opinion of their Lordships no case for imposing penalty was made out.

    19. The case of Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. (supra) was under the Sales Tax Act wherein it was held that liability for penalty was not attracted if the assessee was belabouring under a bonafide contention, though wrongly.

    20. The case of M/s. Pioneer Traders (supra) merely speaks that the jurisdiction to impose penalty is quasi-judicial in nature.

    21. In the case at hand jurisdiction to impose the penalty was attracted. The Assistant Collector of Customs as also the Central Government have recorded findings of fact whereon is based the conclusion that there was a failure on the part of the petitioner to deposit the amount of tax and the delay could not be said to be bonafide. The delay was certainly not trivial or technical merely. Once the jurisdiction to impose the penalty was attracted, the discretion conferred on the authority could play only between the two boundaries statutorily provided i.e not less than 1/5th as minimum and not more than three times as maximum of the amount of the tax hot so paid. The penalty imposed on the petitioner is just near the minimum. We can read nothing in the provision of section 46 so as to spell out a discretion to impose a penalty less than the munimum vesting in the authority. To accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner would amount to rewriting the law which this Court cannot do and could certainly not have been done by any of the authorities implcaded as respondents.

    22. It is well settled that while interpreting the law, it is permissible to iron out the creases but the texture out of which a legislative provision is woven cannot be altered, supplied or taken away. The first and second contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, rejected.

    23. Incidentally, the learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the document Annexure-B (page 50) of the paperbook which is a statement Filed by the petitioners showing the datewise details of the deposits of tax by the petitioners with the Central Government and the months for which the deposit related. This statement shows the collections for the months of January, 1994, February, 1994, March, 1994, April, 1994, May, 1994 and January, 1995 having been made respectively on 4.4.94, 22.6.94, 16.9.94, 20.9.94 and 20.4.95 in support of his submission that the delay in question was not just an aberration but the petitioners were making belated deposits more often then not. Prima facie, the learned counsel for the respondent appears to be right. It is not the case of the petitioners that they had at any time invoked the proviso to Rule 6 and sought for extension of time from the Collector of Customs.

    24. The third contention, though attractive on its face, is found to be devoid of any substance of a little probe. It is true that vide letter dated 29.6.95 (quoted in para 4 above), ACC (IATT) had asked the petitioner to file the required return and deposit the amount in arrears within seven days. However, this letter cannot be treated as extending the time for filing the return and making the deposit of IATT which is statutorily prescribed. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the statute nowhere confers jurisdiction on ACC to extend the time prescribed for filing the return and depositing the amount of tax collected. Secondly, the ACC has nowhere granted extension of time to the petitioners. In the background of the delay which had taken place the ACC was simply reminding the petitioners of their obligation and the default already incurred followed by an insistence to still make the compliance within seven days. The letter cannot be interpreted as having condoned the delay absolving the petitioners from the penal consequences flowing from the default already committed by them.

    25. As all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner fail, the petition is held liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.

    No order as to costs.

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    Sahara India Airlines. v. Union Of India.
    (Nov 4, 1997)