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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Shri S.K. Puri, was a tenant of two bedrooms with bathroom, kitchen and adjoining toilet and some open rear space in property No. E-2/14, Model Town, Delhi. The tenancy was for residential purposes and the premises had been let by late Shri R.N. Chawla, who died on 2 August 1989.

In April 1993 the respondent, Smt. Sarla Chawla, filed a petition under Section 14-D read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 seeking eviction on the ground that she had become owner-landlady on her husband’s death and required the tenanted premises for herself and members of her family (son, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren). The petition alleged she was about 71 years of age and needed constant care and company of family; it also referred to visits by a married daughter who lived elsewhere.

On service of notice, the petitioner applied for leave to defend before the Additional Rent Controller, raising several objections (including non-maintainability under Section 14-D, non-joinder of other legal heirs, that the respondent was not sole owner and alleged concealment of accommodation). The respondent filed a counter-affidavit stating the tenant had attorned to her and paid rent to her after her husband’s death and that her late husband had executed a registered will in her favour, making her sole owner. She also explained that first-floor accommodation was let to another tenant.

The Additional Rent Controller dismissed the petitioner's application for leave to defend and passed an eviction order dated 7 October 1994. The petitioner challenged that order by way of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Act in the High Court. The High Court (Mr. P.K. Jain, J.) heard arguments, considered precedents and the record, and dismissed the revision petition with costs, while granting the petitioner an additional two months to vacate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a petition for eviction under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act is maintainable when the applicant is the widow of the original landlord but there exist other legal heirs/co-owners (i.e., whether the widow alone can seek eviction without impleading co-owners).
  2. Whether the respondent had attained the status of landlord vis-à-vis the petitioner by attornment and/or by virtue of a registered will of the deceased husband.
  3. Whether the respondent’s asserted need for the tenanted premises was bona fide and sufficient under Section 14-D (including whether alleged concealment of additional accommodation negated that need).
  4. What is the scope for granting leave to defend where eviction is claimed under the special categories created by Sections 14-A to 14-D of the Act.
  5. Whether the High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8), should interfere with the Additional Rent Controller’s order dismissing leave to defend and ordering eviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petition under Section 14-D read with Section 25-B was not maintainable because the respondent was already in occupation of an independent, sufficient and reasonably suitable accommodation in the property, and eviction for additional accommodation was not permitted under Section 14-D.
  • On the death of Shri R.N. Chawla, his three legal heirs (the widow Smt. Sarla Chawla, son Rajiv Chawla, and daughter Smt. Kalyani Mehra) became joint owners; therefore Section 14-D could not be invoked by the widow alone and the other co-owners should have been impleaded.
  • The respondent was not the sole, exclusive and absolute owner because she received rent after the death of her husband on behalf of other legal heirs for convenience, and thus could not apply under Section 14-D in her sole capacity.
  • The petition was bad for non-joinder of legal heirs and for concealment by the respondent of accommodation in her possession (one room and one covered shed on the first floor) and for non-filing of an authenticated site plan.
  • Reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court (Nanala Girdharilal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala) to support objections regarding co-ownership/impleading and maintainability.
  • Contended that the respondent’s need was not bona fide and placed a letter and other materials (including a letter of alleged negotiation with a builder) to show the respondent might not intend to use the premises personally; relied on Precision Steel & Engineering Works for the proposition that leave to defend should have been granted.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • After the death of her husband, the petitioner attorned to the respondent and paid rent to her; counter-foils of rent receipts were produced to demonstrate attornment and recognition of the respondent as landlord.
  • Late Shri R.N. Chawla executed a registered will dated 24 April 1978 bequeathing the entire property to the respondent, making her the sole owner and landlady; the Will was registered before his death.
  • The first-floor accommodation claimed to be in the respondent’s possession was in fact let to another tenant (Shri Samuel Filix) since 1976 (or 1986 in another part of the record); thus the respondent did not have the alleged first-floor accommodation available for her own use.
  • The respondent required the ground-floor premises on account of old age and to have compact, self-contained accommodation on the ground floor sufficient for her needs and that of her immediate family.
  • Relied on a series of Supreme Court and High Court precedents (Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath; Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak; Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh; Harbans Singh v. Margrat G. Bhingardive; Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Chand Rani) to support her entitlement and the proposition that a person in the respondent’s position may sue for eviction (and regarding limits on tenant defences and scope of revision).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nanala Girdharilal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala, 1973 AIR Gujarat 131 (Full Bench) Authority relied upon by petitioner regarding co-ownership/impleading other heirs in eviction proceedings. The Court noted this Full Bench decision was relied on by the petitioner but observed that the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions had noticed and explained that decision; it did not prevent a co-owner or successor recognised as landlord from suing for eviction.
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 : AIR 1976 S.C. 2335 Only the landlord can terminate tenancy and sue for eviction; tenant is estopped from disputing the landlord's title under Section 116 Evidence Act; title is generally irrelevant in landlord-tenant suits. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the tenant's attornment and payment of rent to the respondent established her status as landlord for the purposes of the Act and that non-impleading of other co-owners does not defeat a landlord's suit.
Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 : AIR 1977 S.C. 1599 Where a tenant pays rent to a person he recognises as landlord, that person falls within the definition of landlord for the rent control law; concepts of estoppel and Transfer of Property Act need not be rigidly imported. The Court quoted and applied this reasoning to conclude that rent receipts and attornment showed the respondent had become landlord qua the petitioner.
Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh (dead) by LRs, J.T. 1989 (1) S.C. 67 Affirmation of the principle that co-owners can sue for eviction and earlier related decisions. The Court noted Pal Singh affirmed the propositions in the cited Supreme Court precedents and relied on that affirmation to support the view that one co-owner (or successor recognised as landlord) can seek eviction without impleading others.
Harbans Singh v. Smt. Margrat G. Bhingardive, 1990 (1) RCR 680 (Full Bench, M.P. High Court) Case relied upon by the respondent (no specific excerpted principle quoted in the opinion). The Court recorded that the respondent relied on this Full Bench judgment as supporting authority; no separate inconsistent rule was found to displace the precedents relied upon.
Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Chand Rani, 1993 (1) RCR 492 Clarification that under revisional jurisdiction (Section 25-B(8) of the Act) the High Court cannot act as an appellate court to re-examine findings of fact supported by reasons unless shown to be erroneous or perverse. The Court relied on this principle to stress the limited scope of revision and to refuse to substitute its own view where the lower court had taken a possible view supported by reasons.
Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, 1982 S.C. 1158 Authority on the requirement for grant of leave to defend (relates to cases under Section 14(1)(e)). The Court observed Precision Steel concerns Section 14(1)(e), a different provision, and held its scope is different from matters under Sections 14-A to 14-D, so it did not entitle the petitioner to leave to defend in this Section 14-D case.
S. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, J.T. 1991 (1) S.C. 417 Scope of tenant's right to obtain leave to contest an application under Sections 14-A to 14-D is limited to the parameters of the specific Section invoked; tenant cannot widen defence by invoking other Sections. The Court applied this principle to hold that leave to defend in a Section 14-D proceeding is narrowly confined to the matters relevant to Section 14-D (e.g., widowhood and need for premises).
V. Rajeshwari v. Bombay Tyres International Limited, Civil Appeal No. 3006 of 1990 (decided 18 Jan 1994) In cases under Section 14-D, the tenant has practically no defence; the landlady must establish widowhood and that premises are required by her for residence. The Court treated this decision as supporting the narrow scope of tenant defences under Section 14-D and held that the respondent had to prove widowhood and need, which she had done.
Anand Swaroop Vohra v. Bhir San Bahri, J.T. 1994 (4) S.C. 412 Application under Section 14-D is maintainable even where the landlord/landlady has some accommodation available if that accommodation is insufficient for need. The Court relied on this authority to accept that availability of some accommodation on the part of the landlady does not defeat an application under Section 14-D if it is insufficient for her needs.
Helper Girdharibhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, 1987 S.C.I. 782 Principles governing exercise of revisional power: correct principles of law must be applied, facts properly appreciated, decision must not be one no reasonable man could make, and revision should not substitute one view for another where two reasonable views exist. The Court applied these limitations to its own revisional jurisdiction and concluded that the Additional Rent Controller's order was a possible view taken on facts and law and did not warrant interference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a fact-and-law driven analysis, applying precedent and the statutory text of Section 14-D and related provisions:

  1. Attornment and evidence of recognition as landlord: The Court observed it was an admitted fact that the petitioner had been paying rent to Smt. Sarla Chawla after the death of her husband; the record contained counter-foils of rent receipts showing that in later receipts rent was paid in respect of the property of Smt. Sarla Chawla. The Court treated this attornment as creating the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the petitioner for purposes of the Act (applying the reasoning in Kanta Goel and Sri Ram Pasricha).
  2. Registered Will: The Court noted that late Shri R.N. Chawla had executed a registered will in 1978 bequeathing the entire property to the respondent; by virtue of this Will the respondent also became sole owner/landlady. The Court relied on this as an alternate basis for the respondent’s ownership.
  3. Scope of Section 14-D and special categories: The Court examined Section 14-D and concluded it requires a landlady to show she is a widow, that the premises were let out by her or her deceased husband, and that the premises are required by her for residence. The Court found these statutory requirements satisfied on the admitted facts (respondent a widow, premises let by late husband, attornment/Will establishing her status).
  4. Co-owner/impleading objection: The Court relied on Supreme Court authority (Sri Ram Pasricha, Kanta Goel, Pal Singh) to hold that one co-owner or a person who has become recognised as landlord can sue for eviction without impleading other co-owners; non-impleading of other heirs did not bar the Section 14-D petition where the respondent had been recognised/attorned to as landlord or had title by Will.
  5. Genuineness of need and concealment allegation: The petitioner’s claim that the respondent concealed first-floor accommodation was rejected after reference to the site plan on the record: the first floor consisted of only one room set, occupied by another tenant since 1986, and thus was not available to satisfy the respondent’s need. The Court also accepted the respondent’s explanation of need arising from age and requirement for compact ground-floor accommodation for herself and family.
  6. Limited scope to obtain leave to defend: Citing Surjit Singh Kalra and V. Rajeshwari, the Court emphasised the narrow scope of tenant defences against petitions under Sections 14-A to 14-D: a tenant can only contest on matters relevant to the specific section invoked; in Section 14-D cases the tenant’s defence is practically limited and must address widowhood and bona fide need. Precision Steel was distinguished as relating to Section 14(1)(e) and not applicable to Section 14-D cases.
  7. Timing and late allegations: The Court found the new allegation about negotiations with a builder raised only after filing the revision and noted the respondent denied the genuineness of the submitted letter; further, statutory safeguards (sub-Section 2 of Section 19) provide remedies if the landlady fails to occupy personally within specified periods.
  8. Revisionary jurisdiction constraints: The Court reiterated the narrow scope of revisional interference (Helper Girdharibhai and Fibre Bond), concluding that the impugned order was a reasonably possible view, well-reasoned and did not exhibit perversity or illegality warranting interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed. The eviction order dated 7 October 1994 passed by the Additional Rent Controller (dismissing the petitioner’s application for leave to defend and ordering eviction) was upheld. Costs were awarded and counsel fee assessed at Rs. 2,000. The petitioner was granted an additional two months from the date of the judgment to vacate the premises.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The eviction order stands; the petitioner must vacate the premises within the additional two-month period granted by the Court and pay the assessed costs.
  • Statutory and precedential effect: The decision applies established Supreme Court principles on attornment, the limited scope of tenant defences under Sections 14-A to 14-D, and the constraints on revisional interference; the Court did not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts before it.
Appeal dismissed.

    S.K Puri v. Smt. Sarla Chawla .

    Mr. P.K Jain, J.— The petitioner Shri S.K Puri was inducted as a tenant in respect of two bed rooms alongwith one bath room, a kitchen and an adjoining toilet with some open space in the rear portion of property No. E-2/14. Model Town, Delhi by late Shri R.N Chawla. The tenancy was for residential purposes. Shri R.N Chawla died on 2nd August 1989. In April 1993 the respondent Smt. Sarla Chawla filed a petition under Section 14-D read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘the Act’) for eviction of the petitoner stating therein that on the death of her husband, she had become the owner-landlady of the premises in question, that the premises were required by her for occupation as a residence for herself and for the members of her family consisting of her son, daughter-in-law and her two grand children, and that neither she nor her son had any reasonable suitable accommodation in Delhi. It was further pleaded that she was about 71 years of age and required constant care and company of her son, daughter-in-law and grand children. It was also pleaded that her married daughter is living in East of Kailash and frequently visits her with her husband and two children and sometimes they stay with her for spending their week-ends and on festive occasions. It was explained that the accommodation in her possession was grossly insufficient for her residence and to meet the requirements of the members of her family, the need of whom is growing day by day with the growing up of her grand children.

    2. On the service of the requiste notice, the petitioner filed an application for leave to defend before the learned Additional Rent Controller. It was stated by him that the petition under Section 14-D read with Section 25-B of the Act was not maintainable inasmuch as Smt. Sarla Chawla was already in occupation of an independent, sufficient and reasonably suitable accommodation in that property and the eviction petition for additional accommodation was not maintainable under Section 14-D of the Act. It was further pleaded that Shri R.N Chawla was the landlord and on his death, his three legal heirs, namely, Smt. Sarla Chawla (the widow), Rajiv Chawla (the son) and Smt. Kalyani Mehra (the daughter) became joint owners/landlords of the property and as such the provisions of Section 14-D were not attracted and Smt. Sarla Chawla alone could not file the petition under the said provision. It was also stated that Smt. Sarla Chawla was receiving the rent after the death of her husband for herself and on behalf of other legal representatives of her decceased husband as it was convenient for all the legal heirs that the rent be received by one of them and as such Smt. Sarla Chawla was not the sole, exclusive and absolute owner of the property and as such could not apply under Section 14-D of the Act. It was further pleaded that the petition was bad for non-joinder of legal heirs of deceased R.N Chawla, that the petitioner had not disclosed the entire accommodation in her possession in the petition since she was also in possession of one room and one covered shed on the first floor of the property and that the petitioner had not filed any authenticated site plan.

    3. In her counter-affidavit Smt. Sarla Chawla controverted all the pleas raised by the petitioner and explained that after the death of her husband, Shri S.K Puri had attorned to her and had been paying the rent to her. She filed certain counter-foils of the rent receipts in support of the said plea. She also explained that even otherwise her late husband Shri R.N Chawla had executed a Will dated 24th April, 1978, duly registered whereby he had bequeathed the entire property in question in her favour and as such on the death of Shri R.N Chawla, she had become the sole owner of this property. She further explained that the accommodation on the first floor was in possession of another tenant Shri Samuel Filix since the year 1976. She also explained that she required the ground floor premises on account of her old age and also so as to have compact accommodation on the ground floor which would be self contained and sufficient for her needs.

    4. The learned Additional Rent Controller, after hearing the Counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the record, dismissed the application of the petitioner for leave to defend and consequently passed an order of eviction dated 7th October, 1994 which is being assailed by way of this revision petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Act.

    5. Mr. Chandhiok, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the provisions of Section 14-D together with Sections 14-A, 14-B and 14-E have carved out a special category of landlords and the ordinary procedure has been departed from, and that in order to avail the benefit of the special category, the respondent must prove that the case strictly falls within the four corners of the special provisions of Section 14-D. It has been stressed that Shri. R.N Chawla was the owner/landlord who has let out the premises in question to the petitioner and on his death, he has been succeeded by his widow, the respondent herein, his son and a daughter. It is argued that in these circumstances, the provisions of Section 14-D cannot be invoked nor the present petition was maintainable without impleading the remaining two legal heirs i.e the son and the daugher of late Shri R.N Chawla. The learned Counsel has placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court rendered in Nanala Girdharilal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala, 1973 AIR Gujarat 131.

    6. On the other hand, Mr. Adarsh Dial, the lesarned Counsel for the respondent, has argued that on the death of Shri R.N Chawla, the petitioner had attorned to the respondent and thus the respondent became the landlady qua the petitioner, and even otherwise late Shri R.N Chawla had executed a registered Will whereby the entire property was bequeathed upon the respondent and as such she became the sole owner/landlady of the premises. It has been pointed out that the present case is fully covered by three judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in Sri Rant Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 : AIR 1976 S.C 2335, Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 : AIR 1977 S.C 1599 and Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh (dead) by LRs, J.T 1989 (1) S.C 67. Reliance has also been placed by the learned Counsel upon a Full Bench judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Harbans Singh v. Smt. Margrat G. Bhingardive, 1990 (1) RCR 680 and a judgment of this Court rendered in Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Chand Rani, 1993 (1) RCR 492.

    7. In Kanta Goel's (supra) case, after reproducing the definition of the terms landlord and tenant as contained in the Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe as under:

    “Read in the context of the Rent Control law, the simple sense of the situation is that there should be a building which is let. There must be a land-lord who collects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he recognizes as landlord. The complications of estoppel or even the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not necessarily or inflexibly be imported into the proceedings under the rent control law, tried by special Tribunals under a special statute. In this case, rent was being paid to the late Dass who let out to the appellant, on the death of the former, the rent was being paid to the 1st respondent who signed the receipts in his name and added that it was on behalf of the estate of the deceased Dass. At a later stage the rent was being paid to and the receipts issued by the 1st respondent in his own name. Not that the little change made in the later receipts makes much of a difference, but the fact remains that the tenant in this case had been paying the rent to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the latter fell within the definition of landlord, for the purposes of the Act.”

    8. Similarly in Sri Ram Pasricha (supra). It was pointed out by their Lordhsips that the relation between the parties being that of landlord and tenant, only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-impleading of other co-owners as such. Both the aforesaid judgments were affirmed by their Lordships in Pal Singh's case.

    9. Turning to the case in hand, it is the admittec case of the parties that Shri R.N Chawla was the owner/landlord of the premises and he had let out the premises in question to the petitioner. It is also an admitted fact that after the death of Shri R.N Chawla, the petitioner-tenant had been paying rent to Smt. Sarla Chawla, the respondent herein, which fact is fully borne out by the copies of the various counter-foils of the rent receipts placed on the record. It is correct that in October 1992 the counterfoil recites that the rent was being recovered in respect of the property of Shri R.N Chawla, but in all the subsequent receipts it is categorically mentioned that the rent was being paid on account of the property of Smt. Sarla Chawla. Thus the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties came into existence by attornment. Even other wise late Shri R.N Chawla had executed a registered will during his life time bequeathing this property in favour of the present respondent. This Will had been executed and got registered long before his death by the testator. By virtue of this Will also the respondent became the sole owner/landlady of the premises in question.

    10. Even otherwise as per the law laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that one co-owner can sue for eviction under spcial categories of the landlords as contained in Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D of the Act. In Sri Ram Pasricha (supra), Their Lordships had categorically held that a co-owner is as much a owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is, and he can seek eviction of his tenant without impleading the other co-owners. The Full Bench judgment of the Gujarat Hilgh Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was noticed and explained in this case by their Lordships.

    11. From a bare reading of Section 14-D of the Act, it is evident that a landlady is required to show that she is a widow, that the premises were let out either by her or by her deceased husband, and that the tenanted premises are required by her for her own residence. In the case in hand, it is not disputed that the respondent is a widow. It is also an admitted fact that the premises in question were let out to the petitioner by her late husband Shri R.N Chawla. As stated above, the petitioner had attorned to the respondent and as such she became the landlady qua the petitioner and as such has the locus to apply for eviction under Section 14-D of the Act.

    12. Then the learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the need of the respondent in respect on the tenanted premises is not a bonafide one and as such the Additional Rent Controller ought to have granted leave to defend. It is further argued that the respondent is in occupation of a room and a shed on the first floor which fact has been concealed by the respondent and as such there was sufficient material for granting leave to defend to the petitioner. The learned Counsel has also placed on record a copy of the letter dated 8th November, 1994 purported to have written by A.G Promoters to the respondents regarding some alleged collaboration agreement which was being negotiated between them. Thus it is contended that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Precision Steel, and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, 1982 S.C 1158, leave to defend ought to have been granted to the petitioner.

    13. It may be stated that the scope for the grant of leave to defend in cases covered by the special categories created by Sections 14-A to 14-D of the Act is quite limited. In S. Suriit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, J.T 1991 (1) S.C 417. Their Lordships observed as under:—

    “Likewise if the applications are under Sections 14-C to 14-D, the summons should state accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub-Section (5), of Section 25-B. Under Sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the lanlord depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C or 14-D or under Section 14(1)(e). The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under Section 14(1)(e) as against an application under Section 14-B. There cannot be any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our jurisprudence.”

    A little further their Lordships categorically held as under:—

    “Needless to state, therefore, if an application is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective Sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).

    14. Similarly in a recent judgment rendered in V. Rajeshwari v. Bombay Tyres International Limited. Civil Appeal No. 3006 of 1990 decided on 18th January 1994, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with a prayer under Section 14-D of the Act, clearly held that the tenant had practically no defence whatsoever and all that had to be proved under the said Section are that the landlady is a widow and that the premises are required by her for her own residence. The judgment in Precision Steel & Engineering Works (supra) being relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner relates to a case filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the scope of which is quite different as pointed out by their Lordships in Surjit Singh Kalra's case (supra).

    15. It is not disputed that the respondent is resideing alongwith her son, her daughter-in-law and two grand children. It is also evident that respondent has a married daughter who is residing alongwith her husband and children in East of Kailash, New Delhi and her said daughter alongwith family members frequently visits the respondent and they do stay with the respondent some times for spending their week-ends and on festive occasions. It may be clarified that the respondent is admittedly a lady of about 70 years of age and she requires the constant care & company and presence of her son, daughter-in-law and the grand children. The premises in dispute are required by the respondent on the ground that the premises in her occupation are not sufficient and suitable for her residence and the residence of her said family members. It may be mentioned that the need of the premises for the son, daughter-in-law and their children is actually the need of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances discussed above. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anand Swaroop Vohra v. Bhir San Bahri, J.T 1994 (4) S.C 412, an application for eviction under Section 14-D is maintainable even where the landlord/landlady had some accommodation available but the same is insufficient for his or her need.

    16. As regards the contention regarding the alleged concealment, the same does not appear to be sustainable in view of the site plan placed on the record. The first floor consists of only one room set and the same is in occupation of a tenant since the year 1986. There is no such accommodation on the first floor which might be available to the respondent landlady to satisfy her need in any manner.

    17. It may be stated that the scope of the powers of this Court in revision proceedings is limited and restricted. In Helper Girdharibhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, 1987 S.C.I 782 the scope for exercising the revisional power by the High Court has been laid down as such. “In exercising revisional power under Sec. 29(2) the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower Court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. But, in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view in place of that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant.” Even in Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) it was clarified by a Single Bench of this Court that under revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the Act, this Court cannot act as an appellate Court to scrutnise the findings of facts, which are supported by reasons, which have not been shown on the face of the record to be erroneous or vitiated by any infirmity or perversity.

    18. In the present case the impugned order is well reasoned and well considered on facts and in law, and the same is free from any infirmity or illegality. It not require any interference in revision.

    19. Before parting I may deal with another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the patitioner to the effect that the respondent does not require the premises for herself but is negotiating for a collaboration agreement with a builder either to transfer the property or to construct multistoreyed flats. This plea has been taken after the filing of the present revision petition. Even otherwise the provisions of sub-Section 2 of Section 19 are adequate deterrent for the lanclady against her not putting the premises to personal use which is the ground in the petition under Section 14-D, as in the event of her failure to occupy the premises within two months of getting vacant possession, or having occupied. If at any time within three years, from the date of obtaining possession, she re-lets to any other person then it would be open to the petitioner-tenant to apply to the Controller for restoration of possession and the Controller on being satisfied as alleged, can order for restoration of possession or payment of such compensation to the evicted tenant as deemed fit. In the face of these provisions the mere allegation being sought to be raised after the filing of the present revision by filing a copy of the alleged letter, genuineness and correctness of which is denied by the learned Counsel for the respondent, cannot stand in the way of the respondent from getting an eviction order under Section 14-D of the Act.

    20. As a result, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee is assessed at Rs. 2000/-.

    21. The petitioner was granted two months time to vacate the premises when the impugned order was passed and that time is expiring today. In equity, I grant further period of two months to the petitioner from today to handover the vacant possession of the premises to the respondent.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    S.K Puri v. Smt. Sarla Chawla .
    (Dec 6, 1994)